Governance in Marjah

As the Afghan flag was raised over Marjah at the end of February and President Karzai made his second trip to the town on March 7, it was clear that the hardest part of the campaign to make enduring improvements in the key southern town remains. During Karzai's recent visit, it was clear that the main issue on the minds of most locals was likely: How will this operation really change anything and make my life better in the long run?

Already, there are early indications of a return to the way things were before. As I discussed in my previous post, there are three main challenges that lie ahead: 1) Providing enduring security with ANSF (ANA and ANP forces) that are viewed as legitmate and competent by locals; 2) Providing an alternate source of income in the wake of large-scale poppy eradication efforts; 3) and 3) Providing improved local governance and the district and sub-district level.

In my mind, the most important (and most daunting) of these challenges is the governance piece. A recent must-read article by Radio Free Europe provides the best open-source analysis I've read to date of the governance challenges we face in Marjah. The article gives an excellent quote from Azizullah Khan, a prominent local elder in Marjah, who sharply questioned/criticized Karzai during his last visit. Azizullah explained the current dilemma that the people of Marjah face:

"For the past eight years the warlords have been ruling us. Their hands have been stained with the blood of innocents and they have killed hundreds of people. Even now they are being imposed on the people in the name of tribal and regional leaders. People are afraid to convey the real feelings of locals because they sense themselves to be in danger from all sides."

Khan pleaded for the government to ensure security, remove any military presence from schools and private homes, compensate locals for losses resulting from the recent fighting, and help rebuild schools, clinics, and irrigation canals. His most impassioned and telling appeal, however, was for Karzai to avoid repeating a past mistake: Do not hand over control of local affairs to former militia commanders or other "people with influence."

This last statement was clearly a reference to the current battle over influence/control of the Marjah district governor position. As I discussed last week, two individuals (both backed by different elements at the national level) are currently vying for control - Abdul Zahir (the "official" civilian leader that was appointed by the Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal) and Abdul Rahman Jan (the former police chief/local warlord who is recognized by many as the most powerful "strongman" in the area). During the last few weeks, Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) has formed a 50-man "Marjah Executive Committee" in a clear move to re-consolidate the power he previously had (until he lost control to the Taliban over the last 2-3 years). During the time that he held sway, he was known as brutal, corrupt, and mostly ineffective. Yet, in the wake of Operation Moshtarak he's making another bid to capitalize on the power vacuum left behind after the Taliban were pushed out. Abdul Zahir, appointed by Provincial Governor Mangal (recognized by ISAF leaders as quite an effective leader) is also mounting a campaign to gain influence. It will be very difficult given perceptions among the local populace that Abdul Zabir is an outsider.

During the weeks to come, it will be crucial to monitor this tenuous situation. ISAF leadership must work to further legitimize Abdul Zahir, who is definitely the "least worst" option for the crucial post of Marjah district governor. Additionally, as we look forward to planning and preparations for possible large-scale operations in/around Kandahar, we must consider how we'll fight a similar battle there to install a leader who is viewed as more legitimate than the current de facto team of powerbrokers (Ahmed Wali Karzai - the President's brother and head of Kandahar provincial council, Gul Agha Shirzai - former Kandahar provincial governor, and Muhammad Arif Noorzai).

AfPak Update

Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al Amriki, was reportedly captured by Pakistani forces in Karachi.

Wanted to highlight a few important developments in the AfPak region:

1) According to multiple reports coming out of Pakistan, senior al Qaeda spokesman and leader Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al Amriki was captured by Pakistani Special Forces in Karachi. For more details, check out Bill Roggio's excellent post at the Long War Journal. If the initial reports are true, this would be a significant capture. Gadahn has quickly risen within the ranks of AQ's senior leadership over the last several years (in part due to his value to the organization as an American citizen). Successful and rapid exploitation of Gadahn could potentially provide actionable intelligence on senior AQ leaders, including Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al Libi. More to come on this topic as details continue to emerge...

2) Operation Mostarak continues in Marjah (in the southern Afghan province of Helmand). While most of the significant military operations have ended, the more difficult task of transitioning from "clear/secure" to "hold/build" is now occurring. The best coverage and analysis I have seen on the way ahead in Marjah is Josh Foust's writing, both in his recent NY Times op-ed and on his blog Registan. Based on my analysis of the situation, the three greatest challenges facing ISAF and ANSF elements in Marjah are:

• Establishing a government that is both capable and recognized as legitimate by the local populace. Currently there is a battle for control between two individuals - Abdul Zahir (the "official" civilian leader that was appointed by the Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal) and Abdul Rahman Jan (the former police chief/local warlord who is recognized by many as the most influential "strongman" in the area). Abdul Zahir will face an uphill battle to be recognized as legitimate amid reports of his criminal background and, more importantly, his reputation as an outsider. US leaders in Marjah will have to walk a fine line between trying to prop up Abdul Zahir, while minimizing the legitimacy of the more-popular (or at least more-feared) Abdul Rahman Jan. This will be the single-most important part of the entire campaign and right now I'm not sure we're backing the right guy.
• Providing an alternative source of income to the majority of farmers in the area whose livelihood depends on poppy cultivation. As the Christian Science Monitor reports, Marjah has long been recognized as a critical hub in the opium trade that flourishes across Southern Afghanistan. ISAF and ANSF elements have already begun their "government-led eradication" campaign and locals are not pleased. The Taliban has recognized this as a major opportunity to win support and are tailoring their IO messages to highlight the fact that ISAF and the new government are doing more harm than good by stopping poppy growth, and at the same time providing no alternative. For more on the challenges and complexities of eradicating the opium trade in Marjah (and Helmand), see this excellent article from TIME.
• Building capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). As ISAF draws down the number of troops in Marjah, it will become critical to have a competent and trusted security force of locals who can hold the city and prevent the return of the Taliban. Currently, most locals have little trust or faith in the ANSF, especially the ANP who are widely viewed as more corrupt than the Taliban. Several reports from embedded reporters during the operation have highlighted the challenges ahead in improving the performance of the ANSF. CJ Chivers has some excellent analysis in the New York Times, where he highlights the resistance of locals to support the ANP elements being brought to Marjah. One local elder commented to the US commander, "We’re with you. We want to help you build. We will support you. But if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death." Also, check out this excellent article from several days ago by Chivers that describes the poor performance of the ANSF during the clearance operations in Marjah.

3) Finally, I just wanted to link to an excellent book review written by Dexter Filkins and published in The New Republic this week. Filkins reviews the book "In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan," by Seth G. Jones (from RAND). I recently finished the book myself and highly recommend it. Jones provides an excellent summary of the last fifty years in Afghanistan, providing great context for anyone interested in understanding the various forces and events that have brought us to the current point we're at in Afghanistan.

As usual, Filkins writing is masterful (just as it as in his book The Forever War) and I recommend his book review as a stand-alone article. Entitled, "The American Awakening," the article presents a clear, concise, and well-reasoned assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan, highlighting both the progress we've made and more importantly the challenges that lay ahead. If you don't have time to read Jones' phenomenal book, you should definitely check out Filkins' article.

Battle for Marjah: Operation Moshtarak

For weeks now, we’ve heard and read media reporting discussing the upcoming major Marine offensive into the town of Marjah (located in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province) – a major Taliban stronghold and narcotics hub that serves as the Taliban’s command and control (C2) center for the province. The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) commander, BG Larry Nicholson, publicly announced the upcoming operation several weeks ago – a decision likely intended to encourage local residents (who number approximately 50,000) to leave prior to the attack as well to illustrate the willingness of ISAF forces to face the Taliban head-on. The offensive, named Operation Moshtarak, is being billed by ISAF leaders as the first major battle of the Afgan surge – making it a “must win” in terms of gaining the upper-hand in the critical Information Operations (IO) battle against the Taliban. Nicholson has bluntly stated, “We intend to go in big, strong, and fast.”

Clearly, the Marines are looking to send a strong message to the Taliban, hedging their bets that most of the local fighters will either melt away or be defeated, allowing ISAF and ANSF forces to be viewed as the winner for the first time in years. The jury is still out on whether Nicholson’s gamble to announce the operation ahead of time will pay off. So far, initial reports state that most of the residents (up to 90%) have yet to leave Marjah, likely because of intimidation from heavily entrenched Taliban forces. Additionally, insurgents have reportedly constructed tunnels and bunkers, brought in heavy weapons, set booby traps and strewn landmines around Marjah. One local Taliban commander, Qari Fazluddin, told Reuters some 2,000 fighters were ready to fight in Marjah, the group's last big stronghold in the southern province. "We don't have jets and tanks but we have already planted hundreds of roadside bombs to inflict high casualties on the invading forces," said Fazluddin, the Taliban commander. This may indicate that the Taliban’s stranglehold on the town and desire to maintain this control/influence is stronger than initially assessed.

