*Before you read this, I encourage you to brief the first section of this series discussing the emerging "forking strategy" of terrorists in the region; how they move, plan, and organize. Here, I focus particularly on the heightened operational tactics of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to strenghten my analysis on the connecting ideological strands of AQCL affiliates, Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement (ASMM) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Introduction: AQIM Ideology
I first promised to publish this second part only days after the initial post, but found the research I was conducting to be so facinating while attempting to, at least to some degree, put the pieces together that I continued to read more deeply. Today is an opportune time to finally share some of my thoughts and analysis: Yesterday AQIM, reported by Evan Kohlmann at IntelTweet, released their Spanish hostage, Althea Gamit whose kidnapping was confirmed in an official statement made by Andalusia Institute for Media Production in 2009.
AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, whose operations focus on Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Nigeria, has seemingly showcased their heightened operational methods, at least concerning this recent kidnapping case. Previously, captured tourists have been used for ransom - perhaps to drive their drug trafficking. Further evidence: "GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. The ransom paid for their release is unknown but estimated to be from $5 million to as much as $10 million; the group may have used these funds to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment."
In contrast, Gamit's release is ideologically based, not logistically-centered in criminal/terrorist respects: Gamit was forced to convert to Islam as a fulfillment of their "agreed" terms.
Ideology --> Tactics
But I will be wrong, I think, to not connect the ideologically-driven method to the logistical goal: The terrorist group is positioning it's prowess in the region to support what they believe is the necessary return to the Islamic State, dar al-Islam, the pure reign of the Prophet Mohammad. In this way, the mandate to follow and obey religious governance dictates cultural practices and customs as well as fosters the growth of avenues for economic prosperity and political influence (which, AQIM continues to prove, will be pursued and gained vis-a-vis violence).
Such activity is clearly evident of an offensive jihad campaign, and perhaps one can argue a strategy including offensive daw'a. The actions spotlight a sense of mission itself that is thought to be the anecdote to the conventional Western pursuit of progress, which is thought be rooted in injustice, oppression, self-interest, exploitation, and usurpation: The leaders are driven by the burning desire that returning to the Islamic State is arriving. Islam, to AQIM and other affiliates like ASMM that I covered in Part I, is the answer, and all means of offensive tactics - mostly violence - will be used to pave their arrival to supremacy.
I will discuss in more depth in one of my follow-up posts an historical analysis of the four Caliphs (Caliphate) in order to provide further perspective on how AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP may understand themselves in relation to the Prophet. For now, in short, let me name the offensive procedure by which such terrorist groups, especially AQIM as witnessed by their "release" of Gamit, will continue to structure jihad to ensure a returning to economic, political, and religious purity. During the expansion of the Caliphates, Islam was spread in part through military conquests that rested on three ("just") principles when engaging the non-believer:
- Offering to surrender and convert to Islam, as it means to surrender to the will of Allah;
- If not, then opposing party(ies) pay tax, jizya, and in return granted dhimma (protection) by Muslim rulers for recognizing Islam's superiority;
- Lastly, if not still, then party(ies) defeated by offensive force as result of choice not to comply; thus subjecting all persons to death or rule (if survived) and institution of the holistic governing framework .
AQIM and AQCL affiliates, in general, do not follow this procedure in a lock-step process. In fact, they quickly skip to the end. Gamit's situation is uncommon, but important to understand in the larger AQ movement as I will elaborate below. Before I present methods of expansion, please bear with me on two important points concerning the above procedure:
a) There is need to recognize the argument deconstructing the historical meaning of such principles, highlighting that a non-believer, in traditional terms, means only one who believes in no Deity; whereas, Christian and Jew are "brothers" in the monotheistic faith, known as Ahl al-dhimma. The traditional term used here, brother, is not equal to the meaning of the word, akh, akhoya. Cesari's argument, which I described in short in Part I of this series, is important here in explaining AQIM's (and ASMM, AQAP) ideologically-driven tactics because of the tension between terrorism and modernity - the struggle between "returning" and progressing.
b) I always argue, and try to consistently make it clear, that AQCL and AQ affiliates define meaning based on their own narrow interpretation of Islam; therefore, it is understandable that they target all who fall outside of this narrow framework. Non-believer, in this sense, is not similar in meaning to an historical and theological understanding embraced by true, peaceful Muslims. (This may seem a vague explanation, but it rests on takfir: It is my small attempt to define AQ as outside Islam, and this could help Roberts' argument that AQ is an "outsurgency").
