al Sahwa

Is delusion an environmentally-enhanced trait?

2011-07-26T22:05:00.004-04:00

Normally I thoroughly enjoy reading Christian Science Monitor. Their articles are well written and typically on point. This article, published yesterday from Anne Mulrine, left me scratching my head. While well written, I’m a little confused by the personalities she selected to quote through most of the article. Did she not have access to a Battalion Commander or his S-3?

Some of my favorite quotes from this article:

…says Col. Clay Hall, commander of the US Air Force’s 455th Expeditionary Operations Group (EOG). “There’s a feeling of, ‘Let’s use them to maximum effect.’ As we pull out,” with fewer and fewer US troops on the ground, “those engagements are going to become less and less effective.”

Since when is the Commander of a Group of flyers qualified to discuss the effectiveness of current or future ground operations? Sure he said, “There’s a feeling”, but again, this is not his lane. I'm not discussing whether he's correct or not, the point is that he's not a ground force commander. And honestly, could the reporter not find someone better to interview about ground operations than a pilot? How about look for someone, anyone, not wearing those awesome blue tiger stripes or a flight suit?

Next.

After dropping his bombs and being replaced by another team of Air Force fighter pilots, Sorenson returned to base and began listening to the battle on the radio.

I really don’t have anything bad to say about this other than to (once again) kick myself for not being a Zoomie.

And my absolute favorite.

“It’s a Pyrrhic victory is the bottom line.”

I’m sorry, what? Pyrrhic victory? The fact that the Taliban still has the capability to mass 300 determined fighters after a decade in this country is scary. And to say we have the enemy on his heels? Seriously, do you honestly believe that? This article is about the Taliban shifting operations to your Regional Command; as well as massing 300 determined fighters on one of your Platoons. And you, the Commanding General, think you have the Taliban on its heels in your area of operations? Luckily, that Platoon was able to fight its way out with seemingly outstanding support from our Air Force brethren. But RC East has been on the receiving end of massed Taliban attacks before, and they didn’t always end so well for us. Is this a TTP we truly want to replicate because their body count was a lot higher than ours?

How about a little candor? Why not try something like this, "The Air Force did a great job providing Close Air Support to beleaguered ground forces. My boys got pretty lucky with this one, but we won't always get that lucky. As the Commanding General of this Area of Operations, I am committed to disrupting, denying and defeating the insurgent networks operating in my area of operations well before they are able to mass to that level and attack my boys. again We got lucky with this, but I intend to take luck out of the equation and bring the fight to them before they can bring it to us like this again. Moving forward, my goals and plans may not progress perfectly; but we will do everything in our power, top-down, to keep a situation like this from happening again through comprehensive and holistic/integrated offensive operations directed against these networks."

If I were in RC East I'd get pumped reading something that honest and determined from my CG. Instead they get to read puffery and feel like their CG is willing to tempt fate with their lives to try for more Pyrrhic victories.

Syria & Organized Opposition

2011-07-26T10:21:00.003-04:00

The Wall Street Journal reports that Syria's Cabinet is working on draft law to Allow Organized Opposition by "new political parties" who operate. I wonder if this move comes in light of the People's demand for change or as a strategy of the ruling party to control operations. Violence, of course, has been a major concern, but even though this strategy promises reform in order to quell violence the law may indeed spark more protests in opposition to this new-phased governance campaign.

Why - simply because its restricts the parameters of the protests and therefore hinders the dialogue the People want to have. Political parties (or their representatives) must submit an application to receive a license to organize and operate, upon which a Committee will conclude whether to grant license or not. I presume the Committee's "explanation" will be a forthright statement and will not include detailed reasons for or against, which will prove to be another point of contention for the People.

For example, criteria include "a ban on links or affiliation to any non-Syrian political groupings." Firstly, this pretty much will exclude almost everyone. The Committee, who will rule as a representative of the ruling party of the Syrian "state and society", can define "links" or "affiliation" according to their interpretation. Secondly, in effect, such definitions will enable the Committee to further define the strength or degree of relationship(s) between the organizing party who seeks a license and their "non-Syrian" link or affiliation. Citizen records, testimony, and avenues such as the Internet will most likely be used to confirm this.

Once again, we continue to deal with Socrates' Metaphor of the Cave: the State presents images to the People according to their worldview in order to met the objectives of their strategy. Even after the draft law is passed, lawyers will argue on behalf of the State that it is not supported by the Syrian Constitution, and the People will argue that the process is not working.

The People will continue to protest emerging points of contention to the misunderstanding of the State.

Social Welfare

2011-06-17T13:03:00.000-04:00

Came across this article yesterday and revisited it today trying to decide whether it was worth a post. Since a) I have not posted really at all lately, and b) this is the most e-mailed NYT Op-Ed as of today, I figure it warrants a post. Up front, Nicholas Kristof is absolutely correct that the US Military is a social welfare experiment. The options for child care from a cost-based perspective are outstanding. And the military can be credited with a couple significant accolades for being ahead of the power curve in regard to social equality.

However, these are not the key points Kristof is trying to get across. Instead his main points are that the military should serve as a (or rather, the) model for universal healthcare and investment in human capital. Unfortunately, I disagree. Here’s why:

I think everyone would be pretty disappointed with military healthcare. From issues within the Army’s Warrior Transition Units to the military’s overemphasis on time and anti-inflammatory medication for seemingly any malady, military healthcare has significant issues. Many of my more left-leaning friends repeatedly make the argument that “at least you have healthcare”. Couldn’t argue with that logic. But what I can argue with is the level of care provided by the military. Have a significant orthopedic issue and want to see the world-renowned surgeon up the street? You’re either going to be denied or face significant hurdles trying to get up there even if the doctor accepts Tricare. Random aches and pains? You’ll likely never know what it was (and neither will your doctor), but you’ll absolutely receive a prescription for either Ibuprofen or Naproxen. Is this the best we can do?

On to the more military-relevant topic of Kristof’s Op-Ed, the topic of human capital investment. From the outside, the military’s use of career-level oriented schooling for the purposes of training and human capital investment sounds great. But in reality, the majority of students (past the basic course) attending their career-level oriented course have already spent a significant amount of time executing the positions for which they’re being trained. I spent nearly six months at the Captain-level school learning how to hold essential Captain-level positions within my branch. Would’ve been a decent education had I not already held almost all of the positions. And more importantly, the level the course was taught at was the level I taught my Lieutenants to think at. The Officer education system is woefully outdated, inadequate and expects too little from its students.

Kristof should spend a little more time talking to experienced Soldiers and Officers within the ranks before he makes such a bold conceptual assumption about the broader utility of military healthcare and human capital investment.

UBL sans frontier

2011-05-02T14:39:00.002-04:00

Amazin news.........inspiring......uplifting....satisfying.......Usama bin Laden is dead! Archenemy, if the US ever had one, is bested, defeated, and sent to the depths of the Arabian Sea. For all Americans, from those to whom 9/11 was as close as the War on Terror got to those who have spent years away from home killing and being killed, this is just and proper.

With UBL's demise the professional and lay speculation about the future of AQ and the global jihad is in full bloom. While "voices of reason" such as Sec. Napolitano are starting to warn that this is not the end of the War and that his end, though symbolic and fitting, does not mean GWOT is won and done, others are no less prophetic about the loss of faith the average mujahid may suffer, stuck as he is between the stone age and a democratic new middle-east (the NYT seemingly devoted the entire Op-Ed section on 2 May to the debate).

There is a voice that begs for redefinition when something momentous happens. Something that says "tomorrow is different than yesterday". Yet we must let history be the wax in our ears against this Siren's song. UBL was a leader in a 'global jihad'. 9/11 was the most successfull attack of a decade-old 'struggle against the Great Satan' (e.g. 1993 WTC bombing, 1998 Embassy bombings, USS Cole, etc). The Mujahid is the man that must be disuaded from fighting, persuaded to help, and/or killed and his wife must be likewise, for she instills the virtues of the jihad in her sons. The lessons of the coming weeks will shed some light on the pervasive divide between CT and COIN. Is it enough to physically hurt the agents of terror or must we "convert" the agents and their mothers away from it until some tolerable threshhold is reached?

I suspect the results will hardly solve anything. Our tendency to hyperbole and oversimplification will effectively and predictably guide us to "answers" that will hold until another defining moment that leads us to fear or jubilation. Or so the tendency has been. The Napolitano's of the world who see global terrorism as an endemic condition to last a lifetime are perhaps on the right side of the scale, although their tendencies have weaknesses a-plenty. InshAllah, we will overcome our tendencies. Then again, let's enjoy the moment and then go about our business.

