Progress Against AQAP

AQAP's key leaders appeared together in a video from early 2009. Pictured (from left to right) are: Qasim al Raymi (possibly EKIA), Said Ali al Shihri (possibly detained), Nasir al Wuhayshi, and Muhammad al Awfi

Just wanted to highlight two major events that happened over the weekend in the fight against AQAP. If reports from the inside Yemen are true, government forces struck a major blow against the top tier leadership of AQAP. Neither US authorities or AQAP have confirmed the claims of the Yemeni government, but both claims still deserve mention due to the potential impact on AQAP's operational capability over the next 1-2 months.

• On 15 January, an airstrike in the Aljasher region resulted in 6x EKIA, reportedly including the AQAP Military Emir - Qasim al Raymi aka Abu Hurayah. As usual, Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has excellent coverage and background on the strike. Also, for an even more in-depth bio on Qasim al Raymi, check out the great coverage at Waq al Waq, a must-read for anyone interested in Yemen. AQAP responded quickly with a denial of his death, but we'll likely have to wait a few more days for final confirmation. Many analysts believe that Qasim al Raymi (who was the former overall emir of AQ in Yemen prior to their merger into AQAP) was the most critical target within the AQAP network based on his extensive experience and connections across the wider AQ movement.

• On 18 January, the Yemeni government claimed that they captured AQAP's deputy emir - Said Ali al Shihri in the Sylan district in Shabwa. According to Bill Roggio at LWJ, the initial report from the Yemen Observer explains the circumstances of capture: reportedly al Shihri and several other militants were traveling in a car that flipped when trying to bypass a flash checkpoint established by Yemeni government forces. Al Shihri was appointed the deputy to AQAP Emir Nasir al Wuhayshi after the formation of AQAP in early 2009. Previously, al Shihri (a Saudi citizen) had served as a travel facilitator in Iran and also spent time fighting in Afghanistan. He was released from detention at Guantanamo Bay in 2007 and placed into the Saudi rehab program, but quickly returned to his terrorist activities. Several months later, he played a major role in the attack on the US Embassy in Sanaa in September 2008.

If these claims prove true, there will clearly be a significant impact on AQAP's ability to conduct operations in the near to mid-term. However, I believe that they already likely have a major operation (or multiple operations) near the point of execution. Since these attacks would already be quite far along in the operational timeline, the capture/death of al Shihri and al Raymi will have minimal impact in preventing them.

While it's difficult to predict methodology and target selection, I believe we are likely to see two specific attacks in the next 1-3 months: 1) Coordinated suicide strike against the US Embassy in Sanaa (or other known US/Western target). This was recently attempted, and foiled by the Yemeni police, last month and I expect AQAP will keep trying until they get it right; 2) Another strike(s) against US airlines along a similar vein of the failed Christmas Day attack. I believe that Anwar al Awlaki (the dual US-Yemen citizen and radical cleric linked to both the failed Dec 25 attack and the Ft. Hood attacks) is playing an increasingly important role within the organization. His efforts to recruit Western and non-Arab youth are aimed at developing a cadre of suicide bombers with access to the US via their visas (for example, Canada is a perfect example and an area we've seen can be fertile for recruiting). Also, I expect AQAP (and other AQ-affiliated groups) to attempt an attack against the homeland using female suicide bombers. They continue to heavily recruit women and it's just a matter of time until they can put together an attack (similar to the spike in female suicide bombers we witnessed in Iraq in 2008).

In addition to considering future attacks being planned by AQAP, we must also take a step back and put the recent successes of the Yemeni government (likely with US assistance) into a larger context. Lethal targeting of top and mid-tier leaders is a critical element in our fight against AQAP, but there's much more we need to be doing to counter the group's growing influence and capability. In an upcoming post, I plan to examine the wider strategy that the US is waging against AQAP - taking a holistic and comprehensive look at our diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts in Yemen.

In the meantime, for some great background on Yemen and AQAP, check out the West Point CTC Sentinel's Special Issue on Yemen.

AQAP Claims Failed Midair Plot

The Counterterrorism Blog has some great coverage of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) recent claim of responsibility for the failed terror attack on Christmas Day. Only three days after the attack (Dec 28), AQAP released a message praising the "heroic mujahid...Omar al Farooq." A full translation of the media release is available from the NEFA Foundation. The text and timing of the the release tell us a few important things:

1) The AQAP media wing ("Al Malahim") is able to rapidly produce and disseminate a fairly sophisticated release. This indicates that AQAP likely has in place a robust command-and-control (C2) structure modeled similarly on the structure we saw in place in Mosul in 2008 (see my earlier post here). It also illustrates that AQAP views the recent failed attack as an opportunity to gain additional recognition and attention, a critical element of expanding their campaign.

