Exploiting the Rift in Taliban Leadership

As I discussed in a previous post, it appears that there may be a potential rift developing among the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban. Last month, the Taliban officially announced their plan to replace Taliban Deputy Leader (and de facto leader of day-to-day operations) Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar with two different individuals - an unusual move that prompted many to question the decision of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. According to multiple reports, all military operations would be overseen by Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir (for more on him, see my previous post here) and all logistics/support operations would be the responsibility of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor.

A recent article in the UK's Times Online provided additional insight into this developing rift, quoting sources within the Taliban and on the ground in Afghanistan who have confirmed the growing tensions within the Taliban's Inner Shura (top council of leaders). According to a tribal elder in Southern Afghanistan with strong links to the insurgency, "When Mullah Baradar was arrested, Mullah Mansoor thought he would be his replacement...when Zakir was introduced as the defense minister, [Mansoor] was disappointed." According to the report, this resentment has caused a bitter power struggle between the two, forcing subordinate commanders to choose sides. Mullah Mansoor, who was appointed as the Kandahar province shadow governor in 2007, felt he was the logical choice to run all military operations in the Southern region. He reportedly asked the Taliban's leadership council for military control of Helmand and Kandahar after Baradar was detained, but his efforts were blocked by Mullah Zakir and his supporters. Zakir, who is also from Helmand province (and spent several years detained at Guantanamo Bay) and has a reputation as a brutal and aggressive fighter, replied that, "I'm the defense minister. I control all of Afghanistan, we should work together."


As US and ISAF forces continue shaping operations in preparation for an offensive in Kandahar, it will be critical for us to take advantage of this growing rift within the Taliban's ranks. US and partner ISAF forces should make this a major information operations (IO) theme and interweave it within both their lethal and non-lethal operations. During key leader engagements (KLEs) and shuras, leaders should draw attention to the feud, gain more information about it, and highlight the fact that Taliban leaders are only out for themselves and care little about the people of Afghanistan. If the results of the poll quoted above are truly representative of the people's sentiment in Kandahar, then we have a long way to go in terms of discrediting the Taliban. The rift theme should also be heavily played upon in IO products to support our lethal targeting and exploitation operations - making a concerted effort to leave stay-behind fliers/leaflets and spread the word that different leaders and commanders are turning on each other and providing information to US forces. This will help to exacerbate the already-existent feud and increase paranoia across the organization. I've seen firsthand how effective this can be in dividing insurgent organization and creating additional targeting opportunities for US and partner forces.

Shifting Focus to Kandahar

As the US continues to build combat power as part of the Afghanistan surge, GEN McChrystal has already telegraphed his next major move - into the strategically vital Kandahar province. Recognizing the importance of Kandahar city (and its surrounding towns/villages), US forces are planning to focus several of the additional BCTs arriving in Afghanistan in the province. Additionally, McChrystal and ISAF are re-organizing the Regional Command (RC) structure in the South to split the existing RC-South into RC-SW (Helmand) and RC-SE (Kandahar). RC-SW will be led by a Marine 2-star and RC-SE will be led by British MG Nick Carter (the current RC-South commander). Beginning in 2011, a US commander will take over RC-SE and focus the command on conducting operations in Kandahar.

Just as in the recent operation to clear and secure Marjah in Helmand province, the US has developed a comprehensive plan to improve security, governance, essential services, rule of law, and economic growth in the area considered to be the birthplace of the Taliban. And, just as in Marjah, the most difficult objective will likely be to make improvements in governance amidst a highly complex political and tribal landscape [for more background on Kandahar, check out this excellent open-source primer from The Institute for the Study of War]. As Frank Ruggiero, the top US civilian official in Southern Afghanistan explained in a recent Wall Street Journal article, "Kandahar is a political problem...and the campaign in Kandahar will be led by governance." In addition to improving governance across the province's ten districts, it will also be critical to strengthen the rule of law, maintain the delicate tribal balance, and weaken several key power-brokers who wield more influence than the "official" government leaders.

Governance

ISAF forces definitely have their work cut out for them when it comes to improving governance in Kandahar (both at the provincial and the city level). As I've discussed in previous posts, the "official" Kandahar government is in competition with the Taliban's shadow governance structure, which is recognized by many locals as more effective and responsive than the provincial government led by Kandahar Provincial Governor Tooryalai Wesa. A childhood friend of President Hamid Karzai, Wesa is regarded by many as ineffective at best (and also has a reputation for corruption). As Ruggiero explains, "The specific objective is to make the Afghan government a more viable option for people to turn to...it's to show that the government has more relevance to their lives vis-à-vis the shadow governance of the Taliban."

Currently, the provincial government is essentially holed up in their offices in Kandahar City, unable to exert influence/control into most of the province's 17 districts. As explained in a recent NY Times article, there is much work to be done at the district level. One local explained that in Kandahar proper, “The Taliban can walk around, and government officials cannot.” Outside the city, it is worse. Government services barely exist. Only 5 of 17 districts in the province are accessible for government officials. Administrators and police chiefs are appointed to the districts, but they have so little backup and so few resources, they can do little. With 40 to 60 police officers in each district, they can barely guard the district center. Health services and education are virtually absent outside the towns, and two-thirds of the province’s schools are closed, human rights officials say.

Thus, one of the major objectives of the ISAF campaign in Kandahar will be bolstering the local district governments, making them more powerful and able to respond to the needs of their residents. Many have argued that the district level is where we truly need to focus our efforts, and I tend to agree. With ineffective and often corrupt provincial level leaders (who are usually close personal friends of Karzai), our best bet is to empower the district leaders to allow for true "community-level" governance.

