Terrorists Dream of the Islamic State: Geostrategic Ideology of AQIM

*Before you read this, I encourage you to brief the first section of this series discussing the emerging "forking strategy" of terrorists in the region; how they move, plan, and organize. Here, I focus particularly on the heightened operational tactics of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to strenghten my analysis on the connecting ideological strands of AQCL affiliates, Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement (ASMM) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Introduction: AQIM Ideology

I first promised to publish this second part only days after the initial post, but found the research I was conducting to be so facinating while attempting to, at least to some degree, put the pieces together that I continued to read more deeply. Today is an opportune time to finally share some of my thoughts and analysis: Yesterday AQIM, reported by Evan Kohlmann at IntelTweet, released their Spanish hostage, Althea Gamit whose kidnapping was confirmed in an official statement made by Andalusia Institute for Media Production in 2009.

AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, whose operations focus on Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Nigeria, has seemingly showcased their heightened operational methods, at least concerning this recent kidnapping case. Previously, captured tourists have been used for ransom - perhaps to drive their drug trafficking. Further evidence: "GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. The ransom paid for their release is unknown but estimated to be from $5 million to as much as $10 million; the group may have used these funds to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment."

In contrast, Gamit's release is ideologically based, not logistically-centered in criminal/terrorist respects: Gamit was forced to convert to Islam as a fulfillment of their "agreed" terms.

Ideology --> Tactics

But I will be wrong, I think, to not connect the ideologically-driven method to the logistical goal: The terrorist group is positioning it's prowess in the region to support what they believe is the necessary return to the Islamic State, dar al-Islam, the pure reign of the Prophet Mohammad. In this way, the mandate to follow and obey religious governance dictates cultural practices and customs as well as fosters the growth of avenues for economic prosperity and political influence (which, AQIM continues to prove, will be pursued and gained vis-a-vis violence).

Such activity is clearly evident of an offensive jihad campaign, and perhaps one can argue a strategy including offensive daw'a. The actions spotlight a sense of mission itself that is thought to be the anecdote to the conventional Western pursuit of progress, which is thought be rooted in injustice, oppression, self-interest, exploitation, and usurpation: The leaders are driven by the burning desire that returning to the Islamic State is arriving. Islam, to AQIM and other affiliates like ASMM that I covered in Part I, is the answer, and all means of offensive tactics - mostly violence - will be used to pave their arrival to supremacy.

I will discuss in more depth in one of my follow-up posts an historical analysis of the four Caliphs (Caliphate) in order to provide further perspective on how AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP may understand themselves in relation to the Prophet. For now, in short, let me name the offensive procedure by which such terrorist groups, especially AQIM as witnessed by their "release" of Gamit, will continue to structure jihad to ensure a returning to economic, political, and religious purity. During the expansion of the Caliphates, Islam was spread in part through military conquests that rested on three ("just") principles when engaging the non-believer:

1. Offering to surrender and convert to Islam, as it means to surrender to the will of Allah;
2. If not, then opposing party(ies) pay tax, jizya, and in return granted dhimma (protection) by Muslim rulers for recognizing Islam's superiority;
3. Lastly, if not still, then party(ies) defeated by offensive force as result of choice not to comply; thus subjecting all persons to death or rule (if survived) and institution of the holistic governing framework .

AQIM and AQCL affiliates, in general, do not follow this procedure in a lock-step process. In fact, they quickly skip to the end. Gamit's situation is uncommon, but important to understand in the larger AQ movement as I will elaborate below. Before I present methods of expansion, please bear with me on two important points concerning the above procedure:

a) There is need to recognize the argument deconstructing the historical meaning of such principles, highlighting that a non-believer, in traditional terms, means only one who believes in no Deity; whereas, Christian and Jew are "brothers" in the monotheistic faith, known as Ahl al-dhimma. The traditional term used here, brother, is not equal to the meaning of the word, akh, akhoya. Cesari's argument, which I described in short in Part I of this series, is important here in explaining AQIM's (and ASMM, AQAP) ideologically-driven tactics because of the tension between terrorism and modernity - the struggle between "returning" and progressing.

b) I always argue, and try to consistently make it clear, that AQCL and AQ affiliates define meaning based on their own narrow interpretation of Islam; therefore, it is understandable that they target all who fall outside of this narrow framework. Non-believer, in this sense, is not similar in meaning to an historical and theological understanding embraced by true, peaceful Muslims. (This may seem a vague explanation, but it rests on takfir: It is my small attempt to define AQ as outside Islam, and this could help Roberts' argument that AQ is an "outsurgency").

Tactics --> Environment(s)

Accordingly, not only groups like Christians and Jews fall outside of their framework as non-believers, but so too Muslims and others alike. So, the operational environment is not entirely defined by geographic latitudes and longitudes but by an ideological vision. Captain Russell J. Isaacs informs us in his work, The North African Franchise: AQIM’s Threat to U.S. Security - Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 (December 2009) - that the historical development of AQIM is a security threat to US facilities and personnel in Europe, Iraq, and Afghanistan as well as to Europe itself (I provide excerpts here):

• Today, AQIM operates a widespread and coordinated structure across Europe. While the majority of their attacks and operations occur inside Algeria, AQIM maintains a widespread network of financial support and direct action cells outside the country. Terrorism analysts estimate that several dozen cells exist across Europe, primarily in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom.
• A major task of AQIM cells in Europe is the financial support of the group’s operations worldwide. AQIM’s primary means of finance are car theft, credit card fraud, document forgery and the active seeking of donations. AQIM is extremely successful collecting donations in Europe...
• Another focus of AQIM cells in Europe is recruiting Algerian immigrants to fight. French authorities assert that several AQIM cells within France are actively recruiting volunteers for...jihad. Moreover, Spanish media outlets reported in April 2007 that AQIM supporters were collecting funds and recruiting volunteers for terrorist training in the mountains of Algeria. A final focus of AQIM in Europe is the planning and execution of attacks against European targets. AQIM does not hide its intention to carry out attacks against European targets. In February 2005, for example, Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri urged AQIM to be a “bone in the throat of American and French crusaders.

