The Growing "Re-Insurgency" in Iraq

I continue to be disturbed by reports from Iraq that indicate the beginnings of a Sunni "re-insurgency." One of the op-eds in Wednesday's New York Times does a good job of summarizing the two primary drivers of instability:

1) The movement toward formation of a unity government that will essentially be controlled by Shia interests - leaving the Sunnis with little to no representation. The recent announcement of an alliance of convenience between the Maliki's party and Sadr's party puts the Shia within striking distance of a majority in parliament, with the Kurds essentially serving as kingmakers. The Kurds are likely to join the alliance (after extracting as many concessions as they can), leaving Allawi (and the majority of the Sunnis who voted for him) hanging out to dry. Thus, in the eyes of the Sunni populace, even though their candidate won more seats than any other candidate in the March 7 elections, they are somehow being almost completely disenfranchised. This doesn't exactly incentivize participation by the Sunnis at any level (local, provincial, national) and fuels growing feelings of disappointment, resentment, and anger amongst the Sunni populace.

2) The failure to effectively transition members of the Awakening ("Sahwa") movement into follow-on jobs (whether within the ISF or other government-provided jobs) - creating a cadre of military-trained, unemployed, and disaffected Sunni males. As this exceptional article in the New York Times points out, this creates the ideal conditions for AQI to recruit these young men back into the insurgency. As the article points out:

"Although there are no firm figures, security and political officials say hundreds of the well-disciplined fighters — many of whom have gained extensive knowledge about the American military — appear to have rejoined AQI. Beyond that, officials say that even many of the Awakening fighters still on the Iraqi government payroll, possibly thousands of them, covertly aid the insurgency...

As of July, less than half — 41,000 of 94,000 — of the Awakening’s fighters had been offered jobs by the government, according to the Department of Defense. Much of the employment has been temporary and involved menial labor. The government has hired only about 9,000 Awakening members for the security forces, with officials blaming budget constraints."

The case of Nadim al Jabouri, one of the former Awakening leaders quoted in the article, illustrates the ongoing efforts of Maliki's government to weaken the Awakening movement (and thereby the larger Sunni bloc) across the country. Nadim, born and raised in the Sunni stronghold of Duluiyah in Salahadin Province, was a top leader within the AQI organization from 2003-2006 - serving as both a military and media emir at various points during those years. During my first deployment to Iraq in 2005-06, Mullah Nadim (as he was known at the time) was my Battalion's #1 high-value target (HVT) - driven by a massive amount of confirmed intelligence reporting linking him to attacks against US and Iraqi forces across the province. Nadim had been the imam of the Khulafa Mosque in Duluiyah, using his street cred as a self-proclaimed imam to rally the local Sunni youth (and coerce the Jabouri tribal leadership) into fighting both US forces and the Shia-dominated Iraqi Army units in the area.

When I returned to Iraq at the end of 2007, Nadim had essentially switched sides and was the leader of the local Sahwa group - actually living and working from an office on an American base. Although this was initially a tough pill for me to swallow, I recognized the need to work with historically unsavory characters to provide some measure of security. Unsurprisingly, attacks, violence, and intimidation dropped dramatically in the area as Nadim's group of 200-300 Awakening members continued to receive pay from US forces and then for a time from the national government. However, as time progressed and US forces began to shift their attention to other matters and the impending drawdown of troops; and when the Shia-dominated national government took over responsibility for maintaining the Awakening program (on 01 Apr 09), they began a deliberate campaign to weaken and dismantle Awakening groups across the country.

In April of 2009, Nadim was the target of a massive suicide vest attack, which missed harming him but ended up killing five locals and wounding 18, including one of Nadim's brothers. The attack was likely the work of AQI leaders who were upset that Nadim had switched sides and was now helping US and Iraqi forces target AQI. Only one month later on May 4, Nadim and two of his brothers were arrested by Iraqi Security Forces in what was a fairly blatant, sectarian attempt to limit the growing strength of Nadim's group - and to check his growing political power (he was a leading local candidate for provincial/national office within a small Sunni party). Within two months time, Nadim had been targeted by both sides (AQI and the Iraqi government) and with US forces drawing down, he had few people to turn to for support and protection.