2) The AQAP release contains a photo (see above) which shows Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab in a photo with an al Qaeda banner in the background. Although we are uncertain exactly when the photo was taken, this proves that Abdulmutallab was definitely associated with AQAP prior to the attack. It might also indicate that AQAP knew he was going to carry out the attack and wanted a photo of him to release after the attack which would prove a linkage between the attacker and AQ. This is significant and goes a long way towards confirming the claims made by Abdulmutallab that the attack was directed by AQ in Yemen. Further, the release spells out the fact that the attacker conducted the operation, "through direct coordination with the mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula."

3) The release explains that the main reason for the attack was in response to, "the monstrous raids using cluster bombs and cruise missiles that were launched from the American warships occupying the Gulf of Aden, targeting the proud tribes of Yemen in Abin, Arhab, and lastly in Shabwa, and they killed tens of Muslim women and children, and they also killed entire families." Although an attack this complex was likely already quite far along in the planning process, AQAP was savvy enough to speed up the execution of the attack in order to make it seem like a response to the Dec 17 and Dec 24 US-Yemeni stikes on AQAP. This is similar to the response we saw from al Shabaab (an AQ-affiliated group in Somalia) after the death of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in September 09. Nabhan was killed on Sep 14 and we saw a massive suicide VBIED attack three days later on Sep 17 that targeted the AMISOM HQ and killed several top African Union leaders. This appears to be a common TTP for AQ and AQ-affiliated groups who want to seize the opportunity to respond to US counter-terrorism efforts in their countries with a swift and symbolic response.

4) The AQAP media release provides some further insight into the organization and capabilities of their group when they explain that, "the mujahideen brothers in the Manufacturing Sector possessed a highly advanced device, with Allah’s grace, and it was tested and proved to be successful and practical, and it passed the inspection machines." Once again, we see parallels between AQAP and other AQ-affiliated groups, which all usually contain a separate "Logistics" structure which often constructs IEDs and other weapons and supplies them to members of the "Military" cells which then carry out the attacks. This allows the network to design advanced weapons and keep the identity of the highly valuable bombmakers secret from military cell members who may be captured and compromise their identity.

5) The release ends (as usual) with a call to arms for, "every Muslim protective of his religion and doctrine to...declare it a full-scale war against every crusader in the [Arabian] Peninsula." However, they then go a step further urging, "every soldier who works in the crusader armies and the apostate governments to repent to Allah and walk the footsteps of the heroic mujahid brother Nidal Hasan." Clearly, AQAP wants to play upon the knowledge that Anwar al Awlaki (who inspired and corresponded with Nidal Hassan) is known to live/operate in Yemen. As AQAP builds their reputation, they desire to affiliate themselves with al Awlaki, who has gained increased prominence since the Ft. Hood shooting spree. **On a related note, see our earlier posts which discuss the possibility that the Dec 24 strike by the Yemeni AF killed al Awlaki. There is still no official confirmation either way if he was EKIA.

Finally, on a separate but clearly related topic, also check out the article released on Oct 29 in AQAP's official magazine Sada al Malahim (English translation available here from the NEFA Foundation). In the article, AQAP leader Nasir al Wuhayshi (who was possibly EKIA in the Dec 24 airstrike) urges would-be attackers to target, "airports in the western crusade countries that participated in the war against Muslims; or on their planes, or in their residential complexes or their subways." While we have no way to know for certain, this could be an indication that the airplane plot was devised by top AQAP leadership and had been underway for several months. On the other hand, it could be an example of the increasingly common trend where top AQ leaders continue to push the "AQ brand" and advocate attacks, but individuals or small groups actually do the planning and conduct attacks on their own.

I think in this case, the attack was planned with the knowledge and support of top AQAP leaders. In fact, it's quite likely that the Dec 24 meeting which was hit by the Yemeni AF based on US intelligence was being held to give final approval for the attack that Abdulmutallab was going to carry out the next day. This would potentially explain why Nasir al Wuhayshi, Said Ali al Shihri, and possibly Anwar al Awlaki were all located together.

Yemen Strike: Anwar al Awlaki EKIA?