The vision is tied, I think, to OBL's messages (regardless of his actual involvement and/or approval; he mostly issues statements to maintain his own image as the Serpent Head), but more importantly to, for example, Saed Elshari, AQ's number two in the Arabian Peninsula;

"I swear to God, we will open up for them doors of hell on the ground, which will be the key to our victory, where we will cut the tails of the crusaders; destroy the dreams of crusade and ruin the desires of the Jews in the region."

Also, we can consider Gadahn's latest message, which seeks to recruit American-Muslims to act as Hasan did against Western "crusaders;"

"We must erode our cowardly enemy’s will to fight by killing and capturing leading Crusaders and Zionists in government, industry and media who talk the talk but don’t walk the walk and are only interested in prosecuting their profitable wars as long as it’s other people who are in the line of fire and not them...And finally, we mustn’t allow our lawless enemies to provoke us with their evil, sadistic and murderous crimes into crossing the boundaries laid down by Allah and His Prophet or doing anything which may have negative repercussions on the image of the Jihad and reputation of the Mujahideen."

The connection highlights that the regional tactics of AQIM may differ, in degree and manner, to AQAP and ASMM, but the vision is interwoven; it is a singular ideology that is global although environmentally dispersed. We may have cause to apply a rule to AQ regional operations: As I have stated, ideology --> tactics --> environment(s). But this still leaves the odd situation of Gamit: Why did they force him to convert? All AQCL affiliates focus predominantly on violent campaigns which they consider to be defensive, but AQAP and ASMM have not used convergence tactics before (to my knowledge). It is documented as early as 2002 that AQCL under OBL has, having stated in, A Letter to the American People:

(1) The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam.

(a) The religion of the Unification of God; of freedom from associating partners with Him, and rejection of this; of complete love of Him, the Exalted; of complete submission to His Laws; and of the discarding of all the opinions, orders, theories and religions which contradict with the religion He sent down to His Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Islam is the religion of all the prophets, and makes no distinction between them - peace be upon them all.

It is to this religion that we call you; the seal of all the previous religions. It is the religion of Unification of God, sincerity, the best of manners, righteousness, mercy, honour, purity, and piety. It is the religion of showing kindness to others, establishing justice between them, granting them their rights, and defending the oppressed and the persecuted. It is the religion of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil with the hand, tongue and heart. It is the religion of Jihad in the way of Allah so that Allah's Word and religion reign Supreme. And it is the religion of unity and agreement on the obedience to Allah, and total equality between all people, without regarding their colour, sex, or language.

(b) It is the religion whose book - the Quran - will remained preserved and unchanged, after the other Divine books and messages have been changed. The Quran is the miracle until the Day of Judgment. Allah has challenged anyone to bring a book like the Quran or even ten verses like it."

It is obvious this "offering" came after September 11, 2001. So, once again, the lock-step process was not followed but still serves as a framework for justification.

Counter Operations

In short, the US and its allies, I think, do not yet have a comprehensive counter narrative that seeks to erase AQ legitimacy in terms of ideology. Gamit's conversion to Islam, which I would hold is not actually a conversion to Islam but only a recognition of AQIM's narrow definition and interpretation of the meaning of their version in alignment with AQCL's version, provides another opportune time for the US to define and articulate in a clear, concise, and consistent way a counter-narrative that targets AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP leaders. Such an employed tactic, Information Operations, would aid both foreign diplomacy that deeply and rightly involves legitimate Muslim nations and actionable intelligence missions to dismantle AQ logistical tactics in expanding AQ operational environments.

I propose here, as I have promoted before, a targeting strategy focusing on middle-tier personalities: They provide not only training but ingrain identity of both individual persons and collective groups in alignment with ideology throughout an entity. I think HUMINT can be done throughout Europe, but we can follow the money trailing their drug trafficking and financing avenues.

Please share your insights, as we all need to work together to procure our freedoms home and abroad and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ.

AQAP’s Expert Bombmaker: Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri

Abdullah Hassan al Asiri, perpetrator of the failed 27 Aug 09 suicide attack against Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef and brother of Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri, assessed to be a top AQAP explosives expert and bombmaker.

As the US continues to develop a more in-depth intelligence picture of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), I wanted to provide some background on a potential high-value target who I believe serves as a key node in AQAP’s suicide bomber network. Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri is a Saudi citizen currently assessed to be living and operating in Yemen. While his name is far from commonplace among most CT experts, he is someone we definitely should have been tracking based on his assessed involvement in AQAP’s two most recent high-profile suicide attacks. I assess that Ibrahim al Asiri serves as one of AQAP’s explosives experts and bombmakers – a critical position which requires a relatively high level of technical knowledge and experience. Most terrorist networks have few individuals with the necessary skills to fill this important role, making their kill/capture very valuable in terms of degrading the network’s capability.

Ibrahim al Asiri first drew attention after being named as the #1 target on Saudi Arabia’s “Most Wanted List,” which was released to the public in February 2009 [see an English translation of the list from the Saudi Embassy here]. Some online versions of the list that I was able to find also specifically list Ibrahim al Asiri as an “explosives expert.”