Events like this are occurring all across Iraq as Awakening leaders and fighters are arrested, intimidated, and left with no pay. This situation has created a group of trained, armed men who are now extremely disillusioned and angry with the government and left with little or no options for redress. As Nadim explained in the most recent New York Times article:

“The Awakening doesn’t know what the future holds because it is not clear what the government intends for them...At this point, Awakening members have two options: Stay with the government, which would be a threat to their lives, or help Al Qaeda by being a double agents."

The situation is not likely to improve as the Shia consolidate power in Baghdad and continue to undercut any efforts by the Sunni to secure themselves (and their towns) or gain more power through legitimate political means. In my opinion, we are seeing a perfect storm come together that gives Sunnis few options but to turn back towards an insurgency against the Shia-controlled national government. Unless the Iraqis (hopefully with US help) can figure out a more effective power-sharing deal at the national level and determine a better system to reintegrate Awakening fighters and leaders back into the workforce in a fair and legitimate manner, the situation could spiral out of control quickly and move towards an all-out civil war.

Iraq’s Fragile Future (and the US Way Ahead)

As Iraqis prepare to vote in this Sunday’s national parliamentary elections, I think it’s critical to take a moment to examine the current state of affairs in Iraq and re-assess the US strategy for the next 12-24 months.

Tom Ricks’ recent New York Times op-ed, “Extending Our Stay in Iraq,” offers an excellent summary of the current situation in Iraq and the complex challenges that our military/civilian leaders face in formulating a plan for the way ahead. [Also, check out the full version of Ricks’ report, published by CNAS]. Ultimately, we must ask ourselves two key questions: 1) What will Iraq look like in 2-3 years? (in terms of security, governance, and economics); and 2) How should the US proceed in order to enable the best (or least worst) outcome?

Despite the significant progress that has been made in Iraq over the last 2-3 years, it’s clear that there is still a long way to go before the country is likely to remain stable and secure over the long term (10-15 years). Although the surge was successful in terms of making gains in security and the development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), it still has yet to provide any real, lasting improvements in governance. As Ricks explains, “the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened.” The default mindset of all of the various political parties and actors remains very much a “zero-sum game” mentality – in order to advance my narrow interests, I must grab as much power as possible when able. This primarily stems from the political calculus that the prospects for long-term stability and peaceful transfer of power are low, making it imperative to “get yours” while you’re in a position to do so.

Drivers of Instability

The most useful way to understand the current situation in Iraq and predict the future is by examining the main drivers of instability (and/or points of tension). For those who have closely followed the conflict in Iraq over the last 7 years, this list will look quite familiar. And that’s the point – none of these major issues have been satisfactorily resolved. Without some sort of political compromise, any of these divisive issues could quickly ignite significant levels of violence between different ethno-sectarian groups (each of which is essentially aligned with a political party/coalition running in the upcoming elections):

1) Sunni-Shia tensions over sharing of power and strength of the central government. This was the primary underlying force behind the sectarian violence that almost drove Iraq into a civil war in 2006-2008. Here’s how I conceptualize the problem: Think of a small, slow-burning fire – this is the historic tension between Sunni and Shia that has always (and probably will always) existed in Iraq. In a situation where there are relatively high levels of security, economic opportunity, and access to services, this fire continues to burn behind the scenes but causes little/no damage. However, when some sort of accelerant is added to the fire, it can rapidly grow to a point that threatens to destroy everything around it. In 2006, the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra served as this initial accelerant, initiating a vicious and escalating cycle of violence and fear driven by tit-for-tat violence between Sunni insurgent groups and Shia militias. While the US surge temporarily dampened the large flames, there are still multiple indications of a growing fire between Sunni and Shia groups. It’s very possible that if one of these two groups (likely the Sunnis) feel disenfranchised after the March 07 elections, the conditions will be set for another accelerant to re-ignite a major fire.

