Terrorism on Trial: Agility is Our Greatest Tool

Introduction: Poll Data
Two weeks ago, we Editors of al Sahwa requested you share your thought in response to our first-ever poll question, "How should suspected terrorists be tried in the United States of America?" The majority, 44%, concluded that terrorists ought to be tried on a case-by-case basis.

This past week, we asked a more particular question, "How should KSM be tried in the United States of America?" The majority, 58%, think he ought to be tried in a military tribunal while 37% think that a civilian trial ought to proceed.

Our Tool: Legal Agility

The US is engaged in a war against al-Qaeda; we seek to dismantle their expanding operational environments and counter their narrow apocalyptic narrative. It is consistently re-iterated that our leaders need to utilize every tool we have mastered and continue to develop innovative ones that are intellectually intuitive and mechanically strong. All-the-while, AQ's ideological strategy and operational tactics shift and morph, often tailored to local strongholds while maintaining a "global jihad." Our tools that provided solutions earlier falter or lag in delivering results if we do not proactively and interactively stay ahead of the cycle.

We must be agile in our discernment on how to put terrorism on trial, and to aid our dialogue I assess here three separate yet interconnected cases. They are separate because they each have different circumstances, but they are interconnected because each highlights what type of enemy(ies) we are fighting. Both aspects can support our decisions on how to use our tools to dismantle and counter.

KSM: International Combatant

Much political back-and-forth continues to surround the case of KSM. I do think that such debate can cause confusion - an atmosphere I think AQ wants as a part of its Phase IV Strategy to disrupt our culture and values in aiding its targeting of economic and military structures - but also create fervent dialogue about who we are and what actions we need to take. We need to get it right in order to secure our freedoms.

KSM, by definition, is a international terrorist, an unlawful enemy combatant who planned and executed the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (and caused the crash in Pennsylvania) carried out on Thursday, September 11, 2001. As a part of Phase I of AQ Strategy, he spearheaded the most successful attacks from an international, geographical coordinates on the "Far Enemy," the infidel of the West. This was the beginning of the jihadi awakening, a showcase of AQ's operational power.

In short, KSM ought to be tried in a military tribunal according to the Military Commissions Act, which bestows authority on the President of the United States to establish such commissions to try an unlawful enemy combatant;

"(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who
has purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is
not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who
is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces);
or
‘‘(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of
the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense."

The political implications of where such a tribunal is held shall be debated and disputed by representative parties, but most importantly, this process restricts habeas corpus and/or the Brady Rule. Moreover, Subchapter I (Trial Procedure), Section 949d (Sessions), stipulation 3f seeks to safeguard classified information;
‘‘(1) NATIONAL SECURITY PRIVILEGE.—(A) Classified
information shall be protected and is privileged from disclosure
if disclosure would be detrimental to the national security.
The rule in the preceding sentence applies to all stages of
the proceedings of military commissions under this chapter.
‘‘(B) The privilege referred to in subparagraph (A) may
be claimed by the head of the executive or military department
or government agency concerned based on a finding by the
head of that department or agency that—
‘‘(i) the information is properly classified; and
‘‘(ii) disclosure of the information would be detrimental
to the national security.

Our legal system can in no way serve as an entry point for AQ, both Central and affiliates, to penetrate our process, procedures, and protocol.

In conclusion, having made the points that KSM ought to be tried in a military tribunal due to his status as an "unlawful enemy combatant" in alignment with his international operations as well as the process of safeguarding national intelligence, I think our legal tools inherent in the proceedings will pragmatically serve justice and define the US as a nation that is willing to use every masterful, logistical avenue we have to assist in the disruption and countering of AQ abroad.

Zazi: Transnational Combatant

Zazi, who recently pleaded guilty for his acts of conspiracy against the US in planning to execute an attack in NYC on the subways, is also an enemy combatant. However, is a transnational terrorist who was trained abroad and sought to carry out plans on American soil after receiving instructions from AQ conspirators. He purchased the materials in the US, drove a van in the US, resided here, ate, slept, and went to the bathroom here. (I am usually not this loose in my language, but wish to make a point). When considering the case of KSM, Zazi's intentions and acts certainly showcase a progression in the AQ Strategic Plan (Really, you must the report linked here): Operatives have been (and will continue to be) deployed to bring the fight to the far enemy in close quarters. Zazi used deception and deceipt while operating amongst the infidel who was his "Near Enemy," a term conventionally applied to US military soldiers and civilians "occupying" international countries.