While his appearance on the Saudi list is important, things really start to get interesting when you take a look at the individual listed as #40 on the same list – Abdullah Hassan Tali al Asiri. As Christopher Boucek mentions in his recent article in the CTC Sentinel, Ibrahim al Asiri (#1) is assessed to be the brother of Abdullah al Asiri (#40). This relationship is confirmed in an article from the Saudi Gazette, which provides a profile of the entire family and explains how Abdullah (the younger brother) was recruited into AQAP by his older brother, Ibrahim.

If the name Abdullah Hassan al Asiri sounds familiar to you, it should. He was the perpetrator of the failed suicide attack against Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (the lead Saudi CT official) back on 27 Aug 09. Prior to this attack, Abdullah made contact with Prince Muhammad and claimed he wanted to turn himself in to Saudi authorities. Prince Muhammad agreed to meet him in person and during their meeting Abdullah detonated a PETN-based explosive device which was hidden in his underwear (which of course bears a striking resemblance to the TTP employed by Umar Farouq Abd al Mutallab during his failed midair attack over Detroit). Abdullah al Asiri was killed in the explosion, but Prince Muhammad bin Nayef was not harmed. Several weeks later, in fact, the prince met with top Obama CT officials to warn them of the growing threat from AQAP and provide details about the “underwear suicide bomb” TTP.

As we further unravel the key players involved in both attacks (the 27 Aug attack and the 25 Dec attack) and the methods employed, an article from Newsweek highlights a critical piece of information. The article quotes an unnamed US intelligence official who explains that, “U.S. officials now suspect that Nayef's attempted assassin and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian suspect aboard the Northwest flight, had the same bomb maker in Yemen.” Several pieces of evidence support this conclusion: 1) As Peter Bergen explained in an article at CNN, the explosives used (PETN-based) were virtually identical in both attacks; 2) The method of concealment (explosives hidden in the bomber’s underwear) was identical in both attacks; and 3) we know that the same group (AQAP) directed, planned, and resourced both attacks.

So, who is the most likely individual that played the critical role of bombmaker? I believe with high confidence that Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri fits the bill. Additionally, I believe that he has likely constructed similar devices (or even improved versions) for use in future attacks that AQAP is planning against Western targets in the US, Europe, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Ibrahim al Asiri should become a top priority for US intelligence collection and targeting. His movements and communications will likely indicate the timing, target, and possibly attacker of any future attacks conducted by AQAP.

As multiple news sources have reported recently, the Obama administration has publicly warned of the impending threats against the US homeland (and other Western targets) being planned by AQAP [see articles from the NY Times, the Critical Threats Project, and STRATFOR for the best coverage of these threats]. While it’s clearly important to focus on targeting the AQAP top-tier leadership (Nasir al Wuhayshi and Said Ali al Shihri) and the recruitment/facilitation network being run by Anwar al Awlaki, I think the most effective way to disrupt impending attacks and prevent future attacks is to target the key node within the AQAP network who is absolutely necessary to provide the explosive device. I would venture to guess that as Umar Farouq Abd al Mutallab continues to provide intelligence to the FBI during ongoing interrogations, he is highlighting Ibrahim al Asiri as the individual who constructed the device he used during his failed 25 Dec attack. US intelligence and CT officials should immediately make Ibrahim al Asiri a high-priority target for collection and eventual targeting. This is our best way to stop the multiple attacks currently being plotted by AQAP.

Terrorists Dream About The Islamic State: Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, & Beyond

*This is the first section of a two-part post, the second of which I plan to publish later today. Here, I focus my efforts on identifying the expansion of terrorist operational environments as represented in the relationship between the Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement and al-Qaeda's morphing strategy.

Yes, terrorists groups dream about establishing an Islamic State; for it is not only a fantasy but a mission they seek to achieve through endless jihad, The Long War. If the US and its allies understand clearly how terrorists groups like Al Shabaab understand themselves as a part of the self-perceived "infidel" conflict, then there is valid reason to think that analyts and professionals can accurately project their strategic intentions and operational objectives.

Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal reported that the Ras Kamboni Camp (Raas Kaambooni), led by Hassan Turki, of Hizbul Islam was absorbed by Al Shabaab . (It comes as no surprise that the information was reported in Sweden from Al Qimmah Forum, as financier Ali Yassin Mohamed reportedly resided in Stockholm. See how the country is experiencing a "little Mogadishu"). The announcement declared two things; that,
(a) Al Shabaab is a part of the international jihad led the the network of Al Qaeda [and]
(b) The Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement and the mujahideen of Ras Kamboni Camp today merged under one name: Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement (ASMM).

The two organizations have been fighting one another throughout the ending months of 2009 over the control of the Port of Kismayo in southern Somalia. The successful merger now splits Hizbul Islam, leaving three remaining original members to fight for themselves;
(1) Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS);
(2) Jabhadda Islamiya Somalia, a.k.a. Islamic Front of Somalia (JIS);
(3) Mu'askar Anole;
all of who are connected to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which I mentioned in my analysis on the US/UN Operation Restore Hope.

With a blended unification of ideology, the overarching goal is two-fold: To rid the region of "enemies of their religion," who ASMM believes to be both Ethiopian forces aided by the US, and institute an Islamic State in Somalia. Moreover, it identifies their forthcoming ability to join operational tactics and expand operational environments, both within Somalia and transnationally vis-a-vis supporting campaigns with, for, and by AQCL. Of great concern also is the newly-formed organization's prospective capacity to manipulate regional resources, such as Uganda’s oil reserves or Lake Victoria near-by, and/or utilize geographical avenues for trafficking activities as they have done in the Gulf of Aden.