There are already serious indications of this being the likely outcome. As the New York Times reported last month, the efforts of Maliki’s government (and the wider Shia movement) to block qualified Sunnis from the upcoming elections resulted in the decision of a sub-party (Saleh al Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogie Front) belonging to Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement (the leading Sunni alliance) to boycott the upcoming elections. This is the end result of a prolonged campaign by various Shia power-players to weaken Sunni influence and block top Sunni’s from running. For more background on these efforts, check out Abu Nasr’s great coverage at Challenge COIN here and here as well as the always-excellent coverage from Musings on Iraq here, here, and here. Also, see the must-read Brooking Institution report “Iraq’s Ban on Democracy.”

Along these lines, I’d also like to offer some more anecdotal evidence illustrating the ever-simmering tensions between Sunni and Shia within Baghdad. One of my former Iraqi interpreters, Ali (who is now living in the US thanks to the State Department’s Special Immigrant Visa program), recently told me an alarming story involving threats against his son from Ministry of Education officials. Ali’s son, Hassan (who is a Sunni), has been studying engineering at a major university in Baghdad for nearly two years. About one month ago, he was approached while leaving school and told by uniformed officials from the Ministry of Education (run by the Shia) that he was no longer welcome at the school and if he returned he would be killed. According to Ali, this intimidation of Sunni’s to limit their education has occurred all across Baghdad for the last several months, highlighting one of the many ongoing efforts below the surface to gain more power for the Shia. Unfortunately, Sunnis in positions of power are making similar power grabs across the country as well. These daily events are what maintain the steady flame of Sunni-Shia tension that threatens to explode at any given time.

2) Alignment of various ISF elements with ethno-sectarian groups. As each of the various ethno-sectarian groups have aimed to consolidate power and control, they have developed strategic alliances with various units and elements within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – which includes the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraqi Police (IP), Facilities Protection Service (FPS), and Border Police (IBP/DBE) – in order to advance their interests. This situation has grown increasingly more serious over the last year, as highlighted in the recent New York Times op-ed by Najim Abed al Jabouri, a fellow at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and former mayor of Tal Afar from 2005 to 2008. Najim explains that the situation has deteriorated to the point that, “members of the security forces are often loyal not to the state but to the person or political party that gave them their jobs.”

The police and border officials, for example, are largely answerable to the Interior Ministry, which has been seen (often correctly) as a pawn of Shiite political movements. The same is true of many parts of the Iraqi Army. For example, the Fifth Iraqi Army Division, in Diyala Province northeast of Baghdad, has been under the sway of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Shiite party that has the largest bloc in Parliament; the Eighth Division, in Diwaniya and Kut to the southeast of the capital, has answered largely to Dawa, the Shiite party of Prime Minister Maliki; the Fourth Division, in Salahuddin Province in northern Iraq, has been allied with one of the two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Based on my recent firsthand experience and observations, this phenomenon is widespread and extremely dangerous for the long-term security and stability of Iraq. In Mosul (during 2008), there was such a high level of tension and mistrust between many of the Sunni IP officers and Kurdish IA officers that we could barely get them to sit together through an entire meeting, never mind getting them to plan and conduct a joint operation. Each unit’s leadership was clearly aligned with one particular party/group and worked only to advance that element’s agenda, oftentimes at the expense of providing security for the populace.

The politicization and “sectarianization” of the Iraqi Security Forces only appears to be getting worse as various groups ratchet up the competition for power. As it stands, the current system of organizing and funding units only exacerbates the problem. Najim correctly asserts that although, “The status quo offers a temporary balance of power between the incumbent parties, likely providing relative peace for the American exit…deep down, ethno-sectarianism creates fault lines that terrorist groups and other states in the Mideast will exploit to keep Iraq weak and vulnerable.” He is exactly right.