Unlike KSM, Zazi was monitored, tracked, and arrested on American soil by FBI federal agents, which all give reason(s) to proceed with a civilian trial in accordance with the US Constitution, for example:

a) How due process shall be carried out;

1. Amendment Six: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
2. Amendment Seven: In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Zazi's guilty plea is good and useful, and was most likely facilitated through the leveraging of his parents' immigration status. However, even in light of this we must decide how habeas corpus and the Brady Rule, only two tools of many that can be used by suspected terrorists to delay the process, will affect civilian procedures and allow terrorists to ambiguously guise their fidelity to anti-American principles of justice. For example, Ghailani, a suspect in 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, has argued his right to a speedy trial has not been met and the charges against him must be dismissed.

In conclusion, the circumstances particular to Zazi's case fittingly serve to aid our efforts to dismantle and counter AQ in a civilian trial and promise to uphold and promote our legal values and traditions; although, I think issues will arise given the availability of rules like Brady. Our discernment does not end once the civilian trial ensues.

Conclusion: Agility & Abdulmutallab

More cases of international and transnational combatants are bound to present vague circumstances for the US legal system. When I was little, my parents bought me that wooden fraction set which taught me how to fit pieces in their rightful place; circles in circles, squares in squares, and triangles. The scenarios presented by AQ tactics and ideology are not as easy as fitting wooden pieces in their place, and Abdulmuttalab's case, I think, presents such a challenge.

Abdulmutallab is also an unlwaful combatant, but he is a terrorist that trained abroad and committed an act of terrorism while in transnational movement on an international flight destined for US. (Regardless of his failure to accomplish the act, thank God, his motive and intention is cause enough to call it a terrorist act). Is he, then, by definition, an international or transnational terrorist? He was only arrested on American soil. Like Zazi, the US pragmatically leveraged his parents as a resource for information, but unlike Zazi, arguments hold that his circumstances still give reason(s) for military tribunal even though a civilian trial will proceed.

Whether or not a military or civilian trial ensues, this is an oppotune time to establish the protocol for issuing miranda rights; to whom, when, and for what reasons. By no means am I, you, and/or our allies thankful for such an opportunity (as we work to prevent them at all times), but Abdulmuttallab's case begs us to formulate a structure particular to these circumstances that answers my initial question; namely, "How do we exploit our resources to be right and pragmatic; to ensure an outcome that serves justice and maintains processes and procedures?"

For one, current arguments support the allowance of time for suspects to first be interrogated and then read miranda rights. Although pragmatic, yes, the implications of these actions will reverberate as we consider the cases of international detainees at Guantanemo like Khadr, who's Defense argued "The procedures governing the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge and Military Judge in [his] Military Commission contravene Mr. Khadr’s right to be tried by a fair and impartial tribunal" as well as persons operating domestically like Hasan and the newly infamous, Jihad Jane. The Obama Administation may eventually argue to use "custodial interrogation" with suspected terrorists, which prescribes procedures during interrogation after miranda rights have been issued.

Moreover, our work will shape our domestic and foreign policies, and will certainly serve as an aid (or rebuttal of) legal procedures elsewhere: We shall consider those undertaken in Pakistan trying five men once operating in Virginia and another trying four men in a court in Duesseldorf. If we succeed, others will too. If we preserve, others will follow.

The process by which we put terrorism on trial will prevent terrorists from returning to battle, as I do not think it will stop terrorists from being recruited: AQ ideology targets also Western economic and social practices, along with military and civilian operations to generate recruitment efforts. With the expansion of operational environments and ever-morphing AQ tactics, a case-by-case method of legal proceedings will effectively and efficiently aid in the disruption and countering of international, transnational, or - most dangerous to our immediate security - domestic plots against the great nation of the United States of America because we will be able to consistently show how fortified we are; that we figured it out and no attack can decay who we are and what actions we take to safeguard our Nation, our values and traditions.