Despite the internal conflicts between Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam historically, their recent formation testifies to the dangerous, morphing method of expansion by AQ-affiliated terrorist groups in the region. A recent RAND report entitled, "Radical Islam in East Africa 2009," acknowledges this growing trend and the emerging implications, stating;
"East Africa has been a sanctuary and base for Islamist terrorist operations since the early 1990's and remains a priority area in al-Qaeda's global strategy...Although al-Qaeda represents the primary terrorist threat to US interests in East Africa, it is only one component of a much larger universe of radical Islamist groups and organizations in the region. There are numerous indigenous radical Islamist groups in East Africa with varying degrees of affinity to al-Qaeda's agenda. In addition, missionary groups...are actively propagating a radical, fundamentalist, Salafi interpretation of Islam that, while not necessarily violent, function as gateways to terrorism...The weakness of African governments and the internal fighting and corruption of these regimes facilitate the ability of terrorists to move, plan, and organize."

The larger picture sets ASMM and AQAP as singular but interconnecting movements across the chessboard, the entire AQCL operational environment. Each entity of the bigger organization is morphing into con-joining units like a serpent tongue: The main portion belongs to the snake but the ends are separated like a fork. As I stated on 15 January, a "fork" is a chess tactic using one piece to attack two or more pieces. It is a critical to AQ's forked tactical ability - how they "move, plan, and organize" - to expand rapidly. Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam's merger showcase AQ's ability to spread eastward toward AQAP in Yemen and westward toward AQIM in North Africa, as these geographic locations are key to the "exchange."

It is a strategic necessity for the US to take aim at middle-tier personalities [while they exist] in order to disrupt and dismantle affiliate operations. History's lesson of the mujahideen throughout Africa and the Arabian Peninsula offers some intriguing evidence of what "dream-like" expansion seems to be on the horizon in terms of the jihadi operational environment.

Crossroads: Jihadi Infiltration in the US

*Disclaimer: The information provided for readers in this posting does not serve as either my personal or professional advocation for the work and/or the views expressed by the authors and/or participants in association with the work undertaken. It is provided objectively as a resource for exploring information and perspectives in order to arrive at the truth. Furthermore, those that mistake my concluding points as arguments against the Muslim community are wrong; I simply intend to focus my analysis on the threat of jihadi persons and groups within US communities and agencies, not the Muslim Ummah and their social, cultural, political, and religious beliefs, traditions, customs, and structures.

My colleague, JD, analyzed the use of "Counter Narratives" for the establishment of federal-level engagement teams under the direction of the Department of State. Given the need for coalition building between (a) federal law enforcement and policy agencies and (b) Arab and Muslim leaders and citizens, narratives can constructively undertake information warfare.

As I discussed last Friday, it is becoming ever more clear that Al Qaeda's Phase IV Strategy incorporates attacks on US economic and legal frameworks as well as emerging US-domestic operational environments. This is being witnessed internationally, too, as the Taliban, AQAP, and Al Shabaab step-up their transnational terrorism efforts in alignment with AQCL ideology. It is in our national security interest - and the interest of the world - to prevent AQ from establishing safe havens in poor socio-economic regions; as we must protect peoples from their false promises. (See more insight on Economics and Terrorism from Abu Muqawama at CNS)

Combating jihadi propaganda through counter-narratives promises to (a) drive down AQ popularity by (b) crystallizing ethnic differences and (c) promoting collaboration to further a unified message-scheme. It will, as David Bellavia writes in his post entitled, "The Backbone of Islam," "...unmask al Qaeda" for what it really is.
The question remains, however, whether information warfare can unravel what Bill Whittle argues to be "Islamic Infiltration" in his latest report. See Part Two here.

The FBI is no stranger to moles; just ask about Robert Hanssen who sold millions of dollars worth of intelligence to Soviet spies. His trecherous activies cost lives as well as billions of dollars. Then-FBI Director, Louis J. Freeh, stated in a 20 February 2001 Press Release, "This kind of criminal conduct represents the most traitorous action imaginable against a country governed by the Rule of Law."

The crossroads of US and Islamic Rule of Law and Shar'iah's interwoven elements (i.e. "Shar'iah-Compliment Finance" discussed in the link provided) is exactly what Whittle's report brings into question, and that which Frank Gaffney of the Center For Security Policy has been covering for years.


The former Department of Defense analyst quoted in Whittle's video states;
"...[O]ver a long period of time I ended up collecting a large body of Islamic law, an enormous amount of it available in English, and realized that if Islamic law is the criteria by which you measure legitimacy or illegitimacy you can’t show that the moderates have a doctrinal basis for the position they hold, and you can’t show that on the statement of the law the radicals are wrong."
As a result, the unidentified analyst argues, "...the whole [US] national security apparatus...moved from a factual, legal basis to one that supports the narratives." The juxtaposed narratives of righteous Muslims and jihadi extremists need to be understood and clarified to arrive at what is virtuous and true. This is exactly what I think JD attempted to analyze and provide a strategic framework for in order to secure US social, cultural, and political prosperity.

We ought to worry about the infiltration of jihadi ideology throughout US demographics as much as operatives within US federal agency ranks. It is the task of security professionals to divide and conquer moles; it is a separate but just as integral task of citizens to identify and report on questionable activity. This is precisely the reason why the Intelligence Community should find it in their best interest to integrate a realistic system for identifying the religious and social behaviors of radical jihadists. Civic engagament teams can help strike a balance between encouraging what is safe and identifying what is harmful, that which decays and that which prospers. Policy debates ought to surround the questions, "What is the balance of allowing and encouraging diversity of thought and practice while disrupting and dismantling jihadi propaganda?"