Tactics --> Environment(s)
Accordingly, not only groups like Christians and Jews fall outside of their framework as non-believers, but so too Muslims and others alike. So, the operational environment is not entirely defined by geographic latitudes and longitudes but by an ideological vision. Captain Russell J. Isaacs informs us in his work, The North African Franchise: AQIM’s Threat to U.S. Security - Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 (December 2009) - that the historical development of AQIM is a security threat to US facilities and personnel in Europe, Iraq, and Afghanistan as well as to Europe itself (I provide excerpts here):
- Today, AQIM operates a widespread and coordinated structure across Europe. While the majority of their attacks and operations occur inside Algeria, AQIM maintains a widespread network of financial support and direct action cells outside the country. Terrorism analysts estimate that several dozen cells exist across Europe, primarily in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom.
- A major task of AQIM cells in Europe is the financial support of the group’s operations worldwide. AQIM’s primary means of finance are car theft, credit card fraud, document forgery and the active seeking of donations. AQIM is extremely successful collecting donations in Europe...
- Another focus of AQIM cells in Europe is recruiting Algerian immigrants to fight. French authorities assert that several AQIM cells within France are actively recruiting volunteers for...jihad. Moreover, Spanish media outlets reported in April 2007 that AQIM supporters were collecting funds and recruiting volunteers for terrorist training in the mountains of Algeria. A final focus of AQIM in Europe is the planning and execution of attacks against European targets. AQIM does not hide its intention to carry out attacks against European targets. In February 2005, for example, Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri urged AQIM to be a “bone in the throat of American and French crusaders.
The vision is tied, I think, to OBL's messages (regardless of his actual involvement and/or approval; he mostly issues statements to maintain his own image as the Serpent Head), but more importantly to, for example, Saed Elshari, AQ's number two in the Arabian Peninsula;
"I swear to God, we will open up for them doors of hell on the ground, which will be the key to our victory, where we will cut the tails of the crusaders; destroy the dreams of crusade and ruin the desires of the Jews in the region."
Also, we can consider Gadahn's latest message, which seeks to recruit American-Muslims to act as Hasan did against Western "crusaders;"
"We must erode our cowardly enemy’s will to fight by killing and capturing leading Crusaders and Zionists in government, industry and media who talk the talk but don’t walk the walk and are only interested in prosecuting their profitable wars as long as it’s other people who are in the line of fire and not them...And finally, we mustn’t allow our lawless enemies to provoke us with their evil, sadistic and murderous crimes into crossing the boundaries laid down by Allah and His Prophet or doing anything which may have negative repercussions on the image of the Jihad and reputation of the Mujahideen."
The connection highlights that the regional tactics of AQIM may differ, in degree and manner, to AQAP and ASMM, but the vision is interwoven; it is a singular ideology that is global although environmentally dispersed. We may have cause to apply a rule to AQ regional operations: As I have stated, ideology --> tactics --> environment(s). But this still leaves the odd situation of Gamit: Why did they force him to convert? All AQCL affiliates focus predominantly on violent campaigns which they consider to be defensive, but AQAP and ASMM have not used convergence tactics before (to my knowledge). It is documented as early as 2002 that AQCL under OBL has, having stated in, A Letter to the American People:
(1) The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam.
(a) The religion of the Unification of God; of freedom from associating partners with Him, and rejection of this; of complete love of Him, the Exalted; of complete submission to His Laws; and of the discarding of all the opinions, orders, theories and religions which contradict with the religion He sent down to His Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Islam is the religion of all the prophets, and makes no distinction between them - peace be upon them all.
It is to this religion that we call you; the seal of all the previous religions. It is the religion of Unification of God, sincerity, the best of manners, righteousness, mercy, honour, purity, and piety. It is the religion of showing kindness to others, establishing justice between them, granting them their rights, and defending the oppressed and the persecuted. It is the religion of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil with the hand, tongue and heart. It is the religion of Jihad in the way of Allah so that Allah's Word and religion reign Supreme. And it is the religion of unity and agreement on the obedience to Allah, and total equality between all people, without regarding their colour, sex, or language.
(b) It is the religion whose book - the Quran - will remained preserved and unchanged, after the other Divine books and messages have been changed. The Quran is the miracle until the Day of Judgment. Allah has challenged anyone to bring a book like the Quran or even ten verses like it."
It is obvious this "offering" came after September 11, 2001. So, once again, the lock-step process was not followed but still serves as a framework for justification.
Counter Operations
In short, the US and its allies, I think, do not yet have a comprehensive counter narrative that seeks to erase AQ legitimacy in terms of ideology. Gamit's conversion to Islam, which I would hold is not actually a conversion to Islam but only a recognition of AQIM's narrow definition and interpretation of the meaning of their version in alignment with AQCL's version, provides another opportune time for the US to define and articulate in a clear, concise, and consistent way a counter-narrative that targets AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP leaders. Such an employed tactic, Information Operations, would aid both foreign diplomacy that deeply and rightly involves legitimate Muslim nations and actionable intelligence missions to dismantle AQ logistical tactics in expanding AQ operational environments.
