Misunderstanding Sets Back US-Pak Relations

I had to share this amusing (but unfortunate) story involving the temporary detention and interrogation of a delegation of Pakistani officers at Dulles yesterday. Sadly, the incident highlights the fact that a misunderstanding and poor decision-making by a flight attendant and security guards can set back relations between two countries. Despite the billions of dollars we donate annually in aid to Pakistan (particularly in the wake of the recent flooding), this incident is being viewed within Pakistan as a major "humiliation" that resulted from the "paranoia permeating US airports."

From the Washington Post:

"A delegation of senior Pakistani military officials visiting the United States for a major defense conference headed home in protest Tuesday night after they said they were interrogated and rudely treated by security officials at Dulles International Airport.

The nine-member group of high-ranking Pakistani officers boarded United Airlines Flight 727 from Washington to Tampa late Sunday but were pulled off the plane after one of them "made a comment to a flight attendant," said Mike Trevino, a United spokesman.

United did not provide details, but Pakistani officials said the remark came from a general in the delegation who - weary of a long day of travel that began in Islamabad - said, "I hope this is my last flight," or words to that effect.

That sparked a call to Dulles law enforcement officials, who detained the delegation for 2.5 hours and refused to allow the officials to contact their embassy or the U.S. military officials who had invited them to visit, according to a Pakistani military official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Pakistanis were finally released after police at Dulles determined they did not pose a threat. But instead of proceeding to Tampa, the delegation was ordered to return to Pakistan by their military superiors in Islamabad, in protest of their treatment, the Pakistani official said, adding that they were "verbally abused." The group of officers spent the next 48 hours in Washington, waiting for the next available flight home, and were scheduled to depart the United States on Tuesday evening.

The Pakistani officers were originally en route to U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa to attend the annual conference of the U.S.-Pakistan Military Consultative Committee, said Maj. David Nevers, a Central Command spokesman. He said Centcom officials hoped to reschedule the conference."

Myopia: A commentary on military vogue

Recently, a string of articles on the milblog www.smallwarsjournal.com (note 1) has unintentionally highlighted a weak-link in the philosophical chains that string together the concepts and skills of the military profession. At first glance the debate appears to be a parochial, all be it professional, dispute centered on the future of the Armor Corps of the US Army and broadly on the state of the Army's high-intensity combat skills. Written mostly by career Army combat arms officers (mostly teaching at West Point, incidentally) the debate at first glance resembles the spirit of the rather intense branch infighting that characterized the US Army of the 1930's with the introduction of the battle tank (note 2).

The tank of old threatened the primacy of the Infantry and sides were picked. There were conservative voices and liberal 'revolutionary' voices. There were also the moderate ones who seem to have won and integrated both for 60 yrs without accepting the absolutisms of the poles. The focus now is COIN, supposedly an innovation, and the effect it has on the high-intensity, heavy weapons tactical skills in the Army. Again, one side says COIN has atrophied them all but irrevocably while the other insists that the new environment is something to be embraced unequivocally as the status quo. And again, there are the moderates, like LTC Thomas J Weiss (note 3) that suggest a middle ground, a synthesis, is the way to go. Both debates seem to deal with a "newness" that was/is at once threatening the old order and yet could be on the cusp of revolution. However, the otherwise praiseworthy middle-ground article by LTC Weiss betrays the philosophical fallacy that underpins the whole debate by asking the question "...how best do we organize and train our forces for future conflict?" This assumption, that there is something new that is unparalleled and unknown. Something that is "future" is different than the "past" in some fundamental and as-yet unappreciated way, is atrophying something far more critical than a tactical skill set, the profession of arms.

In many ways it is the same mental trend that gripped the Officer Corps post-Vietnam and produced the likes of the Powell Doctrine. The idea that first, America in the future will have a say in the types of conflicts it fights and secondly (and most dangerously) that America has the ability to predict those conflicts with a certainty that will define its capabilities. In the past it led to the insistence that America will not be involved in low-intensity conflict (LIC) or insurgent actions, therefore we will only develop heavy forces. Indeed, that focus has allowed us to steam roll Iraq, twice. Instantly occupy Panama and Granada and otherwise sail and fly around the globe seemingly at will. On the other hand, that focus brought us the absolute misery of Iraq 2004-2009. We invented terminology like COIN and Asymmetrical Warfare and decided that we must win hearts-and-minds and decided that there was a spectrum to warfare to cope with our glaring deficiencies in occupation skill sets and that this is a "new, modern, future war". Yet all this simply betrayed the multi-generational failure of our Officer Corps to understand our profession and to confirm that it has not learned the lesson well at all.