3) Kurd-Arab tensions over oil revenue sharing and the role of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Although Sunni-Shia tension and violence has dominated much of the media coverage coming out of Iraq, the conflict between the various Kurd parties (predominately Barzani’s KDP and Talibani’s PUK) and the Arabs (mostly Sunnis in Northern Iraq) has grown increasingly serious over the last two years. The two primary causes of this tension are: 1) The dispute over who owns Kirkuk (and, more importantly, the multitude of proven oil reserves surrounding it). Although the Kurds historically dominated the area around Kirkuk, Saddam’s “Arabization” campaign re-populated much of the city and surrounding areas with transplanted Arabs in order to shift the demographic balance in favor of the Sunnis; 2) The disagreement over how much power the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has in relation to the federal government. The debate over Article 160 (the allocation of political positions/seats and oil revenue) still rages in the North and has nearly led to full-on force-on-force conflict between Iraqi Army forces (loyal to Maliki’s national government) and Kurdish Peshmerga forces (who are the de facto owners of the KRG). For example, disagreements between Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi Army’s First Division over who had primacy in the town of Khanaqin (in Diyala province) nearly erupted into violence during August-September 2008. It took direct negotiations between PM Maliki and KRG President Barzani (after heavy pressure was applied by US Forces) to defuse the situation. Additionally, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has attempted to stoke the flames of tension between these two groups with a steady string of suicide attacks and SVBIEDs (car bombs) throughout Kirkuk, Mosul, and other key cities in Northern Iraq.

Recently, we have seen the tension between Kurds and Arabs grow stronger in the lead up to parliamentary elections, particularly in Ninewa province (which is about 60% Sunni, 25% Kurd, and 15% Christian/other). In the 2008 provincial elections, the Sunni-led al Hadba party won the majority of the seats in the provincial council (which had historically been dominated by Kurds) and appointed a new Sunni governor, Athil al Nujayfi (whose brother is a prominent member of the national parliament). The Kurdish-led Ninewa Brotherhood List protested not being included in the new government by announcing that they and 16 districts they controlled would not cooperate with al-Hadbaa, denouncing the party as Baathists. The Kurds went further by saying that no provincial officials could enter the 16 areas without their permission. This resulted in two dramatic confrontations in May 09 when the governor and provincial police chief were stopped from entering Kurdish controlled areas by the Peshmerga. As Joel Wing at Musings on Iraq explains, tensions grew later in the month as locals in Tal Afar (30 miles west of Mosul) demanded that they be annexed by Kurdistan, and then in June pro al-Hadba tribesmen got into a shootout with Peshmerga in Sinjar (a small town near the Syrian border). In August, when three large suicide bombs struck minorities the Brotherhood List and al-Hadba blamed each other rather than insurgents for the attacks. It appears that both parties are using various insurgent groups as proxies to target their opponents as well as win political points with their own constituencies – once again, all of this occurs at the expense of the local populace.

Things have gotten no better as the March 2010 parliamentary elections are nearing. In January 2010 the governor of Ninewa, Athil al Nujayfi, initiated a no confidence vote against the mayor of Sinjar (a Kurd), who turned around and filed a lawsuit against the governor. The Brotherhood List condemned the removal of the mayor as well, claiming that al-Hadba represented Baathists and their henchmen. At the beginning of February, Governor Najafi went to the Tel Kayf district (northwest of Mosul) where protestors threw fruits and vegetables at his car, while Kurdish officials said that the governor had gone to the area without their permission. Later in the month Kurdish parties accused al-Hadba of trying to shut down their offices in the province before the vote, while Governor Najafi held a press conference calling on the central government to have the peshmerga removed from Ninewa. I expect these incidents to continue and likely worsen in the wake of the parliamentary elections as the Arabs and Kurds continue to vie for control of the strategic cities of Kirkuk (the northern oil capital) and Mosul (a key economic and political hub).