We have the agile tools to get it right the first time around, and for that matter, every time.

Crossroads: Al Qaeda & Biological Warfare, Literally

As has been linked on Challenge COIN and reported on The Long War Journal, a female suicide bomber killed 54 victims this past week in Baghdad during an annual pilgrimage to Shit'ite Islam's Holy Shrine in Karbala. The event was in celebration of the end of fourty days of mourning the death of Imam Hussein. (Read a fine historical description of Hussein and the tradition in the link provided). The female was wearing an abaya, covering herself from head-to-toe and thus successfully concealing the attached explosives.

The use of female suicide bombers is not new, but the question remains whether the tactic is a trend or a part of the terrorist toolbox. The Washington Post provides a listing of female suicide bombings in Iraq, five of which have been in Baghdad. In addition, see this report by ISI on activity throughout the Palestinian region. For further research, I suggest reading studies and papers from this academic guide, according to your particular interests.

This tactic is one of the many ways terrorists pierce US and ally national security methods, but [perhaps] one of the most dangerous aspects is its direct connection to socio-cultural traditions which are grounded by religious beliefs and practices. One of my advisors while a graduate student, Jocelyn Cesari, argues that tension continues to rise between Muslims and modernity. Currently, France is experiencing a struggle, once again: Shall the law permit Muslim women to wear a burka (usually interchanged with the term, niqab, meaning "veil") while in public space? The conflict is both internal, as Muslim women believe that wearing a burka is a religious testament to their behavior of modesty, and external, as politicians and citizens share their perspectives of national culture while security professionals argue that it presents a legitimate concern.
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*It is an important aside from the discussion to present a brief understanding of the concept(s) inherent in the belief of Muslim women wearing such clothing. For your information, even though I studied such concepts, Muslim scholars [and believers] will, on many occasions, argue that my perspective and analysis is not legitimate simply because I am not Muslim; i.e. I cannot speak Arabic and thus cannot know true interpretation. I understand this perspective, respectively.

Muslims testify the origin mainly to one of three or all three sources recited in the Qur'an. As follows, shar'iah jurisprudence and/or theological interpretation extends this practice to devout Muslim women. Scholars, and the faithful Ummah, divide on what is necessary to be and remain devout.

(1) Verse 53 of Surah Al-Ahzaab, which states (abbreviated);
"O you who believe, do not enter the Prophet’s houses unless permission is granted you, to enter by invitation...But when you are invited, enter, and, when you have had your meal, disperse...And when you ask anything of [his] womenfolk, in other words, the wives of the Prophet(s), ask them from behind a screen, a curtain. That is purer for your hearts and their hearts, than [entertaining] sinful thoughts. And you should never cause the Messenger of God hurt, in any way; nor ever marry his wives after him. Assuredly that in God’s sight would be very grave, as a sin."

(a) Scholars argue that the verse offers restrictions as well as etiquette for Muslim men when having visited Prophet Mohammad's home. Further, it is taken to mean that the Prophet's wives shall not be coveted even after his death; for visitors needed to remain pure of heart. Lastly, the message sought to, at the time, dispel any false rumors about the Prophet and/or his wives that may ridicule him, his image, and/or message.

(2) Verse 59 of the same, Surah Al-Ahzaab, which reads;
"O Prophet! Tell your wives and daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks closely over themselves (jalābīb is the plural of jilbāb, which is a wrap that covers a woman totally) — in other words, let them pull part of it [also] over their faces, leaving one eye [visible], when they need to leave [the house] for something. That makes it likelier that they will be known, to be free women, and not be molested, by being approached. In contrast, slavegirls did not use to cover their faces and so the disbelievers used to pester them. And God is Forgiving, of any occasion in the past when they may have neglected to cover themselves, Merciful, to them in His veiling them."

(a) Scholars hold that this serves as a command for men to prevent social abuse on behalf of their wives. As above, it is extended to all faithful men and women who believe such behavior is devout in the name of Allah and the Ummah.