Power Brokers - Karzai and Shirzai

The crux of the challenge lies in the need to limit the power of a small group of power brokers who have a death grip on the provincial budget and wield power based on their control of the provincial council, ties to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and a monopoly on lucrative security and reconstruction contracts. In essence, real power rests with just two families who have prospered under the presence of American forces in the past eight years. One of them is the family of President Hamid Karzai, who is represented here by his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who heads the provincial council. The other belongs to Gul Agha Shirzai, the former governor of Kandahar, and his brothers Bacha Shirzai and Razziq Shirzai, who have gotten lucrative security and construction deals with NATO forces. Residents and elders accuse the families of persecuting rivals and excluding all other tribes from access to power. Their domination has undercut any popular backing for the government or the foreign forces supporting them.

As the New York Times recently explained, “The first thing Afghans fear is the coming of more foreign troops, and the second thing they fear is the empowering of the current leadership and administration,” said Shahabuddin Akhunzada, a tribal elder from Kandahar city. His Eshaqzai tribe has complained of repeated arrests and political exclusion. The West’s acceptance of Mr. Karzai’s re-election despite widespread fraud was the last straw, he said.

Much attention has been centered lately on the murky past of Ahmed Wali Karzai, in particular his potential links to the illegal opium trade and involvement with the Kandahar Strike Force, a paramilitary element allegedly run by the CIA. In a recent NY Times article, Dexter Filkins discusses the controversial decision of ISAF and US leaders to allow Ahmed Karzai to remain in power in Kandahar despite his alleged ties to the drug trade and potentially to Taliban figures in the region. I tend to agree with several ISAF/NATO officials who argued for Ahmed Karzai's removal (much as Bing West has recently argued for Hamid Karzai's removal). The problem, though, is who (or what) do we replace him with?

I think David Ignatius was onto something with his recent Washington Post op-ed when he discussed "re-balancing" the Kandahar power elite. My proposed strategy to do this would draw on the concepts of sub-national/community-level governance advocated by COL Chris Kolenda and call for the empowerment of district level leaders (whether tribal or other) who could better represent the interests of their people and offer some competition for the Wesa-Karzai-Shirzai factions who control most of the provinces resources right now. Although risky, if ISAF elements are able to find, vet, and empower solid leaders at the district level and funnel resources and money directly to them, it could eventually create some competition for the Kandahar provincial leaders and also eliminate some of the feelings of disenfranchisement that many locals feel right now.

We will continue to see this debate play out in the coming months as ISAF/US forces continue shaping operations around Kandahar and begin the clear/hold phase of the operation. Ultimately, though, there will be no enduring success in Kandahar (or Afghanistan at all) until we're able to establish an effective and legitimate alternative to the Taliban's shadow government.

Governance in Marjah

As the Afghan flag was raised over Marjah at the end of February and President Karzai made his second trip to the town on March 7, it was clear that the hardest part of the campaign to make enduring improvements in the key southern town remains. During Karzai's recent visit, it was clear that the main issue on the minds of most locals was likely: How will this operation really change anything and make my life better in the long run?

Already, there are early indications of a return to the way things were before. As I discussed in my previous post, there are three main challenges that lie ahead: 1) Providing enduring security with ANSF (ANA and ANP forces) that are viewed as legitmate and competent by locals; 2) Providing an alternate source of income in the wake of large-scale poppy eradication efforts; 3) and 3) Providing improved local governance and the district and sub-district level.

In my mind, the most important (and most daunting) of these challenges is the governance piece. A recent must-read article by Radio Free Europe provides the best open-source analysis I've read to date of the governance challenges we face in Marjah. The article gives an excellent quote from Azizullah Khan, a prominent local elder in Marjah, who sharply questioned/criticized Karzai during his last visit. Azizullah explained the current dilemma that the people of Marjah face:

"For the past eight years the warlords have been ruling us. Their hands have been stained with the blood of innocents and they have killed hundreds of people. Even now they are being imposed on the people in the name of tribal and regional leaders. People are afraid to convey the real feelings of locals because they sense themselves to be in danger from all sides."

Khan pleaded for the government to ensure security, remove any military presence from schools and private homes, compensate locals for losses resulting from the recent fighting, and help rebuild schools, clinics, and irrigation canals. His most impassioned and telling appeal, however, was for Karzai to avoid repeating a past mistake: Do not hand over control of local affairs to former militia commanders or other "people with influence."

This last statement was clearly a reference to the current battle over influence/control of the Marjah district governor position. As I discussed last week, two individuals (both backed by different elements at the national level) are currently vying for control - Abdul Zahir (the "official" civilian leader that was appointed by the Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal) and Abdul Rahman Jan (the former police chief/local warlord who is recognized by many as the most powerful "strongman" in the area). During the last few weeks, Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) has formed a 50-man "Marjah Executive Committee" in a clear move to re-consolidate the power he previously had (until he lost control to the Taliban over the last 2-3 years). During the time that he held sway, he was known as brutal, corrupt, and mostly ineffective. Yet, in the wake of Operation Moshtarak he's making another bid to capitalize on the power vacuum left behind after the Taliban were pushed out. Abdul Zahir, appointed by Provincial Governor Mangal (recognized by ISAF leaders as quite an effective leader) is also mounting a campaign to gain influence. It will be very difficult given perceptions among the local populace that Abdul Zabir is an outsider.