4) Intra-Shia tension over the role of Iran in Iraq’s future government. The lead-up to this weekend’s parliamentary elections has also highlighted the serious disagreements between the leading Shia parties/blocs. The main point of tension between the groups is what level of Iranian influence they are willing to tolerate in Iraq. While all of the Shia parties have significant ties to Iran and the Iranian regime, there are clearly differing levels of support for Iran’s push to stay intimately involved in Iraq’s day-to-day affairs. Although we’ve recently seen more signs from PM Maliki that he’s willing to stand up to the Iranians’ push for influence in Iraq (as he did in Dec 09 during a dispute over one of the southern oil fields and during Operation Knight’s Charge in Basra in March-May 2008 aimed at limiting the growing influence of Sadrist elements with ties to Iran’s IRGC-QF), there is still a strong relationship between his Dawa party and the Iranian regime. However, Maliki’s recent formation of the “State of Law” party (primarily composed of former Dawa members) signals his intention to at least nominally distance himself from Iranian influence. Maliki has been under heavy pressure from Iranian officials to join with the other top Shia party/bloc – the Iraqi National Alliance (composed primarily of members of Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadr List). For right now, it appears that Maliki’s State of Law party is likely to win the highest number of parliamentary seats. The key question in the wake of the elections, however, will be the extent to which the two main Shia parties are able to agree and compromise in order to form a coherent political bloc (in opposition to the Sunni bloc). In my opinion, the tension and disagreement between the Shia parties is actually healthy and will continue to go on into the distant future until Iraq is strong enough to form a government that can truly stand up to the ridiculously high levels of Iranian influence and maneuvering in Iraq. Although the intra-Shia disagreements still serve as a driver of instability, they are the least likely to cause significant violence in the short run, as the Shia are mostly willing to compromise on their internal differences in order to appear united in the face of opposition from Sunnis and Kurds. For more background on Iran’s influence and intentions in Iraq, see this excellent post (and all of the other excellent coverage) at Musings on Iraq.

The Way Ahead in Iraq

Based on an understanding of the current situation in Iraq (as defined by the drivers of instability that I discussed above), I’d like to throw out some points of consideration as we discuss/debate the future US strategy in Iraq.

1) Election Outcome: I expect that Iraqis will likely vote along ethno-sectarian lines, as they did in 2005. Ultimately, the elections will largely entrench the already prominent parties. The real period of high risk will occur post-election. Coalition building and government formation (between the various parties/blocs) after the elections will likely require months of negotiations, posting significant governance challenges in the interim. Additionally, unlike in 2005, voters can choose individual candidates rather than selecting a particular bloc, potentially upsetting pre-election agreements and post-vote bloc cohesion. Recent polling data (from mid-Feb) highlighted on Musings in Iraq, seems to confirm this assessment. Respondents were asked the question, “Who would you vote for in the 2010 parliamentary elections?” with these results:

29.9% - State of Law – PM Maliki (Dawa)

21.8% - Iraqi National Movement – Ex-PM Allawi

17.2% - Iraqi National Alliance – Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Sadrists, Ex-PM Jaafari, Iraqi National Congress

10% - Kurdish Alliance – PUK, KDP

5% - Iraqi Unity Movement – Minister Bolani, Sheikh Abu Risha’s Anbar Awakening

2.7% - Iraqi Consensus (Tawafuq) – Iraqi Islamic Party

4.9% - No opinion

2.2% - No response

(+/- 2% margin of error)

So, of the 325 total seats available, I assess that Shia Islamists will win plurality (120-150), Sunni and secular parties will win 60-80 (INM will win most of these), and Kurdish Parties will win 60-70 (KA will take the majority). Since it takes a majority of 163 seats to form a government, this will require the plurality-winning Shia alliance to make an agreement one of the other two groups – most likely one or both of the Kurdish parties.

2) US Forces Drawdown: As President Obama has regularly discussed, his desired endstate is to drawdown all US “combat forces” by September 2010 and all US troops by the end of 2011 in line with the US-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Currently, the plan for 2010 is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the U.S. military presence this year, with the remainder scheduled to be with­drawn by the end of next year. However, as Ricks’ points out in his excellent piece, “This timing is worrisome.”

The two major concerns with this plan are: 1) The synchronization of the US drawdown with the post-election government formation. Just as US troops are being reduced (and the troops staying in country are focused on pulling out troops and equipment), the fledgling new government will be attempting to form coalitions and begin making more progress in terms of significant governance efforts; 2) The potential for a “tipping point” when the withdrawal of US troops changes the calculus of insurgent groups and militias, making them feel that the time is right to ratchet violence back up. The initial troops that are withdrawn will be from relatively secure and stable areas, but as troops are pulled form more critical areas (especially Anbar, Mosul, Kirkuk, and to some extent Baghdad), there is a much greater risk for increased violence.

