Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of Not What I Asked For?

On an earlier post I attempted to speculate on President Obama's decision making process with respect to his pending AfPak strategy announcement. I think my speculative analysis of our Commander in Chief's AfPak meetings is still the most probable scenario. The interesting meeting for me was meeting #7 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff because as I stated, President Obama most likely had his mind made up and wanted the Joint Chiefs to lay out the intricacies of the logistical piece. As Pat replied Richard Holbrooke was dispatch to several nations, the most interesting being Russia. The reason being, we need Russia to play ball on this from a logistical stand point as another option for supply routes that don't travel through the Khyber Pass.

Now lets look at the Wall Street Journal's latest article and see how the pieces are falling into place. The WSJ reports that the Obama Administration has reached out to key NATO allies in recent weeks seeking increased troop commitments to the tune of 3000-7000. Lets take the high number, this means that Obama can send McChrystal 33,000 US troops and still met his request. NATO is going to hold a meeting on Dec 3 to finalize troop commitments following Obama's troop announcement. Most media groups report that Obama has 4 options on his plate with a 35,000 troop commitment mixed between combat and training forces being the favorite option. That means he only has to garner 5,000 additional coalition troops from NATO. Let me say that I actually appreciate the current administration's approach in their attempt to build "The Coalition of the Willing". Having said that, I want to now look at this possible decision from a military perspective.

The higher echelons of our military, to include Gen McChrystal's Staff, conduct a relative combat power analysis. This analysis is a way for the military to quantify the strengths of different units, so that we are making decisions based on Apples to Apples and not Apples to Oranges. I am speculating here; I believe President Obama is comfortable with only sending 35,000 troops but wants to give Gen McChrystal the 40,000 he requested. No one is going to stand up and say that garnering support from NATO allies is not worth the effort, but I don't believe that is what Gen McChrystal asked for. An Italian or Turkish battalion is not the same as an American battalion. We are no longer talking apples to apples. According to the WSJ the possible troop increases will look as follows:

Great Britain: 500 but the Administration believes they are willing to send up to 2,000 more (I love the Brits, if AQ was on Mars they would be on a space ship next to us)

Italy: 400 (Keeping the increased Afghan election security forces already deployed)

Turkey: 800 (Doubling their forces to 1600 total)

Romania: 600

France: They send none, but the Administration believes a troop reduction from Kosovo would free up 1,000 additional troops.

Germany: 1500 (This one is a reach, it will take serious political maneuvering from Angela Merkel to pull this off and it won't be decided until early next year)

So its 2300 highly likely, and 6300 if Great Britain, France, and Germany come through in a huge way. Either way, Gen McChrystal will take it and run even though Italy, Romania, and Turkey do not give him the same combat power the American equivalent he asked for gives him. There are two other points I want to bring attention to. With the creation of the Assist and Advise Battalion (AAB), there is no difference between combat soldiers and training forces. The combat soldiers will partner with ANA forces and the AAB units retain the ability to project combat power within their area of operations. The other point I want to comment on, the WSJ did not provide any information as to what kind of units the NATO countries are planning on sending. If our NATO allies agreed to send service and support units then McChrystal's arithmetic won't add up.

What I want anyone who reads this to understand are two things. I speculated that Gen McChrystal's assessment called for 40,000 American troops, not a combination of NATO and US. I also speculated that President Obama believes 40,000 counter insurgents in any capacity meets Gen McChrystal's request. I am confident that the main stream media will not analyze the differences between 40,000 US soldiers being very different from a combination of 40,000 US and NATO soldiers. Let me conclude by asking, I am sure Gen McChrystal wants as many NATO soldiers as possible, but did he request 40,000 total counter insurgents or 40,000 American soldiers?

JD

Future of Intel in Afghanistan: Enabling the ANSF

I’ve been doing some research and discussion with colleagues for another project of mine - trying to wrap our heads around all of the moving pieces involved in going “all-out” in Afghanistan. We’ve discussed strategic options several times on the blog already, but as we wait for a decision from President Obama, I wanted to try to really drill down to the operational and tactical levels and examine what the future of intelligence operations should look like when/if we surge additional combat forces. Below are some rough thoughts and several questions we’ve been thinking about. I would love some feedback and thoughts from everyone, particularly those who have studied or spent time in Afghanistan.

Working from GEN McChrystal's COMISAF Assessment and operational design (read it here), it's critical that we make significant investments to ensure we properly resource our COIN efforts in Afghanistan. He explains that, "Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign." Clearly, one of the key pillars of this campaign is building ANSF capacity. (The report explains, "To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance”). Unfortunately, however, most discussions of increasing ANSF capability or capacity only speak in terms of adding more infantry troops. While much its clearly critical to increase the numbers of ANA and ANP forces, we must also ensure that all ANSF maneuver elements are also properly resourced with critical intelligence enablers and capabilities. As outlined in FM 3-24 (read it here), “Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven endeavor.” Without a functioning intelligence capability, it will be nearly impossible for ANSF to successfully understand and counter the complex insurgency within their country.

GEN McChrystal himself recognizes the potential pitfalls of focusing solely on growing the numbers of “boots on the ground,” acknowledging that the, "[r]isks inherent in this [maneuver-focused] approach such as inadequate training and lack of organic enablers will be mitigated through close partnering and mentoring by Regional Commanders delivered through the ISAF Joint Command." Well, it sounds so simple when you just put it that way. But, several major questions remain: How will this be achieved? What are the capabilities of ANSF right now and where do they need to be? How can we leverage the cultural knowledge, HUMINT networks, and other skills inherent within the ANSF to truly enable full-spectrum COIN operations? What equipment/tools, methods, and training are required to provide ANSF with a baseline capability to conduct intelligence operations?

I’ve identified two critical lines of effort to focus on (with some initial thoughts outlined below):

1) Enable and Equip ANSF for Intelligence Ops: we must begin now to consider how we’ll expand ANSF intelligence capabilities. They don’t need to necessarily mirror our techniques or technologies, but I think there’s a great deal of potential in sharing our ways and means:

· SIGINT – Collection/Survey (need to work through classification challenges), Reporting (make our reporting releasable and develop an ANSF reporting capability), Analysis (methods/processes and software)

· HUMINT – how do we capture and capitalize on the ability of the ANSF to get better HUMINT than us? Must develop reporting formats/procedures, create a robust reports database, work to supplement their source funding

· Exploitation – this is likely where we could get the most bang for our buck initially; field them with a basic capability to do CELLEX, MEDEX, Biometrics (and develop corresponding tools, ingestion, archiving systems) and link their systems to ours so we can share all data both ways

· Fusion – Joint Fusion Cells at BN/BDE Level? Develop processes and systems to allow all of this intel to be fused and shared across all echelons and among partners (each battle-space owner runs a true Joint TOC with ANSF integrated; painful at first, but necessary). If this happens, what software can we develop to facilitate intel sharing and overcome translation and classification issues?