(3) Verse 31 of Surah an-Nur, which reads;
"And say to the faithful women to lower their gazes, and to guard their private parts, and not to display their beauty except what is apparent of it, and to extend their headcoverings (khimars) to cover their bosoms, and not to display their beauty except to their husbands, or their fathers, or their husband's fathers, or their sons, or their husband's sons, or their brothers, or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their womenfolk, or what their right hands rule (slaves), or the followers from the men who do not feel sexual desire, or the small children to whom the nakedness of women is not apparent, and not to strike their feet (on the ground) so as to make known what they hide of their adornments. And turn in repentance to God together, O you the faithful, in order that you are successful."

(a) One additional point of meaning exposed here is that women could only shown themselves to close relatives, a practice believed to have originated with the Prophet.

____________________________________________________________________

Debate is on-going concerning the use of heightened security measures to prevent terrorist attacks on the US homeland vis-a-vis international and domestic flights; in particular focus is the topic of body-image scanning devices by TSA in airports. Just as professionals and analysts work hard every day to stay ahead of the morphing enemy, so too do AQ planners and operatives. Yet again, a new method uses biological implants of PETN. And yes, scientific experts believe that full-body devices will not be able to see tiny explosive packages hidden within muscle, tissue, cartilage, and/or organs.

It is a different tactic - and a step above - than that previously used by the "Butt Bomber," Ibrahim Assiri, who inserted explosives into his rectum; or the underpants bomber, Farouk Abdulmutallab. Now, Muslim doctors are returning to aid AQ after receiving top-notch medical training in Europe, this time to surgically implant PETN into women's breasts. It is probable, of course, that this tactic is not limited to women, as we should deduce that men may receive implants in, for example, their buttocks.

The connection of terrorist attack methods, then, however great it is to socio-cultural factors, is also related to criminal methods used in operations such as trafficking [which my colleague, Josh, also discussed here].

So, what to do?

As I discussed previously on countering AQ's Phase IV Strategy, "...the deterioration of all US/Western economic and legal structures lies at the heart of the long-term strategic plan of AQ. This method of deterioration that causes our confusion will increasingly be paired with direct attacks on the US homeland." I established here that the deterioration is also connected to socio-cultural traditions, that which is defined/shaped in many ways by the legal and economic frameworks practiced by our great nation.

For one, we can begin by coupling information warfare with civic engagement, as my colleague, JD, argues. Internationally, it requires military campaigns that build, as my colleague, Pat Ryan, names, sharia networks.

For example, an interesting blog entry posted on the U.S. Naval Institute webpage argues that a successful counter-method would circulate propaganda amongst jihadi men (via many sources I assume) highlighting the humorous aspect(s) of biological undertakings to manipulate their ego; sexual id (Frued). It would also create dirty psychological associations in the citizen mind, which would arguably dissipate social approval. Although I do not agree entirely that all male jihadi suicide bombers are, by default, "sexually-repressed beings," I do see the value in exploiting weaknesses, either cultural and/or psychological, but emphasize the need to evaluate exactly who we are targeting so we can accurately script the information for warfare.


Can it work for female suicide bombers? We can strenthen our understanding by identifying, once more, which AQ affiliates use female suicide bombers and why.


We need to continue to be aware of the forthcoming threats facing the US homeland, as women will even pretend to be pregnant in order to hide explosives. So, it does not only require military and intelligence agency operations in regions such as Yemen, as well as national security measures taken by, for example, the US Secret Service, to examine and predict modus operandi of bombers targeting US presidents and political VIP's, but also [perhaps above all] individual and collective integrity to remain firm to the ideals of who we are, what we do, and how we do it.

No one can ever blow that up.

Crossroads: Transnational Terrorism and Prison Gangs

Given the interdisciplinary nature of terrorism and the morphing methodology of the suspected terrorist, I envision this posting to serve as the first of many commentaries in a series which is to be called, "Crossroads." The purpose of this series is to promote dialogue and interaction between intellectuals relating to issues which are woven into the matrix of extreme jihadi violence, especially al Qaeda.


