Fixing Intel: Implementing MG Flynn's SOICs

Now that several months have passed since MG Flynn published his "Fixing Intel" report, I thought it might be an opportune time to examine how his concepts/ideas are being implemented on the ground in Afghanistan.

One of the key components of MG Flynn's proposed strategy to improve intelligence support to full-spectrum counterinsurgency (COIN) operations was the creation of several Stability Operations Information Centers (SOIC) at the RC level - whose mission would be to write and maintain "meaty, comprehensive descriptions of pivotal districts throughout the country" and organize/share/disseminate all of the information and intelligence gathered in the field across various units, agencies, and partners. Essentially, MG Flynn's intent for the SOICs was to serve as a one-stop shops for a particular district/province, providing assessments that fuse a wide array of lethal and non-lethal intelligence data.

While it's easy to agree with MG Flynn on the need for improved fusion, analysis, and dissemination of lethal and non-lethal intelligence, it's much more difficult to actually operationalize his directive in the complex operational environment (OE) in Afghanistan. A recent report written by the RC-West SOIC Director provides an excellent summary of their efforts to stand up one of these SOICs in Western Afghanistan.
Stability Operations Information Center - 09 Mar 2010

The report, aptly entitled "Comprehensive Understanding for Comprehensive Operations," begins with an excellent explanation of the criticality of information management. Explaining the importance of giving the commander a "timely and comprehensive flow of relevant information," the article explains that this feedback can (and will) come in many forms - including academic assessments, KLEs, surveys, source operations, or tribal engagements. The author bluntly explains the existing lack of processes and organizations to capture, fuse, and assess this information, thus highlighting the need to change the way we do business.

One of the most informative and eye-opening sections of the piece is Part III (Why change is needed), which traces the evolutionary steps that we as a military have taken to improve our intelligence processes and systems in COIN operations. This really hit home for me, perfectly capturing the different "stages" that we went through before grasping the importance of understanding all of the dimensions of the complex and adaptive operational environments in COIN - fusing "hard" and "soft" power disciplines. The author's description of Step 2 is spot on and probably accurately reflects where most conventional forces are still at - emphasizing the importance of the "meat eaters" (S2/S3) over the "leaf eaters" (CA/PSYOP/HTT). In the spirit of being brutally self-critical, my unit probably spent the majority of our last deployment to Mosul (from 2007-09) in Step 2. Although we understood the importance of fusing lethal and non-lethal, we never truly institutionalized the process - at least at the BN level. Which brings up another interesting point: although the SOICs are focused at the RC level (DIV), the imperative to synch the meat eaters and leaf eaters extends all the way down to the company-level. Therefore, units at all echelons must develop processes and systems to do so, relying on the SOICs as the initial point of entry and "clearinghouse" for all data.

Another critical section of the paper that merits further consideration and debate is the explanation of the "Population-Centric COIN Targeting Cycle" - UD3A. As you can see in the graphic below, this cycle is a modified version of the widely-used F3EAD lethal targeting cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate).

In contrast to the F3EAD methodology, which is designed primarily for lethal targeting, the UD3A is more comprehensive and aims to more effectively synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic effects - something that we have traditionally done poorly in the past. The most important (and often the most difficult) step of the process is "Understand." This is also the step which the SOICs are designed to facilitate, fusing and analyzing large volumes of data to provide improved situational understanding for the commander or decision-maker. As you can see in the graphic, the "Understand" step includes a full Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE) cycle with an emphasis on understanding the aspects of PMESII and ASCOPE (various non-lethal factors).

Once the commander has a rich contextual understanding of the operational environment, he/she can make an informed decision (in the "Decide" step) about which targeting methodology to utilize and develop a comprehensive collection plan to fill any intelligence gaps (in the "Detect" step). Once the established trigger has been met, the commander then determines the desired effect and the best option to "Deliver" that effect, whether that be a lethal operation (raid, cordon/search, etc.) or a non-lethal operation (key leader engagement, shura, etc.). This is where we see the true power of the UD3A methodology - flexibility. Armed with a deep appreciation and understanding of the situation, refined through focused intelligence collection and analysis, the commander is empowered to deliver tailored effects in order to impact his/her operational environment. Transitioning seamlessly to the "Assess" step, the commander (and staff) then digest the new information learned and use it to further refine their understanding, feeding the next targeting cycle in a continuous loop.

When used effectively to synchronize and focus all operations (both lethal and non-lethal) in a particular OE, this process is extremely powerful. Although this is the first time I've seen the steps laid out and detailed, I'm sure there are units (at multiple different echelons) out there already using it. As always, I'd be very interested in hearing feedback/ideas from those who have used this methodology. In particular, I'm interested in hearing how tactical units at the BCT and below level have operationalized this process (or another similar process) to fuse their lethal and non-lethal targeting efforts. As we continue to conduct COIN operations, this will remain a critical component of maximizing our effectiveness.

Finally, I would love to hear any feedback (positive or negative) from those in the field who have worked at or with the various SOICs that are being stood up. How have the SOICs tied in with the existing fusion cells across theater? How are the SOICs (which sit at RC/Division level) interfacing with BCTs and BNs? How are we integrating partner and local security forces and overcoming classification issues?

Afghanistan: Two Important Reads

Wanted to share links to two important documents that were released/leaked today. I'm bogged down with work at my "real" job so far this week, so don't have much time for analysis. Both are well worth a read if you have a chance...