2) Set the Conditions for Robust Non-Lethal Targeting (necessary to truly do full-spectrum COIN right)

· Leverage the knowledge and cultural understanding of ANSF at the local/regional level

· Collect, ingest, and analyze non-lethal target data (personalities, ASCOPE – FM 3-24 p. B-3)

· Facilitate F3EAD for non-lethal targeting (mirror successful adoption of this process by conventional forces in regards to lethal targeting)

Additionally, as we consider how to enable Afghans to conduct intelligence support to full-spectrum COIN ops, we must look at ourselves and determine how best to shape ISAF elements to facilitate. Some ideas below:

Advise and Assist Brigades vs. MiTTs (ISAF vs. CSTC-A)

· I like the AAB concept in theory: make the battlespace owner responsible for partnering with and building capacity of ANSF; I think this will work.

· BUT, if we are deciding to go with the AAB model, we must give a great deal of thought to how to do it best (drawing on lessons learned from units down it now in Iraq and Afghanistan); what additional elements/enablers need to be added to the existing BCT MTOE? More HCTs? Additional CA, PSYOP, and IO elements?

· Company-Level Partnerships with Afghan Units: Land-owning maneuver companies are where the rubber meets the road; their partnership with ANSF will either make or break the success of the entire effort; MiTTs are only a supporting/enabling effort; this was proven true all across Iraq and will likely hold true in Afghanistan as well; these will be the folks living/working/eating with ANSF forces on a daily basis in Joint COPs

· If this is going to be the case, then we must man/equip/train robust Company intel elements (CoISTs) that can not only conduct analysis, but also train ANSF on basic intelligence ops.

· How then, must we organize/equip AABs and their corresponding companies to do this right? What special personnel/training/equipment must they be armed with?

· How can we ensure there is a robust Intelligence “Train the Trainer” program for all ISAF forces who will be partnering with ANSF elements?

· Currently, there is a huge gap in training for intelligence analysis at all levels (especially at the CoIST level within the BCT structure). What opportunities are there to improve this training (making more realistic/complex/scenario-driven? Focus on processes and critical thought vs. teaching tools? Preparing for unique CoIST role within an AAB conducting FID operations?)

There’s a great deal to think about here; and much more that I’m sure we haven’t even considered. Any feedback or thoughts would be greatly appreciated.

Helmand TOA Follow-up

This will be my last post for a few days while I turn my attention to a socio-cultural analysis writing assignment for the Captains Career Course. Before going incognito, I wanted to follow up to Pat’s comments & questions to my second Helmand TOA post.

AQ efforts in Britain:
AQ-affiliated groups appear to be quite active in their efforts against the UK, but for the most part AQ’s efforts have not replicated the level of Bekay Harrach’s efforts in Germany. The preponderance of open-source reporting revolves around the AQ brand demanding the release of Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza al Masri. While AQ did not carry out any attacks on UK soil this year, they did execute a UK citizen who was kidnapped along the border between Niger and Mali. I was unable to determine whether the June 2009 execution of Edwin Dyer was directly attributed to the April 2009 threat of attacks if Qatada and Hamza were not released. It is, however, extremely plausible.

I also came across an Andrew Exum paper from May of last year titled “The Spectacle of War”. In it, Exum writes “A recent study by al-Qaeda expert Jason Burke demonstrated that insurgent propaganda videos on the internet had played a significant role in the radicalization process of young British Muslims convicted of planning or carrying out attacks on civilian targets in the UK.” The paper goes on later to quote this phenomenon as “cyber-mobilization”. I believe this form of propaganda is particularly threatening to the US and other western nations as it provides a cheap and simple “call to arms” for both overseas and domestic jihad. Perhaps this is actually the next phase of al Sahab’s propaganda campaign, where they turn from national governments to the incitement of foreign citizens?

Lessons learned (and not learned):
In 2008 the UK established a special entity to combat AQ propaganda. The article hyperlinked essentially covers the UK’s national strategy for combating terrorism via the internet, even going so far as to list the group’s key three themes and methods for inserting them. On the western side of the Atlantic, DOD Information Operations campaigns are largely decentralized. I am not aware of a domestic IO campaign, but if there is one it is likely spread across multiple organizations and entities in a fashion similar to the DOD. An extremely appalling blurb came from Bill Gertz’s 17 November “Inside the Ring” segment for the Washington Times where he discusses Congressional plans to slash DOD IO budgets. As many are painfully aware, the US is lagging far behind in the information fight. I’ll try to cover my thoughts more extensively in a later post, but I want to get this idea out to stoke some discussion. Perhaps the way ahead for the US is a similar organization to what the Brits are running: a national-level Joint (USG, DOD, civilian) IO organization that fights the information fight on the domestic and international fronts. The organization would be broken up into COCOM-sized regions (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, NORTHCOM, etc) where the planners and executors are small (i.e. agile) task forces that plan and prosecute the IO fight. It’s a concept, but the key point is that we (read: United States) simply do not have an effective propaganda machine. Our IO efforts to date are too disjointed to be effective.

AStan:
The only way to build an ISAF/NATO consensus is to first determine a desired endstate to the US Afghanistan mission in Washington. By clearly delineating the conditions required to withdraw US forces from AStan (and in my opinion they should not be overly optimistic conditions), our Coalition partners will be more effective in selling the benefits, costs and risks of each option (COIN, CT-pure, hybrid, etc) to their respective citizenry. Until the US completes this, all US troop increases and requests to Coalition partners will be portrayed globally as an escalation to an open-ended war. The US must take back the information initiative through greater transparency of its national objectives in AStan, and remind the world of the righteousness of the mission.

Thoughts?
-User81

The Emerging Role of the Analyst: Can We Understand How "Suspected Terrorists" Interpret Radical Messages?

Allow me to briefly preface my thoughts with the statement that this is part of research that I am conducting for a broader analysis of "what motivates extreme jihadists - religion, culture, or politics(?)." For the time being, my comments are a response to Pat's post entitled, "Anwar al Awlaki: A 'Confidant' for Nidal Hasan."

Of particular interest, Pat states: "In the specific case of Nidal Hasan, intelligence officials were aware of the contact between Hasan and Awlaki, but assessed that this did not pose a threat; how can we improve our analytical processes and include additional factors when analyzing situations like this?" In short, I argue - as I have always - that theology must be a factor when assessing a) the meaning of radical leaders like Awlaki and b) the value of pursuing a situation in light of intelligence analysis.

This perspective is, as many scholars and professionals argue, "out-of-bounds" [to a degree] as a quantifiable and justified factor for conducting intelligence briefings. Simply stated, this factor has proven itself to be a driving force behind motivations for extreme jihadists - both leader and follower alike. The way to harvest accurate and timely insights is to understand the driving force(s) of the enemy, which in Hasan's case showcases itself in his political statements grounded in religious ideology. The rate and impact of his statements are quantifiable factors for measuring his progressive thought process, and thus an indication of his possible and/or probable actions.