These concerns (and others) are likely what has recently prompted GEN Odierno, the top commander of US Forces-Iraq (USF-I), to request a slowdown or halt to the planned withdrawal of US “combat focused” BCTs. As Tom Ricks highlighted in his article at the Foreign Policy blog, Odierno recently publicly requested the extension of a US BCT operating in the critical area of Kirkuk (a major flashpoint for Kurd-Arab tensions during the post-election period). Clearly, this signals serious concern on the part of Odierno, a highly competent and experienced leader who arguably knows and understands Iraq better than anyone else in the US military or government.

So, what does all of this mean for the future of US force levels and US strategy in Iraq? What should the US do based on the increasing potential for ethno-sectarian violence and a continuing state of weak, ineffective government? As Ricks argues in his piece, we have little choice but to adjust our plan based on the changing situation on the ground in Iraq. We must begin a dialogue with the new Iraqi government (and other key power players) to consider modifying the SOFA in order to allow for a greater role for US forces in maintaining stability in the fragile post-election period. It’s just as important to define the mission and authorities of the US forces that will remain as it is to define the number of troops. Concurrently, we must also begin developing a plan to maintain a force of 30,000-40,000 US troops in Iraq for the next 2-3 years (which will need to be synchronized with the Afgan surge as well). While this will clearly be a very tough sell politically for Obama, I believe he has no other choice. I echo the comments of Josh McLaughlin (who is on his way back to Iraq for a third go-around right now) in his recent post, “You break it, you buy it. As much as I hate to admit it, I’m ok with staying if it means we finish what we started.”

Why the Christmas Day Detroit Terrorist Attack is Different

The Christmas Day failed terrorist attack is different than past planned attacks on the homeland. I stated on Monday that "Domestic terrorism is here, and transnational terrorism is now scarier than before because of a) the rate at which threats are arising and b) amount of time AQ and affiliates are organizing attacks on the homeland." The cases of Nidal Hasan and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab present some general differences between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism.

In short, Hasan is a lone-wolf type who acted independently with ideological intentions. As my colleague, Pat Ryan, notes, Hasan is a "soldier who work[ed] in the crusader armies and the apostate governments [who] repent[ed] to Allah..." We at Al Sahwa believe Hasan can be thought of as a "franchise terrorist," one who uses the brand of an entity and independently capitalizes on the strength of its image, mission, and reach to succeed. Hasan shouted "Allah akbar" simply because that is what he thought he should do; he believed he was being good by carrying out divine intention.

Abdulmutallab is not a lone wolf. He was inspired and instructed (in some way we do not yet know entirely) to carry out the Christmas Day attack. Additionally, he must have received materials and instructions from within AQAP either vis-a-vis leaders who confirmed the decision or operatives whom he was connected with. Abdulmutallab is not known to have shouted "Allah akbar" like Hasan or 9/11 perpetrators - and it is not surprising. Whereas Hasan falsely and wrongly did what he did for the Mulsim world, Abdulmutallab did it I think to liberate the Arabian Penisula from the "Western crusader."

Both terrorists do have similarities: a) they give us the opportunity to learn more through interrogations, as they are alive and recovering; b) they can serve as legal case studies for terrorists in US federal prisons. Above all, and of great threat to the US: Hasan and Abdulmutallab will now be the faces for terrorist recruitment campaigns.

It is paramount to understand the differences between domestic and transnational terrorism in order to identify the strategic plan of AQ (Serpent Head). I stated that "The jihadi 20-year plan is entering a new phase, one I think we will see unfold at an increased rate over the next 1-2 years simply because AQ believes we are a) internally vulnerable and b) slow to counter." I now think AQ has entered a new phase with the attempted attack carried out by Abdulmutallab, and here is why.