I propose here, as I have promoted before, a targeting strategy focusing on middle-tier personalities: They provide not only training but ingrain identity of both individual persons and collective groups in alignment with ideology throughout an entity. I think HUMINT can be done throughout Europe, but we can follow the money trailing their drug trafficking and financing avenues.
Please share your insights, as we all need to work together to procure our freedoms home and abroad and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ.
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Hi DP:
ReplyDeleteJust a few quick comments (not necessarily in any particular order) until we know more about Althea Gamit, and you post more about your research on the early Caliphs..
Offering to surrender and convert to Islam, as jihad itself means to surrender to the will of Allah;
Typo? I think you meant "Islam" rather than "jihad" here -- as you know, jihad means struggle, whereas Islam means surrender (and the peace that comes with it).
It is obvious this "offering" came after September 11, 2001. So, once again, the lock-step process was not followed but still serves as a framework for justification.
It is my understanding that UBL came under considerable attack for his failure to offer a call to conversion before 9/11, and that the "offering" you quote was made as a direct result. So perhaps it's not "Look, they don't follow their own rules" so much as "look, they didn't follow their own rules and got in trouble for it". I could track down my source for this, if that would help.
Gamit's conversion to Islam, which I would hold is not actually a conversion to Islam
Evan's tweet in its entirety reads:
:: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has announced the release of Spanish hostage Althea Gamit after consenting to convert to Islam. 10:36 AM Mar 12th via web ::
That's a slender basis for knowing quite what happened, and Google's machine translation of the AQIM statement is pretty garbled. One possibility, for instance, would be a Stockholm Syndrome effect which resulted in Gamit taking the Shahada.
Non-believer, in this [AQIM] sense, is not similar in meaning to an historical and theological understanding embraced by true, peaceful Muslims.
Perhaps we need to distinguish here between apostates, people of the book, polytheists (mushrikun), and disbelievers in general: Christians are "Ahl al-Kitab" (people of the book) and thus eligible for the dhimmi option, while apostates, as I understand it, would be offered the option of returning to Islam, but not accorded dhimmi status.
It is my small attempt to define AQ as outside Islam
I would argue that AQ belongs inside Islam, but as a sub-branch (jihadist) of the puritan wing (Salafi) and thus something of an outlier. In the finer distinctions here, Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:3, 207-239), would be my guide.
Regards..
Charles:
ReplyDeleteGood day to you! Yes, it is a typo and I did mean "Islam." On your second point, I think you are right: Even if OBL did extend an offer, I think he would have done it strategically because he already knew the outcome (according to his perspective). America's refusal would have only served as justification for his actions.
Please, you must share your information on OBL when you locate it.
I am proposing an alternate perspective when saying that AQ is outside of Islam. If we consider my reasoning, then OBL's "offering" would still have been one with particularly narrow stipulations just like AQIM's to Gamit the other day. Gamit is not the only kidnapped person to be pressed to convert; he simply provided the outcome they intended.
This is why I think there is value in considering that a US Counter Narrative can define AQ's ideologically-driven tactics of conversion as (perhaps) not related to the Islamic faith. I encourage you to read Major Mehar's last paper on SWJ, "Is There an Islamic Way of War?"
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/is-there-an-islamic-way-of-war/.
You can also consider this piece from Phares;
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/09/the_azzam_threat_a_prelude_to.php.
Roberts argues as a main feature of his "outsurgency" strategy to deeply involve Muslim nations, and Nance affirms the need for legitimacy as well in his work. Roberts wants them to lead the charge. As I have discussed with Abu Nasr at Challenge COIN, Islam cannot be left out of the picture because it is a driving force for AQ. I am weary, though, of having to delve too deep, but this is where all groups need to work together to formulate and articulate a clear and consistent message. I advocate incorporating takfir as a part of the baseline because it is the very concept AQ uses as takfiris.
AQ has and will continue to define us outside of all frameworks - only theirs matters and will "prevail." I think defining them inside Islam provides them too much authenticity, both philosophically and historically. AQ, perhaps, may even be defined as a group of no faith as Nance hints (cult), but we need all good parties involved to affirm what is right.
We need to continue to detail aspects of our Counter Narrative (CN) as particularly as possible, and then exploit it as efficiently and effectively as possible.