This method reflects the gameboard of chess in that each player must, above all, understand the opposition. Terrorism, on both the domestic and international level, runs its course like a spoked wheel: the issue of terrorism lies at the center while each spoke represents a method by which the phenomenon is spread. Therefore, we need experts from various disciplines to remain ahead of the morphing enemy: finance and economics, sociology and psychology, religion and culture, history and warfare, science and technology, etc.

As presented above, intelligence officials need more religiously-minded scholars to hone in on the theological implications of diversified perspectives exposed by multiple sects in geographical locations. There is much division within Islamic sects horizontally, and the article in the Washington Post today highlights that messages presented by persons like Awlaki are left to "general interpretation" for suspected terrorists. Intelligence officials would prosper from having briefings on how and why these fundamental concepts relate to defensive jihad, offensive jihad, sahwa, dawah, and shariah - and the interconnection of each to the violent tactics and strategies employed by AQ operatives.

Please allow me to end by quoting a statement from the article above by a radical leader himself, an example of the place where we can start our analysis in this manner:
"These armies are the defenders of apostasy," Anwar al-Aulaqi wrote in English on his Internet site July 15 from Yemen, according to the NEFA Foundation, a private South Carolina group that monitors extremist sites. "Blessed are those who fight against them and blessed are those shuhada [martyrs] who are killed by them."
Do we understand this as offensive or defensive jihad, and what are the legal and human-rights implications of such an assessment? It is another factor in determing how we move forward, and in so doing encourages collaboration and coordination among intelligence officials and agencies.

Helmand TOA Update and Saudi Economic Foreign Policy

Helmand TOA Update
The London Times provides a good update of the Brits' district-by-district TOA of Helmand Province, which I previously wrote about on 12 November. Highlights:

- 2010 is an election year. Gordon Brown has to have this in mind as domestic opposition to the UK’s AStan mission grows.
- The British military faces serious shortfalls and likely needs to pull out of ISAF in order to afford a large military modernization program. There are several articles about shortages in armor and helicopters, among other major end items.
- The Brits have volunteered to host a NATO summit in January 2010 to develop a comprehensive political and military strategy. This is long overdue, and something that should have been done prior to the current Washington debate on the US way ahead. Whatever strategy or way ahead chosen for the ISAF mission must be a Coalition (NATO) way ahead, not a US mission that we hope/expect our partners to fall in line and support.
- The article cited PM Brown saying that operations had severely weakened al Qaeda through the depletion of its experienced leaders. I find this highly unlikely. Personal experience shows that organizations like this (in my case AQ/ISI) will likely suffer only in the short-term; examples include the deaths of Jar Allah and Abu Qaswarah. The death of both these key personnel did not have the long-term organizational impacts we had hoped for. Another (likely more relevant) example is that of the TTP and Baitullah Mehsud. Baitullah was killed in a drone strike on 5 August 2009. The TTP Shura Council eventually chose Hakimullah Mehsud on 25 August to lead its operations. Several reports have since surfaced that Hakimullah Mehsud is more violent and ruthless than his predecessor. Citing just these few examples, the logic of his statement about the true damage done to AQ is likely flawed.

Economic Warfare
Foreign Policy’s Shadow Gov’t page has an interesting article (click above link) written by John Hannah about possible Saudi intentions of breaking the Iranian Regime through oil price controls. If the Saudi government is actually deliberately restricting oil prices through market saturation, it’s a stroke of brilliant (and quite dangerous) foreign policy. The US outspent the USSR during the 1980’s when oil prices were low. The pending economic collapse of the failing economy and social unrest in the USSR eventually led to Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost. Based off the information provided in Hannah’s article about required oil prices for each country’s budget, the Saudis can easily afford to squeeze the Iranians financially, thus hopefully causing the Iranian Regime to erode internally. The real danger in this is that the Iranian Regime is unlikely to let things slip that far. This form of economic warfare, if proven, would likely cause either a conventional strike against Saudi Arabia (or other perceived cohorts), or an unconventional strike by a group like the Quds Force inside a Sunni oil-producing state well before the Iranian Regime loses control of their state.

-User81

AAR Slide Show

The Small Wars Journal posted a great power point slide show from 1/5 Marines operating in the Helmand Province. This slide show will resonate with anyone who has conducted Counter Insurgency Operations in any foreign country. I think most of us are concentrating on the upper echelon policy options for the current Administration and I think it is easy to forget how difficult COIN operations truly are for those who have to execute those policy decisions.

JD

Anwar al Awlaki: A “Confidant” for Nidal Hasan?

I know we’ve dedicated quite a bit of time to the case of Nidal Hasan, but I continue to be fascinated and alarmed by the events and people that contributed to what Bruce Hoffman described as Hasan’s “self radicalization” (see full article in the NY Times here).

Today’s Washington Post offers some insightful excerpts from the first interview with Anwar al Awlaki since Hasan’s shooting spree at Ft. Hood (see full article here). Recent investigations have revealed that Nidal Hasan had semi-regular e-mail contact with Awlaki prior to the attacks and even attended several of his sermons at the Dar al Hijra mosque in N. Virginia. In the interview, Awlaki explains that, “he thought he played a role in transforming Hasan into a devout Muslim eight years ago,” and “that Hasan ‘trusted’ him and that the two developed an e-mail correspondence over the past year.” While it is possible that Awlaki is attempting to gain some fame (or infamy) for himself and overplay their relationship, I think it’s more likely that Hasan considered Awlaki to be a legitimate religious authority and looked to him for guidance and even inspiration. In multiple audio recording and blog posts, Awlaki encouraged attacks on US and other “infidel” armies (see an example here from NEFA). It’s no coincidence that his recordings were also found at the homes of several of the Fort Dix attack plotters.

Additionally, after the attack at Ft. Hood, Awlaki almost immediately posted a response on his blog calling Hasan a “hero” (see full transcript of Awlaki’s blog post here). For years, CT experts across the government have tracked Awlaki, stating in a report in 2008 that he was an “example of al-Qaeda reach into” the United States. In 2006, Awlaki left the US for Yemen, where he was then detained (reportedly at the behest of US forces) in 2007 and subsequently released. Since then, he has leveraged the Internet to distribute writings, audiotapes, and videos (all in English) to inspire jihad. For additional background on Anwar al Awlaki, see this in-depth biography and background on the NEFA Foundation site here.

The case of Anwar al Awlaki presents significant challenges and dilemmas for US intelligence and law enforcement authorities. While we can fairly easily track Awlaki and others like him through their writings and websites, how can we place effects on them (both lethal and non-lethal) when they reside in ungoverned spaces like Southern Yemen – which is quickly being reinforced as an AQ safe haven? How can we determine who Awlaki is engaging with in terms of both legitimate al Qaeda leadership as well as potential “self-radicalized” lone wolf types? In the specific case of Nidal Hasan, intelligence officials were aware of the contact between Hasan and Awlaki, but assessed that this did not pose a threat; how can we improve our analytical processes and include additional factors when analyzing situations like this? Clearly there are major legal and privacy aspects to this discussion, but it’s one we must have in order to prevent events like this from happening again.