During the weeks to come, it will be crucial to monitor this tenuous situation. ISAF leadership must work to further legitimize Abdul Zahir, who is definitely the "least worst" option for the crucial post of Marjah district governor. Additionally, as we look forward to planning and preparations for possible large-scale operations in/around Kandahar, we must consider how we'll fight a similar battle there to install a leader who is viewed as more legitimate than the current de facto team of powerbrokers (Ahmed Wali Karzai - the President's brother and head of Kandahar provincial council, Gul Agha Shirzai - former Kandahar provincial governor, and Muhammad Arif Noorzai).

AfPak Update

Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al Amriki, was reportedly captured by Pakistani forces in Karachi.

Wanted to highlight a few important developments in the AfPak region:

1) According to multiple reports coming out of Pakistan, senior al Qaeda spokesman and leader Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al Amriki was captured by Pakistani Special Forces in Karachi. For more details, check out Bill Roggio's excellent post at the Long War Journal. If the initial reports are true, this would be a significant capture. Gadahn has quickly risen within the ranks of AQ's senior leadership over the last several years (in part due to his value to the organization as an American citizen). Successful and rapid exploitation of Gadahn could potentially provide actionable intelligence on senior AQ leaders, including Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al Libi. More to come on this topic as details continue to emerge...

2) Operation Mostarak continues in Marjah (in the southern Afghan province of Helmand). While most of the significant military operations have ended, the more difficult task of transitioning from "clear/secure" to "hold/build" is now occurring. The best coverage and analysis I have seen on the way ahead in Marjah is Josh Foust's writing, both in his recent NY Times op-ed and on his blog Registan. Based on my analysis of the situation, the three greatest challenges facing ISAF and ANSF elements in Marjah are:

• Establishing a government that is both capable and recognized as legitimate by the local populace. Currently there is a battle for control between two individuals - Abdul Zahir (the "official" civilian leader that was appointed by the Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal) and Abdul Rahman Jan (the former police chief/local warlord who is recognized by many as the most influential "strongman" in the area). Abdul Zahir will face an uphill battle to be recognized as legitimate amid reports of his criminal background and, more importantly, his reputation as an outsider. US leaders in Marjah will have to walk a fine line between trying to prop up Abdul Zahir, while minimizing the legitimacy of the more-popular (or at least more-feared) Abdul Rahman Jan. This will be the single-most important part of the entire campaign and right now I'm not sure we're backing the right guy.
• Providing an alternative source of income to the majority of farmers in the area whose livelihood depends on poppy cultivation. As the Christian Science Monitor reports, Marjah has long been recognized as a critical hub in the opium trade that flourishes across Southern Afghanistan. ISAF and ANSF elements have already begun their "government-led eradication" campaign and locals are not pleased. The Taliban has recognized this as a major opportunity to win support and are tailoring their IO messages to highlight the fact that ISAF and the new government are doing more harm than good by stopping poppy growth, and at the same time providing no alternative. For more on the challenges and complexities of eradicating the opium trade in Marjah (and Helmand), see this excellent article from TIME.
• Building capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). As ISAF draws down the number of troops in Marjah, it will become critical to have a competent and trusted security force of locals who can hold the city and prevent the return of the Taliban. Currently, most locals have little trust or faith in the ANSF, especially the ANP who are widely viewed as more corrupt than the Taliban. Several reports from embedded reporters during the operation have highlighted the challenges ahead in improving the performance of the ANSF. CJ Chivers has some excellent analysis in the New York Times, where he highlights the resistance of locals to support the ANP elements being brought to Marjah. One local elder commented to the US commander, "We’re with you. We want to help you build. We will support you. But if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death." Also, check out this excellent article from several days ago by Chivers that describes the poor performance of the ANSF during the clearance operations in Marjah.

3) Finally, I just wanted to link to an excellent book review written by Dexter Filkins and published in The New Republic this week. Filkins reviews the book "In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan," by Seth G. Jones (from RAND). I recently finished the book myself and highly recommend it. Jones provides an excellent summary of the last fifty years in Afghanistan, providing great context for anyone interested in understanding the various forces and events that have brought us to the current point we're at in Afghanistan.

As usual, Filkins writing is masterful (just as it as in his book The Forever War) and I recommend his book review as a stand-alone article. Entitled, "The American Awakening," the article presents a clear, concise, and well-reasoned assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan, highlighting both the progress we've made and more importantly the challenges that lay ahead. If you don't have time to read Jones' phenomenal book, you should definitely check out Filkins' article.

Sustainable Strategy: Mid to High Exploitation

Did it all start with an accident? Since Taliban military commander, Mullah Baradar, was seized by ISI on 8 February, a second prominent leader, Mullah Kabir, operating within the inner circle of Quetta Shura, has been reportedly captured. Now, the latest confirmation of the arrest of nearly half of the Taliban leadership (7 of 15), most of whom are thought to be active decision-makers in Quetta Shura, seems almost surreal. Andrew Exum, Fellow at CNAS and Author of Abu Muqawama even asked, "Woah, did Pakistan just arrest half of the Quetta Shura?"

You must read and bookmark as a reference Bill Roggio's intelligence report on Afgahn Taliban's top leaders. Bill raises an important point, stating, "It remains to be seen if the sustained US offensive and possible future detentions in Pakistan will grind down the Taliban's leadership cadre." I am concerned here with what is sustainable for US [and ISI] counterterrorism officials to dismantle and defeat not only Taliban leadership but also al-Qaeda leadership and the like, including but not limited to ASMM (Al Shabaab merger with Hizbul Islam), AQAP, AQIM, LeT, etc.