Weekly Update

2011-04-23T10:09:00.003-04:00

Back from another long hiatus from the blogosphere. There’s so much going on in the world, yet every time I think I have something to say, I come across someone who’s already said it. Besides that, with my wife’s quickly approaching PCS and the end of my terminal leave/start of a new career, I have been a little keener on fly fishing, kayaking and carting around the 4-year-old blonde “princess terrorist” to her many sporting events and princess outings. Soon enough I’ll be back after it full time; until then I’ll continue to add to the site somewhat sporadically and hope we still have a couple interested readers by then.

Greg Mortenson and the Three Cups of Tea mess. Andrew Exum and Gulliver from Ink Spots covered most of what I would’ve said, and far more eloquently. Whether Mortenson tells tall tales or not, at this point, through the prism of his military relationship, is irrelevant. As Exum and Gulliver already covered, by the time Three Cups of Tea became a “must read” in military circles, most young Army and Marine leaders were already well on their way to diabetes from the gallons of chai (tea) we’d all poured down our throats over the course of multiple deployments. The media’s incessant linking to the Pentagon, and Counterinsurgency practice in general, really is lazy on their part.

Honestly, I am a huge Jon Krakauer fan; he is a genuinely fascinating individual. An old family friend, I always made sure I never missed a get-together when I knew he would also be in attendance. "Into the Wild" and "Eiger Dreams" still have a place front-and-center in my bookcase. Needless to say, big fan. What I’m not completely sure of at this point is Jon’s motive for exposing Mortenson in the way he did. Hopefully it’s pure investigative journalism for journalism’s sake and not something more wide-eyed and nefarious.

P.S. I came across this article from the Guardian on my phone tonight and had to link to it here. I’m sure Greg Mortenson is praying for a shiny ball to divert everyone’s attention anywhere else at this point.

Topic 2: Libya, naturally.

First off, what in the hell is John McCain doing parading around Benghazi? I love the guy, and it doesn’t take a PhD to figure out what he’s trying to effect with this act, but I’m not a fan of this move.

Tribes loyal to Qadhafi are telling the uniformed Libyan army to retreat from Misrata so they can fix the problem. My favorite quote from the linked article: “the tactic of the army is to have a surgical solution.” Right… nothing about artillery barrages, or really anything happening on the ground in Libya right now, can be equated with the term “surgical” in a war fighting context.

The Washington Post with Foreign Policy pretty much dropped the ball on more than half of this article. So hopefully Greg Jaffe, Edward Cody and William Branigin are reading this and will email me after so I can become their ISR contact.

1) 24/7 coverage over Libya by at least two Predators means that several units in Iraq and Afghanistan are not getting the support they need. Just by using the hokey math in the article, that’s at least four platforms that could be used in an operational theater where we have uniformed boots on the ground and therefore (hopefully) ground intelligence to tell the sensor operators where to look. I don’t know of a single unit that has ever said they received enough full motion video support; on the contrary it’s usually a big AAR comment for most units that they didn’t receive enough. ISR, especially long-duration FMV, is a low-density high-demand asset in both theaters. And shouldn’t priority of a ground support intelligence gathering asset like this be prioritized to US and NATO forces who are actually on the ground trying to win the first two wars we were involved in? If not to the uniformed warfighter on the ground, surely then we could be using these somewhere else where we’re chasing around elements of al Qaeda in Africa, Yemen, Pakistan, etc? The bottom line is that these platforms could (and should) easily be utilized elsewhere.

2) “The unmanned aircraft can stay over an area for upwards of 12 hours at a stretch, making them much better at distinguishing rebel troops from loyalist forces than faster-moving fighter jets, which also must stay at higher altitudes.” This was a decent attempt. Do the authors think our fighter pilots are trying to look out the cockpit glass from 14,000 feet up and trying to discern friend from foe? Maybe to get a general feel for what’s happening on the ground, but definitely not for PID purposes on the ground there with the grab bag of vehicles on both sides. Loiter time surely helps in allowing those watching “Kill TV” to take their time and make that solid PID. But this has everything to do with loiter time and nothing to do with flight speed of either aircraft or their respective preferred flight altitudes.

3) “Predators carry relatively small Hellfire missiles that are much more effective than precision guided bombs at striking enemy troops in heavily populated urban areas.” This sentence receives an F for many, many reasons.

4) Discussing strikes in the context of Qadhafi forces hiding out in high collateral, urban areas: “The drones could open up targets there were previously off-limits to NATO aircraft.” Possibly. I’m not there and I haven’t seen any of the target specs that these guys are working. There are a ton of “what if’s” here, so I’ll give them this one but very skeptically as one just need to consider the standard trajectory of a bomb versus a missile in an urban environment.

5) “Some European officials have lamented the absence of U.S. A-10 Warthog ground-attack jets — specifically designed for close air support — and AC-130 gunships. While the low- and slow-flying planes were deployed in small numbers during the first two weeks of the campaign, they were rarely used because of fears they would be shot down by the Libyan army.” Piss off, get your own awesome CAS platforms! While you’re at it, buy even more of our awesome UAVs and fly them over Libya yourself. Maybe we can export our way out of this huge financial hole we’re in after all.

Lots more soon enough… until then many more fish to catch.

No Frontline Fronts in Front of the Rear

2011-04-13T12:10:00.003-04:00

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a trend, often addressed here and in other blogs/forums, of seeing "future war" as fundamentally different in a key aspect: symmetry. What symmetry means, of course, is up for debate. Is it a physical symmetry of forces? Well, Sun Tzu said the best battle is won before it is fought. So, attack with a great advantage of the best technology, the best troops, and best logistics. This seems to imply that the best way to fight a battle (i.e. a war) is against a weaker opponent...not much to do with symmetry. Then there is the metaphysical symmetry of engagement; the notion that we used to fight on a "front" that had a "rear". That the breakdown of this symmetry creates the a-symmetrical battlefield where the "front" is the "rear" and the "rear" is the "front". The idea, of course, that this is the new paradigm. Well then, what are we to do with Lybia then? In Lybia we have fronts, rears, cities cut off and under siege, forces retreating and advancing, all in an oddly familiar way. So too we have in Cote D'Ivoire as a faction advanced from its stronghold in the north on the capital and besieged its opponents. Again, the invasion of Iraq progressed along a front that moved rapidly from Kuwait to Mosul. Weird. Why do these exceptions to a paradigm exist? After all, if the point of a paradigm is to set the framework to understanding, then XXI century conflicts should fall under this new asymmetrical paradigm. Why do these other "things" exist? Perhaps the answer is best found in the one place where everything that has ever been tried can be found: history. These exceptions to the asymmetrical rule show us a couple of things. First, frontlines exist when opposing forces meet. As Fallujah was being cleared north to south, there was a front and a rear for both the coalition and the rebels. The continental fronts of WWI and WWII are historical oddities of the industrialized, multi-million man armies. The scale of the front is the important part. Second, and most important, is that the scale of the front is determined by the size of the weakest participant. For instance, when an infantry platoon engages a rebel squad, their front is 400 m wide and their rear extends 800m deep and the action lasts a few minutes to a few hours, thereafter closing the front. When a Division engages a Brigade, then the front could be 30 km wide and the rear extending 60 km deep. When an Army Group engages an Army then their AO (front + rear) can be 250km wide and 500 km deep and the action can last a few years, thereafter closing the front. A single war may have multiple fronts. TheUSSR was fond of naming their fronts in WWII, while the US likes to capture them with the term Campaigns (Italy campaign, Island Hopping, Normandie, North Africa etc). The front then is a point of engagement on a map. COIN, which is what Lybia is in the midst of (noting that their insurgents have serendipitously acquired an air force and a navy) has fronts too. Sometimes they are many and sometime few. Our intervention in Lybia has balanced the power of the insurgency with the government, allowing a front to stabilize. When the rebellion was weak it had multiple (nay, asymmetric) fronts, just as we have in OIF and OEF. As the rebellion grew in strength it was able to consolidate, allowing better territorial control and a more unified front. The concept of a front then, in the XXI century, is still valid. The problem with fighting a COIN fight is that the balance of power and distribution of forces of the participants create the possibility of something other than a continental front (remeber, it itself is an industrialized oddity, not the historic norm). So has a new paradigm in warfighting evolved since WWII that should force us to reimagine warfare? We shouldn't have to look much further than 500 yrs in the past to an astute observer of human nature for guidance. In The Prince, Machiavelli devoted some time to an interesting subject, the difficulty of conquering France vs. the ease of Alexander's conquest of Persia. I won't bore you with the details, but the conclusion was elegantly simple. A divided and poorly organized state is easier to conquer and harder to occupy. A united and well organized state is the opposite. I leave you with the thought that Afghanistan was always the former and until May 2003 (when we dissolved the organs of that organization) Iraq was the latter. In both there are fronts, and at those fronts scale is the determining factor, not an earth-shattering shift in the human condition necessitating a new paradigm.