The Roman army spent the better part of a millennium patrolling and administering the Empire, not fighting set piece battles. But when it could no longer mobilize for those battles it lost the Empire. Likewise, the British Empire mostly spent its time floating about and dealing with this insurgency or that, with a major war every few decades that required massive armies. History goes on ad nauseam with examples that show that perhaps 9 out of 10 man-years of the professional civilized soldier are spent patrolling and dealing with rebellion. In other words, LIC is the historical norm. The slight problem with that understanding however, is magnitude. While it may be that the US Army conducting LIC is actually the historical norm (Indian-Wars, Philippines, etc) when it is waged poorly it usually drains coffers and kills men. But in the end the failure rarely has any immediate dramatic impact on the civilization deploying those men. Fail in high-intensity, however, and you may well lose everything (a dynamic illustrated eloquently by LTC Weiss in his concluding statements).

Unlike the battle tank, which revolutionized warfare technologically, COIN is not an innovation but a technique. Read Machiavelli for examples. COIN is a technique that is available to every Prince, President and Viceroy to deal with a rebellion; one of several techniques and for our liberal, enlightened dispositions perhaps the most palatable. Pacification and more specifically control of the population is its ultimate goal however. If you are resorting to COIN it means you already have a rebellion, you already lost control.

The medical profession is expected to regard human biological welfare in all spheres to better the health of the people. The legal profession is expected to regard the interpretation and application of the law in all spheres to manage the formal relationships of the people. The military profession is and must be expected to understand and apply the “full spectrum of operations” to enforce the interests of the state it serves and this means being able to do so everywhere on the spectrum. A medical system that trains orthopedic surgeons while presuming cardiologists and neurologists to be not terribly necessary because of frequency of case types would reset 1000 broken bones but fail to save 100 lives. Would the profession be lacking in that case? I think so.

History is full of high intensity and low intensity conflict. To presume that the next 20 yrs will be fundamentally different than the last 5,000 in terms of human behavior is the height of hubris. Alexander II of Russia was assassinated by a secondary IED in 1881 after the primary failed. The Algerian rebellion used IEDs and civilian population attacks to drive out the French. The US pacified a culturally alien and hateful Japan after WWII. USAMGIK secured and westernized a culturally alien South Korea (including putting down internal, non communist, rebellions as necessary) while the Chinese tried the same in the North. And a resurgent German Army energized by a hypercharismatic leader started a world war and fought for 5 yrs against an alliance led by 3 titanic nations to the amazement of all involved. A professional Officer Corps would have recognized and internalized those lessons in order to fulfill its professional obligation to its society. Yet, these examples that are snow flakes on the iceberg of history are not taught to the Corps as a competency either pre-commissioning or post. Instead these issues are left to the musings of CGSC Colonels and academics, while the Lieutenants and Captains rarely go beyond learning how to react to running over a mine in predeployment, all the while being told that they are the ground pounding leaders of COIN.

Notes:

Note 1:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/the-death-of-the-armor-corps/; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/447-smith.pdf; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/08/mostly-dead/

Note 2:

The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Harold R. Winton (Editor), David R. Mets (Editor)

Note 3:

. LtCol Thomas J. Weiss - Mostly Dead: Continuing the Discussion on the Reported Death of the Armor Corps, 26 Aug 2010

Greed and Grievance in Kandahar

As the last US elements of the "Kandahar surge" assume battlespace in and around the city, we are at a critical juncture in the ISAF effort to establish what GEN Petraeus describes as an "oil spot" around Kandahar City and its environs. The daunting task of establishing this zone of security, governance, and prosperity falls on a combination of mostly US and Canadian soldiers and officers (from 2/101 ABN, 1/4 ID, and TF Kandahar). Rajiv Chandrasekaran's recent article in the Wash Post does an excellent job of highlighting the challenges that face these forces, drawing a comparison between the US efforts in Baghdad in 2006-07 and the ongoing efforts in Kandahar.

Ultimately, though, he concludes (accurately) that the dynamics at play in Kandahar are vastly different than they were in Baghdad. ISAF forces in Kandahar must convince a predominately Pashtun, Sunni populace (vice a split Sunni-Shia populace in Baghdad) that the "legitimate" elected government (and security forces) can provide for them and protect them from the murder and intimidation campaign of the Taliban. They must also convince them that this government (led by the figurehead Governor Tooryalai Wesa, the powerful and corrupt Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed Wali Karzai, and the competent but under-resourced Mayor Gulam Haider Hamidi) has the best interests of the local populace at heart - and are not using their positions to advance their personal/financial interests. This will not be an easy sell.