According to logic, the disruption of leaders within Quetta Shura shows us that if we capture a senior-level leader then we can exploit higher. Can this strategy take us all the way? "Much of the Quetta Shura [is] in custody now," but we should not fail to point out that it may really have begun with actionable intelligence targeting two shadow governors in Karachi. One aspect of our plan we must examine is whether the sustainable strategy is and/or remains to be a mid-tier one that enables counterterrorism officials to exploit personalities and sources, locations and havens, materials and routes.

Of course, the rule is to exploit higher when one has the sources and methods to do so. However, we must still strategically decide how to actively dismantle and defeat inner-circles of leaders in networks for which we do not have senior-level commanders in custody - either by accident or actionable intelligence - such as those mentioned above, ASMM, AQAP, AQIM, LeT.

In this case, due to the recognizable (but minimally measured) inter-network collaboration between the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and LeT, it is possible that additional operations can disrupt planning and execution of plots or even lead to the capture of other personalities. As reported by The Nation (Pakistan) on 4 December, 2009;

“Al-Qaeda sees using the Taliban in Pakistan and groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba as ways to destabilise Pakistan and even try to provoke a conflict between India and Pakistan that would inevitably destabilise Pakistan,”US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said on Friday. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Gates said the US has evidence which suggest that the al-Qaeda aims at destabilising Pakistan. “We have evidence that al-Qaeda is helping them pick targets, do operational planning, helping them in their effort to try to destabilise the Pakistani government,” Mr. Gates told lawmakers in response to a question. “The other piece of this that does not include the Taliban or that -- apart from the Taliban is, we also know that al-Qaeda is helping the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the terrorist group that carried out the bombings in Mumbai,” he said. Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, said: “I certainly agree with the nexus (between al-Qaeda and the LeT), and I have watched it over the last year to two, that these groups are coming together... Secretary Gates talked about the linkage between the LeT and Al Qaeda.”

Shall we continue to advocate for a sustainable strategy of attack that targets mid-tier personalities? What promotes the best method of exploitation from here moving forward in targeting affiliate and/or other networks; North Africa, Somalia, Yemen? I will take an accident, especially one that leads to a surreal result, but I think it wise to plan according to the nature of the beast(s) and the threat(s) we face: Each operational environment varies, and is morphing (as seen in the recent growth of Al Shabaab).

Next in Line: Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir?

By now, we’ve all heard the great news of Mullah Baradar’s capture. As most analysts and experts agree, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was a vitally important figure within the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) – overseeing the day-to-day operations of the group, developing and enforcing the recently released Taliban “Code of Conduct,” serving as an intermediary to Mullah Omar, and running the Taliban’s Shura (and associated sub-committees) based in Quetta, Pakistan. For an excellent profile of Mullah Baradar, check out this article from Newsweek and for some insightful analysis on the potential implications of his capture, check out great articles from The Economist, Josh Foust at Registan, and Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal.

While it’s absolutely critical to examine the events leading up to Mullah Baradar’s capture and the implications of his capture on US policy and operations in the wider Af-Pak region, I’d like to focus on a more immediate question: Who will replace Mullah Baradar? And (closely related) who should the US focus on next within the Taliban? Based on my research and analysis, the answer to both is clear: Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir aka Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul.

Mullah Zakir, born circa 1973, is an Afghan citizen from Helmand province who has been involved with the Taliban movement for the majority of his life. Zakir was a senior fighter during the Taliban regime in the 1990s. In a memorandum prepared for his administrative review board at Guantanamo, Zakir stated he, "felt it would be fine to wage jihad against Americans, Jews, or Israelis if they were invading his country." In 2001, he surrendered to US and Afghan forces in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif as the regime was collapsing. He spent the next several years in custody, was transferred to Guantanamo around 2006 (listed as ISN #008), then to Afghanistan government custody in late 2007 (in Block D of the Pul e Charkhi prison), and was eventually released around May 2008. For more on his circumstances of capture and subsequent release, see these excellent articles from the UK Times Online here and here. Also, for summaries and full transcripts of all three of Zakir’s Guantanamo release boards, check out his Wikipedia entry here.

As Seth Jones (from RAND) explains in his excellent profile, Mullah Zakir wasted little time rejoining his Taliban brothers in their fight against ISAF and ANSF forces, quickly assuming another high-level position within the organization as the Overall Emir for South Afghanistan (responsible for a huge area including the vital provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, the Taliban’s primary safe haven and command and control (C2) base as well as the logistical hub for Taliban supply, finance, and drug smuggling). Clearly, the fact that Mullah Zakir was appointed to such a prominent position almost immediately after his release speaks to his stature within the organization and helps to confirm reports of his close relationship with both Mullah Omar and Mullah Baradar. Mullah Zakir quickly developed a reputation as a charismatic and effective leader, helping to increase the level and severity of IED attacks across RC-South while simultaneously bolstering the Taliban shadow governance system and minimizing Taliban excesses that could cost them valuable popular support among locals.