Increasing social and cultural awareness requires a thorough analysis of what we have been witnessing for some years now in England, France and Germany, who are experiencing emerging AQ threats as well as tensions between regional/national heritage and customs of the Muslim Ummah and Shar'iah Law. Analysts and professionals alike are bound to become more frustrated in differentiating between righteous customs and jihadi customs if we fail to deciphere between efforts of propaganda and democratic prosperity. Such work can, as I said, (a) crystallize ethnic differences and (b) promote collaboration.

In one of my upcoming posts, I will elaborate on the FBI's Community Outreach Program in order to assess how JD's engagement teams can strategically counter jihadi narratives (i.e. exposed in false sharia fatwas that are not legitimate) through civic coalitions. This will, I think, holistically strengthen the ability of CT professionals to track, monitor, and interrupt actual and/or potential moles in agency rank and file and radicals moving throughout regional areas of society.

Terrorism on Trial: Countering AQ's Phase IV Strategy

There has been buzz in the news throughout the morning about the legal framework US authorities, led by the Department of Justice, ought to use to try terrorists. Al Sahwa has previously explained the main options available while discussing the case of Nidal Malik Hasan.

The reporting, and accompanying conversation, is circling the case of Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day, underpants, would-be bomber. The Washington Post has two articles here and here that beg us, once again, to question the interconnecting elements of terrorism with our Constitution - as well as our social fabric and the values and traditions celebrated by them.

You may read complimentary articles on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's (KSM) trial from the NY Times, and/or the implications for our prison population (that I discussed previously in the link provided) from the Philadelphia Inquirer.

I propose beginning with the U.S. Constitution, in particluar Article I, Section 8, which establishes the right of Congress "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Moreover, the definition of "Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas" should be understood to descriptively include Terrorism committed on land, seas, and air. Such an alteration can successfully give way to "make[ing] Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" which shall also include airspace.


The intention and purpose is to provide the preservation of liberties and protection of their daily engagements of, by, and for U.S. citizens.

On this last point, cases such as Abdulmutallab and KSM's raise the importance of the possible utilization of habeas corpus if/when not suspended during terrorism trials. Article I, Section 9 states, "The Priviledge of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public safety may require it."

Please see legal information of U.S. Code, "the codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States," pertaining to habeas corpus here.

It is clear in the language used by the drafters and signers of the Constitution that the Founding Fathers, Statesmen, and citizens framed their arguments according to the possible perils they faced on land and water. As such, the definition of "making rules" for capture followed the logic inherent in their own language. Thus, "terrorism" is not mentioned and/or defined simply because the trecherous activity was not in and on the minds of the US leaders and citizens.

As we all have known for some time, US leaders and citizens face threats unfamiliar and unimaginable to the Founders. In light of the practicality sought by the Obama Administration on matters of law and terrorism, it is of utmost concern to raise further questions bound to the aformentioned constitutional concepts.

Firstly, what is the meaning of the independent right to life as a US citizen, and the adjoining rights possessed by one's citizenship? Amendment XIV, Section 1 grants to citizens naturalized rights. If terrorists are granted miranda rights, tried in civilian court [and convicted or acquitted], then by default what other rights shall be granted to suspected terrorists? Common sense tells me that constitutional rights grant me equal protection of the laws, but that equality can not be shared by foreign, enemy combatants.

Secondly, shall the US provide comprehensive rights to suspected terrorists being tried in civilian court? Amendment VI grants persons being tried in criminal prosecutions, for example, the right to a speedy trial and public trial. This must be judged by an impartial jury. Shall we also, then, apply the Brady rule if a terrorist or his/her [public] defender think evidence was withheld? (Also see Brady and its probable implications for terrorism trials here and here). Common sense tells me that the circumstances particular to a US citizen's trial rightfully imply a speedy, public trial, but that presumption of innocence can not be prescribed to foreign, enemy combatants.

Thirdly, and lastly, if suspected terrorists are granted any amount of rights also held by US citizens (gained through birth or application), when are the accused terrorists in fact charged with treason as holders of US rights? Article III, Section 3 states that all persons "levying War...or in adhering to Enemies, giving them Aid or Comfort" shall be charged with treason. Common sense tells me that the Attainder/Conviction of treason leads back to the situation suspected foreign terrorists face in the first place: "The loss of all civil rights by a person sentenced for a serious crime."

It is important to note that an attainder can apply to both an individual and group. According to the Constitution, an attainder results in the sentencing of the convicted to death.

The argument is being made that "broad consensus" holds that terrorism trials are best decided on a case-by-case basis (pg. 5). Must we, then, form courts and complimentary structures, systems, and procedures to meet the demands of such variety? For example, what is the difference in trying US citizens compared to enemy combatants when considering Al-Awlaki, a US-born, AQAP, radical Islamic cleric? What ought we to say about or how ought we to decide on Nidal Hasan or Abdulhakim Muhammad?

Margaret Thatcher said in a 1981 speech, "To me consensus seems to be the process of abandoning beliefs, principles, values and policies in search of something in which no one believes, but to which no one objects—the process of avoiding the very issues that have to be solved, merely because you cannot get agreement on the way ahead."

Sadly, I think the deterioration of all US/Western economic and legal structures lies at the heart of the long-term strategic plan of AQ: It is what makes us great, and that which AQ seeks to attack. This method of deterioration that causes our confusion will increasingly be paired with direct attacks on the US homeland. We have the will and the power to prevent both; to protect, preserve, and prosper.