As we examine the situation in Kandahar, I believe it's extremely useful to consider the "greed vs. grievance" model that Tony Corn outlines in his recent Small Wars Journal article - "COIN in Absurdistan." Corn argues that the grievance-based COIN model that applied in Iraq cannot be accurately applied in Afghanistan in 2010. Instead, he claims that:

"Today, a good case could be made that the political divergences (Grievance) that once existed between the main protagonists (Kabul officials, regional warlords, Taliban of all stripes, not to mention Pakistani officials) have taken a backseat, and that a convergence of sorts has begun to emerge on a shared economic objective (Greed): milking the American cow for all it’s worth, and for as long as possible."

Most of the arguments and policy/strategy discussions we hear related to Afghanistan seem to default to the "grievance" model. For example, in his recent COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance (released Aug 1, 2010), most of GEN Petraeus' advice revolves around winning over the local populace by addressing their grievances (in terms of security, governance, and services) and building trust in ISAF and the GIRoA. Corn essentially argues that we're missing half of the picture if we're only considering this grievance-focused solution. We must also consider the alternative that many of the most prominent and powerful Afghans are in fact motivated by greed and opportunism. It is therefore in their interest to maintain the status quo of massive US and international spending that fuels the Afghan "rentier state" economy. As Ambassador Peter Galbraith explains:

"Americans view the war as a contest between the U.S.-backed Karzai government and the Taliban insurgency. The reality is more complex. In the Pashtun south where the insurgency is strongest, local power brokers and officials have relations with the Taliban, who are tribesmen and relatives. They make deals with each other to run drugs, trade weapons, eliminate rivals, and rig elections. Both sides collaborate in order to profit from massive U.S. expenditures. The U.S. spends hundreds of millions on Afghan security companies who use the proceeds to pay off the Taliban not to attack, or, in some cases, to stage attacks so as to enable the local warlord (a.k.a. security contractor) to hire more men at higher prices."

So, how should this reality inform (and change) our understanding of the complexities at work in Kandahar? As Corn explains (in what I view as the most important takeaway from his paper), we must view Hamid Karzai not as the Afghan president, but rather as the CEO of "Karzai Incorporated." From this lens, many of his recent and past actions make sense - repeatedly shielding various cronies from anti-corruption investigations and using his position as president to gain control of a greater share of foreign aid and increase his patronage. In Kandahar in particular, the situation described by Ann Marlowe appears to be spot on:

"Ahmed Wali Karzai is running a mafia out of Kandahar, and his brother Hamid Karzai is protecting him. This mafia is worth over a billion a year to him, if the Times of London is to be believed...In fact, it may no longer be the case that AWK does what he does in order to strengthen the hand of his brother: It may be that Hamid does what he does to strengthen the hand of AWK."

When you examine Hamid Karzai's recent decision to eliminate all private security companies (PSCs) through this "greed" lens it begins to make more sense. I believe this surprise announcement by Karzai is another move in his efforts to gain more leverage over ISAF leaders in his overall campaign to maintain his "bottom line" as leader of Karzai, Inc. When coupled with his recent criticism and challenging of the efforts of the US-backed Major Crimes Task Force and Special Investigative Unit, both of which have implicated several close associates of Karzai in massive corruption and money laundering schemes, his latest move to eliminate PSCs is likely motivated by two complimentary goals:

1) In the short term, to essentially "call the bluff" of ISAF leaders who constantly pressure Karzai to eliminate corruption. By speeding up the timetable for eliminating PSCs to four months, Karzai will force ISAF leaders to concede that PSCs are in fact necessary for success in Afghanistan (at least over the next 12-18 months as ANSF build capacity);

2) In the medium to long-term, to enable Karzai's government to exert more control over the private security efforts across the country - the competition to Karzai, Inc. Under Karzai's plan, his government would oversee all efforts to transition and integrate what are currently "private" companies into the formal Afghan security forces. Thus, Karzai Inc. would essentially determine which private companies continue to exist (albeit, now as nominal Afghan security forces) and which would not. This is the ultimate move to consolidate control of the security industry and eliminate competition.