Jack of Everything (Follow-on comments to my previous post)

2011-03-09T04:19:00.002-05:00

Really enjoyed the multiple, and broad, responses to my last post. Unfortunately, Blogger didn't like my 1000+ word response. So I decided that instead of cutting it into multiple comments I would just create a new post. My responses by commenter:

@ The Constitutional Insurgent:

I too mostly agree with what you wrote. Every NCO I’ve sent off to an NCOES over the last 3 years (at least) has already served at the level he was attending school for. This goes for 11, 13, and 35-series NCOs who have worked for me across multiple Battalions, so it’s not just a specific unit or MOS that’s behind the power curve.

We’re seeing a major transformation of the POI for the training centers right now. I think the first Hybrid Threat MRX happened just a couple months ago. Starbuck from WoI has a great post on the much ado about nothing that is the hybrid threat here.

In terms of phased operations, this is a major issue that I think many Officers across the board will (and are already) struggle with. My recent first-hand experience shows two types: the first is so tired of COIN/LIC/SASO/SOSO/SO/IW/AW/not-HIC that they see this merely as an opportunity to get back to the “good ol’ days” of getting their K on, and the second group is stuck in the minimization of collateral damage and win hearts and minds absolute far-left end of the spectrum of conflict. Neither, obviously, is better than the other; but more importantly it likely shows the lack of flexibility/adaptability in the thinking of many leaders. The ability to move fluidly along the spectrum of conflict and transition from Full Spectrum Ops to COIN to HA-type operations, or wherever in between, by phase or otherwise, is paramount. What I’ve seen over the last six months is leadership getting stuck on just one phase and forgetting about everything after that one specific phase. More in a couple paragraphs that should help finish this thought.

@ Pat:

Fully agree on all fronts. TRADOC has failed a half decade’s worth of Officers at least. I recently saw an entire Battalion fail one of their low-numbered firing tables; I’m sure a sizeable portion of that failure was attributable to TRADOC. Not that I’m discounting leaders’ responsibility in this, but if you don’t know your job it’s probably a lot more difficult to make it through gunnery tables.

This stroke of brilliance dawned on me as I sat here tonight next to Mama Mac studying for her next ACSC exam. What if the Army adopted a liberal arts style continuing education program for its Company Grade Officers? By this I mean a correspondence program where an Officer must complete one course focusing on a specific portion of the spectrum of conflict annually. The courses could be self-paced but with a mandatory completion date, take two to three months each, be tracked via AKO, accountable on OERs with no deployment waivers authorized, and focus separately on historic HIC, COIN, HA events/wars/uprisings, etc. I think a program like this would have tremendous benefits. It would help fill the gaps that TRADOC wasn’t able to get to. It would help span the spectrum of conflict and perhaps help broaden perspectives under GEN Dempsey’s new training plan. It would also help fill gaps in the Officer’s commissioning source education (think directional schools vs. USMA and Engineering vs. Military History undergraduate degrees). With a written paper or two in each course it would help Officers actually think in and write full sentences (which many cannot). With this program an Officer, while training for the hybrid threat or the Red Horde, would read Galula and Trinquier and learn about the Algerian War; they would learn about British CT efforts in Northern Ireland, WWII, etc., the options along the spectrum of conflict are numerous and would help fill gaps. I know as well as you that you can’t just expect most Officers to learn about this stuff on their own; most of them would rather play Call of Duty than read anything. And I know what many of you reading this are saying, but what about JRTC/NTC/MRX/CPX/field problems? The classes would be self-paced and two to three months long, if it’s mandatory you’ll find the time to do it. This sort of program probably would have kept me a little more sober (and out of trouble) as a young Lieutenant, so there’s another benefit. Enough with my diatribe, but I think the Army would be well served with a program like this.

@ Anonymous (JB… didn’t think I’d catch that did you?!)

I was actually considering a full post about the misapplication of the Full Spectrum Operations term and how most senior leaders are treating it solely as if it is HIC/MCO. Phase IV what? But instead of writing that post I decided to go fly fishing.

Now a couple disagreements from your comment.

First, I think Division and Corps-level exercises, while obviously difficult to execute and manpower intensive on subordinate units, are vitally important. Take I Corps as an example, who will be deploying relatively soon. Should their first non-digital exercise be in the combat environment in which they will take over day-to-day operations for? How do you truly test your systems?

Second, while I do agree with you that policy makers must understand and accept that actual Full Spectrum Ops should be off the table for the next couple years until the Army is back up to par. I think we’re seeing that now in the push back against military intervention in Libya. Or maybe that’s because policy makers have no idea what the goals of intervention would be, a logical stopping point for our intervention if you will, and are loathe to commit US forces to another open-ended operation. Perhaps. I digress. What I disagree with is your sentence where you say we should only do what we do well moving forward. In a perfect world sure, but I don’t see that world coming any time soon and we as an Army should be prepared to serve our Nation’s goals in whatever capacity POTUS decides to employ us in. A more realistic goal perhaps would be to train toward perfecting MCO and then implementing the broadening program I outlined above for CGOs; and then possibly expanding the ILE and War College-level cross-training opportunities for the best and brightest of each annual class. This could help create a solid cadre of senior-level SMEs on the core capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, etc, of each specific agency of the government. So with this kind of model you’d have a force trained for combat and leaders at every level able to understand and conceptualize Phase IV operations; with senior leaders able to maximize the efforts and contributions of all contributing agencies in a JIIM environment.

Jack of all Trades

2011-03-04T01:44:00.003-05:00

Just came across the GEN Dempsey article from last week's Army Times. This article really hasn't sat well with me over the last couple days. Some thoughts...

Many leaders have significant issues spanning multiple spectrum's of conflict, sometimes on multiple blocks, or in short amounts of time. The reality is that many formations and their leaders simply are not capable of spanning the full spectrum of conflict. This is my biggest issue with this article; the notion that we as leaders must narrow our focus to master only a few key constructs; the “military pentathlete” (or as I call it, Renaissance Ranger) is on his way out the door. In the early days of Iraq, we had formations trained for linear combat against uniformed enemy formations. Major Combat Ops were what they (we) did. As the situation worsened and gained complexity by the day, it quickly became apparent that our SOPs were not working. But many (most) units continued to hammer away. If we only work on and master a couple concepts, people will have a tendency to see through the prism of knowledge and experience; in essence, everything becomes a nail if all we’re carrying is a hammer. We learned the hard way that not everything is a nail, and that we needed to carry more than a hammer. I have already seen this regression to only carrying a hammer again firsthand over my most recent Reset phase of the training cycle.

2. Combined arms warfare is not lost, as many advocate. I would argue at the Battalion-and-below level it is (and has been) alive and well. At the tactical level, most Platoon Leaders and NCOs can effectively maneuver ground elements, provide task/purpose/EEI to FW and RW CAS as well as ISR platforms, while also coordinating with higher and adjacent units. These situations have been (and are) happening on a daily basis. Things get fuzzy at the Brigade level, and downright messy at echelons above Brigade. There’s nothing like being in the heat of a situation and receiving a flurry of mIRC messages or phone calls from someone at Division because the old man is watching and wants to know exactly what we’re up to 200+ miles from his current location. Apparently the myriad storyboards produced after an event just don’t provide quite the same level of satisfaction as watching a Squad Leader maneuver his fire teams near-real time (while also often providing near-real time feedback). So, perhaps the capacity to conduct combined arms warfare at the Division or Corps –level is a more accurate statement.

If we’re going to refocus our future doctrine and training plans to only a couple tasks, it seems imperative that we find a way to broaden leader’s skill sets so we don’t pigeon hole ourselves as an organization. Further, if a jack-of-all-trades doesn’t make a leader, why do we as Officers switch jobs as often as we do? I was always told it was because as a future Commander it would help me understand everything I would need to in order to effectively command. Parallels?

An Open Letter to Baghdad's City Council

2011-02-28T02:24:00.001-05:00

Came across this absolutely amazing article from Reuters about a week and a half ago; but doing the outprocessing dash across post prevented me from posting on it earlier. Fairly sarcastic responses to some of the better quotes; I couldn’t help myself.