DP
Just curious what does this phrase mean: 'I think HUMINT can be done throughout Europe...' Is that HUMINT by the US agencies alone, in coordination and cooperation with European allies or left to the European agencies?
ReplyDeleteWould AQIM give priority to US targets in Europe over European targets, notably in France which unlike most EU states deports people to Algeria.
I do agree the counter narrative part of any response is paramount.
Hi DP:
ReplyDeleteAnd thanks for your speedy response to mine. I'm posting this in two parts, to make for easier reading. Here's the overview.
In my view, naming who belongs to a religion and who is outside it an inherently tricky business, because the question itself forms part of a number of significant discourses.
To give you an example:
Mormons call themselves Christians, and in my view have every right to do so, since they proclaim themselves the followers of Jesus Christ. Some but not all other Christians claim that Mormons are not Christians, on the grounds that they do not subscribe to the credal statements (ie the Apostles, Nicene and Athanasian Creeds) and/or that they have "added" both a prophet and a set of scriptures to received, normative Christianity -- and those who hold this view are, in my opinion, equally justified. The question we need to ask when this dispute comes up is not so much "is they is, or is they ain't?" as "what's your perspective?"
So in terms of Islam and AQ, we need to distinguish between diplomatic purposes, particular Islamic theological purposes, and the purposes of religious scholarship and clear analytic understanding.
For diplomatic purposes, it is vitally important to understand that the global jihad that AQ preaches is considered to be irhab, un-Islamic terrorism, and thus not jihad at all, by large numbers of Muslims -- so that Islam as such is not viewed as aligned with AQ.
In this sense, a Muslim may well consider AQ to be outside the pale of Islam, or to have "hijacked" it. That's the position taken by Ihsanic Intelligence, and I respect it.
Neither of these positions however, will satisfy the scholar of religions, who is concerned with the full spectrum of religious beliefs and practices. And while the speech-writer may need to concerned with the diplomatic use of language, the analyst needs to have the religious scholar's perspective in his toolset -- because if UBL considers himself to be acting from devotional and (to use Zulaika's term) sacramental motives, "knowing the enemy" will involve becoming deeply aware of how those motives work within him, and in influencing his followers.
Now for the meat of Maj. Khan's SWJ piece.
ReplyDeleteI read Major Khan's paper carefully, and found it a very mixed bag, to be honest.
The Major does not appear to have a very deep knowledge of religions: to say, for instance, as he does, "No religion condones, let alone approves, bloodshed" is far too simple -- it completely ignores Krishna's participation at Kurukshetra, Mohammad's at Badr, and the warfare preached by the God of Israel against the Amalekites.
Here, for instance, is I Samuel 15. 3:
Now go, attack the Amalekites and totally destroy everything that belongs to them. Do not spare them; put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys.
Elsewhere, Maj. Khan is a lot more careful in framing his words:
To say that any religion, let alone Islam, can condone or approve killing of innocent bystanders is not only ridiculous but also a lie that has already had catastrophic consequences for humanity.
That's much closer to something I could agree with -- but again, consider those Amalekite "children and infants". Were the infants at least not "innocent bystanders"?
Likewise, I find it less than impressive for Maj. Khan to say, at a crucial moment in his paper, emphasized in both bold and italics:
I sincerely believe, and my belief is borne by historical facts, that just as there is no Christian Chemistry or Jewish Physics or Hindu Ballistics, there is no such thing as Islamic Warfare.
Why skip from behavior (warfare) to physical law (physics, chemistry, ballistics) like that? There is definitely a Christian theory of warfare, it's called Just War theory, and counts Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas among its major exponents.
Again, Maj. Khan writes:
In this article I will attempt to explain why it is historically and factually wrong to attribute terror tactics to teachings of Islam and declare it as some kind of an Islamic Way of Warfare.
It is perhaps unfortunate that "terrorism" has come to be the term used in its current sense, because the Qur'an actually quotes God as saying:
And Allah turned back the Unbelievers for (all) their fury: no advantage did they gain; and enough is Allah for the believers in their fight. And Allah is full of Strength, able to enforce His Will. And those of the People of the Book who aided them - Allah did take them down from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts. (So that) some ye slew, and some ye made prisoners. -- Qur'an 33.25-26, see also 3.151
But those texts were revealed long before the Reign of Terror began our current usage of the term, and refers to fear as a state of mind rather than terrorism as a tactic -- so on this point I'd agree with Maj. Khan.
However, while AQ may represent irhab rather than jihad, it should also be remembered that Maj. Khan's fellow-countryman, Brigadier SK Malik, studied the Qur'an as well as Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, and wrote a book entitled The Qur'anic Concept of War.