In fact, multiple reports suggest that Mullah Zakir was one of the primary authors of the 2009 Taliban Code of Conduct (along with Mullah Baradar). This document (and the enforcement of its provisions) has been critical during the Taliban’s campaign to bolster their control and influence across the country, especially in RC-South – where ISAF leaders have chosen to focus the initial elements of the US “surge” beginning with Operation Moshtarak in Marjah. In addition to his prominent role as the overall emir of South Afghanistan, I also assess that Mullah Zakir plays an important role within the Taliban’s Shura (“council”), which oversees and plans all QST operations from Pakistan. He is likely the de-facto replacement for Mullah Dadullah Lang (EKIA in May 07) as the Chief of the Taliban Military Commission and is also assessed to run the important Accountability Commission (responsible for implementing the Taliban Code of Conduct and acting as the Taliban’s version of “internal affairs”). As the head of these two committees, Mullah Zakir essentially runs both the Taliban’s lethal and non-lethal operations across the entire country, making him an extremely influential leader within the organization.

In the wake of Mullah Baradar’s capture, we can expect the Taliban to choose a competent, experienced, and well-respected replacement. An individual who understands both the lethal military aspects of the fight as well as the equally important imperative to win the support of the local Afghan populace. Mullah Zakir fits this description perfectly. In fact, as Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal notes, it appears that one of the first Taliban commanders to confirm Baradar’s capture in a telephone interview with Bloomberg was none other than “Abdul Qayam,” likely identifiable with Mullah Zakir. I’m confident that our expert interrogators and analysts are already working with the Pakistani Army (and ISI) to fully exploit Mullah Baradar, likely with the primary focus of developing lines to Mullah Omar. Hopefully they are also developing actionable intelligence on other key QST leaders, particularly Mullah Zakir. I expect that Zakir’s influence and importance will increase significantly now that Mullah Baradar is out of the picture.

Battle for Marjah: Operation Moshtarak

For weeks now, we’ve heard and read media reporting discussing the upcoming major Marine offensive into the town of Marjah (located in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province) – a major Taliban stronghold and narcotics hub that serves as the Taliban’s command and control (C2) center for the province. The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) commander, BG Larry Nicholson, publicly announced the upcoming operation several weeks ago – a decision likely intended to encourage local residents (who number approximately 50,000) to leave prior to the attack as well to illustrate the willingness of ISAF forces to face the Taliban head-on. The offensive, named Operation Moshtarak, is being billed by ISAF leaders as the first major battle of the Afgan surge – making it a “must win” in terms of gaining the upper-hand in the critical Information Operations (IO) battle against the Taliban. Nicholson has bluntly stated, “We intend to go in big, strong, and fast.”

Clearly, the Marines are looking to send a strong message to the Taliban, hedging their bets that most of the local fighters will either melt away or be defeated, allowing ISAF and ANSF forces to be viewed as the winner for the first time in years. The jury is still out on whether Nicholson’s gamble to announce the operation ahead of time will pay off. So far, initial reports state that most of the residents (up to 90%) have yet to leave Marjah, likely because of intimidation from heavily entrenched Taliban forces. Additionally, insurgents have reportedly constructed tunnels and bunkers, brought in heavy weapons, set booby traps and strewn landmines around Marjah. One local Taliban commander, Qari Fazluddin, told Reuters some 2,000 fighters were ready to fight in Marjah, the group's last big stronghold in the southern province. "We don't have jets and tanks but we have already planted hundreds of roadside bombs to inflict high casualties on the invading forces," said Fazluddin, the Taliban commander. This may indicate that the Taliban’s stranglehold on the town and desire to maintain this control/influence is stronger than initially assessed.

As the Institute for the Study of War explains in their recently released report, the Marines (and other US and ANSF elements) have already begun initial “shaping” operations – including establishing parts of an outer cordon, securing key routes in and out of the city, and precision targeted raids against top Taliban leaders in the area. So far, we have already seen:

• BG Nicholson and Afghan Brig. Gen. Mahayoodin Ghoori held a shura, or leadership council, several days ago with Marjah’s most important district elders where they encouraged them to convince residents to stay inside once the fighting begins


• Begin­ning on 04 Feb 2010, Afghan and British troops launched a helicopter and ground advance south through Nad Ali towards Marjah


• On 06 Feb 2010, the British press reported that U.S. Navy SEALs and British Special Forces began infiltrating the town, airlifting in on “kinetic” missions during the night. It was later reported that as many as fifty specifically targeted insurgents were killed during the raids. The following day, coalition forces dropped leaflets which were aimed primarily at the militants, listing several of their commanders by name and warning fighters to leave the area or be killed.


• On 09 Feb 2010, the pace of the shaping operations increased. Approximately 400 troops from 5/2 Stryker Brigade along with 250 Afghan Army soldiers and their thirty Canadian trainers moved to take up positions northeast of Marjah.

Based on these initial indications, major clearance operations are likely to begin in the next few days, with two Marine battalions serving as the core of the assault force. 3/6 Marines (along with their partner Afghan National Army BN) have already occupied a temporary outpost seven miles north of Marjah and are completing final preparations before moving south. 1/6 Marines (with their partner ANA BN) conducted a series of air assault operations to seize the area known as the “Five Points” a key intersection east of Marjah where the main route in the area (Rt. 601) intersects with the Bolan Bridge (which spans the Helmand River and connects Marjah to the provincial capital of Laskhar Gah). According to embedded reports, Taliban militants attacked the joint force almost immediately with heavy machine gun, rocket, and small arms fire. Although the Marines (and RC-South) have yet to announce the “formal” start of operations, it sure sounds like things have kicked off. I would expect full-on, large-scale clearance operations to begin in the next 24-48 hours.