Recent open-source reporting has discussed the possibility that Anwar al Awlaki, the radical cleric who was in e-mail contact with MAJ Nidal Hassan prior to his Ft. Hood shootings, was killed today in an airstrike in Shabwa province. For initial details, see Bill Roggio's post at the LWJ here.

In an article in today's Washington Post, it's reported that both US and Yemeni officials claim that Awlaki was EKIA along with two other prominent Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leaders. The Yemeni Embassy in Washington reported that Awlaki was at a meeting of regional leaders along with Nasser al Wuhayshi (the regional head of AQAP) and Said Ali al Shihri (his deputy). According to reports from Saba News, the official media outlet of the Yemeni government, all three were at a meeting at the home of Awlaki (or one of his close relatives) to discuss responses to the 17 Dec combined raid and air strikes against an AQAP training camp in Sanaa and Abyan that resulted in 34x AQAP EKIA and 29x captured. For more on the 17 Dec strikes, see this great article in the LWJ.

However, there is still a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the three were at the meeting and who was actually killed in the strikes, which were carried out by the Yemeni Air Force. According to the Yemen Observer, the whereabouts of Awlaki and Shihri are unknown, and Wuhayshi is thought to have survived/escaped. Al Jazeera (English version here) is also reporting that local sources say Awlaki was not injured/killed in the attacks. The AJ story also provides an interesting sidenote to the complex story surrounding Awlaki, when an official in Yemen is quoted as saying that, "[Awlaki's] father is an adviser to the president of Yemen. If they really wanted him, they could phone him and tell him to come back to the capital and arrest him...I have serious doubts about him being a target - simply because he is well connected to the government and there is no serious case against him." Sounds about right for the Middle East...

Although initial reports are always sketchy and we might not know for sure for several days, I assess that Awlaki was not EKIA in this particular strike. There are several reasons for this: 1) The initial reports from the Yemen Observer say that the strike occured at Awlaki's home, but never say that he was actually present - in fact, in the WP article, Awlaki's father claims that he has actually been staying with an uncle who lives over 40 miles away for the last two months; 2) Awlaki is more well-known among Western audiences and jihadists and has little historic affiliation with top AQ-affiliated leaders like Wuhayshi and Shihri; 3) Awlaki is more of an "inspirational" figure (would likely fall under the sharia wing of the organization), while the others are more operational/military planners. While Awlaki might be consulted to bless off on a planned attach, these two groups are more likely to communicate via phone than to meet in person; 4) If the Al Jazeera report is true and Awlaki has some ties to the government, I doubt they would have launched the strike. As JD explained previously in his excellent post, the Yemeni government (led by Ali Abdullah Saleh) is playing both sides and has historically tolerated (and even supported) some AQ elements in the country.

The only way that I could see these three (and reportedly several other top AQAP leaders) being together in one location would be if the Dec 17 strikes (a combined US-Yemen effort driven by US intel) were so disruptive that they spread panic across the organization and forced the top members of the group to communicate via phone to set up a face-to-face meeting to assess the damage and plan the way forward. More likely, however, is that some folks within the Yemeni government got overexcited and reported false or exaggerated information to the media, which is now being propagated across the Western and Middle Eastern media outlets.

I hope the initial reports are true, but I doubt it.

Anwar al Awlaki: A “Confidant” for Nidal Hasan?

I know we’ve dedicated quite a bit of time to the case of Nidal Hasan, but I continue to be fascinated and alarmed by the events and people that contributed to what Bruce Hoffman described as Hasan’s “self radicalization” (see full article in the NY Times here).

Today’s Washington Post offers some insightful excerpts from the first interview with Anwar al Awlaki since Hasan’s shooting spree at Ft. Hood (see full article here). Recent investigations have revealed that Nidal Hasan had semi-regular e-mail contact with Awlaki prior to the attacks and even attended several of his sermons at the Dar al Hijra mosque in N. Virginia. In the interview, Awlaki explains that, “he thought he played a role in transforming Hasan into a devout Muslim eight years ago,” and “that Hasan ‘trusted’ him and that the two developed an e-mail correspondence over the past year.” While it is possible that Awlaki is attempting to gain some fame (or infamy) for himself and overplay their relationship, I think it’s more likely that Hasan considered Awlaki to be a legitimate religious authority and looked to him for guidance and even inspiration. In multiple audio recording and blog posts, Awlaki encouraged attacks on US and other “infidel” armies (see an example here from NEFA). It’s no coincidence that his recordings were also found at the homes of several of the Fort Dix attack plotters.