It would appear that there is an Islamic Way of Warfare -- the question is whether AQ is following it, or straying from it.
*
This is all a bit hasty, and if time permits, I'd like to write up a more detailed account of Maj. Khan's paper -- but this will have to do for now.
My main purpose here is to suggest that we need to be extremely careful in our wording, especially when writing about religious violence for an analytic audience.
< btw: i imagine Althea / Aisha would be a "she" not a "he" >
ReplyDeleteDavidbfpo:
ReplyDeleteI am interested in your thoughts about what aspects of a counter narrative you agree with: What are the strong points, and what are the details that need to be worked out further?
Per Isaacs brief, I think their is reason to focus immediate intelligence on who AQIM is seeking donations from and who actually gives (and in what capacity). Perhaps more information can be gathered on where the money is going and what it is being used for from identifying which personalities are involved.
Moreover, Isaacs tells us Algerian immigrants are being recruited throughout Europe to join AQIM. Cruickshank, a colleague of Peter Berger, tells us something similar in his 2007 piece, "Al-Qaida's Expanding Franchise"
(http://www.lawandsecurity.org/get_article/?id=87);
"AQIM has now established a loose network of clusters of disaffected and radicalised young Algerians across Europe and is also beginning to reach out to other jihadist groups operating in Europe such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the outfit responsible for the March 11 2004 Madrid bombings. The fact that Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans and Moroccans tend to live in some of the same immigrant-heavy locales in European cities has facilitated the forming of such links."
There is a similar event of immigrant-heavy locales for AQAP, too; such as "Little Mogadishu" in San Diego (16,000), Minneapolis (35,000), Toronto (50,000), and Stockholm (40,000 Scandinavian countries).
To give the short answer, I think AQIM gives the #1 slot to the US simply because of the Iraq War. After 2001, then-GSPC declared their allegiance to AQCL but did not merge with them and become AQIM until 2006, with al-Zawahiri announcing that AQIM will be "a thorn in the neck of the American and French Crusaders and their allies, and an arrow in the heart of the traitors and apostates.”
But there have been continuous threats by AQIM against, for example, France and Italy. Even though conventional thought may be that AQIM uses these areas throughout Europe for fundraising and planning, the work poses a threat. So, even though the initial motivation may have been the Iraq War with US entry, all allied parties need to work in collaboration somehow to safeguard freedoms.
Abdulmutallab, Zazi, and the suspects recently arrested in Ireland are three examples that the threat of transnational terrorism requires coordination across borders, and I think AQIM and AQAP continue to show their intentions.
Charles and Davidpfpo:
ReplyDeleteI wish we could conduct these conversations over coffee/tea; they would be dynamic face-to-face. A pint would be even better.
I am trying to push the envelope on how Islam, if at all, is to be embraced and embedded in an effective CN. We are not dealing with black and white, but with gray shades.
Am I right that we agree Islam needs to be an aspect of the CN? I like the "cult" perspective also considered by Abu Nasr (Challenge COIN), but would like to still raise the argument that violent cults are, in many ways, driven by a religious interpretation.
When Mormons, or any religious group for that matter, use violence (which historically increases in degree and manner over time with the existence of the cult) to promote and pursue their narrow interpretation of theology, there is certainly cause to examine whether or not the group is in alignment with the faith or choosing to place themselves outside of it. Two poor examples I have used before: Jim Jones? Adolf Hitler?
AQ is successful because it incorporates four essential elements to aid its tactics; namely, tradition (i.e. Salafi purity), experience (i.e. colonialsim), reason (i.e. defense of self, society), and historical texts (i.e. Qur'an). They project a well-defined narrative, although narrow.
In order to exploit it we must ask this question, generally: What is the spectrum of religious experience? What is the baseline for theological interpretation that we ought to measure from? We have to use a measured approach to align our qualitative and quantitative approach.
Are we willing to say that AQ, in being violent terrorists, is at the far end of the spectrum? What/Who, then, lies at the other? I am not sure if I am willing to place AQ on the line because it gives them a "legitimate" perspective; it becomes and remains a choice for followers or something for them to regress into, either theologically or sociologically. AQ already uses global jihad as the "arrival" point, the true apocalyptic fulfillment of struggle.
Charles, you speak of diplomatic efforts/campaigns. Yes, we must be careful with our language - that is why I wish to delve into what we can say exactly and what we cannot; what is right and pragmatic and what is off-course. Interfaith dialogue and coalition building has taught me (and my colleagues, I think) that all parties must be willing to be truthful with ourselves and one another. On the other hand, we have to believe that AQ is being truthful in their ambitions in order to accurately define them and formulate then employ our tactics.