More important, though, than “going in hard and fast” with offensive clearance and capture/kill operations will be what the ISAF forces do once they occupy the town and how long they stay to hold the critical terrain. So far, I am encouraged by what ISAF has planned in terms of non-lethal operations to support the Marjah clearance. The Washington Post reports that ISAF has already designated a dedicated “civilian reconstruction team” (read mini-PRT) to move into Marjah post-hostilities. Additionally, an American team also is working with the Karzai government to deploy a contingent of Afghan civil servants. To encourage Afghans to serve in Marjah, the government reportedly plans to increase the average monthly salary for such personnel from $60 to about $300. Once Marja is secure, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development plan to assist farmers in planting crops and rehabilitating the canal network, a project the United States began more than 50 years ago and has yet to complete.

Additionally, the Afghan government plans to provide a more enduring security presence in the area. Yesterday, Hanif Atmar, the Afghan interior minister, told a group of about 350 elders from Marja’s main tribes that when Operation Moshtarak ends about 1,000 police officers will be assigned to help keep the Taliban out – composed mostly of local residents. “Give me your sons,” Mr. Atmar said, “and we will make a national police force with them.” These ANP forces will be bolstered by US elements that will likely remain in the town for several weeks, occupying temporary outposts as they stand up local government councils, begin projects to improve essential services, and dissuade the Taliban from returning. With a limited number of troops available, however, ISAF will not be able to remain here in force for too long. Within 1-2 months, I would expect a minimal ISAF presence (maximum of 1x US BN), making it difficult to consolidate any gains in the long-term.

Whatever ISAF and ANSF forces stay behind will not only have to battle the Taliban for influence, but will also need to provide an alternative to poppy that can provide some sort of sustained, long-term economic support for the local populace. Although the Taliban may be brutal and extreme, they have served as good business partners for the people of Marjah for several years. A recent Reuters article highlights this challenge: "Our poppy business is booming under the Taliban. We don't want the government, we want the Taliban," said Abdul Ahmad, a farmer. "When the government destroys our only income, why should we support it?" Ensuring long-term economic (and political) support to locals is necessary to ensure the militants do not come back. "If this operation is a show of force then it is not going to work," said Haji Usman, a Marjah tribal elder. "The government needs to bring all public services that we are looking for -- schools, clinics, mosques, electricity and jobs for young boys to get busy instead of fighting for Taliban."

Let’s hope that ISAF forces heed Haji Usman’s advice and are able to achieve three critical and enduring effects with Operation Moshtarak: 1) clearing the town of Taliban fighters; 2) holding the physical terrain and retaining influence over the populace; and 3) building local capacity in terms of governance, economy, and essential services in order to provide an enduring alternative to the Taliban. Failure in any one of these difficult objectives will not only mean a loss in Marjah, but will also have strategic implications in terms of building momentum and support for the Afghanistan surge.

Afghanistan: Two Important Reads

Wanted to share links to two important documents that were released/leaked today. I'm bogged down with work at my "real" job so far this week, so don't have much time for analysis. Both are well worth a read if you have a chance...

1) Ambassador Eikenberry's Afghanistan Cables - leaked to the NY Times and published today. Read the summary article here and view the full document below:

Eikenberry Cable - Afghanistan

2) MG Flynn's Afghanistan Assessment (from 22 Dec): published by Peter Bergen at CNN. Although the full document is not viewable, the content outlined in Bergen's article sounds very similar to the slides I shared from COL Thompson (MG Flynn's deputy) several weeks ago in a previous post here. Key highlights from Flynn's assessment include:

• The Taliban's organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding and the group is capable of much greater frequency of attacks and varied locations of attacks.
• The insurgency can now sustain itself indefinitely because of three factors: 1) The increased availability of bomb-making technology and material; 2) The Taliban's access to two major funding streams, one from the opium trade and the other from overseas donations from Muslim countries, which reach the Taliban by courier or through a system of informal banks known as "hawalas" that operate across much of the Islamic world; and 3) The Taliban's continuing ability to recruit foot soldiers based on the perception that they "retain the religious high-ground," and factors such as poverty and tribal friction.
• Detained insurgents said the Taliban saw 2009 as the most successful year of the war, because violence had expanded and because the Afghan presidential election on August 20 was marred by low turnout and fraud. Detainees also told interrogators that the Taliban see al Qaeda as a handicap - a view that is spreading as the Taliban try to present themselves as a nationalist group seeking to liberate Afghanistan from foreign forces.
• The Taliban are effectively creating a parallel government, in competition with the Kabul government. [For more on the Taliban's shadow government, see my recent post here] The Taliban's strategy in 2010 includes expanding into the north and west of Afghanistan, where the Taliban traditionally have had scant support; continuing aggressive operations during winter, when warfare has traditionally eased in Afghanistan; and increasing Taliban influence around the key cities of Kabul and Kandahar.
• Taliban weaknesses include: disagreements among local Taliban leaders, the group's dependence on marginalized ethnic Pashtuns, and over-reliance on "external support," a reference to Taliban havens in Pakistan.

Taliban's Shadow Government: “Community-Level” Governance

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially released the State Department’s “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy” on Thursday [read the full report here]. The NY Timesprovides a great summary of the key elements of what has been referred to by many as the “civilian surge” in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). Explaining that, “Our civilian engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan will endure long after our combat troops come home,” the report goes on to outline several key initiatives including: 1) a civil-military agriculture redevelopment strategy; 2) efforts to improve governance at the provincial, district, and local level, where most Afghans encounter their government; 3) a bolstering of justice and rule of law programs; 3) support to Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al-Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system; and 4) a complementary expanded civilian presence at both the national and local levels to implement these initiatives.