Another MAJ Hasan Post

A close associate sent me this interesting piece on Nidal Hasan last night. The individual listed on the left column, eighth from the top on page 29 is indeed the alleged Ft. Hood, TX shooter. George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) confirmed the rumor by publishing an official press release on 6 November regarding Hasan’s status at their events.

On page 12 of the report from GWU, a balding man in Army Combat Uniform (ACU) is shown photographed at a December 2008 round table titled “International Strategy: Re-Invigorating Our Role in the World”. While impossible to confirm from the photo whether this is actually him or not, the male pattern baldness at least makes it plausible.

What exactly was MAJ Hasan’s intent at the HSPI forum(s)? Gawker.com has a quote from HSPI’s Deputy Director, Daniel Kaniewski, stating the following: He says institute staffers recall Hasan attending at least one task force event, and that he RSVP'd for several. "We do recall him speaking at one of our events as an audience member," he says, "but none of us recall what he actually said.” Why have no other people in attendance confirmed seeing him at the event? As a general rule of thumb, the one guy dressed (much) differently in the room will likely stick out, especially in as confined of an environment as this appears to be. This, of course, is obviously assuming that MAJ Hasan did indeed wear ACUs to the event he attended.

The slowly emerging details on MAJ Nidal Hasan’s past continue to get more interesting. On a separate and mostly unrelated note, what is it about Virginia Tech and mass murderers?

The Counter Intuitiveness of Cyber Security

I found Wesley Clark's and Peter Levin's article, "Securing the Information Highway" in this months issue of Foreign Affairs very intriguing. The article highlights security vulnerabilities in both Software and Hardware. I found their recommendations to improve our security counter intuitive to my common sense. I want to pose a security scenario that I believe is rooted in common sense and show how the authors' recommendations challenge my beliefs.

The year is 2019 and Iraq's main internal security threat is criminal in nature. I have a billion dollars in cash and I don't trust any banks to secure my assets. I can only find three good security guards that are willing to put their life in jeopardy because crime is rampant. The local lock manufacturer's morals are compromised and has created security flaws into his designs as well as leaving his design schematics unsecured. From my perspective, I need to design and build my own locks as well as build a site that is small enough for three security guards. I need to limit the points of access to only one doorway. This seems common sense to me but according to the authors we need to take an opposite approach to achieve network security.

If we are concerned with monitoring all access points to prevent cyber attacks, my intuition says limit the number of access points. My doorway analogy is flawed because limiting the amount of access points to the network creates a "Stiff" system. The authors sum up this point by saying, "...bundling the channels in order to better inspect them limits the range of possible responses to future crises and therefore increases the likelihood of a catastrophic breakdown."

The authors point out our weakness to malicious hardware defects because we largely use foreign made components. To me, simple solution is control the production of mission critical components. The authors again defy my logic by stating its not a feasible solution to produce 100% American made components. The safe guard for us is found in building systems that can detect deficiencies and by configuring anti-tamper safeguards.

The final counter intuitive aspect of their article advocates for a paradigm shift from classified cyber security initiatives to an "Open Source" approach. The reasoning is simple, if we keep our security initiatives classified we effectively exclude the majority of skilled, creative, and innovative experts who are paid handsomely in the private sector. I understand we need to seek out talent, but how do we achieve security through transparency?

I look forward to learning more on this topic since I realized my basic security knowledge doesn't hold water in the Cyber Security field.

JD

Bud Light Commericals and Robotic Warfare: Just Right!

Bud Light

Have you seen the recent Bud Light commercials, in particular the one where one man tries to show his friend how he trained his dog? (This is not an advertisement for Bud Light or any associate of Bud Light). The message is artisticly explained: Bud Light is "just right," or as beer specialists often describe fine brew - "well-balanced."

Columnist Roger Cohen, in his recently published op-ed piece in the NY Times this past weekend entitled, "Of Fruit Flies and Drones," raises the question of how "video-game-like" international drone killings are fundamentally changing the way we "go to war." He notes that President Obama has authorized as many drone strikes in Pakistan in nine and a half months as George W. Bush did in his last three years in office; at least 41 total.

I assume Cohen is asking this question on an ethical level as well, as he argues that "when robots are tomorrow's veterans, does war become more likely and more endless(?)." The conclusion he draws in the midst of the "dark side of the war on terror" is that a public debate is needed to highlight "how targets are selected, what the grounds are in the laws of war, and what agencies are involved" in order to establish and maintain accountability for wartime decisions.

While I appreciate his concern for these types of questions, I think that the public is limited in the way in which a topic of this nature can be debated: what should be known, when it should be known, etc. The public has elected people to be knowledgable about these aspects, and we need to trust them to do their job. As JD remarked in his recent blog, "how do we achieve security through transparency?" These decisions ought to remain the responsibility of officials; the public will always debate without the full picture, and that might be "just right" like the Bud Light commercial portrays.

Robotic Warfare

Overall, Cohen does raise an important topic for further discussion; namely, the promise of success robotic warfare holds while engaged in the war on terror. While discussing morality and terrorism with my undergraduate advisor, I was asked by him: If Osama bin Laden had captured you and your group of 24; and you had a gun loaded with one bullet but could not kill yourself or him; and he said to you 'If you kill one of your people I will let you all go free;' what would you do? I still think to this day: "But Osama and AQ have changed the rules of engagement, and I can never trust him to let us go even if I kill one of my own."

Even though the example is dictated by boundaries, the point is: AQ and their associates, who work in linked-networks that are ever-morphing and increasingly indidivualized/separatist in nature, have changed warfare. It is now irregular warfare, as we do not even define it as guerilla warfare: no uniforms; no intentions to found or run a state-sanctioned government or soverign entity. Yet it is incorporated with intellectual persons motivated by a global vision and highly specialized in systematic training techniques, and it both supports and praises any ounce of extremist activity related to martyrdom. This type of warfare expects and accepts only one end and supports any means to that end.

Robotic warfare is able to meet these challenges on an ever-morphing war landscape. It is a controlled and precise way of targeting specific coordinates where "suspected terrorists" seek safe haven(s); it is "just right" and "well-balanced" because it limits simultaneously the possible diametric impact of harm to civilians. The technology being developed now offers a more promising means of a) obtaining more intelligence information which leads to b) the execution of successful operations.

The process is not simply, as Cohen puts it, "watch[ing] people get vaporized on a screen in Virginia and then drive[ing] home for dinner with the kids." Going to war using robotic warfare requires human capital as well - and expertly trained human resources for that matter - to integrate intelligence and communication tactics. It is a tool, like the internet, that can be used virtuously or co-opted. For example, dogs are "man's best friend," but the Red Army trained them to sit under enemy tanks with bombs attached during the Second World War.