(Continued)
ReplyDeleteThis post from Pakistan Defense can serve our conversation well (all should read):
http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/32636-word-irhab.html.
Irhab is understood to mean "preventing" warfare, and warns followers to "make ready their strength" in case of the possibility of harm (i.e. waging of war, attacks). Also, it is understood to play a role in negotiations to prevent war/attacks; "to discourage the enemy before or during the war, to daunt, and to demoralize spiritually and psychologically."
AQ, at least OBL, most likely doesn't use irhab because they believe they are past that strategic phase; they are fully engaged in "defensive jihad" which is actually offensive. For a brief on AQ Strategy see my colleague, JD's, post here:
http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/01/assessing-al-qaedas-20-year-plan.html.
Even if irhab were to be used, I think they would co-opt that term as well (like they have jihad) to justify their "struggle";
"Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war to strike fear into (the hearts of) the enemies of God, and your enemies and others besides, whom you may not know, but whom God does know. Whatever you shall spend for the sake of God shall be repaid unto you and you shall not be treated unjustly. (Anfal 8:60)"
I appreciate Mehar's piece, as well as Nir Rosen's note (below) at NAF, because they provide perspective and maintain our constant effort to remain on course.
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/03/its_not_about_i/.
Hi, DP:
ReplyDeleteThanks for the pointer to the Pakistan Defense article on Irhab -- very helpful.
Even if irhab were to be used, I think they would co-opt that term as well (like they have jihad)
I'd mentioned the Qur'an's use of "terror" as a descriptive of Allah's own contribution to warfare in my comment on Maj. Khan's piece, but that piece really does takes the point further as you say, pointing out that jihadists can co-opt this term for their own uses as a term used positively in the Qur'an -- even if we use it against them in the negative sense of "terrorist" as advocated by Jim Guirard in various postings for his TrueSpeak Institute:
http://truespeak.org/
I think Guirard's approach has some merit, though I'm not that huge a fan -- but I do think the point the PD piece makes clearly overrides Guirard's suggestion re jihad / irhab, and will also avoid that particular problem myself in future.
*
A bit of an aside --
That page you cite from the Pakistan Defense forums is actually an excerpt from an article by Dr. Ergun Capan on "Suicide Attacks and Islam" found on what appears to be a Fethullah Gulen site:
http://www.mlife.org/content/view/87/71/
although I can't find an "About" tab to definitively verify the Gulen connection.
The Gulen movement is a topic unto itself, with a considerable impact on the balance of secularism and religiosity in Turkey (see links below). If it is true, as alleged in the MEQ article, that he "considers himself a prophet", and controls "an unregulated and opaque budget estimated at $25 billion" we need to be very clear when reading associated materials that Gulen's pervasive influence may be at work.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fethullah_Gülen
http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition
Interestingly enough, Gulen managed to get himself named as number one of "The World's Top 20 Public Intellectuals" in a ballot which must have surprised the editors at Foreign Policy magazine -- as FP commented:
No one spread the word as effectively as the man who tops the list. In early May, the Top 100 list was mentioned on the front page of Zaman, a Turkish daily newspaper closely aligned with Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. Within hours, votes in his favor began to pour in. His supporters—typically educated, upwardly mobile Muslims—were eager to cast ballots not only for their champion but for other Muslims in the Top 100. Thanks to this groundswell, the top 10 public intellectuals in this year’s reader poll are all Muslim. The ideas for which they are known, particularly concerning Islam, differ significantly. It’s clear that, in this case, identity politics carried the day.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/06/16/the_world_s_top_20_public_intellectuals
*
More shortly...
More...
ReplyDeleteNir Rosen I respect a whole lot more than Guirard, and I generally admire his reporting from Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, in which he consistently provides vivid anecdotes about life on the ground that are far more probing of reality than the bland generalities often served up by reporters less familiar with the terrain, the languages etc.
In the particular piece you cite, however, he runs up against the problem that seemingly always attends attempts to describe a subtle blend of motivations in a population, writing "it's not this, it's that" despite the fact that more realistically "it's largely this, with a leaning that way in not exactly a major minority to be sure, but a fairly sizeable one, not exactly a tiny bunch of outliers... and there are others ready to swing that way if triggered, but not there yet... according to our best current estimate" and so on.
The IC ran up against the same problem, didn't it, and found itself forced to define the meanings to be read into a bunch of phrases in the NIEs, under the heading "What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language":
Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as probably, likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even chance. The terms unlikely and remote indicate a less then even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms such as might or may reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule out, or we cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning.
It is very hard to explain a complex ecosystem of beliefs and motives in a few words...
