From Pakistan to Times Square?

As usual, Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has some excellent exclusive coverage of the latest claims made by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). In a video recently posted to YouTube (and since removed), Qari Hussein Mehsud - one of the TTP's top explosives experts - took "full responsibility for the recent attack in the USA."

Mehsud explained that "this attack is a revenge for the great and valuable martyred leaders of the mujahideen"- listing Baitullah Mehsud (killed in August 09), Abu Umar al Baghdadi (AUAB), and Abu Ayyub al Masri (AAM).


Additionally, the TTP sent a videotape and audiotape to the Long War Journal that were intended to serve as proof of life for Hakimullah Mehsud, who was initially thought to be killed in an airstrike in January. In the video (produced on 04 April), Mehsud specifically warned of impending attacks in the US, saying "The time is very near when our fedayeen will attack the American states in their major cities...and god willing we will give extremely painful blows to the fanatic America."

Although it's impressive that the TTP's media wing (Umar Studios) was able to so quickly capitalize on the failed attack in Times Square, I believe it's unlikely that the Pakistan-based group was actually responsible. My primary reasoning for this assessment is the method/TTP employed in the attack - which has been reported as a very crude device made of 3x propane tanks, 2x jugs of gasoline, dozens of M-88 firecrackers, and a metal gun case holding 100x lbs. of fertilizer (which police said was incapable of exploding). The only possible explanation for the TTP using such a crude bomb would be that is served as a "test run" to gauge our response/reaction prior to one or more follow-on attacks with more sophisticated devices.

Looking forward, it will be critical for NYPD and federal officials to conduct a detailed exploitation of all evidence (videotapes, detonation device, biometrics, etc.) to determine who was actually responsible. Unfortunately, I believe this attack could mark the beginning of what I predict will be a series of VBIEDs that will strike targets across the US in the coming months/years. The increased use - and success - of the VBIED TTP in both Iraq and Afghanistan by Al Qaeda and affiliated groups (and in several other areas where the group operates) makes it almost inevitable that we'll see this TTP migrate to the US.

Hakimullah Mehsud Update

Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud (L) sits beside Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal Al-Balawi, the suicide bomber who killed CIA agents in Afghanistan on 30 Dec, in this still image taken from video released January 9, 2010

We continue to see conflicting reports from Pakistani authorities and TTP leaders/spokesmen on the possible death of Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan).

Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal provides two great updates on the situation here and here. Both sides have released public statements in the last 1-2 days, while US intelligence officials continue to provide no confirmation one way or the other. Today, Maulvi Noor Jamal aka Maulvi Toofan (a TTP commander who reportedly took over for Hakimullah) issued a statement saying, "Hakeemullah was neither killed nor I have been appointed acting emir of the Taliban."

Contrasting the Taliban statements, the Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik also released a statement claiming he had "credible information" that Hakimullah was in fact dead, but he offered no concrete evidence. Unfortunately, Malik has been wrong several times before with his claims of dead insurgent leaders, in particular when he claimed that Hakimullah was killed in a clash back in Aug 2009 over who would succeed the recently killed Baitullah Mehsud.

Although no credible evidence exists either way (due in large part to the inability of Pakistani forces to even operate in the area where Hakimullah was reportedly killed - near the city of Multan), I believe that Hakimullah is in fact dead or gravely injured. The persistent nature of the rumors of his death have typically been enough to justify a videotape, but this time we saw a highly unusual statement at the end of January from Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq who claimed that the TTP didn't have to release a video to prove Hakimullah was alive. I strongly believe that if Hakimullah was able to make a video, it would have already been released by now to assuage concerns stemming from the rumors of his death. The lack of a video and the bizarre rationale for not releasing anything are in my opinion the strongest proof that Hakimullah is in fact dead (or so seriously hurt that he cannot be filmed in his current state).

Al Sahwa will continue to monitor the situation and provide updates as they become available.

Pakistani Taliban Leader Dead?

Reports continue to circulate claiming that Hakimullah Mehsud, the current leader of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), is dead after suffering wounds from a mid-January drone strike. Several Pakistani officials have claimed that Mehsud had died sometime at the end of January based on "word of mouth" (aka HUMINT) confirmation, according to a report today from ABC News. However, US intelligence officials have yet to confirm the EKIA reports and the TTP was quick to issue a statement denying the death of their leader. According to Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal, reports of Mehsud's death are premature. Hakimullah's spokesman (Azam Tariq) issued a statement saying, "Hakimullah is alive and safe." Additionally, one of Mehsud's subordinate commanders, and a potential successor, (Qari Hussein Mehsud) called the Pakistani press to issue a similar statement.