"The U.S. forces changed this beautiful city to a camp in an ugly and destructive way, which reflected deliberate ignorance and carelessness about the simplest forms of public taste," the statement said.

Deliberate ignorance? Not sure about that. Most of us weren’t DELIBERATELY stupid; it was far more innocent and unintentional… this I can assure you. However, I do apologize for upsetting your discerning taste for architecture and urban planning by attempting to prevent scenarios like this. Beautiful city? Right, I’m sure it was just like Florence prior to March 2003.

"Due to the huge damage, leading to a loss the Baghdad municipality cannot afford...we demand the American side apologize to Baghdad's people and pay back these expenses."

Ok, I’ll take the bait.

Dear Baghdad, (let’s get this out of the way up front) I am sorry we were ever in your country. Be that as it may, I am sorry we had to set up so many Hesco and concrete barriers to protect you from each other… especially in Baghdad. I understand you are still targeting each other daily throughout most of the country, but we were unable to Hesco your ENTIRE country; instead only the areas we felt were most critical, volatile or dangerous at the time of emplacement. Unfortunately for you, most of Baghdad was akin to a level of Doom 3D and required massive amounts of dirt and concrete to separate one side from the other’s death squads. Timeouts just weren’t working anymore…

I’m also sorry that many of the locations of Joint Security Stations, checkpoints, etc., are right on roads, markets, or right in the middle of formerly volatile and deadly neighborhoods. Many of these locations were directed by YOUR security force leadership, but that obviously does not negate our responsibility at maintaining the pleasing aesthetics of your fair city. Yes it was our money that funded the security improvements to protect not only our warfighters, but yours, but that doesn’t excuse us either. But most of all, I am sorry we did everything we could think of to keep AQI out of the Shia neighborhoods, and the Special Groups out of the Sunni side of town at night. And I am also very sorry that we fortified the building that these politicians were sitting in when the Baghdad city council drafted this absurd statement. Oops, our bad. We’ll come pick those dirt and concrete barriers protecting you up first ok?

As far as a payback goes, great idea, we’ll subtract it from the $50 billion(ish) we’ve already spent there on reconstruction. Now you only owe use $49 billion. Pretty good deal, eh? Or you could just quit misappropriating the wealth from your massive oil reserves and pay for the removal of this dirt and concrete yourselves. Just one of many options.

The statement made no mention of damage caused by bombing.

Really? I seemed to have missed that during all the absolutely ridiculous finger-pointing from the Baghdad city (or possibly beladiyah too?) government. I wonder what the reconstruction bill for AQI or JAM would look like for Baghdad.

The heavy blast walls have damaged sewer and water systems, pavement and parks, said Hakeem Abdul Zahra, the city spokesman.

Hakeem, maybe if you built anything in the last century even remotely close to internationally accepted building standards this would not have happened. It’s a possibility I think we should not throw out. Oh, also refer back to the $50 billion(ish) we’ve already spent trying to rebuild your country and the significant amount of corruption at all levels of government that has seriously degraded our reconstruction efforts from day one.

Baghdad is badly in need of a facelift. Electricity and trash collection are sporadic, streets are potholed and sewage treatment plants and pipes have not been renovated for years.

Much of this statement is true, Baghdad as a whole is likely worse today aesthetically and structurally than it was eight years ago. It definitely does not mean we have not attempted to not only fix what we’ve broken but also modernize a lot of the stuff that was broken before we even got there; especially in Baghdad and even up north in Diyala. But, at least they have the right to voice absurd statements like this one today. And the right to not seat a national government for 9 months, which effectively paralyzed Provincial and below governments (which I experienced firsthand for most of 2010), who were leery of unintentionally crossing whatever master eventually was seated in Baghdad.

Time to take the lead and hold someone other than US Forces-Iraq accountable.

Moscow's Festering Terrorists

2011-02-08T03:26:00.006-05:00

Hard to believe that this came from the same group that made this. Doku Umarov is a master at keeping his cause never-too-far from the headlines. Almost a year ago exactly, JD provided a great rundown of Umarov in his “Who’s Who Terrorist” series. That, along with this profile from the BBC, should be ample primer for the uninformed on the notorious Chechen insurgent leader.

Seems as if Umarov is hoping for a major retaliatory crackdown in the North Caucasus by Russian Security Forces, likely with the hope of reigniting separatist aspirations of the region’s population. I’m not a big follower of the region, but I do think it will be pretty interesting to see how Russia handles this moving forward.

The Post-Authoritarian Middle East

2011-02-04T16:46:00.002-05:00

It has now been over two months since my last post, I’ve definitely been slacking as of late. Between hunting with my Griffon pup Darby, ski trips, and vacations to Hawaii I have been off my writing and analytical game. My big update recently has been the approval of my ETS packet so I will be out of the Army and into the unemployment line within a month. So if you happen to see a 30-ish guy who looks like he just got out of the Army holding a homeless vet sign, that may be me. It’s been an interesting seven years thus far, mostly a positive set of experiences, but it’s time to move on. I won’t bore everyone reading this with the laundry list of reasons for my departure from the military; suffice it to say the cons started to outweigh the pros so I’m hanging up my proverbial hat. I may or may not write a future post on my perspective of the woeful state of my soon-to-be-former branch after I go on terminal leave, I am yet to fully weigh the merits of such a post.

I am definitely looking forward to my next professional challenge, which hopefully will get finalized in the next couple weeks; otherwise you’ll be able to find me on the saltwater flats outside of Honolulu chasing Bonefish with a fly rod or carting my daughter around to her various sport practices (something that “Major Mommy” has been doing very well on her own far too long).

Onto more serious news.

Every warm blooded American Soldiers’ favorite reporter Lara Logan was detained in Cairo. I was ambivalent on the uprising until I read this; now I want whoever is responsible to pay! But seriously, I am still fairly undecided on whether this is a good thing or not. My humanitarian side fully supports the uprising for the good of the Egyptian people. However, the realist side of me is more than a little worried. Not knowing what the next government will look like is an obvious concern. Whoever comes next will undoubtedly not unabashedly support American interests the way Mubarak has, which isn’t necessarily the end of the world; but I do worry our access into Africa and the Middle East will dwindle even more. And for the Egyptian people, I think they are forgetting the lessons learned by the Iraqi people about coming out from under a dictator after an extended period of time. The Iraqis had (and still have) absolutely no idea how to run a government; so hopefully they will not fully disband and fully replace their civil servants. What will hopefully emerge is a moderate government; and they will need trained and established civil servants to reduce lag time for the improvement of essential services.

Then when we consider that Egypt has been the historical leader of the Middle East, things get even more troubling for us. Counterterror operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula throughout Yemen, the last known residence of Anwar al Awlaki, will undoubtedly become more difficult when Ali Abdullah Saleh steps down in 2013, or is forced out earlier. Is Yemen bound to be the next Afghanistan then? Will we continue to have a military presence on the Sinai? Will we be able to continue our CT efforts in Yemen?

The Egyptian uprising leaves us with more questions than answers on what the Middle East of tomorrow will look like; and even more about our position in the region we have expended more time and resources in than any other in the past three decades.

Bekkay Harrach Confirmed Dead in Afghanistan

2011-01-31T14:01:00.015-05:00

As you can see by the lack of posts recently on the site, work has kept the entire Al Sahwa crew very busy over the last few months (we have to find some way to pay the ridiculously high rent here in DC!). However, I'm hoping to pick back up the pace of our posts during 2011. I'm excited to dive into Georgetown's Security Studies Program starting this semester, which will demand much of my time, but also hopefully re-energize the analytical and critical thinking parts of my brain. I'll be concentrating primarily on Terrorism and Substate Violence, which fits quite nicely with the original focus of the site. In our attempts to increase the frequency of posts, you might notice a slight decrease in the length of our articles, but hopefully not in the quality.

To start things off, I wanted to link to an excellent article/profile written by Chris Anzalone over at Foreign Policy (Chris also blogs at Views from the Occident, one of my daily reads). He profiles the recently deceased Bekkay Harrach, who was a key face for Al Qaeda in its European/German operations. Bekkay aka Abu Talha al Almani was reportedly killed in May 2010 leading a complex suicide attack on Bagram Airfield in eastern Afghanistan.

This is significant for many reasons, most of which Anzalone highlights expertly in his article, including:

• The rising levels of German citizens traveling to the AfPak region to participate in attacks; and the related implications of the ability for these individuals to acquire safe haven in Waziristan and NW Pakistan.

• The increasing ties between Al Qaeda Central, the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - who all reportedly collaborated for the attack that Harrach died in.