Bin Laden Claims Christmas Day Plot

Al Qaeda Central leader, Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the Christmas Day bomb plot in a video released by Al Jazeera. He called Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab "an heroic warrior" similar to AQ 9/11 terrorists.


The time between the attempted attack and OBL's message is enough to think that this is an attempt by the leader himself to project his supremacy. Also, it is a follow-up opportunity to spread AQ's false ideological message once again, as documented in al Sahwa's mission:
"Under the banner of the blessed awakening which is sweeping the Islamic world...Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy - your enemy and their enemy - the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one's own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam"
(Osama bin Laden, Aug 1996).

Department of State spokesman, P.J. Crowley, is correct is stating that this is an attempt to remain relevant. I think OBL's actions here may internally anger AQAP leadership who most likely planned the attack independently.

As you may know, al Sahwa has been engaging in dialogue about whether or not AQ is structured and strategically operating as a conglomerate, or if the conventionally accepted theory remains true that AQ is a franchise. OBL's message presents good reason for further exploration on this matter, as it helps to determine an effective counter-terrorism targeting strategy.

I propose examining OBL's rhetoric, as it will undoubtedly identify his overarching philosophy: Palestine. He stated in today's message that it is "unfair for the West" to live as it does while "brothers in Gaza [suffer]." Accurately assessing where his "heart" lies, what he is knowingly concerned about, why he repetitively acknowledges the reason for continuing jihad, will enable professionals to understand and target past attacks. Most important to our mission, it will empower us to project future attacks.

Examining the leader's rhetoric will also enable us to identify the aligning ideologies of AQCL affiliates and determine whether or not they are actually a part of a "franchise" or "conglomerate" base. For example, AQAP is concerned with liberating Muslims throughout the Arabian Peninsula,while LeT seeks to liberate Muslims in India (Kashmir). The ideological thread will further highlight the correlation between where ideologies differ and how attacks are planned and executed.

In conclusion, what I think is happening - and my colleagues will most likely agree with me on this point - is that AQ and its affiliates are collectively strengthening their efforts to bring the jihad directly to the US. Even though OBL's message was delayed, it is important to point out that he still successfully has the perceived ability to reach his AQ network. The Christmas Day attempt was only one of many plots against the US in 2009. Especially due to documented increase of the use of the internet, jihadists, either American-born or foreigners to the US homeland, will continue to seek religious and tactics training in Yemen and Pakistan [amongst other nations].

Rehabilitation for Al Qaeda: The Limits of Soft Counterterrorism

I am looking forward to Pat's upcoming analysis on "...the wider strategy that the US is waging against AQAP." He plans to take an holistic and comprehensive look at our diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts in Yemen. For the time being, I wish to focus on one more of the many important strategic aspects for countering AQ, namely, psychological rehabilitation. It is increasingly becoming more a part of US discussions as a viable avenue for achieving diplomatic and economic success.


On 14 December, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton designated AQAP as a foreign terrorist organization. This step is important for two reasons: a) it enables the U.S. to target and prosecute AQAP members and their network affiliates; and b) it opens the door for further cooperation with the Yemeni Government. For example, officially adding top-tier leaders such as Nasir al-Wahishi and Said al-Shihri, as well as al-Zindani, to the F.B.I.'s Most Wanted List empowers the Department of Justice to work in cooperation with President Salih's Prime Minister for Security and Defense, Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi along with others.


The work is already beginning, as Clinton has met with Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi to discuss effective ways to "control [Yemen's] borders, conduct counterterrorist activities, [and] improve services to the people of Yemen. But, it is imperative to note, as al-Qirbi stated earlier, that "Yemen welcomes U.S. and foreign troops for training, intelligence and logistical support." In confirmation of this, President Obama has stated repetitively that "grounds troops" will not be sent, and the US is only seeking to further aid the host nation with its capabilities and resources throughout 2010 as General Petraus says here.


Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment reiterates al Sahwa's perspective that a successful counterterrorism strategy must be holistic, and adds that professionals have reason to conduct a "greater evaluation" of soft security measures such as psychological rehabilitation programs that incorporate prevention and aftercare methods. He quotes that the program now being used by the Saudi Arabian Government, which has treated 3,000 prisoners, boasts an 80-90% success rate. Such a program surely promises a multi-disciplinary approach to combating extremism, but is it a viable aspect of a comprehensive strategy?

U.S. local, state, and federal police organizations have traditionally used rehabilitation methods to combat gang-warfare and culture in order to protect citizens and families and prevent socio-economic hardship. Speaking in terms of statistics alone, 80-90% is not successful or promising when considering the objective of defeating Al Qaeda. When the percentage is applied to both criminal gang activity and international/transnational terrorist jihad, it simply means that 1-2:10 persons remain either committed to or openly vulnerable to becoming committed once again to carrying out micro and/or macro attacks.

At first glance, soft counter-terrorism methods offer only a positive perspective and limited promise for realistic results. It is positive because it does give reason to evaluate further as Boucek argues, but it is limited because a) it may only work for certain regional populations and/or b) it has proven to work only to a certain degree.


As Bill Roggio examines on LWJ, Shihri himself was released from Guantanemo Bay in 2007 and wasted no time getting back into the game. Furthermore, an interesting article in Foreign Policy (15 January, 2010) entitled, "Camp Nowhere," states;
"Indeed, between 2000 and 2005, the Sanaa government supported a rehabilitation program for its own prisoners, the Yemeni Committee for Dialogue...Reports suggest that several graduates returned to their violent ways, many of them in Iraq. Moreover, plans for renewing and improving deradicalization efforts [through religious dialogue and reintegration into society] are still in the very early stages."