I sympathize with a lot of what Rosen is doing in the piece on Steve Clemons' blog that you pointed to, but (to consider just one of his targets) he ridicules the idea that there's a "cult of martyrdom" among the proponents of jihad. But why, then, does Bukhari include a hadith in his collection that says:
Narrated Abu Huraira: The Prophet said, "A wound which a Muslim receives in Allah's cause will appear on the Day of Resurrection as it was at the time of infliction; blood will be flowing from the wound and its color will be that of the blood but will smell like musk."
-- and what business does Abdullah Azzam have writing a book about "The Signs of ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan" in which he recounts stories of the miraculous "Fragrance of the Shuhadaa" -- which can be recognized according to one story "at a distance of two and a half kilometers"?
Of course it doesn't add up to "Muslims have some kind of reptilian brain, thinking in pre-destined cultural scripts" as Rosen puts it -- but it does indicate the perennial influence of a religious motif, which (as I've said elsewhere) has a close comparative-religious parallel in the Catholic "odor of sanctity".
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And hey, that good strong coffee would be most welcome!
This week at a RUSI, London conference a UK diplomat commented on the record 'AQIM is a significant threat to travelling nationals, not to Europe'. The 'travelling nationals' being those who holiday in the deep Sahara or Sahel.
ReplyDeleteA few notes:
ReplyDeleteThe author seems to assume that AQIM (and GSPC) are/have been acting from a position of strength - that's not at all evident.
If you read AQIM's messaging closely (and over time), you'll see that the US is not a primary target. The Algerian state and France are consistently identified as primary enemies.
I think the author may be conflating global jihadist networks in Europe (in which Algerians/North Africans or former GIA/GSPC/AQIM members may participate) with AQIM cells. Certainly AQIM cells are there, and certainly they raise funds, but it's awfully hard to look at the European jihadits milieu and say with any certainty that someone is from Group X or Group Y.
Thanks.
Anonymous:
ReplyDelete*This is DP, writing from my phone and cannot access the log-in.
I wrote from a position of projecting that AQIM ideology is a strength (for them) and that it can aid their advancement of operational environments to achieve their Salafist-centered goals.
For a brief on AQIM operational tactics, read Hanna Rogan's piece, "Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11" in the CTC Sentinel: "This study suggests that certain, although not all, changes in operational patterns can be traced to and probably explained by this alliance between a mainly nationally-oriented Islamist group and Usama bin Ladin’s global al-Qa`ida network."
http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00115/Violent_Trends-CTCS_115081a.pdf.
So, operational "strength" is connected to AQCL which sought allegiance as a result of the Iraq War. I concur that French targets are one of primary but think long-term strategies certainly target US facilities/personalities. Perhaps this is just my American-geared analysis, but it is part of my job/duty to offer this perspective.
I think that the combination of narrow ideology - which I argue is a driving factor - and attack TTP's can position AQIM long-term, and countering this threat with an allies "forking strategy" that identifies the inter-connecting threads in ideology and operational strengths between AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP can prevent and protect while disrupting.
How do you agree and disagree?
Please share more on my conflation of networks: Trends suggest AQ/affiliates in general are more decentralized. I agree completely; the definitions and boundaries of how we identify groups are seemingly more difficult. To be successful, we need to be able to name personalities in association with X and Y.
What suggestions do you have, or what certainty can we begin with? Looking forward to your input.
DP,
ReplyDelete(part one)
I don’t disagree with your point about the importance of ideology, but I think that AQIM needs to be understood in context. Ideology alone doesn’t tell the whole story (not that you claimed that it did).
Let me say at the outset that I think GSPC merged with al-Qa’ida as a survival strategy – partly for ideological reasons, but largely out of necessity. If you don’t buy that argument, then you won’t agree with anything that follows.
Yes, AQIM adopted suicide attacks after it aligned with AQ. Yes, its communications became much more sophisticated, and included many more references to the U.S., and increasingly referenced AQ ideas, AQ thinkers, AQ goals. Yes, there has been an increase in kidnappings that target Westerners. But.
To put the situation in context: AQIM leadership is isolated and under siege. The Sahara/Sahel units are at odds with one another. Locals view AQIM as a bunch of criminal thugs. AQIM has trouble attracting recruits in Algeria. AQIM’s use of large-scale attacks has declined precipitously in the last year, and the group has returned to its pre-merger attack pattern consisting largely of ambushes and roadside bombs targeting Algerian security services. Check the attack reporting over the last 18 months and you’ll see what I’m talking about.
When you look at the situation from this lens, AQIM’s kidnappings seem to be driven by greed or financial necessity as much as by ideology. Maybe AQIM is targeting Westerners for kidnapping because it pays well and makes a splash in the news. Maybe AQIM expanded operations into the Sahel because it’s getting slammed in Algeria.