Al Qaeda's "principal architect of 9/11," Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is to be tried in a U.S. civilian court beginning sometime in the next six months. Not only will the amount of public media coverage his case receives boost recruitment and financing for AQ and its affiliates, but it will cause confusion amongst policy-makers and citizens alike concerning the appropriate methods of dealing with suspected terrorists. Of importance to this discussion, I wish to focus on why intellectuals and intelligence officials need to begin to discuss the multitude of potential problems we are on course to face once suspected terrorists are convicted and are sentenced to either await their execution or serve a [life] sentence in prison.

(Of course, discussing whether or not convicted terrorists should be sent to a prison cell at all - and proposing solutions for placement and aligning processes and procedures - is one conversation we must have in addition to this another time).


In light of the new avenue AG Holder, under the leadership of the Obama Administration, has paved for the U.S. legal system, at least for the time being - and putting aside whether or not the decision is actually constitutional - we must imagine the following:

1. What type of setting, atmosphere, and environment KSM and other suspected terrorists will enter into;


2. How they themselves will be viewed, understood, and regarded, and;


3. Who they will have direct and indirect access to and interaction with.

Ultimately, we must converse with one another to decide on a) how we ought to move forward and b) what resources are at our disposal to prevent and counter organized recruitment, hierarchical indoctrination, planned bouts of violence, and uncontrollable outbreaks of dissent.

I think the most pressing issue is the spread of propoganda in support of the recruitment of operatives by connecting to prison-gangs. In this manner, AQ can become dynamically dangerous because of the capability it will have to expand its jihadi pool. Essentially, internal efforts within prison walls will reach external gang leaders in space and time.

Even when considering the various amount and diverse types of prison-gangs - in measuring mentality, philosophy, structural hierarchy, indoctrination methods, organized criminal activity, and employed violent methods - it is crystal clear that AQ ideology and methodology aligns itself with one group in particular; namely, the Neta Association also known as La Sombra, which means "The Shadow."

Founded by Carlos Torres in Puerto Rico, NA has grown to one of the top five prison-gangs in the U.S., mostly disturbing New England states of MA, CT, NY, and NJ as well as FL and TX. Torres formed the "cultural organization" to protect and further the rights of [Puerto Rican] prisoners in the midst of communal suffering and abuses. It sees itself as being the "voice of the marginalized," mainly as a direct result of the assassination of their leader in 1979 by a member of their Puerto Rican rival, G-27.

Roles of members are distributed according to their hierarchy, and gender responsibilities are understood horizontally: men recruit most Hispanic teenagers, teach gang values, and engage in violent campaigns while women take care of inmates, manage funds like secretaries, and provide "public service."

Of particular relevance to the crossroads of AQ and NA is the oath members take just before being "baptized" in to the organization:

“I swear to God and the Neta Association from this day on, I will live conscious to finish with the abuse that we confront, because of the administration...From this day on I will live conscious of my Neta brothers. Your suffering and pitfalls will be mine. Your bloodshed will be my bloodshed also. For this reason, I will never intend to take a life of a brother Neta."

Afterward, the member signs a sworn testimony, which states:
“I swear in the presence of my brothers and Almighty God that when I accept to be a brother of the Neta Association I will live by the norms, and protect them in my mind and heart. I will never kill another brother or his family. Your suffering will be my fight brother, their bloodshed will be mine also. I will be a warrior if it is necessary, so that the dreams of our brothers and leader Carlos La Sombra will be strong forever. I will fight against the abuse of the [G-27] and the corruption of the administration everyday of my life. I except it's ideals and I will respect the norms and leaders forever.”

Moveover, the leaders host a monthly meeting on the 30th day to pay homage to their fallen brothers. In concluding this ceremony, members recite the following:

"May the spirit of our Lord, Jesus Christ, and the memory of our maximum leader, Carlos Torres Iriate, aka Carlos La Sombra; and the rest of our brothers that lost their lives in the struggle, reign in our hearts and minds forever and ever. . .”

Each of these three recitations, which are woven into the structured, ceremonial indoctrination process, highlight the strong, overwhelming use of religiously-centered ideology. Each also spotlights the "justification" inherent in their rhetoric. Furthermore, NA's theological interpretation of what it means to be loyal, trustworthy, and just is dictated to them through their ritualistic, communal tradition(s). This disturbing activity is homologous to AQ's method of propaganda to build a nation of fighters willing to die by way of "defensive jihad."