The fact that even a small percentage returns to jihad is enough reason to not implement such a program into the holistic and comprehensive strategy. Moreover, as I learned in my "Crisis Management" course while an MBA student, it is not always the amount of times an event happens but the severity of one event happening that results in broader disruption and/or destruction. The return of 1-2 AQ fighters is enough to determine the global impact of its network; for these members spread harm on many fronts.


The implications inherent in the philosophy of soft counter-terrorism techniques begets the argument once more that "Al-Qaeda is an organization to be destroyed, not to be negotiated with in any manner..." President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and participating agencies such as the FBI can successfully protect America by "continuing to press the Yemenis to defeat al-Qaeda, not to talk with them."


After further assessment, soft counter-terrorism methods seem to not dismantle a terrorist's personal and group willingness - and if I may say, inner yearnings. Another case paramount to understanding the dynamic which we are facing is that of Othman Hadi al-Umari, an AQ weapons smuggler who surrendered to Saudi Arabia authorities in 2004. He was, at the time, number 25 of 26 on their most wanted list. Al-Umari (also written Omari) "renounced his earlier thinking but later rejoined the organization and was captured [in 2009] with the cell of 11 terrorists" The Interior Minister has affirmed that AQ uses the rehabilitation program to further their ideological objectives, stating that "Al-Qaeda has managed to lure back about 11 returnees from Guantanamo that had benefited from the programs."

In conclusion, despite the return rate of "rehabilitated" terrorists to jihad, psychological programs cannot be implemented into a comprehensive strategy at this time but need to be explored further so that the US and host nations can identify successful soft counterterrorism techniques to evaporate jihadi extremism and prevent radicalization amongst the youth populations. I argue, above all proposals, that educational programs promise the greatest deliverance from ideological growth and violent activity. This is where such a program can be as effective as police-oriented gang programs.


As an aspect of my next post, I plan to discuss the effectiveness of the F.B.I.'s Community Outreach Program (C.O.P.) and its opportunity to integrate business networking, educational institutions, and religious communities to combat terrorism. The analysis will be important for understanding further how host nations such as Yemen can potentially implement a framework for community programs to aid in the disruption of AQ networks.

For now, "The economic issue is key to Yemen's challenge in shutting down al Qaeda -- not just in re-educating militants, but in preventing militancy." It is evident that in order for this to be successful, the US and Saudi Arabia must aid in the stabilization of Yemen's economy, as I discussed here.

Progress Against AQAP

AQAP's key leaders appeared together in a video from early 2009. Pictured (from left to right) are: Qasim al Raymi (possibly EKIA), Said Ali al Shihri (possibly detained), Nasir al Wuhayshi, and Muhammad al Awfi

Just wanted to highlight two major events that happened over the weekend in the fight against AQAP. If reports from the inside Yemen are true, government forces struck a major blow against the top tier leadership of AQAP. Neither US authorities or AQAP have confirmed the claims of the Yemeni government, but both claims still deserve mention due to the potential impact on AQAP's operational capability over the next 1-2 months.

• On 15 January, an airstrike in the Aljasher region resulted in 6x EKIA, reportedly including the AQAP Military Emir - Qasim al Raymi aka Abu Hurayah. As usual, Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has excellent coverage and background on the strike. Also, for an even more in-depth bio on Qasim al Raymi, check out the great coverage at Waq al Waq, a must-read for anyone interested in Yemen. AQAP responded quickly with a denial of his death, but we'll likely have to wait a few more days for final confirmation. Many analysts believe that Qasim al Raymi (who was the former overall emir of AQ in Yemen prior to their merger into AQAP) was the most critical target within the AQAP network based on his extensive experience and connections across the wider AQ movement.

• On 18 January, the Yemeni government claimed that they captured AQAP's deputy emir - Said Ali al Shihri in the Sylan district in Shabwa. According to Bill Roggio at LWJ, the initial report from the Yemen Observer explains the circumstances of capture: reportedly al Shihri and several other militants were traveling in a car that flipped when trying to bypass a flash checkpoint established by Yemeni government forces. Al Shihri was appointed the deputy to AQAP Emir Nasir al Wuhayshi after the formation of AQAP in early 2009. Previously, al Shihri (a Saudi citizen) had served as a travel facilitator in Iran and also spent time fighting in Afghanistan. He was released from detention at Guantanamo Bay in 2007 and placed into the Saudi rehab program, but quickly returned to his terrorist activities. Several months later, he played a major role in the attack on the US Embassy in Sanaa in September 2008.

If these claims prove true, there will clearly be a significant impact on AQAP's ability to conduct operations in the near to mid-term. However, I believe that they already likely have a major operation (or multiple operations) near the point of execution. Since these attacks would already be quite far along in the operational timeline, the capture/death of al Shihri and al Raymi will have minimal impact in preventing them.

While it's difficult to predict methodology and target selection, I believe we are likely to see two specific attacks in the next 1-3 months: 1) Coordinated suicide strike against the US Embassy in Sanaa (or other known US/Western target). This was recently attempted, and foiled by the Yemeni police, last month and I expect AQAP will keep trying until they get it right; 2) Another strike(s) against US airlines along a similar vein of the failed Christmas Day attack. I believe that Anwar al Awlaki (the dual US-Yemen citizen and radical cleric linked to both the failed Dec 25 attack and the Ft. Hood attacks) is playing an increasingly important role within the organization. His efforts to recruit Western and non-Arab youth are aimed at developing a cadre of suicide bombers with access to the US via their visas (for example, Canada is a perfect example and an area we've seen can be fertile for recruiting). Also, I expect AQAP (and other AQ-affiliated groups) to attempt an attack against the homeland using female suicide bombers. They continue to heavily recruit women and it's just a matter of time until they can put together an attack (similar to the spike in female suicide bombers we witnessed in Iraq in 2008).

