Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty

Today AQ-affiliated terrorist Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty in Brooklyn Federal Court, admitting that he and several associates were planning a "martyrdom operation" targeting Manhattan's subway system to be carried out sometime in mid-September 2009. As has been previously reported, Zazi's plot was disrupted by federal officials who had been tracking him for several months, eventually ending in his car being stopped by FBI agents on a bridge into Manhattan. Prior to his arrest, Zazi resided in Aurora, CO, where he had rented a hotel room and was utilizing a recipe (given to him at an Al Qaeda training facility in Pakistan) to create TATP-based explosives.

Zazi faces a maximum sentence of life in prison after pleading guilty to three separate charges: conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiring to kill US soldiers abroad, and providing support to al Qaeda. Reportedly, Zazi agreed to plead guilty to the charges in an attempt to spare his parents from prosecution.

For more background on Najibullah Zazi and the circumstances leading to his detention in September 2009, check out my previous posts here and here. Also, see this excellent summary of the incident from the NEFA Foundation.

Zazi's guilty plea in this important case is significant for several reasons:

1) In terms of understanding current and future threats, Zazi's failed plot highlights the fact that Al Qaeda still retains the capability and intent to conduct attacks against the US homeland originating from the AfPak region. Zazi first became affiliated with Al Qaeda at a training camp in Pakistan in 2008, where he traveled so that he could fight alongside the Taliban. However, several AQ leaders identified his potential utility in a more significant attack, re-directing him to focus on planning and conducting a suicide attack in the US. I think it's safe to assume that AQ continues to focus much of their recruiting efforts on US citizens and visa holders, as evidenced by the five young men from Virginia who were recently arrested in Pakistan after being recruited via Facebook.

2) In terms of determining how best to prosecute future terrorist cases within the US, the successful guilty plea by Zazi should be viewed as evidence that utilizing the existing criminal system (rather than the military justice system) is the best way to go. As Attorney General Eric Holder said today, "In this case, as it has in so many other cases, the criminal justice system has proved to be an invaluable weapon for disrupting plots and incapacitating terrorists, one that works in concert with the intelligence community and our military." The ability to apply pressure to Zazi through prosecution of his parents would not have been available in the military justice system. We are also seeing similar results in the ongoing interrogations and prosecution of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the failed Christmas Day bomber), who began providing detailed intelligence to officials after his parents were flown to Detroit.

Crossroads: Learning From Intelligence-led Policing & Integrating Social Networking to Ensure Optimal Intelligence

This posting will be available in two separate parts, the first of which is posted here. After introducing a systematic framework for understanding our joint capabilities to combat transnational terrorism, I assess the major issues relevant to the intelligence-led policing model so we can begin to bridge our understanding to meet practical methods of optimal operation in the 21st Century. Following this post will be the conclusion of my arguement proposing an integration of a social networking system which I wish to call, "bubblenet intelligence."

I. The Introduction of “Bubblenet Feeding”
Systems theory predominantly refers to an interdisciplinary field of biological science that studies the nature of complex systems, but can be understood as a framework for analyzing entities that work in concert for the purpose of producing a result(s).[1] The most important lesson expressed by systems theory in learning about the existence of inter-relatedness amongst biological ecosystems is the promise of organizational collaboration as participants in the complex field of security. Each process and procedure of one entity is, in some way and to some degree, can be understood as related to a second entity, and so on.

Within the past decade, the growth in precision of the scientific field known as biomechanics has enabled doctors to promise patients, for example, new muscle tissue to combat decay or an incurable disease. Similarly, by incorporating their study of photosynthesis, military scientists have used the field of bioengineering to develop a protein-based photovoltaic coating that is applied to the top of a combat soldier’s helmet in order to provide electrical power for missions and lighten carrying load.[2] An emerging field now being called biomimicry seeks to enhance human capabilities for living more simply and solving more problems by mimicking natural processes. One of the well-known examples of biomimicry is the development of wind turbine blades fashioned after the flippers of humpback whales that have 32% less drag than other whales.[3]

Surprising enough, another process by humpback whales can be utilized to serve as the foundation for developing a structural system that shares intelligence information horizontally and maintains vertical hierarchy across national security organizations. Humpback whales feast primarily on krill throughout their oceanic journeys. It has become known to marine biologists that these whales eat at the highest rate when they employ their tactic of “bubblenet feeding.”