For further background on Mehsud and the key role he plays within TTP, check out JD's excellent profile here and this article from the CTC Sentinel.

If in fact the reports are true, we are likely to see another potential struggle over who would take over leadership of the TTP (similar to the reported infighting that occurred after the August 2009 death of the former TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud). The top three contenders to assume the key role include:

• Wali-ur-Rehman, the young deputy leader who functions as the group's operational commander


• Qari Hussein, who oversees the suicide bomb program and is Hakimullah's cousin


• Saeed Khan Mamozai, a local commander from Orakzai tribal agency

Al Sahwa will continue to monitor open-source reporting and provide updates and analysis on this critical story as more information becomes available.

Multiple Groups Claim Responsibility, But Only Hakimullah Mehsud Has The Video to Prove It.

I was quite surprised this morning to see a Taliban propaganda video on CNN with the Jordanian suicide bomber sitting next to Hakimullah Mehsud. I have yet to see anyone mention his name since the focus of the story is about Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi's reasons for Martyrdom, see the video here.

Mustafa Abu al-Yazid provided a statement from Al Qaeda stating this attack was in retaliation for not only the death of Baitullah Mehsud but also, Abu Saleh al Somali (AQ external operations cheif), and Abdullah Saeed al-Liby (leader of Lashgar al Zil)

The Taliban in Afghanistan claimed credit for the attack on FOB Chapman on December 31. They claimed the bomber was dressed as an Afghan National Army officer.

Bill Roggio's August 26 post covers Hakimullah Mehsud's retaliatory threats to the United States. The interesting part of this story is that Humam Khalil's motivation was to avenge the death of Baitullah Mehsud. He never mentioned the death of the Shadow Army leader or AQ External Operations Chief. It is possible that the video was shot prior to the drone strikes that killed Abu Saleh al Somali and Abdullah Saeed al-Liby. If that was the case, then we might be able to assume that Al Qaeda played some role in the FOB Chapman attack. This could be an opportunity to learn more about the dynamics of the AQ, TTP, and HQN operational relationships as this story unfolds. It seems right now that AQ is attempting to gain some credit for an attack they did not perpetrate. If this attack was planned and executed solely by Hakimullah Mehsud's TTP, we can now assume that Hakimullah is becoming a transnational threat. Prior to the release of the TTP's propaganda video, I thought Al Qaeda was the only group capable of recruiting a Jordanian as a triple agent.

We need to continue our analysis of this event in order to confirm or deny the TTP's increase in capabilities, or identifying what roles the HQN and AQ played in conducting this particular attack.

Who's Who The Terrorist Edition: Hakimullah Mehsud

Hakimullah Mehsud

Occupation: Leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), "Student Movement of Pakistan", Taliban's militant umbrella group in Pakistan

Born: 1978

Education: Madrassa-e-Daraul Aloom Sharia. He reached the 8th grade, then dropped out to attend religious studies. He made it to the 5th grade and dropped out once America started Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001.

Employer: A mix between the Taliban Shura Council choice as the leader of the TTP and a possible Deputy to Siraj Haqqani (most likely a relationship due to mutual enemies)

Career Highlights: Succeed Baitullah Mehsud as leader of the TTP following his death on August 5, 2009 from a Predator Drone strike. Prior to Baitullah's death, Hakimullah was one of his primary body guards/deputies, as well as acting as the TTP's media spokesman. Prior to leading the TTP, Hakimullah lead attacks against NATO supply convoys traveling through the Khyber Pass. The LWJ reports that the Khyber Pass was closed 6 times due to Hakimullah's attacks. He also led a campaign of suicide bombings targeting pro-Pakistani Government Tribal leaders. Hakimullah Mehsud may have orchestrated the Jordanian suicide bombing against the CIA at FOB Chapman, which would be his greatest career highlight.

Family: Son of Abdullah Din Mehsud. Hakimullah is from Ashangai Tribe (sub tribe Kharmat Khel) He has two wives, one from the Ashangai Tribe, and one from Orakzai Agency. He also has 4 younger brothers and 4 younger sisters. He stated his brother Ijaz was a Shaheed or Martyr.

Address: Due to his high leadership profile, Hakimullah has to keep his locations a secret or he will end up like his predecessor Baitullah. In the past we know he has operated in the Arakzai, Khyber and Kurram Tribal Agencies in the FATA. He is also likely to frequent both South and North Waziristan.

Assessment: Hakimullah Mehsud is part of what I am calling the "2nd Generation Taliban." He was too young to take part in any of the Mujahideen operations against the Soviets in the 80's. I believe this will lend to an even more radicalized version of the Taliban focused on attacking the Pakistani government and American interests abroad.