In addition to considering future attacks being planned by AQAP, we must also take a step back and put the recent successes of the Yemeni government (likely with US assistance) into a larger context. Lethal targeting of top and mid-tier leaders is a critical element in our fight against AQAP, but there's much more we need to be doing to counter the group's growing influence and capability. In an upcoming post, I plan to examine the wider strategy that the US is waging against AQAP - taking a holistic and comprehensive look at our diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts in Yemen.

In the meantime, for some great background on Yemen and AQAP, check out the West Point CTC Sentinel's Special Issue on Yemen.

The Exchange: Stay Ahead of the Cycle in Yemen

The reason why Josh's latest series of posts is extremely important is because it enables us to determine the operational attack strategies and methods of Al-Qaeda. Terrorists intend to spread a political message through violent activity, and continuously target economic sources and activities to do so. A 2007 RAND (Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy) study entitled, "Economically Targeted Terrorism," explains that Al-Qaeda either attacks a) interdependent economic streams to break down activity, such as transportation, or b) economic networks that spread effects, such as food or water contamination.

AQ's ability to plan and execute either small or large-scale attacks relies on their own economic stability; i.e. funding. "Truly hobbling a large, stable economy is likely to be beyond the means of most terrorist groups. However, a variety of potential terrorist operations could produce sufficiently...sizable numbers of casualties and damage or destroy large amounts of property..." It is important to identify that the objectives of AQ are witnessed in two ways, namely, to generate a) broad disruption and/or b) large-scale destruction.


Ironically, but not surprising, the economic stability of AQ depends largely on the economic instability of other nations. This is a trend that I established concerning the criminal activity of trafficking. AQ thrives in impoverished areas. For example, The Economist declared that the worst country on earth in 2010 is Somalia, home of "piracy, poverty, and perdition." Similarly, Al Shabaab calls it home, too: "...according to the UN’s World Food Programme, more than 40% of the population need food aid to survive, and one in every five children is acutely malnourished. The constant fighting has internally displaced more than 1.5m people, with a third living in dire, makeshift camps. Aid workers have been able to supply them with less than half the daily water needed."

Conditions such as these have caused both the US and international agencies, such as the UN, to provide financial, nutritional, and military support. As I discussed with US Operation Restore Hope, scenarios as the one Somalia and other countries face - as they have faced in the past and continue too now - can be miscalculated and result in financial loss and/or military conflict. As The Economist article states, "The world's most failed state, regrettably, threatens to become a bigger problem for the rest of the world."


Sadly, this theory holds true, as the 2009 worst country on earth was none other than Afghanistan. Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institute, identified Afghanistan as the first crisis region in a report entitled, "Four Global Crisis Spots." He discusses the strategic opportunities for the US as well as the multi-disciplinary resources needed to counter terrorist growth, increased violence, and social and economic hardship.


Mr. O'Hanlon's former colleague (Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, 2006-2009) and now US Ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, has recently co-authored "Confronting Poverty" with Susan E. Rice - (December 2009). He argues that due to the connections between poverty and fragile states, "alleviating poverty and shoring up weak states are not only humanitarian and economic imperatives, but key components of a more balanced and sustainable US national security strategy." The "War on Terror" has taught us - and shown us over and over again more than we like - that the most sustainable US strategy should not focus on singular states but interconnecting states within a region, as AQCL is now affiliated with terrorist and criminal organizations operating throughout regions like a spider. It is a chess game.


The most effective counterterrorism strategy, then, is forward thinking, matrix-like, and multidimensional, especially when combating a morphing and expanding ideology and image, tactics and strategies. My colleague, Pat, makes a fantastic point, stating: "As we consider the future of irregular warfare and terrorism, it’s critical to monitor the threat posed by regionally-based terrorist groups who become increasingly mobilized in line with a global Islamist ideology." Pascual/Rice argue that the US needs to "invest in poverty alleviation and capacity building in weak states to break the vicious cycle of poverty, fragility, and transnational threats." If The Economist's theory holds true again, then we need to act now in order for the cycle not to worsen in Yemen; for our common human experience alone shows that once the cycle begins it is rarely broken but only slowed or subdued.


We need to stay ahead of the emerging, developing, threat of Yemen becoming the fertile land of AQCL and/or affiliates. As a result, AQAP and Al Shabaab, and perhaps AQIM's, tentacles will grow: The region will become within the next decade the haven for AQ to plan micro and macro terrorist plots targeting economic activities and networks to generate broad rupture and/or large-scale destruction. Al Sahwa does not want Yemen to be the worst country on earth in 2011. If so, then criminal activities such as trafficking will regularly occur like it has in Afghanistan and social displacement will increase as witnessed in Somalia. As stated before, the scenario "threatens to become a bigger problem for the rest of the world."


In conclusion, Yemen is directly connected to Afghanistan and Pakistan; it is gradually becoming the rook of AQ. In order to stay ahead of the cycle in Yemen, the US needs to win The Exchange by taking the rook and using the knights (Iraq, Afghanistan - forking) and the bishop (Pakistan - endgame) to our advantage: We will set ourselves in a strategic location to successfully disrupt, dismantle, and work towards defeating the morphing and expanding AQCL and affiliates.