• The pattern of using "local" spokespersons on many As Sahab media productions (such as Adam Gadahn in many of the English-language videos), indicating the increasing Western-focused media campaign by AQ. This clearly has direct recruiting/operational implications as well.

However, this report also prompted me to ask another question: why would AQ Central approve/allow such an important strategic figure to participate in what was essentially a tactical level operation? By many reports, Bekkay was one of the key inspirational and operational leaders of a group of German citizens who had traveled to the AfPak region and were serving as a forward hub for many European AQ members who wanted to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan. The only logical reason for Bekkay Harrach to lead the attack would be to gain additional followers and recruits after martyring himself. Essentially, he made the calculus that his death was more valuable to the organization than the work he was doing while still alive. Despite this possibility, I still have a hard time seeing the leadership of AQ Central being willing to lose such an important media/propaganda figure in such an attack. Anyone have other competing theories that might explain this anomaly?

Wikileak-er: Activist vs. Terrorist

2010-12-08T17:37:00.008-05:00

I realize that I am about to raise a thorny issue... Yet the sheer mass of events unfolding in the news in the last two weeks around the WikiLeaks release of DoS cables is difficult to ignore. Word of a pro-WikiLeaks cyber-attack started to filter into the media (here and here) showing a group of so-called "hacktivists" performing denial of service attacks on websites of companies that have broken contact with WikiLeaks over its recent actions. The attacks appear to be organized by a group of sympathizers who have been actively tweeting their intent, resulting in disabling attacks on MasterCard, Visa, PayPal and Amazon.com over. Interestingly, they are following on the heels of an anti-WikiLeaks attack on Nov 29th (see here).

Concurrently, the infamous founder of WikiLeaks is in some legal hot water in Europe over some interestingly ambiguous sexual assault charges coming from Sweden.

So this is the situation, but what is the context? A foreign organization (WikiLeaks) has been actively disseminating USG secret documents after receiving them from sources internal to the USG.

This is where it gets thorny. Throughout the on-line world there is intense forum and media discussion around a deceptively simple question...what do you call what WikiLeaks is doing? Is it journalism? Is it espionage? Is it, maybe even terrorism? The first amendment is often invoked and just as often countered by a security prerogative. And then you have the active interlocutors in the discussion (aka hacktivists), who contribute to the debate with their actions. Even the USG is painfully confused with Attorney General Holder claiming "intense investigations", Senators throwing around espionage, and the President mysteriously silent on the whole thing (example). So round and round we go...what do we do with a foreign man who has taken it upon himself to damage American interests and has a rag-tag army of loosely organized, volunteer supporters?

Wait...that is the question, isn't it?

While it might sound as hyperbole, there is a real issue of precedent here. Precedent set not on hijacked aircraft but in electrons. For a decade we have heard of the emerging threat of cyber-terrorism and cyber-attack from China or Iran. For a decade we have speculated that it might come as an attack on the banking system, electrical grid, or even the DOD networks. Yet we are inexplicably confused about what to call WikiLeaks. Does good faith make one's actions less damaging to the interests of the country we live in? If Al Qaeda got a hold of a laptop with US secrets and released them for the world to see how evil America is would we not call that an act of terror? What exactly is the rule for defending American interests? Perhaps there are no rules and at the end of the day we are just winging it (as the Administration's frustrating-to-watch confusion seems to imply)?

Those are the questions that come to mind. But allow me a moment to indulge in my own conclusions. There is no issue of freedom of speech here. There is no issue fairness or journalistic privilege here. In fact, there is no issue of due process here or justice. In Iraq the US Bill of Rights no more applies than the Iraqi Constitution in the US. Even Julian Assange himself notes the irony of charging an Australian with betraying the USA (here). What we do have is an issue of a foreign citizen acting knowingly against US interests around the WORLD! Not even in just Iraq or Afghanistan or any other single issue. But an outright effort to discredit the United States. That is what we call in the US Army, an IO campaign (Information Operations). That is also what we would call a non-lethal weapon. So, why do we not insist that Australia attempt to control its citizen? To be frank, until today that would have been enough, in my opinion, as otherwise it would mean taking action against a citizen of an ally, an issue all its own. Yet with the hacktivists carrying out cyber-attacks, the WikiLeaks campaign has taken on a new dimension. After all, a cyber-attack is as much a weapon system in our arsenal as an IO campaign. Except enterprising hackers can do a lot of damage. So perhaps Julian Assange is a wayward citizen of an ally that needs to be brought in line. But the hacktivists are bona fide terrorists that need to be pursued as such if the US is serious about protecting its interests and not just winging it. After all, all of us that have put on a uniform and gone to war were doing just that, so it must be important...no?

As to the issue of the press. There is none. WikiLeaks is foreign. The NYT has published what WikiLeaks published and no action is even contemplated against them. But then again, the NYT also shows us the occasional Al Qaeda motivational also. There is a broader issue than speech, and that is mens rea. The idea that WikiLeaks and the hacktivists are intending to harm US policy and at least for those of them who are not US persons there needs to be a swift, multi-avenue response. For those that are, we have plenty of hacker laws on the books. And for those that leak, they are the ones that take the risk of Espionage.

A few thoughts..............so much more to say.......

Pearl Harbor Day

2010-12-07T16:34:00.001-05:00

Today is December 7th. For a historical reminder of the importance of this day read DP’s post from last year here. One of my favorite posts from our team.

Also fully encourage you check out CS Monitor’s photo gallery titled, “Pearl Harbor remembered”; moving and motivating images.

Leadership Failures, Command Importance and Counseling. Seriously, all of that's in here.

2010-12-02T19:13:00.004-05:00

Received this article a couple hours ago, written by the famous “PowerPoint Ranter” COL(R) Lawrence Sellin, from a buddy. Good article overall, however the first couple paragraphs of this article are spot on and warrant recitation.

“I think that there are serious problems with the culture of Army leadership: close-mindedness, careerism, an aversion to innovation or creativity born of the fallacy that everything can fit into a step-by-step procedure, and a task-oriented mindset that creates an atmosphere of anti-intellectualism...and not only those who can think, but those who possess the moral courage to stand up for the hard truths that their bosses are unwilling to accept. I think this is going to be especially important as we transition away from Iraq and Afghanistan and attempt to prepare for unknown future conflicts.

Indeed.

It has always seemed odd to me that the US military spends billions of dollars on service academies, war colleges, graduate programs and other forms of education in order to train people to think, but then places them inside a bureaucracy that prevents them from doing so.The step-by-step procedures and task orientation methods like the Military Decision Making Process can create a mindless group mentality that inhibits discussion and stifles innovation. Although intelligent people may be embedded within such a system, all can be dragged downstream by the same aimless bureaucratic current.”

Amen.

What specifically struck me was the comment from the first paragraph, written by a Lieutenant, was the aversion to innovation and creativity. I don’t think a single person in the Army will tell you they haven’t seen this. It takes a good Commander to change this mindset and atmosphere; and one who cares about nothing more than winning each and every day while bringing his men home safe. *Eagle 6, if you’re reading this (which you better be; otherwise I think we’re down to only our mothers and significant others reading this blog), I really miss being in your unit. We didn’t always see eye to eye but at least you let mine, or Eagle 2, or Eagle 3A’s voices be heard and honestly assessed our opinions and recommendations. I wish I saw more of that these days. Innovation was a strong suit of the entire Battalion under your leadership.* This is unfortunately largely lacking and undoubtedly one reason we struggled in Iraq for so long and continue to struggle in Afghanistan today.

Enough about PowerPoint and COL Sellin’s distaste for it has already been written. Instead, I finally have a way to recommend a book I read last spring in Iraq titled, “A Question of Command”. If you haven’t read it, go buy it now and put away the latest Harry Potter or Twilight book that you’re currently pouring your heart and soul into. Mark Moyar’s thesis is outstanding; it’s well written with good case studies and really should be somewhere on the CMH Recommended Reading List. If you haven’t already, read it now. Moyar provides excellent historical reference on the importance of leadership in a counterinsurgency. COL Sellin’s article accurately spells out what is lacking and what we’re actually dealing with for the most part. Before I go any further, I’m not saying it’s like this everywhere, just most places.
Now on to my somewhat connected but not really rant of the week.