Additionally, after the attack at Ft. Hood, Awlaki almost immediately posted a response on his blog calling Hasan a “hero” (see full transcript of Awlaki’s blog post here). For years, CT experts across the government have tracked Awlaki, stating in a report in 2008 that he was an “example of al-Qaeda reach into” the United States. In 2006, Awlaki left the US for Yemen, where he was then detained (reportedly at the behest of US forces) in 2007 and subsequently released. Since then, he has leveraged the Internet to distribute writings, audiotapes, and videos (all in English) to inspire jihad. For additional background on Anwar al Awlaki, see this in-depth biography and background on the NEFA Foundation site here.

The case of Anwar al Awlaki presents significant challenges and dilemmas for US intelligence and law enforcement authorities. While we can fairly easily track Awlaki and others like him through their writings and websites, how can we place effects on them (both lethal and non-lethal) when they reside in ungoverned spaces like Southern Yemen – which is quickly being reinforced as an AQ safe haven? How can we determine who Awlaki is engaging with in terms of both legitimate al Qaeda leadership as well as potential “self-radicalized” lone wolf types? In the specific case of Nidal Hasan, intelligence officials were aware of the contact between Hasan and Awlaki, but assessed that this did not pose a threat; how can we improve our analytical processes and include additional factors when analyzing situations like this? Clearly there are major legal and privacy aspects to this discussion, but it’s one we must have in order to prevent events like this from happening again.

The Radicalization of Nidal Hasan

Thanks to everyone for the comments in reply to my post about Nidal Hasan. Also, many thanks to Dan for his insightful analysis and proposed solution(s) for identifying potential violent jihadist extremists.

I wanted to briefly clarify the meaning behind the title of my last post. When I asked whether Nidal Hasan was "the new face of AQ," I meant it as a question/hypothesis - not a statement of fact. As more information is made available to the public, we are able to get a more rich understanding of the mindset of Nidal Hasan leading up to his horrific attack. Ultimately, there were a multitude of factors that contributed to his radicalization. However, I think that as we continue to learn more, we will see that Nidal Hasan is another example of what seems to be an increasing threat: the "homegrown, lone-wolf" terrorist. While its likely that Hasan acted alone, I argue that he was ultimately inspired by AQ's propaganda message.

Here's what I mean by this: Al Qaeda continues to morph and adapt to our targeting methodologies. As we have pressured the traditional core individual leaders of AQ (what some refer to as "AQ central"), they have adopted two additional lines of operation to allow them to continue (and even expand) their operations: 1) Partnerships with several traditionally "regional" extremist groups who have begun to co-opt the AQ global message (i.e. Shabaab in Somalia, the former GPSC in Algeria - now AQIM); 2) An increasingly sophisticated and capable media/IO wing that allows for the radicalization of individuals spread across the globe.

The videos and discussions on jihadist forums combined with radical sermons preached at certain mosques (including some in the US) tend to appeal to those who are feeling isolated, insecure, upset/angry, and powerless - just as Hasan was. A must-read article in Sunday's Telegraph sheds some more light on this, explaining that Hasan attended a particular mosque in Virginia in 2001 at the same time as three of the 9/11 bombers and had contact with a known AQ-sympathetic imam there (Anwar al Awlaki). The article also highlights the difficulty that Hasan had after the deaths of his parents in 1998 and 2001 and his failed attempts to find a wife after several years of searching (the shame involved with not finding a wife for a Muslim male is very significant and likely contributed to his frustrations). All of these details begin to line up and seem to be critical pieces in the puzzle that will explain how Hasan was transformed from a well-intentioned medical student to a crazed gunmen shouting "Allahu Akbar" while mowing down his fellow soldiers.

While some may feel that I'm going too far with this assertion, I still argue that the actions of Nidal Hassan are in fact representative of the newly-decentralized "Al Qaeda brand" - able to inspire violence through an extremely appealing marketing campaign aimed at disillusioned Muslims across the globe. This poses a serious threat that we must be able to defend against - while still carefully balancing the civil liberties of our own citizens. Not an easy task...

**Update: Evan Kohlmann at the Counterterrorism Blog has some great coverage of Anwar al Awlaki and his response to the shootings at Ft. Hood here and here. On his blog, al Awlaki praises Nidal Hassan as a "hero." Read the full, translated text of the blog here (courtesy of the NEFA Foundation).