06 November 2009

Domestic Terrorism: Realistically Quantifying Religious Practices

The horrific and tragic event of yesterday, Thursday, November 5, carried out by Major Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood in Texas - the largest base on American soil - brings to light questions concerning the possible rise of domestic terrorism in America. This I consider to be the major issue facing us regarding our future cultural, social, and political prosperity.

Allow me to preface my thoughts by stating that I am not concluding that Major Hasan is connected to a terrorist network; nor am I assuming or identifying the Mental Health Counselor as a terrorist. Doing such would not only harm my perspective and arguement but also jolt the understanding of the state of Muslims in America (i.e. False logic concludes that every Muslim is a terrorist). Simply stated, Major Hasan is a deeply troubled man - to say the least - who we now know is motivated by religious beliefs that are connected simultaneously to a) personal religious apprehensions and b) professional political objectives.

Major Hasan's religious solidarity with his Muslim brothers and sisters, which became increasingly apparent as his deployment neared, caused him to believe that he could not fight against his religious kin. Furthermore, and most indicative of his struggle, was his inability to differenciate between Muslim brothers and sisters who are fair-minded citiznes as opposed to ideological-minded terrorists. Major Hasan's actions raise the main question we must now ask ourselves: How do intelligence/counter-terrorism professionals, whether they be analysts or operatives, identify progressive religious practices in order to target potential or actual domestic terrorists? In order words, as I present in the title: How do we quantify religious practices which are thought to be justified by quality so that we can prevent or counter terrorist activity on American soil?

This is a daunting question that me and my academic colleagues have continued to ask, and it is one that is not welcomed in many circles. I offer this practical response: The Prophet Muhammad, in following the voice of Allah, wore his garb in a particular fashion, styled his hair in a specified manner and carried a comb, trimmed his beard to a certain length, wore sandals and often walked with a stick. All of this we know or are aware of in experiencing Muslim culture - and regional Arabs for that matter - while conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (although each is different in its own right).

Most important to our discussion here is the information the case of Major Hasan presents. It has yet to be confirmed whether or not he was born and raised a Muslim or whether he converted to Islam, but what is apparent now is that at some point he broke with the traditional and actual meaning of Islam itself. It is this, I believe, that we can procedurally begin to identify when analyzing the religious and social practices of persons; i.e. Hasan spoke of progressive issues facing American combat operations and Muslims.

Of course, these do not conclude terrorist intention or activity nor do they connect him to a network by default. What these initial clues do conclude is that his behavior, and therefore his motivation(s), became more progressive in time. It is a fact, as stated previously, that his failure to differentiate Muslims and their philosophies and activities shows to a certain extent the state of his mind and break from actuality. This is often the case with fundamentalist Muslims, whether they be Taliban, AQ, etc. Also, it is a fact that professionals missed the cues of Hasan's behavior.

I do not want intelligence/counter-terrorism professionals to continue to miss/overlook progressive tendencies which showcase the forthcoming of destructive activity. The initial steps I propose, then, include consistent surveillence of growing progressive Muslims in America and also the same type of surveillance of growing progressive religious persons in general in America (i.e. Leaders such as Jim Jones who proclaim to be the Second Coming of Christ). Furthermore, it includes building a dynamic and trusting relationship with small communities who can identify on a ground-level such behavior. This can be maintained by organizational communication strategies between local, state, and federal agencies (i.e. COMPSTAT instituted by then-NYPD Commissioner Bratton).

Lastly, it relies on knowledge of religious practices. This is not easy, and is the most unstable but also most promising aspect of the plan drafting. In order for it to be successful, a system of education must be implemented to keep persons informed about the practices of Muslims as well as religious groups. This would enable citizens and leaders alike to identify and differentiate common and progressive practices and prepare them to measure religious activities in quantifiable terms. This is a task which we must engage in both personally and professionally.

The social implications of this plan need to be addressed in order for it to proceed to a second phase. Firstly, the common presumption that Muslims or religious persons and their practices will be profiled must be overcome. I offer this as one point of commentary, but welcome any questions and clarifications in discussion.

3 comments:

  1. I think the man who wrote this article (Potocki) is acually a member of the NSA. The reason being is that this article is so well-written, so clearly defined....it couldn't be from just your average citizen blogging. Potocki has the inside track as to what's really happening out there. Everyone better take a listen...because the guy's REAL GENIUS!!!!!!

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  2. "This is a daunting question that me and my academic colleagues have continued to ask, and it is one that is not welcomed in many circles."

    Yes I think we all recall the DHS report on the most numerous and active extremist threats for domestic terrorism in the US being decried on the basis that 1 (one) of the myriad of extremist threats was a little inconvenient.

    Perhaps you or anyone else speaking from a military background would be taken more seriously on planning to address domestic terrorism threats if you first got those out of the way.

    Speak on the far more numerous groups of Christianity-based extremist groups and their scores of domestic terrorism plots and how these should be monitored, analysed and investigated to address that threat. Likewise for the non-religious-based militias who've also targeted/planned attacks on military bases for far different reasons with far more frequency.

    This is not to excuse the threat posed by Islamic-extremists on US soil, but I think we've got that covered. No shortage of deep thinking on what can be done about the muslims who randomly shoot some people because of motivations tied to US foreign policy.

    Meanwhile, the guys actually building dirty bombs on US soil, planning presidential assassinations, targeting judges and federal workers and planning mass casualty attacks who aren't muslim or dark skinned yet again don't warrant any such CT planning.

    In fact, yet again, it's quite hard to find someone talking seriously about countering the domestic terrorism threat who's even willing to acknowledge their existence.

    Whatever respective POVs you and I have, at the end of the day it's still the case that the guy with this surname who carried out 1 of the X number of shooting sprees this year warrants a serious discussion on addressing threats to the US homeland, while a guy without such a surname building a dirty bomb on US soil doesn't.
    How can that discussion be taken seriously by an unbiased observer ?

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  3. Kilo, thakn you for your well-thought post. I am particularly interested in your comment, "This is not to excuse the threat posed by Islamic-extremists on US soil, but I think we've got that covered." I posted my researched analysis precisely because intelligence professionals do not have the full picture of what to expect from religious and non-religious radical groups in the midst of their hard work to tackle such an expansive and ever-morphing issue.

    I attempted in my remarks to identify a systematic and scientic way of monitoring all violent progressive individuals - whether they acting solely on within a collective group. Thus, I stated, "Of course, [Major Hasan's actions] do not conclude terrorist intention or activity nor do they connect him to a network by default. What these initial clues do conclude is that his behavior, and therefore his motivation(s), became more progressive in time." Since this posting, it has crystalized that Major Hasan's personal yearnings became deeply connected in some way to religious outlets; i.e. Internet contact with AQ websites, Virginia mosque, search for wife with hijab, traditional men's garments.

    My initial outline for a systematic approach applies to both religious and non-religious individuals and groups. What I strive to identify, in particular, is the motivational force of religious ritual/ceremony/sociology that attaches itself to progressive and radical thought. Of course, this is witnessed in all religious groups, Christian and Muslim alike but showcases itself in different fashions and to varying degrees. This is where I foresee my "system" being most falty because it is difficult to catagorize this in a quantifiable measure.

    A comprehensive CT planning system cannot target just "Muslim or dark-skinned" persons or "the guy with this surname" because, in that case, it would not work. It is the most promising yet most challenging as I say because it seeks to target social and religious values connected to social and political practices. The struggle before us presents blurry barriers because of the interpretations of the religious and social values, which is why I state that "the common presumption that Muslims or religious persons and their practices will be profiled must be overcome."

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