The central cause for concern is nothing other than Detroit, MI. The location means absolutely nothing to AQ and its affiliates AQAP, AQI, AQAFPAK; there is nothing of importance there for them to capitalize on. Detroit spotlights for us AQ logic: they are willing to choose any entry point for a deadly attack in order to send the message that they can and will continue to kill us to counter our military and diplomatic campaigns. AQ, at least AQAP, showed on 25 December that they are interested more in a swift response than a detailed but delayed response.

Comparing Detroit to 9/11 helps us understand the meaning of Detroit more deeply. One, 9/11 was planned over a course of several years; Detroit was most likely planned over the course of a couple of days after US air strikes in Yemen 17 December as a response to attempting to kill Islamic AQ cleric al-Awlaki.

Two, as mentioned above, Detroit holds no national or cultural meaning in comparison to previous targeted areas: the World Trade Center was the financial hub of the US (and world), and the Pentagon is the center of national and international security activity.

Three, the 9/11 plan utilized domestic flights that originated in Boston, MA (American Airlines 11, United Airlines 175), Newark, NJ (United Airlines 93), and Washington, D.C. (American Airlines 77). All flights were meant to fly across the States to San Francisco and Los Angeles, but the hijackers wanted to use the stored fuel for larger impact.

In comparison, Detroit (Delta Airlines 253) was an international flight from Amsterdam, Netherlands. This shows a break from the previous plan: AQAP did not scientifically measure the amount of fuel or strategically plan for taking over the cockpit. Rather, Abdulmutallab used the natural flight path and was probably instructed to wait until an appropriate time just before the flight ended. As stated, the goal was not the size of the impact but their ability to respond.

Detroit means that AQ in general, and AQAP specifically, are more confident in their attempts to bring the fight directly to the US homeland. The new phase of the AQ plan, I think, will employ Detroit-like methods in terms of a) short response time over larger impact and b) US targets that are more vulnerable than meaningful. This strategy spreads their playing field and imitates their tactics in the Arabian Peninsula against "crusader armies and governments."

AQI in Mosul: Don't Count Them Out

As much of our collective national attention shifts its focus to the pending “surge” in Afghanistan, it’s easy to lose sight of important events and indicators occurring in Iraq. As Josh discussed in his recent post here, we continue to see spectacular, coordinated attacks targeting the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) and GOI (Government of Iraq) targets across the country. While less frequent, these attacks are still extremely deadly and more importantly continue to highlight the inability of Maliki’s government to secure the populace and counter the insurgents. In particular, I’d like to focus on the current state of the insurgency in Mosul – a key finance, logistics, planning, and facilitation hub for al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

While there are substantial and important differences between Al Qaeda’s presence in various areas, a close look at how AQI operates in Mosul (and the linkages of this region to the wider AQ efforts) provides great insight into the global “modus operandi” of AQ. Before we can put recent events into context, it’s important to understand how AQI is structured and how they attempt to gain control over a specific city/region/province. AQI tends to organize along similar lines in most areas (with certain tweaks made to adjust for local conditions). Their structure, as shown above, gives us insight into how they operate. When attempting to influence, control, and eventually dominate an area, AQI roughly follows this methodology:

1) Establish intelligence/security apparatus: gain understanding of the area, identify targets and key individuals to influence, develop intelligence source network, intimidate/assassinate uncooperative elements, counter-intel efforts against CF informants, extortion and criminal activity

2) Establish administrative and finance nodes: lay foundation for command and control (C2), recruiting, and logistical support of military cells and other support structure

3) Establish sharia network: begin building relationships with local religious leaders, start recruiting efforts, begin initial information operations (anti-CF and pro-jihadist), bless off on targets

4) Establish media/information capability: Develop capacity to track/record attacks, develop ability to send to higher elements for production, eventually create own production capability

5) Establish military cells and conduct attacks: last step completed after all other elements are ready to support, rely heavily on security to choose targets, admin to pay and track personnel, sharia to recruit and justify attacks, and media to gain local populace support

Note that this is often not a rigid step-by-step process, but is usually very fluid and can often waver back and forth between different phases across different areas based on local conditions. They key takeaways to keep in mind are: 1) Every military attack conducted requires significant support and planning efforts; 2) Just because we fail to see traditional military attacks in an area doesn’t mean that AQI doesn’t still maintain a significant presence in an area in terms of security/admin/media; and 3) AQI is often capable of quickly escalating and moving from a lower-level assassination and intimidation campaign to a military (sometimes even conventional) campaign; then they can quickly “go underground” and de-escalate.

