Exploiting the Rift in Taliban Leadership

As I discussed in a previous post, it appears that there may be a potential rift developing among the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban. Last month, the Taliban officially announced their plan to replace Taliban Deputy Leader (and de facto leader of day-to-day operations) Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar with two different individuals - an unusual move that prompted many to question the decision of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. According to multiple reports, all military operations would be overseen by Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir (for more on him, see my previous post here) and all logistics/support operations would be the responsibility of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor.

A recent article in the UK's Times Online provided additional insight into this developing rift, quoting sources within the Taliban and on the ground in Afghanistan who have confirmed the growing tensions within the Taliban's Inner Shura (top council of leaders). According to a tribal elder in Southern Afghanistan with strong links to the insurgency, "When Mullah Baradar was arrested, Mullah Mansoor thought he would be his replacement...when Zakir was introduced as the defense minister, [Mansoor] was disappointed." According to the report, this resentment has caused a bitter power struggle between the two, forcing subordinate commanders to choose sides. Mullah Mansoor, who was appointed as the Kandahar province shadow governor in 2007, felt he was the logical choice to run all military operations in the Southern region. He reportedly asked the Taliban's leadership council for military control of Helmand and Kandahar after Baradar was detained, but his efforts were blocked by Mullah Zakir and his supporters. Zakir, who is also from Helmand province (and spent several years detained at Guantanamo Bay) and has a reputation as a brutal and aggressive fighter, replied that, "I'm the defense minister. I control all of Afghanistan, we should work together."


As US and ISAF forces continue shaping operations in preparation for an offensive in Kandahar, it will be critical for us to take advantage of this growing rift within the Taliban's ranks. US and partner ISAF forces should make this a major information operations (IO) theme and interweave it within both their lethal and non-lethal operations. During key leader engagements (KLEs) and shuras, leaders should draw attention to the feud, gain more information about it, and highlight the fact that Taliban leaders are only out for themselves and care little about the people of Afghanistan. If the results of the poll quoted above are truly representative of the people's sentiment in Kandahar, then we have a long way to go in terms of discrediting the Taliban. The rift theme should also be heavily played upon in IO products to support our lethal targeting and exploitation operations - making a concerted effort to leave stay-behind fliers/leaflets and spread the word that different leaders and commanders are turning on each other and providing information to US forces. This will help to exacerbate the already-existent feud and increase paranoia across the organization. I've seen firsthand how effective this can be in dividing insurgent organization and creating additional targeting opportunities for US and partner forces.

New Taliban Deputy: Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir

As I predicted last month, it appears that Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir (aka Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul) has been appointed as the Taliban's Deputy Commander. He will replace Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a highly influential leader and close associate of Mullah Omar who was reportedly involved in high-level reconciliation talks with Afghan leaders (some analysts hypothesize this is why he was arrested).

Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai report on their Declassified blog (at Newsweek) that Mullah Omar recently announced the promotion of Abdul Qayim Zakir and Akhtar Mohammed Mansoor as his deputies, according to a reliable source who is a senior Taliban operator. As the Newsweek article mentions, it appears that Zakir is a popular choice among Taliban leadership and members:

"The choice of Zakir, who was released from Guantánamo in late 2007, and who returned to join the Taliban in the field about one year later after being freed by Afghan authorities, is popular with Taliban commanders. Several Taliban commanders have told Newsweek that they wrote letters to Mullah Omar in support of Zakir as the logical replacement for Baradar soon after his deputy's arrest. The commanders favor Zakir because, unlike Baradar—who never set foot in Afghanistan since the Taliban's collapse in late 2001—he frequently visits insurgent units in the field, giving them advice and listening to their complaints. For more than a year, Zakir, who is in his mid-30s, has largely been in charge of insurgent operations in the south of Afghanistan."

It appears initially that the capture of Baradar could in fact result in more harm than good, at least over the next 6-9 months. Although his removal from the critical Deputy position disrupted Taliban command and control and planning, the Taliban was clearly able to appoint a replacement relatively quickly who is highly respected, experienced, and less willing to consider reconciliation than Baradar reportedly was.

On a related note, the announcement of dual deputies is quite interesting and may offer possible opportunities to drive a wedge between the senior Taliban leadership. Clearly, the recent capture of several top Taliban leaders has disrupted the internal leadership structure and might have caused paranoia and infighting that we could exploit. We need to continue to develop a better understanding of the current structure and relationships within the Taliban's Inner Shura in order to identify potential weaknesses and select the best individuals to target, both kinetically and non-kinetically.