1) Ambassador Eikenberry's Afghanistan Cables - leaked to the NY Times and published today. Read the summary article here and view the full document below:

Eikenberry Cable - Afghanistan

2) MG Flynn's Afghanistan Assessment (from 22 Dec): published by Peter Bergen at CNN. Although the full document is not viewable, the content outlined in Bergen's article sounds very similar to the slides I shared from COL Thompson (MG Flynn's deputy) several weeks ago in a previous post here. Key highlights from Flynn's assessment include:

• The Taliban's organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding and the group is capable of much greater frequency of attacks and varied locations of attacks.
• The insurgency can now sustain itself indefinitely because of three factors: 1) The increased availability of bomb-making technology and material; 2) The Taliban's access to two major funding streams, one from the opium trade and the other from overseas donations from Muslim countries, which reach the Taliban by courier or through a system of informal banks known as "hawalas" that operate across much of the Islamic world; and 3) The Taliban's continuing ability to recruit foot soldiers based on the perception that they "retain the religious high-ground," and factors such as poverty and tribal friction.
• Detained insurgents said the Taliban saw 2009 as the most successful year of the war, because violence had expanded and because the Afghan presidential election on August 20 was marred by low turnout and fraud. Detainees also told interrogators that the Taliban see al Qaeda as a handicap - a view that is spreading as the Taliban try to present themselves as a nationalist group seeking to liberate Afghanistan from foreign forces.
• The Taliban are effectively creating a parallel government, in competition with the Kabul government. [For more on the Taliban's shadow government, see my recent post here] The Taliban's strategy in 2010 includes expanding into the north and west of Afghanistan, where the Taliban traditionally have had scant support; continuing aggressive operations during winter, when warfare has traditionally eased in Afghanistan; and increasing Taliban influence around the key cities of Kabul and Kandahar.
• Taliban weaknesses include: disagreements among local Taliban leaders, the group's dependence on marginalized ethnic Pashtuns, and over-reliance on "external support," a reference to Taliban havens in Pakistan.

Fixing Intel: Empowering Companies at the Tactical Edge

Although many have probably already seen the “Fixing Intel” report published by CNAS this week, I wanted to link to it and highly encourage you take the time to read it. Written by MG Flynn (ISAF J2), CPT Matt Pottinger (his aide), and Paul Batchelor (DIA), the report is a brutally honest assessment of the current state of military intelligence efforts in Afghanistan [*For a great profile of MG Flynn, see this LA Times article from November]. Examining our intelligence process through the lens of a full-spectrum counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective, Flynn concludes that, “Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy,” and that, “the vast intel­ligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the envi­ronment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade."

Afghan Intel - Flynn (Jan 10)

MG Flynn does a great job of laying out many of the critical shortfalls in the existing military intelligence (MI) system and then proceeds to recommend several major changes to the way business is currently done. Most importantly, MG Flynn points out that,

“The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents – anti-insurgency – is without question a necessary component of suc­cessful warfare, but far from sufficient for military success in Afghanistan. Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gain­ing and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan popula­tion.”

While his recommendations span the entire spectrum from tactical to strategic, I’d like to focus my comments on the tactical level considerations since this is where I believe we can have the greatest impact and this is where the expertise of most of the Al Sahwa authors lies.

Under Flynn’s proposed changes, the scope of what tactical-level intelligence analysts will be responsible for increases dramatically. I wholeheartedly agree that intelligence shops at the Battalion level should be focused on gaining an in-depth understanding of all of the complex factors at play in their operational environment (governance, economics, development, local populace, etc.). In many cases, however, Battalion S2 sections are under-staffed, over-tasked, and under-resourced. Priorities from their commander are often more focused on lethal targeting and with limited time and resources the “non-lethal” elements of the fight can become an afterthought. As the reports explains, “At the battalion level and below, intelligence officers know a great deal about their local Afghan districts but are generally too understaffed to gather, store, disseminate, and digest the substantial body of crucial information that exists outside traditional intelligence channels.” This doesn’t excuse a lack of production on their part, but just means that we must change how things are currently done (as MG Flynn argues).

In my opinion, the most effective way to improve the system is to make an investment at the tactical level by providing more resources to maneuver battalions and companies – best achieved by institutionalizing and empowering Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoISTs) across the force. If we are expecting these elements to expand the scope of their responsibilities, we must resource them to do so. As MG Flynn highlights in the section of the report that discusses one of the units that “got it right” (1/5 Marines in Helmand province), the company level is where the greatest potential for understanding the environment exists. We must enable maneuver commanders at the company level to capitalize on this opportunity and gain true situational understanding (SU). For more on the successes of the 1/5 Marines, see JD's previous post here.

In order to effectively visualize and understand all of the complex factors at play in a company’s operational environment (OE), the commander must be resourced with a team of analysts who are properly trained and resourced to do the job. Many units across the Army have created ad hoc company-level intelligence sections that have been extremely effective in both Iraq and Afghanistan (such as the units highlighted by MG Flynn – 1/5 Marines, 1-91 CAV, and 3-71 CAV). However, there are still too many units who don’t get this right. The Army must develop a standardized manning, training, and equipping plan for these CoISTs and make them part of a unit’s MTOE, rather than relying on each unit to create these sections from their existing personnel. The Army must agree on what the core capabilities must be for the CoIST and use this as a baseline to develop a robust plan to man, train, and equip them.

I’ve been doing a great deal of thinking about this topic, especially after hearing LTG Zahner (the Army G2) discuss his plan for “Rebalancing the MI Force.” (For more details on this plan, see LTG Zahner’s slides here and his article here). Based on my experiences as a Battalion S2 who implemented a somewhat successful system of company-level intelligence sections in Iraq (we called them “Company S2s rather than CoISTs), I propose the following six core capabilities for CoISTs that must be capable of conducting full-spectrum operations ranging from COIN to foreign internal defense (FID) to conventional offensive operations:

Follow-on posts will discuss more details on how to properly man, train, and equip these CoISTs, but I would greatly appreciate your thoughts/input on what core capabilities we should focus on.