While it’s encouraging to see Secretary Clinton embrace the State Department’s important role in a “whole-of-government” approach, it will be a long and extremely difficult struggle to improve governance and essential services at the community level (district/village). Ultimately, until the people of Afghanistan see their local government meeting their basic needs, their only other option will be to turn to the Taliban. It’s clear from recent reports in Afghanistan that the Taliban has the upper hand right now in terms of influencing the “key terrain” of Afghanistan – the local populace. As Clinton explains, “The Afghan government is under assault from the Taliban and struggling to provide security, jobs, and basic justice to a society devastated by 30 years of war.”

In the remainder of this post, I will discuss the greatest obstacle the US faces in its efforts to successfully implement this civil-military strategy: the Taliban’s “shadow government.” As GEN McChrystal’s Afghanistan assessment highlighted this summer, the Taliban has established a formalized “shadow government” system across the country, with Taliban shadow governors appointed in 33 of 34 provinces. The ISAF assessment provides a good summary of the roles and functions of these shadow governors in providing an alternative source to meet the people’s needs in terms of governance, essential services, and justice:

“The QST [Quetta Shura Taliban] has a governing structure in Afghanistan under the rubric of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a body to receive complaints against their own "officials" and to act on them. They install 'shari'a' courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment. In short, the QST provides major elements of governance and a national and religious narrative.”

The Times of London provides an excellent profile of what the shadow government looks like on the ground in a recent article here. Highlighting the story of a local woman, Habiba, who lives inJaghatu district, Wardak province, a short drive south of Kabul, the article tells the story of her attempt to resolve a dispute between her husband and a neighbor over water rights. Habiba traveled for hours to see Mullah Zafar Akhund, the Taliban’s shadow governor for the district.Within a matter of days, he had ruled on the dispute and sent several Taliban fighters to Habiba’s village to enforce his decision, something that the local government had been unable to accomplish for months. Another neighbor of Habiba’s summarized his similar experiences with the Taliban’s justice and governance system, explaining that, “If you complain to the Government it takes years; they ask you for bribes and you have to go to their offices every day…That’s why people choose the Taliban.” For more background and coverage of the Taliban’s shadow governance efforts, also check out this excellent story from the Washington Posthighlighting the Taliban’s shadow government in Laghman province, this article from McClatchythat discusses the increasing Taliban efforts in RC-North, and my previous post on the Taliban’s shadow government in Nuristan province.

As these articles illustrate, the greatest challenge in countering this shadow government will undoubtedly occur at the community level, particularly in the multitude of districts and villages across Afghanistan’s South and East. Clinton clearly recognizes this, stating, “The provinces and districts are where our most consequential programs will be delivered, where we must help the Afghan government provide economic opportunities that increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency – and where we are most visibly expanding our civilian commitment.” But will our efforts be enough? While the Taliban has an extensive network of governors, ministers, intelligence sources, and fighters to rely upon, the US currently relies primarily on our Soldiers and Marines. Clinton’s civilian surge will help by more than tripling the number of civilians on the ground to over 1000, but this still pales in comparison to the numbers that the Taliban already has in place.

So, what’s the solution? Clearly, we all agree on the need to greatly increase the number of civilian advisors at both the national and local levels. But what should they be focused on? And how can we leverage the thousands of troops stationed across the country to compliment the “civilian surge”? In his must-read article published in the most recent issue of Joint Forces Quarterly, COL Chris Kolenda offers one solution. His article, entitled “Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level,” essentially advocates the “population-centric COIN” approach outlined in FM 3-24 (and emphasized by GEN McChrystal in his recent COIN Training Guidance), but with a major focus on providing governance at the local community level. Rejecting the argument that Afghanistan is incapable of governing itself, Kolenda explains that, “The current state of weak and bad governance is at the heart of political dissatisfaction, not the existence of government itself. Although several institutions have made significant progress and many national level ministers have proven quite capable, the same is not true at the subnational levels where the government meets the people.” In Kolenda’s plan, the main effort must be to re-establish capacity at the local level to provide basic governance, requiring “mobilization at community rather than tribal levels.” This runs counter to the arguments of many (like MAJ Jim Gant in his paper “One Tribe at a Time”) who have recently advocated engagement at the tribal level as the best (and only) method for success.

Kolenda argues, correctly in my opinion, that, “The community level will be decisive – and that support is entirely up for grabs.” By focusing our efforts on community leaders (which would include a combination of local government and tribal leaders, selected based on an informed intelligence analysis of key local power brokers), we can mobilize a segment of the populace that to this point has been on the fence, essentially afraid to commit in any one direction. Kolenda highlights this sentiment with a quote from a local elder who explains, “We are robbed by our government, bombed by international forces, and beaten by the Taliban.” We must win the support of this target audience in order to tip the balance in our favor and away from the current de facto power brokers – the Taliban shadow government. In order to do this, Kolenda offers three specific recommendations to improve sub-national governance: 1) increasing the numbers of technical experts at provincial and district levels to help develop basic public administration systems while providing necessary overwatch to ensure accountability; 2) expanding the concept of official governance by incorporating traditional structures such as village and district shuras to provide an effective check and balance to district officials through programs like The National Solidarity Program Community Development Councils and District development Assemblies (similar to the bolstering of the NACs and DACs across Iraq to complement the military surge operations in 2007-2008); and 3) developing and establishing effective local dispute resolution mechanisms that can outmatch the rough justice meted out by extremists like Mullah Zafar and other Taliban shadow governors.