First, a group is formed, including both males and females, and roles are distributed among participates. After all participants dive down slowly to a specified depth beneath the pools of fish, one whale swims horizontally past his companions while blowing bubbles at a high rate. When this whale reaches the end of the line a second whale swims horizontally across and sounds a high-pitched noise. As a result, the high-pitched noise scares the krill swimming above the humpbacks and causes them to swim toward the surface. Simultaneously, while the bubbles trap the krill in a net-like area some whales herd the fish together.[4] This scenario allows the humpbacks to swim easily to the surface and savor large amounts of krill as they rise above the surface with a mouth full of protein. Above all, what ensures the success of the whales' mission is teamwork.

II. Assessing the Main Issues With Intelligence-led Policing
Terrorism itself is a morphing phenomenon, and recent occurrences such as the shooting at Fort Hood has shown that the intelligence community’s collaboration efforts have fallen short of expectation which spotlights the importance of stronger teamwork. An emerging threat in transnational terrorism is the increasingly domestic nature of its activity in scope: terrorist operatives utilize criminal activity as an avenue for internationally-based operations.[5] Also worth mentioning is the unearthing of the lone-wolf terrorist, such as persons like Nidal Malik Hasan who was motivated by extreme jihadist ideology.[6]

The intelligence community is a collection of chessmasters who strive to strategically stay ahead of the enemy. We can learn from the growing system of intelligence-led policing in order to incorporate an interdisciplinary system that overcomes the barriers of communication to solve complex problems by including intelligence and counterterrorism analysts and agents and military officers and investigators alike.

As a “proactive approach to crime management” that is “managerially-centered and top-down in decision-making format,” it proves to be – and shall remain so – a dynamic internal measurement system for directing policing efforts to fight recidivists and serious crime offenders (Ratcliffe et al, 4). Furthermore, though the “central tenets of intelligence-led policing make intelligence analysis pivotal to organizational planning” (4) the post-9/11 organizational chart is compartmentalized into “geographical hierarchies” (9) for the purpose of creating intelligence flow.

This structure has proven, to a certain extent, to work on the state level, particularly in the New York region; however, there is no solid evidence or case study analysis available that supports reasons for its adoption on the federal level. Events such as Fort Hood raise the question, once again, about why “institutional friction, intelligence-hoarding, and information silos” prove to be cultural barriers to advancing the intelligence community's efforts (Ratcliffe, 12). The processes and procedures of our communication need to be strengthened, as our situation begs the question as to whether or not they are sustainably promising when combating transnational terrorism.[7]
_____________________
[1] Systems Theory. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved June 2009, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_theory.
[2] Armstrong, RE. & Warner, JB. (March 2003). Biology and the Battlefield. Retrieved November, 2009 from Defense Horizons website: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH25/DH25.pdf.
[3] Wind Energy Institute of Canada. (July 2008). WhalePower Tubercle Blade Power Performance Test Report. Retrieved from WhalePower website: http://www.whalepower.com/drupal/.
[4] National Geographic Xpeditions. (n.d.). Lesson Plans: How Do Humpback Whales Feed? Retrieved from http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/lessons/18/g35/cchumpback.html.
[5] I have in mind two specific occurrences which spotlight the growth of domestic, homegrown plots. One, in the summer of 2009 Bryant Neal Vinas confessed that he joined al Qaeda while in Pakistan and plotted with conspirators to execute suicide bombings on Long Island Railroad trains while stationed in Penn Station in New York, New York. Also, in September of 2009 Najibullah Zazi and his father, Mohammed Wali Zazi, were arrested and charged with lying to federal investigators and conspiracy to bomb undisclosed locations in the United States.
[6] When using the phrase, “lone-wolf,” I have in mind that which is exposed by Evan Kohlmann, a private sector International Terrorism Consultant who is the author of the influential book, al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (2004).
[7] Ratcliffe, JH & Guidetti, R (in press). ‘State Police investigative structure and the
adoption of intelligence-led policing’, Policing: An International Journal of
Police Strategies and Management.

