Bin Laden Claims Christmas Day Plot

Al Qaeda Central leader, Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the Christmas Day bomb plot in a video released by Al Jazeera. He called Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab "an heroic warrior" similar to AQ 9/11 terrorists.


The time between the attempted attack and OBL's message is enough to think that this is an attempt by the leader himself to project his supremacy. Also, it is a follow-up opportunity to spread AQ's false ideological message once again, as documented in al Sahwa's mission:
"Under the banner of the blessed awakening which is sweeping the Islamic world...Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy - your enemy and their enemy - the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one's own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam"
(Osama bin Laden, Aug 1996).

Department of State spokesman, P.J. Crowley, is correct is stating that this is an attempt to remain relevant. I think OBL's actions here may internally anger AQAP leadership who most likely planned the attack independently.

As you may know, al Sahwa has been engaging in dialogue about whether or not AQ is structured and strategically operating as a conglomerate, or if the conventionally accepted theory remains true that AQ is a franchise. OBL's message presents good reason for further exploration on this matter, as it helps to determine an effective counter-terrorism targeting strategy.

I propose examining OBL's rhetoric, as it will undoubtedly identify his overarching philosophy: Palestine. He stated in today's message that it is "unfair for the West" to live as it does while "brothers in Gaza [suffer]." Accurately assessing where his "heart" lies, what he is knowingly concerned about, why he repetitively acknowledges the reason for continuing jihad, will enable professionals to understand and target past attacks. Most important to our mission, it will empower us to project future attacks.

Examining the leader's rhetoric will also enable us to identify the aligning ideologies of AQCL affiliates and determine whether or not they are actually a part of a "franchise" or "conglomerate" base. For example, AQAP is concerned with liberating Muslims throughout the Arabian Peninsula,while LeT seeks to liberate Muslims in India (Kashmir). The ideological thread will further highlight the correlation between where ideologies differ and how attacks are planned and executed.

In conclusion, what I think is happening - and my colleagues will most likely agree with me on this point - is that AQ and its affiliates are collectively strengthening their efforts to bring the jihad directly to the US. Even though OBL's message was delayed, it is important to point out that he still successfully has the perceived ability to reach his AQ network. The Christmas Day attempt was only one of many plots against the US in 2009. Especially due to documented increase of the use of the internet, jihadists, either American-born or foreigners to the US homeland, will continue to seek religious and tactics training in Yemen and Pakistan [amongst other nations].

AQAP & A Central Question We Must Ask

The Christmas Day attack has sparked, and rightly so, a rigorous debate surrounding a central question that we must ask at this time: Is AQAP legitimately advancing, and if so, what is it advancing - ideology, tactics, strategy, operations?

Scholars Christopher Boucek, Associate in the Middle East Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Leah Farrell, author of the blog, All Things Counterterrorism, offer insight into the historical and contemporary workings of AQAP.

Boucek holds, in an interview conducted 29 December, that AQAP "...pose a serious challenge to U.S. and regional security efforts. For one, plotting against targets on U.S. soil represents an expansion of the al-Qaeda affiliate's ambitions..."

On the other hand, it seems Farrall takes a different line, stating;
"Bottom line: There is very little that is new here. AQAP has always had an external attack capacity and sought to use it. It has always recruited internationally...The only *new* thing here is the type of device used and reaction to the plot. But even in terms of IED’s, AQAP has always been on the sharp end of the stick when it comes to innovation."

Despite the differences in viewpoints, in either case there is something new that is emerging because it is not the same in nature and scope. I think we simply cannot put our finger on the exact aspect that is morphing, namely the ideology, tactics, strategy, and/or operations. We must ask the following subordinate questions whether the case be that AQAP is expanding ambitions or continuing to recruit internationally:
a) Who is providing funding to support these activities, and has the funding increased?
b) What materials are being trafficked into the network, and from where?

The answers will give hint as to who AQAP is talking to, if it has changed and to what degree, and how the relationship(s) is advancing. This investigative process will also, by default, determine if AQAP has the capacity to advance internally - which would be the worst case as Josh explains here.

But Boucek reminds us of the larger picture, identifying for us the type of situation that we are seeing at the moment:
"There have been reports for about the last six months saying that there have been al-Qaeda operatives fleeing Pakistan and the Tribal Belt in Pakistan and Afghanistan--leaving [and] fleeing to Yemen and Somalia."

The geo-political issue now facing the region has more meaning, as Boucek states, "The terror group's rise occurs at a time of growing security and economic challenges besetting Yemen's central government--from civil war to a shortage of oil and water. If left unchecked... conditions may ripen for al-Qaeda's further entrenchment in Yemen...The fear is that al-Qaeda-aligned or affiliated organizations will make use of these under-governed spaces to plot and plan and train to mount operations inside Yemen and beyond."