For more background on Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir, check out my previous post here.

Next in Line: Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir?

By now, we’ve all heard the great news of Mullah Baradar’s capture. As most analysts and experts agree, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was a vitally important figure within the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) – overseeing the day-to-day operations of the group, developing and enforcing the recently released Taliban “Code of Conduct,” serving as an intermediary to Mullah Omar, and running the Taliban’s Shura (and associated sub-committees) based in Quetta, Pakistan. For an excellent profile of Mullah Baradar, check out this article from Newsweek and for some insightful analysis on the potential implications of his capture, check out great articles from The Economist, Josh Foust at Registan, and Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal.

While it’s absolutely critical to examine the events leading up to Mullah Baradar’s capture and the implications of his capture on US policy and operations in the wider Af-Pak region, I’d like to focus on a more immediate question: Who will replace Mullah Baradar? And (closely related) who should the US focus on next within the Taliban? Based on my research and analysis, the answer to both is clear: Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir aka Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul.

Mullah Zakir, born circa 1973, is an Afghan citizen from Helmand province who has been involved with the Taliban movement for the majority of his life. Zakir was a senior fighter during the Taliban regime in the 1990s. In a memorandum prepared for his administrative review board at Guantanamo, Zakir stated he, "felt it would be fine to wage jihad against Americans, Jews, or Israelis if they were invading his country." In 2001, he surrendered to US and Afghan forces in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif as the regime was collapsing. He spent the next several years in custody, was transferred to Guantanamo around 2006 (listed as ISN #008), then to Afghanistan government custody in late 2007 (in Block D of the Pul e Charkhi prison), and was eventually released around May 2008. For more on his circumstances of capture and subsequent release, see these excellent articles from the UK Times Online here and here. Also, for summaries and full transcripts of all three of Zakir’s Guantanamo release boards, check out his Wikipedia entry here.

As Seth Jones (from RAND) explains in his excellent profile, Mullah Zakir wasted little time rejoining his Taliban brothers in their fight against ISAF and ANSF forces, quickly assuming another high-level position within the organization as the Overall Emir for South Afghanistan (responsible for a huge area including the vital provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, the Taliban’s primary safe haven and command and control (C2) base as well as the logistical hub for Taliban supply, finance, and drug smuggling). Clearly, the fact that Mullah Zakir was appointed to such a prominent position almost immediately after his release speaks to his stature within the organization and helps to confirm reports of his close relationship with both Mullah Omar and Mullah Baradar. Mullah Zakir quickly developed a reputation as a charismatic and effective leader, helping to increase the level and severity of IED attacks across RC-South while simultaneously bolstering the Taliban shadow governance system and minimizing Taliban excesses that could cost them valuable popular support among locals.

In fact, multiple reports suggest that Mullah Zakir was one of the primary authors of the 2009 Taliban Code of Conduct (along with Mullah Baradar). This document (and the enforcement of its provisions) has been critical during the Taliban’s campaign to bolster their control and influence across the country, especially in RC-South – where ISAF leaders have chosen to focus the initial elements of the US “surge” beginning with Operation Moshtarak in Marjah. In addition to his prominent role as the overall emir of South Afghanistan, I also assess that Mullah Zakir plays an important role within the Taliban’s Shura (“council”), which oversees and plans all QST operations from Pakistan. He is likely the de-facto replacement for Mullah Dadullah Lang (EKIA in May 07) as the Chief of the Taliban Military Commission and is also assessed to run the important Accountability Commission (responsible for implementing the Taliban Code of Conduct and acting as the Taliban’s version of “internal affairs”). As the head of these two committees, Mullah Zakir essentially runs both the Taliban’s lethal and non-lethal operations across the entire country, making him an extremely influential leader within the organization.

In the wake of Mullah Baradar’s capture, we can expect the Taliban to choose a competent, experienced, and well-respected replacement. An individual who understands both the lethal military aspects of the fight as well as the equally important imperative to win the support of the local Afghan populace. Mullah Zakir fits this description perfectly. In fact, as Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal notes, it appears that one of the first Taliban commanders to confirm Baradar’s capture in a telephone interview with Bloomberg was none other than “Abdul Qayam,” likely identifiable with Mullah Zakir. I’m confident that our expert interrogators and analysts are already working with the Pakistani Army (and ISI) to fully exploit Mullah Baradar, likely with the primary focus of developing lines to Mullah Omar. Hopefully they are also developing actionable intelligence on other key QST leaders, particularly Mullah Zakir. I expect that Zakir’s influence and importance will increase significantly now that Mullah Baradar is out of the picture.