Al Qaeda: Franchise or Conglomerate?

This blog post comes out of a series of email discussions with DP, and is the first of at least two posts. These posts are intended to generate thought and discussion; I need you to challenge this theory! If you are a returning reader, you will undoubtedly recognize the word “franchise” from prior posts as we discuss al Qaeda’s offshoots around the world. If you are not a returning reader, I suggest you read this article from the BBC for background, and click here and here for a few of DP’s recent posts discussing franchise terrorists. These groups include (but are not limited to) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Harakat Shabaab Mujahideen (HSM), and al Qaeda in the Caucasus (AQC). Over the course of my discussions with DP, I began to visualize al Qaeda and its subordinate “franchises” under a different commercial simile: that of a business conglomerate. I do not think franchise is a bad simile, but I don’t think it truly highlights the kind of relationship seen between al Qaeda’s Central Leadership and its networked subordinate terror groups.

First, let’s look at commonly accepted definitions of both franchise and conglomerate:

Franchise - the right or license granted by a company to an individual or group to market its products or services in a specific territory.
Conglomerate - a corporation consisting of a number of subsidiary companies or divisions in a variety of unrelated industries, usually as a result of merger or acquisition.

At first glance, franchise seems like a good fit. But, let’s first analyze both words in a true business format, and then move on to analysis of a terrorist group flying the black flag and shehada of AQ.

FRANCHISES

A prospective small business owner in Small Town, USA decides he wants to invest in a fast food franchise. He then analyzes what he feels this small town is missing, and takes a look at a website like http://www.franchiseopportunities.com to see what opportunities in fast food exist. The businessman eventually decides upon my favorite sub shop, Jimmy John’s. The businessman buys into the franchise and starts setting up shop in the small town. The new Jimmy John’s becomes just another Jimmy John’s, carrying the same name and packaging, selling the same food, etc. If this small town has a specific style of sub that is popular in that region (like a Po Boy in Louisiana or a Cuban in Florida), the new Jimmy John’s would not be able to capitalize on that popularity and sell Po Boys or Cuban subs. They are restricted to make and sell what is approved by Jimmy John’s corporate headquarters. Another key consideration is that the sub shop is a Jimmy John’s before the doors open on the first day. It’s not often that you see a mom & pop shop open up and then later become a Jimmy John’s or Subway.

CONGLOMERATES

In a business conglomerate, a major corporation buys a smaller company to gain a foothold in a specific industry in an effort to diversify. The major parent corporation then likely will provide one or more personnel to the smaller company’s board of directors to provide strategic guidance. Otherwise, the smaller company is (typically) left to its own devices. If the smaller company attempts to employ a new business tactic or push a round of optimization, they can draw upon the larger company for subject matter experts on whatever task they are undertaking or having issues with. The major corporation offers guidance, knowledge, trainers, etc. in an effort to enable the success of the smaller company. Each subordinate company maintains its own leadership structure with only a few key personnel reporting up to the larger corporation, and largely guides itself through day-to-day operations. Lastly, it is important to highlight that the smaller companies of a conglomeration were usually in business before they became a part of the larger corporation. This is an important aspect to remember as we look at al Qaeda.

THE AL QAEDA CONTEXT

Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM) of Somalia is a great example for this discussion. After splintering from the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, the group has grown steadily. Starting at first as purely a national insurgency against Ethiopian forces, HSM later moved on to targeting the Transitional Federal Government and rival militias like Hizb ul Islam. In June 2008, HSM leadership published its first communiqué that began with greetings to AQ Central Leadership. This is the first known signal that HSM had aligned with AQ and moved into the ranks of global jihad. Although to be approved to carry the AQ banner, HSM must have made previous overtures toward AQCL that they were prepared to elevate their attacks to a regional and/or international level. What makes HSM more like a small company in a conglomerate than an AQ franchise?

1. HSM was in business before aligning under AQ, which likely did not occur until June 2008.
2. HSM maintains its own leadership and goals while simultaneously supporting AQCL’s overall global ambitions. For background on HSM’s movement into the ranks of transnational jihadism, click here and here.
3. AQCL reportedly provides operational and planning subject matter experts to HSM. The emerging tactics and media capabilities of al Shabaab also lend credence to a foreign training cadre in Somalia.
4. Despite the subject matter experts on the ground and other forms of support like communiqués from Abu Yahya al Libi and Ayman al Zawahiri, HSM is largely left to its own devices for how it will prosecute their front of the war.
5. Just as AQIM is in the business of kidnappings (see here and here for two examples) to support the greater jihadist movement, and AQAP undertook the attempted Christmas Day bombing, HSM utilizes attacks on free speech in Europe to prosecute their style of global jihad against the West.

SUMMARY

I realize that this argument is largely a case of semantics, but these semantics help drive our conceptual understanding of al Qaeda, and it is vital that we accurately portray our enemy in order to attack them in the best way possible. For this reason, I feel it is important to challenge the commonly accepted framework of al Qaeda and its subordinate terrorist groups. If this were a franchise, the tactics and methods between all groups mentioned in bullet five would all be the same. Instead, they represent the capabilities and strengths of each group. In essence, each group is producing their own regional “Po Boys”, and not waiting for a specified menu from corporate headquarters. There is recent open source reporting that Hamas and its offshoots have made efforts to align themselves under al Qaeda. The article, citing a not-yet-published study from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says that Hamas and affiliated offshoots are being snubbed by al Qaeda for failing to prove that their intentions extend beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. If true, this helps fortify my assessment that AQ and subordinate groups are more like a conglomerate than franchise. In a business sense, this situation is akin to a major corporation conducting an assessment of a potential takeover target and determining that the smaller company is not a viable “fit” with the company’s long-term business plan. In the case of AQ, their long-term agenda is to wage war against the West, principally the United States. Subordinate terror groups are merely tasked with prosecuting AQCL’s long-term interests with their own set of capabilities and unique strengths. In the case of HSM, they have a large Somali diaspora spread throughout Europe and North America that they can draw upon. AQAP had a Nigerian national who traveled to Yemen and seemingly offered himself up for a suicide attack. Each attack by a subordinate group against a Western target is a form of “profit” for AQ, and serves to strengthen the overall conglomerate. Recent attacks against the West came from AQ in the Caucasus, who were the likely perpetrators of an attack against a Russian police station in Dagestan; HSM, who was likely responsible for the attempted assassination of Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard; and AQAP, who has already admitted being behind the attempted Christmas day bombing of an international flight headed to the United States.

Looking back at the definition of a conglomerate that I provided near the top of this post, let us simply remove the words “unrelated industries” and replace them with the word “regions”. When re-looking both definitions, conglomerate with the replaced words, which one now seems to be the best fit for AQ? Al Qaeda as a franchise with a set playbook (i.e. menu) of attack methods and capabilities, or a conglomerate made up of subordinate terrorist groups that prosecute their own brand of terrorism within each group’s unique set of strengths and capabilities?

In my next post, I will discuss how altering the prism of al Qaeda's framework will potentially benefit us in our ongoing efforts to combat al Qaeda and its subordinate terror groups.