At the Battalion and below level, an organization is really only as good as its Commander. You can have bad Majors; a bad staff, bad Company Commanders even, but what keeps it all together and moving forward is that dynamic Battalion Commander. You can have the best Companies and staff in the Army and it’s all for naught if your Battalion Commander is lacking. As young Lieutenants and surly (and frequently disgruntled) Captains we are constantly reminded of a leaders’ responsibility to counsel subordinates, Officer and Non Commissioned Officer alike. Counseling is a very important part of the military culture. If you think I’m wrong ask a Commander or First Sergeant the importance of counseling when it comes to chaptering a Soldier out of the Army. Paramount. After nearly five years on various Battalion staffs, I have become increasingly concerned with the lack of counseling of Junior Officers. I say this strictly to highlight that it’s not an isolated incident but is endemic across the Army. In this almost half decade of toiling (read: rotting) away on staff I have received one counseling that came in the form of an Officer Evaluation Report (OER) counseling from my senior rater for an annual OER. These are great when utilized along with the other theoretically mandatory counseling’s. At the bottom of the first page of an OER is Part IV, Block d: Officer Development (requiring a mandatory yes or no entry for CPTs, LTs, CW2s and WO1s. It asks a simple question, “Were developmental tasks recorded on DA Form 67-9-1a and quarterly follow-up counselings conducted?” Yes that misspelling is straight from the form. TFor those of you not in the Army a DA Form 67-9-1a is an OER Support Form where we essentially highlight all the things we were supposed to do, all the things we did throughout the rating period, what special skills we have that better the Army and what jobs we’d like to have in the future. But before you get to the “pat yourself on the back” portion of the OERSF, there’s Part III which is verification of face-to-face discussion, i.e. counseling sessions with your rater (boss). There are spaces for an initial counseling and three periodic (quarterly) follow-up counseling sessions. This, unfortunately, is largely a hand jam as counseling sessions are rarely conducted for Company Grade Officers. This constitutes an absolute failure by our leaders in developing the next generation of leaders and sets a dangerous precedent for the perpetuation of poor leadership, laziness, non-confrontation, whatever you want to call it. I call it an epic failure and I believe it’s one of the many reasons droves of young Officers eligible to REFRAD continue to submit their paperwork. Frustration can come quickly if you have no idea what’s expected of you in a new job, or you just have a scatter-brained boss whose priorities for you continue to morph and change on a daily basis. Developmental counseling’s lead to far less confusion and clearly delineate what is expected of that young Officer, Sergeant or Soldier. Besides that, it’s a disservice not only to the young Officer or Sergeant, but also to his subordinates and it could contribute to the stunting of his professional development. We’re all busy but it does not relieve us of our responsibilities as a leader or supervisor.

Long story short, if you haven’t read Moyar’s book, you need to. And for Christ’s sake, if you are behind in your counseling’s, get on it.

Beaver Nation and (Unrelated) Cyber Attack

2010-11-28T14:02:00.000-05:00

Quite a few developments over the Thanksgiving weekend. Unfortunately not a ton of time to delve into them as I have a long, snowy drive back to Western Washington ahead of me.

Tip of the hat to the FBI for their work in Portland. Some are calling it entrapment but the kid was motivated. Remember Minneapolis? Another reminder that the Somali diaspora is probably the most at-risk segment of our population for radicalization. The fire this morning at the Salman al-Farisi Islamic Center was an interesting development; I’m pretty stoked to learn who is responsible for this vengeful act. And finally, the kid’s (or was now that he’s behind bars) a Beaver, so his sanity should have been checked prior to enrollment. Just sayin.

WikiLeaks. Lots of articles and analysis of the information being released this round; Starbuck’s is definitely worth a read most for his insightful analysis linking the State Department to the movie Mean Girls (which is likely giving the State Dept. too much credit). All I can add is that I fully support any attack on the WikiLeaks site. I can’t believe it took us this long to respond (assuming it was us that is).

Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri

2010-11-04T00:26:00.003-04:00

Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri, assessed to be the lead explosives expert for AQAP.

In the wake of the recent interdiction of two potential "printer-bombs" on flights bound for the US, I wanted to briefly call attention to a post I wrote back in February about Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri - who I assessed at the time to be the top explosives expert for AQAP. Recent comments from high-level government and intelligence officials seem to confirm my original assessment that he is in fact serving in this role and likely has been since as early summer 2009 (when his brother Abdullah blew himself up in a failed attempt to kill Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef). For an excellent updated biography of Ibrahim al Asiri, check out this story from the BBC.

The question I have to ask is why we haven't used our extensive HUMINT network (courtesy of the Saudis - who by the way tipped us on this latest planned attack) and SIGINT network to kill/capture this guy over the course of the last year? Although the interdiction of the explosives was a success story, if we had done our job more effectively in the first place, we could have potentially removed the key individual from the network who possessed enough knowledge to construct these devices in the first place.

PM Maliki Is My Hero

2010-11-01T23:49:00.001-04:00

Not sure how I missed this since it was in my inbox courtesy of Google Alerts, but Maliki having a well trained direct action force at his fingertips is probably not a bad thing. I’ve seen the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) operate on multiple deployments and they truly have developed into an impressive CT force. The fact that Maliki wants them at his personal finger tips is umm… well, a little disturbing. Or maybe I’m just being paranoid. Read more here, http://bit.ly/dle4SX .

The Growing "Re-Insurgency" in Iraq

2010-10-23T12:00:00.000-04:00

I continue to be disturbed by reports from Iraq that indicate the beginnings of a Sunni "re-insurgency." One of the op-eds in Wednesday's New York Times does a good job of summarizing the two primary drivers of instability:

1) The movement toward formation of a unity government that will essentially be controlled by Shia interests - leaving the Sunnis with little to no representation. The recent announcement of an alliance of convenience between the Maliki's party and Sadr's party puts the Shia within striking distance of a majority in parliament, with the Kurds essentially serving as kingmakers. The Kurds are likely to join the alliance (after extracting as many concessions as they can), leaving Allawi (and the majority of the Sunnis who voted for him) hanging out to dry. Thus, in the eyes of the Sunni populace, even though their candidate won more seats than any other candidate in the March 7 elections, they are somehow being almost completely disenfranchised. This doesn't exactly incentivize participation by the Sunnis at any level (local, provincial, national) and fuels growing feelings of disappointment, resentment, and anger amongst the Sunni populace.

2) The failure to effectively transition members of the Awakening ("Sahwa") movement into follow-on jobs (whether within the ISF or other government-provided jobs) - creating a cadre of military-trained, unemployed, and disaffected Sunni males. As this exceptional article in the New York Times points out, this creates the ideal conditions for AQI to recruit these young men back into the insurgency. As the article points out:

"Although there are no firm figures, security and political officials say hundreds of the well-disciplined fighters — many of whom have gained extensive knowledge about the American military — appear to have rejoined AQI. Beyond that, officials say that even many of the Awakening fighters still on the Iraqi government payroll, possibly thousands of them, covertly aid the insurgency...

As of July, less than half — 41,000 of 94,000 — of the Awakening’s fighters had been offered jobs by the government, according to the Department of Defense. Much of the employment has been temporary and involved menial labor. The government has hired only about 9,000 Awakening members for the security forces, with officials blaming budget constraints."

The case of Nadim al Jabouri, one of the former Awakening leaders quoted in the article, illustrates the ongoing efforts of Maliki's government to weaken the Awakening movement (and thereby the larger Sunni bloc) across the country. Nadim, born and raised in the Sunni stronghold of Duluiyah in Salahadin Province, was a top leader within the AQI organization from 2003-2006 - serving as both a military and media emir at various points during those years. During my first deployment to Iraq in 2005-06, Mullah Nadim (as he was known at the time) was my Battalion's #1 high-value target (HVT) - driven by a massive amount of confirmed intelligence reporting linking him to attacks against US and Iraqi forces across the province. Nadim had been the imam of the Khulafa Mosque in Duluiyah, using his street cred as a self-proclaimed imam to rally the local Sunni youth (and coerce the Jabouri tribal leadership) into fighting both US forces and the Shia-dominated Iraqi Army units in the area.

When I returned to Iraq at the end of 2007, Nadim had essentially switched sides and was the leader of the local Sahwa group - actually living and working from an office on an American base. Although this was initially a tough pill for me to swallow, I recognized the need to work with historically unsavory characters to provide some measure of security. Unsurprisingly, attacks, violence, and intimidation dropped dramatically in the area as Nadim's group of 200-300 Awakening members continued to receive pay from US forces and then for a time from the national government. However, as time progressed and US forces began to shift their attention to other matters and the impending drawdown of troops; and when the Shia-dominated national government took over responsibility for maintaining the Awakening program (on 01 Apr 09), they began a deliberate campaign to weaken and dismantle Awakening groups across the country.