Just Right

Just like bio-mechanics is a booming field, so too is a newly-forming science called bio-mimicry, which boasts nature as our "model, measure, and mentor." I think robotic warfare can grow more precise, more accurate, and more intelligent by integrating bio-mimicry in military operations.

For example, humpback whales eat the most krill when they employ a tactic known as "bubblenet feeding." The process: a group is formed and roles are understood; all dive down slowly to a specified depth; then one whale swims horizontally past his companions while blowing bubbles at a top rate; when this whale reaches the end of the line a second whale swims horizontally across while sounding a high-pitched noise. The high-pitched noise scares the krill swimming above the humpbacks and causes them to rise to the surface while the bubbles trap the krill in a net-like area. What promises the whales' success is, above all, teamwork. What successfully enables the whales to feast is the confusion of the krill.

Imagine, now, that bio-mechanics and bio-mimicry could reproduce this tactic in robotics technology. Could we employ an object(s) that mimics this in its mechanics? Scientists need to continue to work with a) intelligence analysts to understand threats, b) special forces to understand strategic opportunities, and c) military leaders to understand objectives so that the proper tools can be integrated to achieve operational victories in countering AQ and associates.

Meditate With Me: Hasan to be Charged with Premeditated Murder

The Washington Post is reporting that Major Hasan, who is now conscious and recovering in the hospital, will be charged with "premeditated murder" in a military court for his actions of open firing two handguns and killing 13 people; of whom 4 were officers, 8 were enlisted soldiers, and 1 civilian who is a retired chief warrant officer. (I hold that 14 were actually killed because one woman was pregnant with her first child). Lawyers have indicated that hosting the trial in a military court "because he is a service member" also means that investigators have evidence (to a large enough degree) to prove that Hasan acted alone. Otherwise, if he acted in company/partnership with other parties and players then a civil trial would take place. Moreover, if he were a "suspected terrorist" a military commission might be formed to investigate and prove his specified actions in that light.

The legal implications of this charge - and the due process thereof - have widespread meaning for the current debate concerning the purpose of hosting legal proceedings when facing issues of this magnitude: (a) convential civilian and criminal proceedings vs. (b) military court vs. (c) military commission. The major difference, as I see fit, is the way in which each process identifies the suspect(s) involved in the case: "a" defines the suspect in terms of the American Constitution and its binding rule of law whereas "b" defines the suspect in terms of the justice inherent in the American Constitution but alien to the common law whereas "c" deals with the suspect for a specified reason to serve justice, such as war crimes.

Thus, the conventional method holds that the suspect is granted due process according to the following public proceedings:
trial by jury;
presumption of innocence;
exposal of evidence;
cross-examination;
choice to take the witness stand as defendent;
right of appeal;
(and all that relates to such).

Accordingly, "b" holds that an established process is carried out within military ranks in order to arrive at a judgment of the suspect's actions, which is exactly what Hasan will face. What meaning does this hold for Hasan (?) - that he is not a terrorist in the eyes of the military court. What meaning does this hold for the American legal system (?) - that persons who commit such acts of horror, as described above, are within the legal perview of defining such behavior as a psychological disorder. If Hasan were a civilian who walked onto the base at Fort Hood he would be, according to these parameters, tried as a civilian with the same mental condition. The only difference in nature is that he is a "service member."

Can Hasan's actions in themselves be described as an act of terror? Given the initial evidence of his growing extremist religious ideology [i.e. witnessed in his powerpoint presentation] and social connections to certain leaders [i.e. Imam] and AQ representatives [witnessed in his computer emails and blog posting], can his intentions be explained as an act of terror against the U.S. Military and thus the U.S.A., It's Constitution, and It's People? This is why the question needs to be asked: the case against Hasan has concrete implications for the case against the civilian, and in turn, also holds dire implications for the case to be held against present and future "suspected terrorists." A military commission can, in fact, be formed to investigate Hasan in that light; however, it may be legally and socially speedy to charge him in this manner.

The House of Representatives recently passed (2009) amendments to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 issuing "suspected terrorists" greater due process rights. The Act grants each suspect the following, as the NY Times article describes:
a military lawyer to defend them;
a presumption of innocence;
a right of appeal.
Alleged co-spirator of 9/11 who once shared a room with Mohammad Atta and has been a detainee at Guantanemo Bay, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, is one person whose case is an example of applying the Act's amendments in real time.

Richard V. Meyer, a Major with the US Army and Judge Advocate and author of "When a Rose is Not a Rose: Military-Commissions v. Courts-Martial" (Oxford University Press, 2007), describes in his abstract:

"The Military Commissions Act developed a judicial system based upon that of General Courts-Martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The military commissions will use many of the same personnel and share some procedures with general courts-martial, but certain aspects show them to be very dissimilar. Specifically: the revised evidentiary rules on coerced statements, hearsay and classified evidence; the lack of speedy trial rights; the absence of a formal pre-trial investigation; and the failure to apply case law precedent. These differences will have significant secondary effects on the process that are not favourable to a defendant. As a result of both the primary and secondary effects of the differences, the commissions will provide significantly less due process to unlawful combatants than the general court-martial process will provide to their lawful combatant counterparts."

To process Hasan in a military commission, he would have to be defined as an "unlawful combatant" - which would require extensive investigation into his extremist ties, if any. Therefore, given the nature of the options of proceedings available to us at this time and the nature of his actions, it is within reason to charge Hasan with "premeditated murder" in a military court. In conclusion, I think this fails to identify him as a "lawful combatant" and his actions for what they prove to be - treacherous to the American People -; and holds dangerous, far-reaching implications of ease and sensitivity for future commissions to be held for conspirators against the Constitution.

Helmand TOA

Yesterday the Financial Times reported that the British were planning on transitioning authority of several Helmand Province districts to the ANA over the next 8 months. The article goes on to quote a British official who inferred that the Brits would maintain a presence in the districts but the Afghans would take the lead politically and militarily. At face value this seems to be a great thing and a crucial step toward ending the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

Now let’s look at the reality of the situation. 24th MEU was moved from Kandahar to Helmand Province early last year to reinforce British elements that were facing increased AQ/Taliban attacks (side note: click here for a great overview of Helmand Province previously provided by JD). The Marines have been doing great things since entering Helmand, but ISAF still faces an uphill battle in the province. Violence across RC-South has been extremely high. Helmand province was also the scene of the tragic 4 November green on blue attack that took the lives of five British MiTT Soldiers.

Is this a repeat of Basra? While this is obviously a completely different country and problem set, there are parallels in the actions of the British Government (UKGov).

The Brits conducted a formal transition of authority ceremony with their Iraqi counterparts in December 2007. Looking back, GoI authorities in Basra were handed a steaming pile that they were unable to handle. This eventually led to PM Maliki ordering Operation Charge of the Knights in March 2008. This operation was supported on the ground by US elements while the UK “overwatch” contingency provided FW CAS from Tornado platforms and logistical support to Iraqi Security Forces. This BBC article provides great commentary on Britain’s stance during the initial phases of the operation. I see this as another premature “high five” on the part of the UKGov. The Taliban’s resiliency and prowess for popping up in ISAF-free areas has been proven time and again.