Recent media reporting (often based on poor and/or overly optimistic assessments from CF in the area) has repeatedly highlighted the decrease in attacks conducted by AQI, arguing that the organization has been severely weakened or even defeated. Recently, even GEN Petraeus declared that, "There is no question that Al Qaeda in Iraq has been significantly reduced in its capability and capacity." (Reuters) We must be careful, however, that we don’t count AQI out and let up the pressure on them that we’ve so effectively applied through precision lethal targeting of the network across all of its operational lines (military, admin, sharia, finance, media).

A recent Reuters story (read it here) does just this, declaring that the increase in “[d]rive-by shootings, murders and extortion” represents a, “weakened insurgency in Mosul.” I would argue that although we’ve made significant progress against AQI in Mosul, they still retain the capability to conduct large scale attacks that feed the still-strong sense of insecurity in Mosul and de-legitimize the local/provincial/national government and security forces. We saw this just the other day when a VBIED detonated at a police recruiting center on the eastern edge of Mosul (in Gogjali), killing two and wounding 18 (Reuters, 13 DEC). Even more worrisome is the almost delusional assessment provided by COL Gary Volesky (commander of 3/1 CAV who replaced 3 ACR in Mosul last year). He argues that, “[t]he insurgency has evolved from being ideologically-driven to organized crime looking for money.” Volesky’s boss (BG Vandal) goes even further, assessing that, “Because of their inability to do, in some instances, those high-profile attacks ... they're resorting to extortions, assassinations to continue to exert pressure on individuals.” I’m not sure where these guys are getting these ideas from, but they appear to be more politically motivated (to stay in line with the already announced drawdown of US forces) than based on ground truth.

What is actually occurring is that AQI has suffered some small setbacks in terms of interrupted finance and some key leaders being captured/killed, but they still clearly maintain the ability to influence the local populace. Although the military apparatus’ ability to conduct attacks is degraded, we see clear indicators that the security and media lines are operating at near full capacity. With these parts of the organization functioning, all AQI needs to do is continue to pick off effective government and security leaders (with assassination and intimidation) and conduct a slow but steady stream of spectacular attacks (which will then be effectively captured and distributed by various media products) to maintain their relevancy and delegitimize the Iraqi government. Additionally, we are likely to see an uptick in politically motivated attacks designed to target candidates for the 2010 national elections as inflame the already simmering Arab-Kurd tensions that form the underlying cause of insecurity and ineffectiveness in Mosul and N. Iraq.

If we’re not careful and we let up the pressure too quickly, we could easily see a return to what Mosul looked like when my unit assumed our battlespace on the East side of the Tigris River in January 2008 (foreign fighters were embedded in a multitude of military battalions across the city, multiple VBIED and catastrophic IED attacks every week, and AQI forces essentially controlling terrain in some parts of the city with the tacit support of almost the entire local populace). For more details on this, read the excellent report “The Fight for Mosul” from the Institute for the Study of War.

Looking beyond the current (and future) situation in Mosul, we must keep these lessons in mind elsewhere. Open-source reporting on a daily basis describes similar indicators of growing AQ security, admin, and media elements in multiple areas across the globe (including Somalia, Yemen, Northern Afghanistan, and potentially even the US?). Even though we have yet to see major attacks (or at least a regular stream of them), we must be conscious of the process by which AQ lays its roots and establishes a foundation for future military actions in a given area. If we are able to effectively identify these indicators, mobilize resources, and target these elements (ideally in partnership with host nation CT elements) we can potentially nip this growing AQ presence in the bud with fairly limited resources.