As the Institute for the Study of War explains in their recently released report, the Marines (and other US and ANSF elements) have already begun initial “shaping” operations – including establishing parts of an outer cordon, securing key routes in and out of the city, and precision targeted raids against top Taliban leaders in the area. So far, we have already seen:

• BG Nicholson and Afghan Brig. Gen. Mahayoodin Ghoori held a shura, or leadership council, several days ago with Marjah’s most important district elders where they encouraged them to convince residents to stay inside once the fighting begins


• Begin­ning on 04 Feb 2010, Afghan and British troops launched a helicopter and ground advance south through Nad Ali towards Marjah


• On 06 Feb 2010, the British press reported that U.S. Navy SEALs and British Special Forces began infiltrating the town, airlifting in on “kinetic” missions during the night. It was later reported that as many as fifty specifically targeted insurgents were killed during the raids. The following day, coalition forces dropped leaflets which were aimed primarily at the militants, listing several of their commanders by name and warning fighters to leave the area or be killed.


• On 09 Feb 2010, the pace of the shaping operations increased. Approximately 400 troops from 5/2 Stryker Brigade along with 250 Afghan Army soldiers and their thirty Canadian trainers moved to take up positions northeast of Marjah.

Based on these initial indications, major clearance operations are likely to begin in the next few days, with two Marine battalions serving as the core of the assault force. 3/6 Marines (along with their partner Afghan National Army BN) have already occupied a temporary outpost seven miles north of Marjah and are completing final preparations before moving south. 1/6 Marines (with their partner ANA BN) conducted a series of air assault operations to seize the area known as the “Five Points” a key intersection east of Marjah where the main route in the area (Rt. 601) intersects with the Bolan Bridge (which spans the Helmand River and connects Marjah to the provincial capital of Laskhar Gah). According to embedded reports, Taliban militants attacked the joint force almost immediately with heavy machine gun, rocket, and small arms fire. Although the Marines (and RC-South) have yet to announce the “formal” start of operations, it sure sounds like things have kicked off. I would expect full-on, large-scale clearance operations to begin in the next 24-48 hours.

More important, though, than “going in hard and fast” with offensive clearance and capture/kill operations will be what the ISAF forces do once they occupy the town and how long they stay to hold the critical terrain. So far, I am encouraged by what ISAF has planned in terms of non-lethal operations to support the Marjah clearance. The Washington Post reports that ISAF has already designated a dedicated “civilian reconstruction team” (read mini-PRT) to move into Marjah post-hostilities. Additionally, an American team also is working with the Karzai government to deploy a contingent of Afghan civil servants. To encourage Afghans to serve in Marjah, the government reportedly plans to increase the average monthly salary for such personnel from $60 to about $300. Once Marja is secure, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development plan to assist farmers in planting crops and rehabilitating the canal network, a project the United States began more than 50 years ago and has yet to complete.

Additionally, the Afghan government plans to provide a more enduring security presence in the area. Yesterday, Hanif Atmar, the Afghan interior minister, told a group of about 350 elders from Marja’s main tribes that when Operation Moshtarak ends about 1,000 police officers will be assigned to help keep the Taliban out – composed mostly of local residents. “Give me your sons,” Mr. Atmar said, “and we will make a national police force with them.” These ANP forces will be bolstered by US elements that will likely remain in the town for several weeks, occupying temporary outposts as they stand up local government councils, begin projects to improve essential services, and dissuade the Taliban from returning. With a limited number of troops available, however, ISAF will not be able to remain here in force for too long. Within 1-2 months, I would expect a minimal ISAF presence (maximum of 1x US BN), making it difficult to consolidate any gains in the long-term.

Whatever ISAF and ANSF forces stay behind will not only have to battle the Taliban for influence, but will also need to provide an alternative to poppy that can provide some sort of sustained, long-term economic support for the local populace. Although the Taliban may be brutal and extreme, they have served as good business partners for the people of Marjah for several years. A recent Reuters article highlights this challenge: "Our poppy business is booming under the Taliban. We don't want the government, we want the Taliban," said Abdul Ahmad, a farmer. "When the government destroys our only income, why should we support it?" Ensuring long-term economic (and political) support to locals is necessary to ensure the militants do not come back. "If this operation is a show of force then it is not going to work," said Haji Usman, a Marjah tribal elder. "The government needs to bring all public services that we are looking for -- schools, clinics, mosques, electricity and jobs for young boys to get busy instead of fighting for Taliban."

Let’s hope that ISAF forces heed Haji Usman’s advice and are able to achieve three critical and enduring effects with Operation Moshtarak: 1) clearing the town of Taliban fighters; 2) holding the physical terrain and retaining influence over the populace; and 3) building local capacity in terms of governance, economy, and essential services in order to provide an enduring alternative to the Taliban. Failure in any one of these difficult objectives will not only mean a loss in Marjah, but will also have strategic implications in terms of building momentum and support for the Afghanistan surge.