Speaking of Najibullah Zazi

Following up to my previous post, I wanted to post a link to this excellent report, which was recently released by the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation. "Target: America - The September 2009 New York/Denver Terror Plot Arrests" provides the most in-depth UNCLASS analysis of the case against Najibullah Zazi I have yet to see, compiling a huge volume of open-source reporting into a great product. 18 pages packed full of data that's well worth reading - provides great insights into the TTPs being used by AQ to plan/execute operations in the West.

Download the report here.

The Taliban's Growing Ambitions

After reading JD’s post on David Rohde’s article and the links between AQ/Taliban and the Haqqani network (HQN), I wanted to respond to one portion in particular.

JD, you said, “Even with that said I still have not seen any evidence that Pashtun tribesmen are willing to conduct terrorist attacks outside of the AfPak region. We won’t see any evidence of this while the main battleground is in their backyard.”

While I agree that the current pressure on the Taliban will keep them mostly occupied and tied down in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I wanted to shed some light on what I see as the growing radicalization and “globalization” of the Taliban. As Rohde mentioned, there is a growing element within the Taliban who aim to achieve a wider Islamic Caliphate (which falls in line with AQ’s stated goals). Especially at the higher levels, I believe that the line of distinction between AQ and the Taliban is very blurry – and may not even exist in many cases.

Peter Bergen’s recent article in The New Republic, entitled “The Front,” examines the links between AQ and the Taliban, using the case of Najibullah Zazi (recently detained by US officials in Aurora, CO for planning attacks within the US) as an example.

Bergen highlights the critical role that AQ training camps has played in all of the recent attacks in the West (including 1993 WTC attack, 9/11, 1998 African embassies, USS Cole, 2002 Bali, and the failed 2006 British airline plot), explaining that the AfPak border continues to serve as the “epicenter of the war on jihadist terrorism.”

Most importantly, Bergen offers some facts that point to an increasing level of cooperation between AQ and the Taliban, including some efforts by the Taliban to attack Western targets outside of the immediate AfPak region (he cites the involvement of Baitullah Mehsud – recent EKIA and former leader of the Pakistan Taliban – in a plot to dispatch suicide bomber to Barcelona in 2008). I believe this is similar to some of the attempts by Zarqawi (AMZ) to extend the reach of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) outside of Iraq –including a major suicide attack against a Western hotel in Jordan. As senior Taliban leaders (many of whom are Pashtun tribe members) become increasingly close with AQ, I think we’ll see them become more and more involved in planning attacks in the West.

Many details are still sketchy about who exactly Najibullah Zazi was working with and receiving direction from prior to his arrest in September, but I would be willing to bet that some of the “un-named intermediaries” that connected Zazi to Mustafa Abu al Yazid (a top AQ operational and financial leader) were in fact just “local Afghans.”

In my mind, this is what makes Afghanistan (and its porous border with Pakistan) the most dangerous of potential AQ safe havens – as compared to areas such as Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. In the AfPak region, AQ has built an extensive and complicated web of interwoven personal relationships that affords them protection and support (for example, Zawahiri is even married into a local tribe). They continue to involve themselves more heavily in Taliban efforts, embedding AQ “Arabs” as trainer and leaders within the existing Taliban leadership structure (similar to what we saw with the re-organization of the Mosul “Arab Battalion” when it was broken up and distributed across the entire military structure). As AQ increases its involvement in the Taliban at the operational and tactical level, I expect to see an even stronger relationship at the top-tier strategic level.

There are more Najibullah Zazi’s out there right now, being identified by embedded AQ leaders/trainers and recruited to move up within the AQ structure. This is who we need to watch out for…