Is this a trend or a cycle of AQAP's ebb and flow as Farrall argues:
"I wrote back in September that I thought AQAP had reached a position similar to what it had in 2003, and as such it would seek a broader operational ambit and permission for external attacks against N America, as it did in early 03. All the indicators were there...How did I know that? Well for starters I watched AQAP congeal online in early 02 and I have their founding documents, their guidelines, objectives and rules of conduct and lists of what detachments they formed–right down to the oath recruits were to take. I’ve watched them ever since because I find the group fascinating and...I know that this is not the first time AQAP has tried to attack in N America. It’s not even the second time."

Let us return to our question to identify what we are seeing happening at this moment.

What if the the advancement is larger than one sole issue. Is there reason to think that the emergence is occurring at the level of communication; in the way that terrorists affiliates talk to one another? Conventional wisdom holds that many lines of communication are informal, ad hoc. With the possibility of Al Shabaab aiding AQAP by crossing the Gulf of Aden and the continuous uncovering of a growing recruitment effort by these entities in Europe and America - including the efforts by LeT - there is reason to project that the terrorist "franchises" are operating with business savviness.

The innovation may be occurring at the organizational level, but we are focusing on the entity level only; i.e. growth of Al Shabaab. Groups may be beginning to talk intra-organizationally. This would cause a systematic shift in ideology, tactics, strategy, and operations. The shift need not be small but only effective; it need not be complex, but only coordinated.

Therefore, when asking the question, "Is AQAP legitimately advancing(?)," we must ask also the connecting questions:
1) Is Al Shabaab advancing?
2) Is LeT advancing?
The answers may lead us, in some way, to better understand the organizational interconnection (and the growth), if there is one, between the "franchises." It would also help us understand further the recruitment efforts of these entities transnationally, involving persons from the Virginia Muslims (Pakistan), Minnesota Somalis (Pakistan), and UK Nigerians.

Terrorists may now be seeing the benefit(s) of working together to execute transnational attacks.

Headley Pleads Not-Guilty

David Coleman Headley (formerly Daood Gilani) pleaded not guilty to nine felony accounts in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and three separate counts from 2005 for plotting attacks against the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten. Pertaining to the Mumbai attack charges, Headley is cited as the key individual responsible for surveillance and reconnaissance of the Mumbai attack locations, and the harbor where the ten Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives came ashore.

LWJ has a great article today on David Headley’s activities in Mumbai, and his background including a 1998 heroin smuggling charge.

For a background prep/refresher on the group, read Pat’s 27 November post here.

Lashkar e Tayyiba: Mumbai and Global Ambitions?

As usual, this month’s edition of the West Point CTC Sentinel is packed full of excellent and timely articles. In particular, their headline piece detailing the background and recent activities of the Pakistan-based Lashkar e Tayyiba (LeT) is well worth a read. Also, the WSJ has a great summary of the group here.

This Thanksgiving (Nov 26th) marked the one-year anniversary of LeT’s horrific attack against multiple targets across Mumbai – significant not only because of the attack’s high casualty rate but also because it was LeT’s first attempt to propel themselves onto the global stage by focusing on a “Western” target set. For a riveting account of the attacks, check out HBO’s recent documentary “Terror in Mumbai,” which overlays video of the attacks at multiple sites with real-time voice intercepts gathered by Indian intelligence. It’s fascinating and chilling to hear the attackers on the ground being directed over cell phone by their controllers many miles away in Pakistan, representing a new shift in TTPs. It was clear throughout the attacks that the LeT controllers’ main objective was to gain global media attention and ensure that all ten attackers martyred themselves (only one attacker survived).

For more background on the initial formation of LeT, their ties to Pakistani intelligence (ISI), a history of attacks, details of the Mumbai attack, and the group’s current disposition, check out the following resources:

-Lashkar e Taiba Wikipedia entry (here)
-RAND “Lessons of Mumbai” Report (here)
-Carnegie Endowment Mumbai Attack Site (here)
-MSNBC Detailed Timeline of Mumbai Attacks (here)

As we consider the future of irregular warfare and terrorism, it’s critical to monitor the threat posed by regionally-based terrorist groups who become increasingly mobilized in line with a global Islamist ideology. Although LeT remains primarily focused on targeting Indian interests in the short-term, I believe there exists a growing element within the group who desire to “go global” and parallel the path of AQ. Some reports also argue that LeT is increasing their cooperation with AQ and the Pakistani Taliban – an alarming trend based on the strong presence and large numbers of fighters that LeT has in the tribal regional of NW Pakistan. It will be very important to continue to monitor this group and potential splinter groups who may attempt another attack on Western interests in the next 2-3 years, especially across the border into Afghanistan.

We must also look to similar emerging threats from what have traditionally been regionally-based groups in Northern Africa (GPSC becoming AQIM), East Africa (al Shabaab movement in Somalia), Yemen/Saudi Arabia (AQAP), etc. Although these groups continue to primarily draw popular support and recruits based on local/regional grievances, elements within them are forming increasingly strong bonds with AQ proper (based in the AfPak region). These "AQ affiliates" have the potential to dramatically increase the global reach and capabilities of the group in the next 5-10 years if left unchecked.