While I do advocate an end to Afghanistan, I do not see this as an ideal time to start hinting at redeployment. Everyone reading this likely knows and understands the COIN principle of the HN population being the center of gravity. ISAF elements are unlikely to garner much, if any, support from the Afghan populace when they perceive our presence as temporary and the Taliban as permanent.

Governance in Afghanistan: The Lesser of Two Evils?

As President Obama continues to weigh his options for a way ahead in Afghanistan, most of the media has focused on comparing the various courses of action (COAs) based on the number of US troops that would be committed. While force structure is a key element to any strategy, this largely misses the point. The real question is: What will these troops be doing? What is their desired endstate? Assuming that we follow the guidelines for COIN articulated in FM 3-24, a critical line of operation will be establishing and legitimizing governance – at the local, district, provincial, and national levels.

The NY Times reports this morning that LTG(R) Karl Eikenberry, Obama’s ambassador to Afghanistan, has expressed his concerns about sending additional troops due to his assessment that Karzai’s government is unable/unwilling to clamp down on corruption and will be unable to produce visible improvements in governance (see full article here). While additional troops would clearly help in the effort to improve security, it will be impossible to make enduring improvements in Afghanistan without a parallel effort to improve governance. In order to improve the legitimacy of Karzai’s government, all agree that he will need to make a concerted public effort to root out corruption and provide basic services to the populace. However, Helene Cooper explains in her article this morning that the US really has no leverage to pressure Karzai to make progress along these lines – and he knows it (see Cooper’s article in the NY Times here). The article highlights several responses from administration officials to these concerns in which they explain that they will use carrots instead of sticks to prod Karzai, but I have major concerns about this. Having dealt with several leaders in the third world, I tend to think that sticks are more effective.

To further complicate matters, we continue to see the Taliban flex their muscle in terms of offering an alternative “government” for the people. As Bill Roggio explains at the Long War Journal, there are several districts and areas (particularly in Eastern and some parts of Southern Afghanistan), where the Taliban is the only option for locals to turn to for basic services, a judicial/legal system, and other government-type functions. Alarmingly, the Taliban have re-asserted themselves in the critical Nuristan district only one month after ISAF forces suffered heavy casualties during a day-long firefight at COP Keating. The Taliban’s “shadow governor” for the district (Dost Mohammed) conducted an interview with Al Jazeera this weekend, explaining that “We are working on providing people's basic needs.” For more details, see the full story from LWJ here.

At the end of the day, the local populace in many parts of Afghanistan is forced to choose between the lesser of two evils – what they view as corrupt, ineffective government led by Karzai or a radical, Islamist “shadow government” espoused by the Taliban. So far, it seems that the Taliban have the edge and are gaining. Unless Obama’s overarching strategy in Afghanistan is able to improve governance and offer the people a viable alternative to the Taliban, we could send 400,000 additional troops and have little or no enduring effects.

Thanks to our Veterans!

A day off from work today provided for a good opportunity to truly reflect on what Veteran's Day really means. For me, today was about remembering all of the phenomenal Soldiers with whom I had the privilege and honor to serve (and all of their families who supported them). My deepest gratitude and thanks to all veterans, past and present.

I wanted to share a brief e-mail I received today from a former colleague and mentor (known to some as SuperDave or "the maestro" - see back story in the NY Times here). His words capture my sentiments exactly:

Gentlemen,

Just wanted to take an opportunity on this Veteran’s Day to say how lucky and proud I am to have served with each and every one of you. I hope when you reflect on the meaning of today that you are reminded of how truly special your individual and collective accomplishments are to our Nation. You are all tremendous Soldiers, Leaders, and Men. I wouldn’t trade anything in this world for the experiences we shared together. From one Veteran to another, “Thank you for your service”.

Enjoy your day and “GOD BLESS.”

Also, this evening I watched an extremely powerful and moving documentary on HBO called "Section 60: Arlington." Called "the saddest acre in America," Section 60 of Arlington National Cemetery is a burial ground for U.S. military personnel killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, a place that epitomizes the honor of service and the cost of war. The hour-long film captures the lives of several fallen Soldiers (and their families) all taken from the perspective of their grave sites in Arlington. This is a must-see film; one that I feel every US citizen would benefit from watching. Read more about the documentary on HBO's website here. Unfortunately, I haven't been able to find a link to a free version of the film yet, but hopefully one will show up on YouTube soon. If anyone finds one, please let me know so that we can share it.

I hope everyone took a few minutes today to pause and reflect on the sacrifices of our veterans today. Please continue to think about and pray for all of those serving in harm's way across the globe.

Thanks Facebook...

I don’t typically write about domestic issues, nor do I put a ton of time or research into domestic-related topics. But, this one is partially about my home state, so I couldn’t pass up the opportunity. This morning on my Facebook page, a friend had highlighted a link to an article on everyjoe.com from August 29, 2009 titled “U.S. Forest Service Warning: Ahh..Mexicans!”. First off, I put about as much credence into a website that is concerned with things like the season 2 of Keeping up with the Kardashians as I do to the political opinions of Hollywood…close to zero. While I do not normally respond to the random links my hippy friends (and I have many of them) post on Facebook, I had to write her back on this one, and thus felt obliged to post this story and some subsequent information onto the blog. Before I go any further with this post, I have to get out of the way that I do not condone the statements made by the US Forest Service. In fact, it was quite possibly the dumbest possible thing they could have done while attempting to broach a very serious subject. While perusing the stellar website that the Facebook link came from, I was reminded of a recent WSJ article about drug busts on Indian reservations in Oregon and Washington. Call the drug war what you want, but large-scale pot cultivation in the US is a major concern. The narco-gangs that control these major pot farms are also the same paramilitary groups driving the Mexico toward “failed state” status.

Due to increased pressure from the Mexican government and increased US efforts at the border, the Mexican cartels are finding it more difficult to grow in Mexico and then transport to the US. This is causing the cartels to develop and execute major grow farms in remote portions of Indian reservations and national forests. There is simply too much money at stake for these cartels to not undertake any and every means possible to maintain revenue. The West Coast, California in particular, is ground zero for US marijuana growth and seizure on public land. There have also been major seizures on public land in Arizona, Colorado and the Oregon bust mentioned in the above WSJ article.

On a macro scale, without increased support and effort at all levels the US Government (USG) stands little chance of providing much more than a happy photo op every once in a while with a confiscated crop. On an even larger scale, I’d assume that pot farm operations in the US are offsetting whatever difficulties the cartels may be facing financially in Mexico from their war with the MexGov. The standard line of logic thus suggests that US marijuana farms run by Mexican cartels are contributing to the rising murder rate and continued destabilization of Mexico by narco-gangs and criminal organizations like “Los Zetas”, and the La Familia, Sinaloa and Tijuana Cartels (among many others).