Looking at the Taliban through Darwin's eyes

CTC Sentinel has an interesting article about Hakimullah Mehsud. I don't want to rehash the entire article, but there is one fact that was not covered due to the scope of the article that I would like to point out and maybe spur dialog amongst the awake.

Early on in the piece the Sentinel states that Hakimullah is different from his predecessors because he was too young to fight the Soviets. This is a point that I would bet most of us haven't thought about. As this war progresses I believe there will be a shift from the "Old Guard" to the new kids on the block that may have drastic implications. It's speculation but most people believe that Uday and Qusay were going to be more ruthless than daddy. I think we should start to categorize the Taliban leadership between the former CIA supported Mujahdeen and the current CIA targeted Taliban. Now obviously some from the former category are still leading the current one but there are some ideological differences between the old guard and the up and coming Taliban. The Soviets drew first blood and it was a noble fight for the Muj. Al Qaeda not only brought with them the military might of America but also radical teachings of Jihad to the youth. As I am writing this the Madrasas in FATA/NWFP are cranking at full steam. As the Sentinel points out Hakimullah and many of his peers didn't complete their religious training before they joined the fight, I wonder what parts of the Koran are not covered until the end? I think there will be a tipping point as more radical individuals join the fight. If the Taliban becomes increasingly radical, will we see Anbar style disenfranchisement from the Afghani/Pakistani locals? The Sentinel also points out that Hakimullah has a possible sectarian agenda. In Iraq the insurgency exploded much in part from AQI fanning the flames. In Afghanistan there was already a network of fighters and tribal leaders that were solidified in their roles. I think it is possible that Al Qaeda's methodology may have taken longer to catch fire in Afghanistan and Pakistan because the Taliban already had a working system where in Iraq there really wasn't the same infrastructure. The last thing I want to add is I instantaneously started to think about this topic as I read the Sentinel, I haven't had a chance to do any actual research on this.

JD

Taxicab Confessions Part II: Putting the Attacks in Context

As I pounded the pavement tonight with some of the DC Striders (a great running club I'm in; check them out here), I tried to put the recent conversation I had with my Pakistani cab driver into a broader context. All I was left with were some initial thoughts and more questions, but I wanted to share them briefly:

Clearly, the recent surge of attacks across Pakistan (primarily targeting security forces and civilians in the major urban centers of Islamabad, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Lahore) is quickly turning public opinion against the Pakistani Taliban. Hundreds more died today in several attacks and it feels like momentum for more attacks continues to build. As I ran through the dark streets of DC (thanks to Daylight Savings Time), I tried to understand how the Pakistani populace must feel. Ultimately, I think a "siege" mentality must be setting in or at least beginning to form. Remember that most of these areas are not used to any violence beyond the normal crime of a major city. Now, seemingly everywhere they turn, suicide bombers are blowing themselves up. So, who is winning and who is losing in the eyes of the populace:

Pakistani Government: The current government, headed by Ali Zardari -widower of Benazhir Bhutto - is quickly losing face as its unable to provide security. According to many reports, the local populace places most of the blame on the government's inability to stop the Taliban.

Taliban (Pakistan Wing): The dramatic surge in attacks since the beginning of October has likely alienated all but the most radical supporters of the Taliban. Most of the locals view them increasingly as puppets of AQ proper (bin Laden and cronies). So far, they are the biggest losers. What I still can't quite understand is whether their continued appetite for violence is really a tragic flaw (that will eventually end them) or whether they have some grand plan that has yet to play out? I'm not sure what the calculus of the new leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, is yet...or if there is any?

Pakistani Army: With the Army making a huge PR show of its ongoing operations in Waziristan, the local populace continues to most strongly support the Army (as it has for many years in this country - thus their propensity for coups). As the government continues to lose support, we must ask who will gain it? The logical answer is the Army, led by Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. Quickly becoming a rising star, and reportedly an increasingly outspoken critic of Pres. Zardari, Kayani is a major player.

So, the logical question (at least for us conspiracy theorists out there) is: When a new trend starts occurring, we must consider who stands to benefit most from it. In this case, it seems plausible (although not certain) that the Pakistani Army is gaining significant support from these attacks - especially when combined with the perception amongst the populace that they're the only ones trying to do something to stop the attacks (the Waziristan operation). I hate to ask this: but is it possible that some elements within the Pakistani Army (or its ruthless intelligence wing, the ISI) could be responsible for the surge in attacks? I wouldn't necessarily put it past them...