DP,
ReplyDelete(part 2)
Your post referred to Althea Gamit’s release as evidence of increasing adherence to ideology – maybe so, but calling her release an example of daw’a is stretching things. If I was in her shoes, I might convert too, since it could exempt me from execution. I find the killing of Edwin Dyer to be a much stronger example of an ideologically driven action, but one can also make the case that it was necessary demonstration of strength to get AQIM’s critics (the ones who think they’re not sufficiently ideological) off its back. It could also be an instance of an unproven emir trying to make a name for himself. AQIM is made up of individuals with varying levels of ideological commitment, loyalty, and common sense.
Some of them (say, the leadership in the Central Zone) are probably genuinely trying to do the right thing by being closer to AQSL, and they may even believe that they can create an Islamic state. Others (say, MBM) are long-time operators who will keep fighting (or making money) no matter the cause.
I think your argument is interesting – I just don’t think it applies to AQIM. I think we (observers, analysts, whoever) sometimes spin ourselves into a corner with overly thought-out explanations that rely more on theory than reality.
As for the European networks – I’ve no doubt that AQIM has cells there…but if they were as big and scary as they’re made out to be (in the Isaacs piece that you quoted), wouldn’t we see AQIM attacks in Europe? Wouldn’t we see AQIM gaining strength from the flow of Algerians coming from Europe to fight? Algerian jihadists have had cells and support in Europe from the time of the GIA – it’s nothing new and certainly not connected to AQIM’s desire to satisfy AQSL.
You wrote: ‘I think that the combination of narrow ideology - which I argue is a driving factor - and attack TTP's can position AQIM long-term, and countering this threat with an allies "forking strategy" that identifies the inter-connecting threads in ideology and operational strengths between AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP can prevent and protect while disrupting.” I think AQIM’s narrow(ing) ideology may earn it some support from AQ and its global supporters, but that same narrowness will prevent it from gaining local support in Algeria or anywhere else in Africa. I read your previous post about the forking strategy, and I’m not sure what specific measures you have in mind. Would love to hear your thoughts. If you mean that a combination of measures designed to broadly subvert AQ ideology while targeting individuals in the middle layer (and do you mean target intellectually or otherwise?) would be useful, than I agree (sort of).
Cheers.
DP,
ReplyDelete(part 2)
Your post referred to Althea Gamit’s release as evidence of increasing adherence to ideology – maybe so, but calling her release an example of daw’a is stretching things. If I was in her shoes, I might convert too, since it could exempt me from execution. I find the killing of Edwin Dyer to be a much stronger example of an ideologically driven action, but one can also make the case that it was necessary demonstration of strength to get AQIM’s critics (the ones who think they’re not sufficiently ideological) off its back. It could also be an instance of an unproven emir trying to make a name for himself. AQIM is made up of individuals with varying levels of ideological commitment, loyalty, and common sense.
Some of them (say, the leadership in the Central Zone) are probably genuinely trying to do the right thing by being closer to AQSL, and they may even believe that they can create an Islamic state. Others (say, MBM) are long-time operators who will keep fighting (or making money) no matter the cause.
I think your argument is interesting – I just don’t think it applies to AQIM. I think we (observers, analysts, whoever) sometimes spin ourselves into a corner with overly thought-out explanations that rely more on theory than reality.
As for the European networks – I’ve no doubt that AQIM has cells there…but if they were as big and scary as they’re made out to be (in the Isaacs piece that you quoted), wouldn’t we see AQIM attacks in Europe? Wouldn’t we see AQIM gaining strength from the flow of Algerians coming from Europe to fight? Algerian jihadists have had cells and support in Europe from the time of the GIA – it’s nothing new and certainly not connected to AQIM’s desire to satisfy AQSL.
You wrote: ‘I think that the combination of narrow ideology - which I argue is a driving factor - and attack TTP's can position AQIM long-term, and countering this threat with an allies "forking strategy" that identifies the inter-connecting threads in ideology and operational strengths between AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP can prevent and protect while disrupting.” I think AQIM’s narrow(ing) ideology may earn it some support from AQ and its global supporters, but that same narrowness will prevent it from gaining local support in Algeria or anywhere else in Africa. I read your previous post about the forking strategy, and I’m not sure what specific measures you have in mind. Would love to hear your thoughts. If you mean that a combination of measures designed to broadly subvert AQ ideology while targeting individuals in the middle layer (and do you mean target intellectually or otherwise?) would be useful, than I agree (sort of).
Cheers.
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