A few thoughts on combating the use of public land for cartel operations.

- I’m sure the USG is all over this, but the use of CI’s and HUMINT is key. There are nearly 200 million acres of national forest land in the US. This is a lot of terrain to cover without targetable information.
- Develop a program for IMINT platforms that seeks standard repeating patterns of emitted or radiated energy. In the video here, the reporter identifies the Pike NF bust in Colorado as having plants separated by 3 feet each. This kind of repeating pattern has to reflect solar radiation from the exposed dirt in a certain fashion that would allow for exploitation by aerial asset. I think something like this has tremendous potential.
- These pot farms all utilize some form of drip lines to water the crops, and are often quite long. It was also suggested that a lot of the watering is conducted at night in order to avoid aerial detection. This provides opportunities.

If anyone reading this knows of hardware/software along these lines already available, please comment. If nothing yet exists, some of the contractors reading this can freely use either of these concepts…for a small intellectual fee of course.

Analysis of President Obama's Decision Making Process

ABC posted a timeline of President Barak Obama's AfPak meetings following General McChrystal's recommendations. The White House posted some pictures of a couple of the meetings along with a list of who attended. I wanted to analyze the meeting timeline and the participants to speculate on what is actually going on behind the closed doors.

Aug 30-McChrystal sends Gates his assessment without troop requests. McChrystal believes we have 12 months to gain the initiative or lose the war. The mark on the wall is Sept 1, 2010

Sept 13-Obama has his first meeting with his "National Security Team". There is no picture or list of attendees. I think this was a meeting to lay the ground work for future meetings and decide who should attend.

Sept 22-Bob Woodward gets a hold of McChrystal's report and forwards it like it's hot.

Sept 30 (2nd Meeting)-I don't think it is a coincidence that the news reports that McChrystal provided Sec Gates his troop requirements on this day. This could have happened after the meeting but I believe it was the topic of the meeting. In attendance; Biden, Gates, Clinton, Adm Mullen, Gen Petraeus, Gen McCrystal, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Admiral Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, CIA Director Leon Panetta, Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Anne Patterson, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, General James Jones, National Security Advisor

Oct 7 (3rd Meeting)- No change to previous attendance and add Susan Rice, UN Ambassador and John Brennan, assistant to President on CT and Homeland Security.

Oct 9 (4th Meeting)- Add Rahm Emanuel and Lt. Gen Lute, special assistant to President on AfPak.

Oct 14 (5th Meeting)- No change to attendance. I believe the President used the last 4 meetings to look at multiple courses of action between the full 40,000 additional troops to Biden's CT plan and everything in between.

Oct 26 (6th Meeting)- No military or Intelligence Agency leadership in attendance. This was a meeting with the Secretaries and White House staff only. I think the troop decision was made by this point. The President probably held a meeting to war game their release of the new AfPak strategy.

Oct 30 (7th Meeting)- The Chairmen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all in attendance for this meeting. No intel agencies or operational military leadership in attendance. I believe this is the meeting that the President told the Joint Chiefs officially what the plan is and brought them in for their input on the impacts on how it would affect the patch charts and the logistics. Rahm Emanuel is also in attendance.

Nov 10th, Gen Casey went on the record in favor of a troop increase in Afghanistan but would not specifically say if he supported Gen McChrystal's 40,000 troop request. I think this is a telling fact that only after the Oct 30th meeting did Gen Casey officially support a troop increase. Since he didn't say outright that he supports 40,000 additional troops, I believe we can infer two things. 1) The President did not decided on a CT focused strategy. 2) McCrystal won't get his 40,000 he requested.

Nov 11th (Next Meeting) No word on who will be in attendance.

I was happy to see that the President brought in the military, intel, and State Dep folks to weigh in on the decision. We don't know what they added but at least they had a chance to provide input. The only thing that I worry about when I see meetings like this is Rahm Emanuel's attendance. I think everyone else was there to work for a victory while Rahm's primary duty is to look at this from a political perspective and is concerned more about 2012 Washington than 2010 Kabul.

We know that the White House will make a public statement on Afghanistan most likely after President Obama's trip to Asia. What we need to do now is match the future troop deployments to McChrystal's 12 month time frame for success or failure.

JD

The Enemy of My Enemy...but Who is Our Friend?

Yemen is currently all over the news but mostly as a side story. Imam Anwar al Awlaki's current location, Saudi Arabia battling Houthi Rebels, and AQAP's establishment are just a few of the recent news stories. My goal in this post is to begin to provide a common operating picture because it won't be long until Yemen is a continual front page story. A quick political history is necessary for us to understand the culture of strife.

Port of Aden has always been a point of contention throughout Yemen's history. The Romans, Ottomans, Ethiopians, and Persians have all controlled the important port city. In 628 AD, Yemen converted to Islam. Yemen was divided between the Imam run Northern portion and the British controlled Southern portion. Egypt, with Russian support as well as Kind Saud of Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan clashed within Yemen's territory. In May 1990 Pro-Western Yemen and Marxist Arab Republic united after 300 years of separation. The important part of the union is President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the first and only leader of united Yemen.

Ali Abdullah Saleh was President of North Yemen from 1978-1990 and continues to lead Yemen to this day. Saleh is Shia which provides an interesting dynamic with Yemen's recent military campaign against the Shia rebels in the border region of Saada. Ali Abdullah Saleh would be a great ally against Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) if he was a strong leader. It doesn't take one long to find a myriad of online articles espousing the limitations of Ali Abdullah Saleh's power and willingness to be a champion for peace. It is clear that Ali Abdullah Saleh will do just enough to garner the votes needed to remain in power.

Now lets get to the "so whats" of Yemen's importance on our foreign policy. Yemen's weak central government is beacon for multiple groups. Yemen is home to a Somali refugee population that grows by the day. While there is no open source information proving links between AQAP and al Shabaab that I know of, it does not take much imagination to see the benefit for Al Qadea to use the sea route between Yemen and Somaliland.

There is a large Shia rebel population that is attempting to survive on the boarder of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The government of Yemen has clashed with the Houthis Rebels on and off since 2004 and recently launched offensive operations to wipe out the rebel groups three months ago. Saudi Arabia has launched its own offensive operations to push the Houthis Rebels back inside the Yemeni boarder. It will be no surprise to the readers that Iran is supplying the Shia rebels with arms through the African country of Eritrea. The troubling part to us Americans is, King Saud and Ali Abdullah Saleh seem to have no reservations about launching military operations to squash Shia rebels while AQAP is working to build their network seemingly unchallenged.

Now I know that this is probably not a fair assumption that AQAP is unchallenged but it is widely known that AQAP is largely unchallenged south of Saudi Arabia's boarder. Yemen is #18 on the Failed States Index found at foreignpolicy.com or fundforpeace.org. The conditions are ripe for Al Qaeda. The primary source for income in Yemen is a dwindling oil reserve, water will become a flashpoint in the future, and Yemen continues to fail to provide enough stability to deny AQAP the disenfranchised youth they need to grow.