In April of 2009, Nadim was the target of a massive suicide vest attack, which missed harming him but ended up killing five locals and wounding 18, including one of Nadim's brothers. The attack was likely the work of AQI leaders who were upset that Nadim had switched sides and was now helping US and Iraqi forces target AQI. Only one month later on May 4, Nadim and two of his brothers were arrested by Iraqi Security Forces in what was a fairly blatant, sectarian attempt to limit the growing strength of Nadim's group - and to check his growing political power (he was a leading local candidate for provincial/national office within a small Sunni party). Within two months time, Nadim had been targeted by both sides (AQI and the Iraqi government) and with US forces drawing down, he had few people to turn to for support and protection.

Events like this are occurring all across Iraq as Awakening leaders and fighters are arrested, intimidated, and left with no pay. This situation has created a group of trained, armed men who are now extremely disillusioned and angry with the government and left with little or no options for redress. As Nadim explained in the most recent New York Times article:

“The Awakening doesn’t know what the future holds because it is not clear what the government intends for them...At this point, Awakening members have two options: Stay with the government, which would be a threat to their lives, or help Al Qaeda by being a double agents."

The situation is not likely to improve as the Shia consolidate power in Baghdad and continue to undercut any efforts by the Sunni to secure themselves (and their towns) or gain more power through legitimate political means. In my opinion, we are seeing a perfect storm come together that gives Sunnis few options but to turn back towards an insurgency against the Shia-controlled national government. Unless the Iraqis (hopefully with US help) can figure out a more effective power-sharing deal at the national level and determine a better system to reintegrate Awakening fighters and leaders back into the workforce in a fair and legitimate manner, the situation could spiral out of control quickly and move towards an all-out civil war.

Mobile Banking in Somalia

2010-10-20T14:48:00.001-04:00

Something tells me this has more to do with HSM getting their slice of the pie than how un-Islamic it is. Anyone have more particulars on this trend? I know it’s being used in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I’d assume many other Muslim nations. Tip of the hat to Bill Roggio at LWJ for finding this morsel.

AAFES Bans Video Game... Possible Punishment For Owning Medal of Honor?

2010-09-16T01:25:00.002-04:00

Somehow this little gem from last week slipped past me. Last week AAFES (Army & Air Force Exchange Service, the military’s version of Walmart) announced it was banning the new Medal of Honor video game set to be released next month from its stores and GameStop’s operating on Army and Air Force bases. Honestly, I’m really not into video games. But anyone that’s spent more than five minutes around a Soldier in the US Army will realize that the overwhelming majority of our Soldiers are. But again, taken at face value the banning of selling this game by AAFES is no big deal. Most Soldiers who want this game will just go off base to purchase the game. Another good link to see how Soldiers feel about this decision by AAFES is available here.

Again, not a “gamer”. And I realize that saying this is no big deal opens me up to all sorts of criticism. But I’ll go ahead and say it anyway, this is not a big deal. I have lost friends and close comrades overseas. The game is set during early 2002’s Operation Anaconda; and while OEF continues to trudge on, how is this any different than a video game of WWII, Korea, Vietnam or any other war game or shooter? And anyone stupid enough to think that a video game is really like actual combat is just that, stupid. I am yet to meet a single Soldier who joined the Army because combat looked pretty cool in a video game. Not saying it hasn’t happened, but I am yet to meet this person.

Here’s where it may get better. Today a good friend (who is very well connected) told me that certain bases will make having this game on base a punishable offense. Not like, you have to rake some leaves or mow some grass kind of punishment, but paperwork in your permanent file kind of punishment. I have no idea whether this is actually going to happen, but if anyone else has heard about this, feel free to share. I’ll provide updates to this post if anything changes here.

Also, if playing a video game as Team Muj is insensitive, reprehensible, etc., would the Army also be right to ban training like Mirror Image because you learn how to think and act like a terrorist/insurgent/Mujahideen?

What do you think?

Operation New Dawn or Yet Another Dawn?

2010-09-02T04:28:00.001-04:00

First off, it’s great to be back in the US. After nearly three years of deployed time in Iraq, I’m fairly confident this was my last trip there. Obviously, after devoting the better part of my 20’s to either prepping for a deployment, or actually deployed, I have a fairly vested interest in Iraq; and also the American perception of our efforts in Iraq. Over the last week, there has been a tremendous amount of coverage regarding the formal end of combat operations in Iraq yesterday, 31 August. Yesterday Operation Iraqi Freedom ended and today brought the first day of Operation New Dawn and a new USFI Commanding General. Having worked extensively with the Diyala Provincial Reconstruction Team, I gained a solid and comprehensive understanding of the way ahead in Iraq. For the most part, I am a fan; it’s not perfect but I am just happy the State Department is finally taking the lead in Iraq.

Back to the topic at hand, the major headline in the news has been the end of formal combat operations and a transition to Stability Ops today (here, here and here). The reality though is that we really transitioned to stability ops as a force preemptively in December 2008 when conventional forces were bound to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). After SOFA, our ability to execute offensive operations was severely hampered by the Iraqi Security Forces, and pretty much the entire Government of Iraq (GoI). The post-SOFA reality for US Forces is that it has become more dangerous to operate with each passing day as our intelligence assets are pulled further away from its most important asset, the host nation population. Without good Human Intelligence the rest of our “int’s” become weaker and our ground forces suffer exponentially.

The other significant news last week was 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s execution of the last “combat patrol” in Iraq, which in all reality was a ground movement of their Strykers to Kuwait for movement back to the States. 4-2 SBCT was the last Brigade Combat Team in Iraq; now all that’s left are Advise and Assist Brigades. I love a good re-branding. A bunch of extra Field Grade Officers added to a Brigade Combat Team does not significantly alter the fact that these Brigades are still combat formations.

The reality: next week will be the same as last week for those living and serving in Iraq. There is still a lot of work to be done in Iraq. There is a significant ongoing SOF counter-terror mission that should not cease any time soon; evidence can be seen here. A new Iraqi government is nowhere in sight. Corruption and graft continue to plague the country. There is work to be done but we need a willing partner moving ahead, something that has been missing in Iraq for a long time.

Misunderstanding Sets Back US-Pak Relations

2010-09-01T10:09:00.003-04:00

I had to share this amusing (but unfortunate) story involving the temporary detention and interrogation of a delegation of Pakistani officers at Dulles yesterday. Sadly, the incident highlights the fact that a misunderstanding and poor decision-making by a flight attendant and security guards can set back relations between two countries. Despite the billions of dollars we donate annually in aid to Pakistan (particularly in the wake of the recent flooding), this incident is being viewed within Pakistan as a major "humiliation" that resulted from the "paranoia permeating US airports."

From the Washington Post:

"A delegation of senior Pakistani military officials visiting the United States for a major defense conference headed home in protest Tuesday night after they said they were interrogated and rudely treated by security officials at Dulles International Airport.

The nine-member group of high-ranking Pakistani officers boarded United Airlines Flight 727 from Washington to Tampa late Sunday but were pulled off the plane after one of them "made a comment to a flight attendant," said Mike Trevino, a United spokesman.

United did not provide details, but Pakistani officials said the remark came from a general in the delegation who - weary of a long day of travel that began in Islamabad - said, "I hope this is my last flight," or words to that effect.

That sparked a call to Dulles law enforcement officials, who detained the delegation for 2.5 hours and refused to allow the officials to contact their embassy or the U.S. military officials who had invited them to visit, according to a Pakistani military official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Pakistanis were finally released after police at Dulles determined they did not pose a threat. But instead of proceeding to Tampa, the delegation was ordered to return to Pakistan by their military superiors in Islamabad, in protest of their treatment, the Pakistani official said, adding that they were "verbally abused." The group of officers spent the next 48 hours in Washington, waiting for the next available flight home, and were scheduled to depart the United States on Tuesday evening.

The Pakistani officers were originally en route to U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa to attend the annual conference of the U.S.-Pakistan Military Consultative Committee, said Maj. David Nevers, a Central Command spokesman. He said Centcom officials hoped to reschedule the conference."

Myopia: A commentary on military vogue

2010-08-30T16:17:00.002-04:00

Recently, a string of articles on the milblog www.smallwarsjournal.com (note 1) has unintentionally highlighted a weak-link in the philosophical chains that string together the concepts and skills of the military profession. At first glance the debate appears to be a parochial, all be it professional, dispute centered on the future of the Armor Corps of the US Army and broadly on the state of the Army's high-intensity combat skills. Written mostly by career Army combat arms officers (mostly teaching at West Point, incidentally) the debate at first glance resembles the spirit of the rather intense branch infighting that characterized the US Army of the 1930's with the introduction of the battle tank (note 2).