Claims of confusion and outrage on the part of some of these private security companies, like the massive and powerful Watan Group that employs over 24,000 security guards, are in fact staged blustering to disguise the consolidation going on below the surface. Ahmad and Rashid Popal, owners of Watan, are actually cousins of Hamid and Ahmed Karzai and have a long history of cooperation and mutual interest. While their claims that security guards who lose their jobs will join the Taliban may at first seem to have merit, its much more likely that Watan will end up growing and gaining more power/influence (albeit likely under a different name or even as nominal ANSF). Whatever the public/official outcome, the Karzai enterprise stands only to gain through this consolidation of PSCs. For an excellent summary and analysis of this dynamic, please see Kim Kagan and Carl Forsberg's piece for the Institute for the Study of War, written at the end of May, that essentially predicted this move for consolidation.

Looking forward, US and ISAF strategy and policy must recognize this reality and integrate an understanding of the "greed" paradigm into our efforts. While addressing the grievances of the local populace is a critical component of our COIN campaign, we cannot become solely focused on achieving this end. As Tony Corn advocates, we must complement the ongoing tactical/operational military surge with a policy of coercive diplomacy at the strategic level. At the most basic level, coercive diplomacy would send the message (primarily to Karzai and his cronies) that our commitment is not open-ended and unconditional. This policy represents our best option to affect the growing influence and "greed" of Karzai, Inc. For a more detailed discussion of what this policy might look like at the national level, see the recent articles by Robert Blackwill in Politico (advocating a de facto partition of Afghanistan) and Richard Haas in Newsweek (advocating a "patchworkization" of Afghanistan).

So, what does this look like in Kandahar - the "main effort" in our current campaign? Ultimately, we must resolve the dissonance between Obama's policy of unconditional support for Hamid Karzai (and thus the larger Karzai enterprise) and the ISAF strategy of providing a lasting and comprehensive solution in Kandahar. As Corn succinctly explains, "either the policy is (rightly or wrongly) to consider Karzai as indispensable, in which case his Kandahar brother is untouchable, and a Kandahar offensive is a non-starter; or a Kandahar offensive is seen (rightly or wrongly) as the indispensable centerpiece of a COIN strategy, in which Karzai's brother has to go." This is not an easy choice - but we must make a decision. My vote: Ahmed Wali Karzai must go (or at least be heavily marginalized). By acknowledging and eliminating him as the primary source of "greed" in Kandahar, we have an opportunity to send a message to the people and at the same time eliminate a major source of many of their grievances.

A Business-like Strategy: Al-Qaeda & Al Shabaab

I cherish those good 'ole days when my colleague Josh was around and posting every other day or so. (Hey Josh, keep trucking over there!). Remember the vibrant discussions we all had on the conglomerate vs. franchise model both here and over at SWJ. Let's revisit!

As the Washington Post reported today, "Foreign fighters gain influence in Somalia's Islamist al-Shabab militia." It is not by any means new to us that AQ's ideology is being imported at an increased pace into Somalia and other regions, such as Yemen. Al Sahwa discussed this months ago when Bill Roggio at LWJ reported that Al Shabaab merged with Ras Kamboni Camp.

The question is why. To embolden ASMM to fight Hizbul Islam? To prepare for the World Cup? (Here is an AEI Critical Threat's Project report assessing the threat of AQ during the World Cup, Charlie Szrom). No, this is simply short term.

Recently, US intelligence reports have estimated Al Shabaab to have approximately 200 fighters affiliated with AQ in southern Somalia. A franchise model holds that AQ wants to expand its business; "it has a great product to sell." A conglomerate model holds that AQ enables ASMM and encourages its success; "it believes in the mission/purpose of the movement and ability to excel."

If AQ senior leadership is beginning to take more of an armchair fighter, sort of a Chairman of the Board role, then it will seek to employ a collaborative campaign while maintaining consistency. This ensures the import of an ideology through a flatter hierarchy. The flatter hierarchy, in this case, imports also foreign fighters to improve operations. Is this an indication that Al Shabaab is weak, that it needs help, that it cannot figure out how to secure regional prowess? AQ wants its affiliate to grow because it grows as a result.

*This arguement is truly based on the assumption that AQ has the direct intention to recruit and deploy fighters to foreign areas.

Of course, we must also consider once again Ronfeldt's tribal paradigm . Is Somalia a pure example of a netwar (low-level conflict)? Regardless, it will escalate if we allow AQ's operational environments to expand.

Go ahead, ask me...Ok, yes, I do think AQ will pursue advancement of its operational environment through a business prism because it seeks to survive; it believes in both its mission (without a doubt that is the driving force) and its "product" (or as I say, dream of the Islamic State). The only way it approaches survival is by clinging to what it already has, which, in this discussion, is Al Shabaab.