Yemen was not overly helpful during the USS Cole investigation but after Sept 11, Yemen increased their support to us in our war against Islamic extremism. Yemen is used as a hub for counter terror activities in our persistent watch of the Horn of Africa. I believe this is both a blessing and a curse. We need a launching pad like Yemen for our activities in the Horn even with our footprint in Djibouti. I do not think our footprint in Yemen will be utilized as a launch pad for counter AQAP operations due to Ali Abdullah Saleh's desire to retain his power. The local Yemenis won't loose sleep over attacks against al Shabaab but they will become restless if we turn our attention inside the Yemeni boarder.

What to do with Yemen. I do not know what our State Department focus is right now with Yemen. It is clear to me that we need to aggressively fight the conditions we know AQAP needs to thrive. I think we need to create a dependence on American support for the people and the government of Yemen. Without a well publicized dependence, I don't see how we could conduct CT operations targeting AQAP if the locals don't need American economic support.

Final point; we need to keep an eye on Yemen because its location has strategic importance and both Al Qaeda and Iran have interests in Yemen.

JD

Critical Progress in Iraq

Wanted to highlight one positive thing that occurred over the weekend. Lawmakers in Iraq were able to break a long-standing stalemate and pass a law that will allow for national elections to occur sometime in Jan 2010. This is a huge step in the process to bring greater legitimacy to the Iraqi national government.

According to the NY Times (see full article here), representatives from the US and the UN were able to broker an agreement on the sensitive topic of how votes would be allocated in Kirkuk (there was disagreement between Arabs and Kurds over whether to use census data from 2004 or 2009). Once a compromise was reached on this aspect of the bill, lawmakers were able to include another key provision: the decision to use an "open list" format where Iraqis can vote for individual candidates rather than a party/bloc. This will allow for all Iraqis to feel that their vote counts and hopefully go a long way towards improving perceptions of legitimacy.

Finally, a small glimmer of hope for some semblance of enduring success in Iraq. Although the passage of this bill required some pressure from outside parties, it still shows a willingness to compromise among the various ethno-sectarian groups...

The Radicalization of Nidal Hasan

Thanks to everyone for the comments in reply to my post about Nidal Hasan. Also, many thanks to Dan for his insightful analysis and proposed solution(s) for identifying potential violent jihadist extremists.

I wanted to briefly clarify the meaning behind the title of my last post. When I asked whether Nidal Hasan was "the new face of AQ," I meant it as a question/hypothesis - not a statement of fact. As more information is made available to the public, we are able to get a more rich understanding of the mindset of Nidal Hasan leading up to his horrific attack. Ultimately, there were a multitude of factors that contributed to his radicalization. However, I think that as we continue to learn more, we will see that Nidal Hasan is another example of what seems to be an increasing threat: the "homegrown, lone-wolf" terrorist. While its likely that Hasan acted alone, I argue that he was ultimately inspired by AQ's propaganda message.

Here's what I mean by this: Al Qaeda continues to morph and adapt to our targeting methodologies. As we have pressured the traditional core individual leaders of AQ (what some refer to as "AQ central"), they have adopted two additional lines of operation to allow them to continue (and even expand) their operations: 1) Partnerships with several traditionally "regional" extremist groups who have begun to co-opt the AQ global message (i.e. Shabaab in Somalia, the former GPSC in Algeria - now AQIM); 2) An increasingly sophisticated and capable media/IO wing that allows for the radicalization of individuals spread across the globe.

The videos and discussions on jihadist forums combined with radical sermons preached at certain mosques (including some in the US) tend to appeal to those who are feeling isolated, insecure, upset/angry, and powerless - just as Hasan was. A must-read article in Sunday's Telegraph sheds some more light on this, explaining that Hasan attended a particular mosque in Virginia in 2001 at the same time as three of the 9/11 bombers and had contact with a known AQ-sympathetic imam there (Anwar al Awlaki). The article also highlights the difficulty that Hasan had after the deaths of his parents in 1998 and 2001 and his failed attempts to find a wife after several years of searching (the shame involved with not finding a wife for a Muslim male is very significant and likely contributed to his frustrations). All of these details begin to line up and seem to be critical pieces in the puzzle that will explain how Hasan was transformed from a well-intentioned medical student to a crazed gunmen shouting "Allahu Akbar" while mowing down his fellow soldiers.

While some may feel that I'm going too far with this assertion, I still argue that the actions of Nidal Hassan are in fact representative of the newly-decentralized "Al Qaeda brand" - able to inspire violence through an extremely appealing marketing campaign aimed at disillusioned Muslims across the globe. This poses a serious threat that we must be able to defend against - while still carefully balancing the civil liberties of our own citizens. Not an easy task...

**Update: Evan Kohlmann at the Counterterrorism Blog has some great coverage of Anwar al Awlaki and his response to the shootings at Ft. Hood here and here. On his blog, al Awlaki praises Nidal Hassan as a "hero." Read the full, translated text of the blog here (courtesy of the NEFA Foundation).

Tragedy in Texas - The New Face of AQ?

The horrific attack yesterday at Ft. Hood has left everyone stunned. First and foremost, we’d like to offer our condolences and prayers to the families of the dead and wounded, most of whom were Army soldiers. Personally, I am still trying to process these tragic events and understand what could have been going on inside the mind of Army MAJ Nidal Hasan. It’s difficult enough to lose a fellow soldier while deployed and conducting combat operations, but it’s even worse to have them slain by one of their own back in the US.

At this time, details continue to be slowly released to the public as Army and federal officials conduct their investigations. In the meantime, the NY Times has published two good primers on the attacks as well as a running blog with regular updates as more information is released:

-Overview of the Attack – see full article here

-Brief Bio and Background of Hasan – see full article here

-NY Times Blog – see updates in real-time here

The Long War Journal also has some excellent coverage of the story here and here, including two important details: 1) Weeks before he conducted the attack, Hasan began wearing “Arabic clothing”. The morning of the attack he handed out Korans and gave away his furniture: 2) Just before opening fire on his fellow soldiers, he shouted “Allahu Akbar,” or “God is greatest.”

As the story unfolds, a few questions that will be critical to consider:

-What events/actions led to the “radicalization” of Nidal Hasan? How long did this process take? Who/what were the key influencers (imams, religious texts, jihadist forums, stress of his job, stories heard from soldiers he counseled)?
-What connections (direct or indirect) does Hasan have with AQ or other extremist jihadist groups? Was he acting alone or did he receive guidance from someone? Are there others out there who are planning similar attacks?
-What actions leading up to the attack should have served as indicators of what was coming (conversations with family/friends, website/bog posts, purchase of weapons, etc)?
-In terms of physical security, how was he able to gain access to the post and the attack site with two non-Army issue weapons? What implications does this have for security at other Army posts and government buildings?