In conclusion, the parallels I have presented here - which represent only the tip of the iceberg when considering the comprehensive methodology and reach of NA - target problems on the horizon for intellectuals, intelligence specialists, and criminal justice professionals. I urge us to begin to first identify these striking similarities in order to script a plan that will structurally and systematically counter and prevent partnerships/alliances between convicted terrorists and prison-gangs, especially AQ and ones such as NA.

This work, I propose, can start with a case study analysis of the suspected chief of the Spanish AQ cell, Syrian Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas - alias Abu Dahdah - who was tried in Madrid and convicted to only 27 years in prison for conspiracy. (The DA argued for 60,000 years - 25 for each victim; thus, 2,400 total). 18 other AQ members were convicted, but what is interesting to study is the comment Yarkas made at the end of the trial:

"The existence of a terrorist cell is an invention. The relationships between the accused came about naturally [because] we've been living [in the country] for 20 years, we come from the same country, we have the same religion and the same customs."

Can we not imagine Khalid Sheikh Mohammed saying something similar to an NA President, Vice President, or Recruiter?

The Emerging Role of the Analyst: Can We Understand How "Suspected Terrorists" Interpret Radical Messages?

Allow me to briefly preface my thoughts with the statement that this is part of research that I am conducting for a broader analysis of "what motivates extreme jihadists - religion, culture, or politics(?)." For the time being, my comments are a response to Pat's post entitled, "Anwar al Awlaki: A 'Confidant' for Nidal Hasan."

Of particular interest, Pat states: "In the specific case of Nidal Hasan, intelligence officials were aware of the contact between Hasan and Awlaki, but assessed that this did not pose a threat; how can we improve our analytical processes and include additional factors when analyzing situations like this?" In short, I argue - as I have always - that theology must be a factor when assessing a) the meaning of radical leaders like Awlaki and b) the value of pursuing a situation in light of intelligence analysis.

This perspective is, as many scholars and professionals argue, "out-of-bounds" [to a degree] as a quantifiable and justified factor for conducting intelligence briefings. Simply stated, this factor has proven itself to be a driving force behind motivations for extreme jihadists - both leader and follower alike. The way to harvest accurate and timely insights is to understand the driving force(s) of the enemy, which in Hasan's case showcases itself in his political statements grounded in religious ideology. The rate and impact of his statements are quantifiable factors for measuring his progressive thought process, and thus an indication of his possible and/or probable actions.

This method reflects the gameboard of chess in that each player must, above all, understand the opposition. Terrorism, on both the domestic and international level, runs its course like a spoked wheel: the issue of terrorism lies at the center while each spoke represents a method by which the phenomenon is spread. Therefore, we need experts from various disciplines to remain ahead of the morphing enemy: finance and economics, sociology and psychology, religion and culture, history and warfare, science and technology, etc.

As presented above, intelligence officials need more religiously-minded scholars to hone in on the theological implications of diversified perspectives exposed by multiple sects in geographical locations. There is much division within Islamic sects horizontally, and the article in the Washington Post today highlights that messages presented by persons like Awlaki are left to "general interpretation" for suspected terrorists. Intelligence officials would prosper from having briefings on how and why these fundamental concepts relate to defensive jihad, offensive jihad, sahwa, dawah, and shariah - and the interconnection of each to the violent tactics and strategies employed by AQ operatives.

Please allow me to end by quoting a statement from the article above by a radical leader himself, an example of the place where we can start our analysis in this manner:
"These armies are the defenders of apostasy," Anwar al-Aulaqi wrote in English on his Internet site July 15 from Yemen, according to the NEFA Foundation, a private South Carolina group that monitors extremist sites. "Blessed are those who fight against them and blessed are those shuhada [martyrs] who are killed by them."
Do we understand this as offensive or defensive jihad, and what are the legal and human-rights implications of such an assessment? It is another factor in determing how we move forward, and in so doing encourages collaboration and coordination among intelligence officials and agencies.