The Start of a Counter Narrative Strategy

*A successful Counter Narrative Strategy begins with a philosophical foundation for building and employing tactical and operational methods of engagement. My perspective is one of many, as I intend to push the envelope here in order to generate dialogue so that we may arrive at an optimal solution.

I encourage you to read John Brennan's full remarks (26 May, 2010) at CSIS, entitled "Securing the Homeland by Renewing American Strength, Resilience and Values."

In the first half of his speech, he pinpointed an aspect of an effective Counter Narrative Strategy (CNS) that I have spoken of in the past: Al-Qaeda, and for that matter, all affiliates, are not Islamic. I mean this literally.

The US and its allies can not benefit (socially or economically) from considering AQ's and AQAM's thought and action as Muslim in nature. Indeed, AQ's stance rests on a dis-illusionary system of motivation and justification that is insane and self-centered. If the AQ definition and practice of Islam is now and/or were to continue to be acceptable, their philosophy would remain on the spectrum as a religious choice. A CNS must (re)affirm that violence and oppression are not adequate and/or viable avenues of fulfillment, freedom, and happiness; that AQ is not a choice.

We commonly hear (correct) arguments that Islam is a religion of peace. AQ is the direct negation of this statement: AQ is a perverted pseudo-movement that seeks to advance a selfish agenda based on an apocalyptic illusion through violent means and propagandized messages. Forming an effective CNS requires the recognition of a two-pronged approach, which Brennan elaborated on in the spirit of President Obama's vision:
1. Fight al-Qaeda and AMs, particularly in targeting safe havens, to disrupt and dismantle operations;
2. Support Muslim communities, both home and abroad (but mainly home) to promote cultural and economic prosperity.

**Andrew Lebovich of the New America Foundation summarizes the main points well in his weekly Foreign Policy Legal War on Terror (LWOT) brief, as well as how it fits into the National Security Strategy (NSS).

The plan (as it remains a plan until strategically engaging in action) requires a wedding of military "hard" power and diplomatic "soft" power. (Here is a sound perspective on the uses of both powers by Angelo Codevilla at FPRI). Above all, such a strategy begs leaders to take an assertive, secure - not sensitive - stance on US values and traditions in order to facilitate the use of inter-disciplinary skills and employ multicultural tactics.

Instead of walking on egg shells, I propose speakingly directly about religion - a tactic that is not typically favorable, perhaps not to offend any one community or party. I believe AQ has already sparked a renaissance of collective thought; we simply have not utilized our joint strengths to synergize our action into a collective authority.

To aid senior-level decision makers, a CNS ought to follow these guidelines:
1. Identify the enemy.
Yes, Islamic extremism exists, but this is simply how we have come to describe it in relation to the phenomenon of religious-centered activity. By default, we use "Islamic" because that is what AQ seems to be. AQ leaders and followers are not Muslim simply because they invoke Allah and Muhammad.

In other words, I think we describe AQ, not define them. Often, the definitions we intermix represent Islam and Muslims, and do not adequately (and rightly) describe the ideology and operations of AQ and AMs. In this sense, a good offense is a good defense: The CNS will actively characterize AQ's worldview as insane and dis-illusionary.

An effective CNS re-formulates the understanding of AQ's goal in light of their worldview, not our understanding of AQ in relation to Islam. This means employing an accurate and dynamic understanding of Islam in order to juxtapose AQ's use of Islamic terms. In fact, their co-optation of terms to promote their cause and identify their enemy is precisely why they continue to be successful: From their inception, AQ has stood for something; all-the-while a "robust" and "diverse" debate has ensued both within Islam and in the West.

***The debate is in no way a negative thing. Indeed, we need intellectual debate. My concern, and frustration, lies with our inability to arrive at a conclusion in order to take action. We cannot debate and then not agree due to the nature of the issue at stake.

An effective CNS gets to the bottom line: It identifies the enemy in black and white terms. We have a choice to join together our authority, and it begins with the "Yes" or "No" answer in response to the question; "Is AQ Muslim?" Can we not agree to define AQ as not Muslim? The violent movement does not represent, foster, and/or promote any ounce of Islam.

****I have two more guidelines senior decision makers can consider, but will share them in a future thread. It is important to know that this conversation is already under way, as Malcolm Nance of SWJ and Abu Nasr of Challenge COIN have pressed for AQ to be defined as a cult movement. The points posited above can be strengthened by enlisting comparisons of other quasi-religious, pseudo-communities.