Clinton’s plan is a good first step and it at least mentions the importance of focusing our limited resources at the local level. However, in reality, most of the State Department’s focus is still at the national level, with very few resources being pushed down to improve governance at the district/village level and create bridges between Karzai’s government and the provincial/district government entities. In order to truly tip the scales in our favor, we need to drastically increase the number of civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan and we must ensure that they are focused to provide effects at the critical point – the community level. If we don’t do this right, we risk missing the opportunity to exploit the improved security provided by the military surge, leaving us without an enduring system of local governance that can replace the Taliban.

The Exchange: Stay Ahead of the Cycle in Yemen

The reason why Josh's latest series of posts is extremely important is because it enables us to determine the operational attack strategies and methods of Al-Qaeda. Terrorists intend to spread a political message through violent activity, and continuously target economic sources and activities to do so. A 2007 RAND (Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy) study entitled, "Economically Targeted Terrorism," explains that Al-Qaeda either attacks a) interdependent economic streams to break down activity, such as transportation, or b) economic networks that spread effects, such as food or water contamination.

AQ's ability to plan and execute either small or large-scale attacks relies on their own economic stability; i.e. funding. "Truly hobbling a large, stable economy is likely to be beyond the means of most terrorist groups. However, a variety of potential terrorist operations could produce sufficiently...sizable numbers of casualties and damage or destroy large amounts of property..." It is important to identify that the objectives of AQ are witnessed in two ways, namely, to generate a) broad disruption and/or b) large-scale destruction.


Ironically, but not surprising, the economic stability of AQ depends largely on the economic instability of other nations. This is a trend that I established concerning the criminal activity of trafficking. AQ thrives in impoverished areas. For example, The Economist declared that the worst country on earth in 2010 is Somalia, home of "piracy, poverty, and perdition." Similarly, Al Shabaab calls it home, too: "...according to the UN’s World Food Programme, more than 40% of the population need food aid to survive, and one in every five children is acutely malnourished. The constant fighting has internally displaced more than 1.5m people, with a third living in dire, makeshift camps. Aid workers have been able to supply them with less than half the daily water needed."

Conditions such as these have caused both the US and international agencies, such as the UN, to provide financial, nutritional, and military support. As I discussed with US Operation Restore Hope, scenarios as the one Somalia and other countries face - as they have faced in the past and continue too now - can be miscalculated and result in financial loss and/or military conflict. As The Economist article states, "The world's most failed state, regrettably, threatens to become a bigger problem for the rest of the world."


Sadly, this theory holds true, as the 2009 worst country on earth was none other than Afghanistan. Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institute, identified Afghanistan as the first crisis region in a report entitled, "Four Global Crisis Spots." He discusses the strategic opportunities for the US as well as the multi-disciplinary resources needed to counter terrorist growth, increased violence, and social and economic hardship.


Mr. O'Hanlon's former colleague (Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, 2006-2009) and now US Ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, has recently co-authored "Confronting Poverty" with Susan E. Rice - (December 2009). He argues that due to the connections between poverty and fragile states, "alleviating poverty and shoring up weak states are not only humanitarian and economic imperatives, but key components of a more balanced and sustainable US national security strategy." The "War on Terror" has taught us - and shown us over and over again more than we like - that the most sustainable US strategy should not focus on singular states but interconnecting states within a region, as AQCL is now affiliated with terrorist and criminal organizations operating throughout regions like a spider. It is a chess game.


The most effective counterterrorism strategy, then, is forward thinking, matrix-like, and multidimensional, especially when combating a morphing and expanding ideology and image, tactics and strategies. My colleague, Pat, makes a fantastic point, stating: "As we consider the future of irregular warfare and terrorism, it’s critical to monitor the threat posed by regionally-based terrorist groups who become increasingly mobilized in line with a global Islamist ideology." Pascual/Rice argue that the US needs to "invest in poverty alleviation and capacity building in weak states to break the vicious cycle of poverty, fragility, and transnational threats." If The Economist's theory holds true again, then we need to act now in order for the cycle not to worsen in Yemen; for our common human experience alone shows that once the cycle begins it is rarely broken but only slowed or subdued.


We need to stay ahead of the emerging, developing, threat of Yemen becoming the fertile land of AQCL and/or affiliates. As a result, AQAP and Al Shabaab, and perhaps AQIM's, tentacles will grow: The region will become within the next decade the haven for AQ to plan micro and macro terrorist plots targeting economic activities and networks to generate broad rupture and/or large-scale destruction. Al Sahwa does not want Yemen to be the worst country on earth in 2011. If so, then criminal activities such as trafficking will regularly occur like it has in Afghanistan and social displacement will increase as witnessed in Somalia. As stated before, the scenario "threatens to become a bigger problem for the rest of the world."


In conclusion, Yemen is directly connected to Afghanistan and Pakistan; it is gradually becoming the rook of AQ. In order to stay ahead of the cycle in Yemen, the US needs to win The Exchange by taking the rook and using the knights (Iraq, Afghanistan - forking) and the bishop (Pakistan - endgame) to our advantage: We will set ourselves in a strategic location to successfully disrupt, dismantle, and work towards defeating the morphing and expanding AQCL and affiliates.