The tank of old threatened the primacy of the Infantry and sides were picked. There were conservative voices and liberal 'revolutionary' voices. There were also the moderate ones who seem to have won and integrated both for 60 yrs without accepting the absolutisms of the poles. The focus now is COIN, supposedly an innovation, and the effect it has on the high-intensity, heavy weapons tactical skills in the Army. Again, one side says COIN has atrophied them all but irrevocably while the other insists that the new environment is something to be embraced unequivocally as the status quo. And again, there are the moderates, like LTC Thomas J Weiss (note 3) that suggest a middle ground, a synthesis, is the way to go. Both debates seem to deal with a "newness" that was/is at once threatening the old order and yet could be on the cusp of revolution. However, the otherwise praiseworthy middle-ground article by LTC Weiss betrays the philosophical fallacy that underpins the whole debate by asking the question "...how best do we organize and train our forces for future conflict?" This assumption, that there is something new that is unparalleled and unknown. Something that is "future" is different than the "past" in some fundamental and as-yet unappreciated way, is atrophying something far more critical than a tactical skill set, the profession of arms.

In many ways it is the same mental trend that gripped the Officer Corps post-Vietnam and produced the likes of the Powell Doctrine. The idea that first, America in the future will have a say in the types of conflicts it fights and secondly (and most dangerously) that America has the ability to predict those conflicts with a certainty that will define its capabilities. In the past it led to the insistence that America will not be involved in low-intensity conflict (LIC) or insurgent actions, therefore we will only develop heavy forces. Indeed, that focus has allowed us to steam roll Iraq, twice. Instantly occupy Panama and Granada and otherwise sail and fly around the globe seemingly at will. On the other hand, that focus brought us the absolute misery of Iraq 2004-2009. We invented terminology like COIN and Asymmetrical Warfare and decided that we must win hearts-and-minds and decided that there was a spectrum to warfare to cope with our glaring deficiencies in occupation skill sets and that this is a "new, modern, future war". Yet all this simply betrayed the multi-generational failure of our Officer Corps to understand our profession and to confirm that it has not learned the lesson well at all.

The Roman army spent the better part of a millennium patrolling and administering the Empire, not fighting set piece battles. But when it could no longer mobilize for those battles it lost the Empire. Likewise, the British Empire mostly spent its time floating about and dealing with this insurgency or that, with a major war every few decades that required massive armies. History goes on ad nauseam with examples that show that perhaps 9 out of 10 man-years of the professional civilized soldier are spent patrolling and dealing with rebellion. In other words, LIC is the historical norm. The slight problem with that understanding however, is magnitude. While it may be that the US Army conducting LIC is actually the historical norm (Indian-Wars, Philippines, etc) when it is waged poorly it usually drains coffers and kills men. But in the end the failure rarely has any immediate dramatic impact on the civilization deploying those men. Fail in high-intensity, however, and you may well lose everything (a dynamic illustrated eloquently by LTC Weiss in his concluding statements).

Unlike the battle tank, which revolutionized warfare technologically, COIN is not an innovation but a technique. Read Machiavelli for examples. COIN is a technique that is available to every Prince, President and Viceroy to deal with a rebellion; one of several techniques and for our liberal, enlightened dispositions perhaps the most palatable. Pacification and more specifically control of the population is its ultimate goal however. If you are resorting to COIN it means you already have a rebellion, you already lost control.

The medical profession is expected to regard human biological welfare in all spheres to better the health of the people. The legal profession is expected to regard the interpretation and application of the law in all spheres to manage the formal relationships of the people. The military profession is and must be expected to understand and apply the “full spectrum of operations” to enforce the interests of the state it serves and this means being able to do so everywhere on the spectrum. A medical system that trains orthopedic surgeons while presuming cardiologists and neurologists to be not terribly necessary because of frequency of case types would reset 1000 broken bones but fail to save 100 lives. Would the profession be lacking in that case? I think so.

History is full of high intensity and low intensity conflict. To presume that the next 20 yrs will be fundamentally different than the last 5,000 in terms of human behavior is the height of hubris. Alexander II of Russia was assassinated by a secondary IED in 1881 after the primary failed. The Algerian rebellion used IEDs and civilian population attacks to drive out the French. The US pacified a culturally alien and hateful Japan after WWII. USAMGIK secured and westernized a culturally alien South Korea (including putting down internal, non communist, rebellions as necessary) while the Chinese tried the same in the North. And a resurgent German Army energized by a hypercharismatic leader started a world war and fought for 5 yrs against an alliance led by 3 titanic nations to the amazement of all involved. A professional Officer Corps would have recognized and internalized those lessons in order to fulfill its professional obligation to its society. Yet, these examples that are snow flakes on the iceberg of history are not taught to the Corps as a competency either pre-commissioning or post. Instead these issues are left to the musings of CGSC Colonels and academics, while the Lieutenants and Captains rarely go beyond learning how to react to running over a mine in predeployment, all the while being told that they are the ground pounding leaders of COIN.

Notes:

Note 1:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/the-death-of-the-armor-corps/; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/447-smith.pdf; http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/08/mostly-dead/

Note 2:

The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941. Harold R. Winton (Editor), David R. Mets (Editor)

Note 3:

. LtCol Thomas J. Weiss - Mostly Dead: Continuing the Discussion on the Reported Death of the Armor Corps, 26 Aug 2010

Greed and Grievance in Kandahar

2010-08-18T14:00:00.000-04:00

As the last US elements of the "Kandahar surge" assume battlespace in and around the city, we are at a critical juncture in the ISAF effort to establish what GEN Petraeus describes as an "oil spot" around Kandahar City and its environs. The daunting task of establishing this zone of security, governance, and prosperity falls on a combination of mostly US and Canadian soldiers and officers (from 2/101 ABN, 1/4 ID, and TF Kandahar). Rajiv Chandrasekaran's recent article in the Wash Post does an excellent job of highlighting the challenges that face these forces, drawing a comparison between the US efforts in Baghdad in 2006-07 and the ongoing efforts in Kandahar.

Ultimately, though, he concludes (accurately) that the dynamics at play in Kandahar are vastly different than they were in Baghdad. ISAF forces in Kandahar must convince a predominately Pashtun, Sunni populace (vice a split Sunni-Shia populace in Baghdad) that the "legitimate" elected government (and security forces) can provide for them and protect them from the murder and intimidation campaign of the Taliban. They must also convince them that this government (led by the figurehead Governor Tooryalai Wesa, the powerful and corrupt Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed Wali Karzai, and the competent but under-resourced Mayor Gulam Haider Hamidi) has the best interests of the local populace at heart - and are not using their positions to advance their personal/financial interests. This will not be an easy sell.

As we examine the situation in Kandahar, I believe it's extremely useful to consider the "greed vs. grievance" model that Tony Corn outlines in his recent Small Wars Journal article - "COIN in Absurdistan." Corn argues that the grievance-based COIN model that applied in Iraq cannot be accurately applied in Afghanistan in 2010. Instead, he claims that:

"Today, a good case could be made that the political divergences (Grievance) that once existed between the main protagonists (Kabul officials, regional warlords, Taliban of all stripes, not to mention Pakistani officials) have taken a backseat, and that a convergence of sorts has begun to emerge on a shared economic objective (Greed): milking the American cow for all it’s worth, and for as long as possible."

Most of the arguments and policy/strategy discussions we hear related to Afghanistan seem to default to the "grievance" model. For example, in his recent COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance (released Aug 1, 2010), most of GEN Petraeus' advice revolves around winning over the local populace by addressing their grievances (in terms of security, governance, and services) and building trust in ISAF and the GIRoA. Corn essentially argues that we're missing half of the picture if we're only considering this grievance-focused solution. We must also consider the alternative that many of the most prominent and powerful Afghans are in fact motivated by greed and opportunism. It is therefore in their interest to maintain the status quo of massive US and international spending that fuels the Afghan "rentier state" economy. As Ambassador Peter Galbraith explains:

"Americans view the war as a contest between the U.S.-backed Karzai government and the Taliban insurgency. The reality is more complex. In the Pashtun south where the insurgency is strongest, local power brokers and officials have relations with the Taliban, who are tribesmen and relatives. They make deals with each other to run drugs, trade weapons, eliminate rivals, and rig elections. Both sides collaborate in order to profit from massive U.S. expenditures. The U.S. spends hundreds of millions on Afghan security companies who use the proceeds to pay off the Taliban not to attack, or, in some cases, to stage attacks so as to enable the local warlord (a.k.a. security contractor) to hire more men at higher prices."

So, how should this reality inform (and change) our understanding of the complexities at work in Kandahar? As Corn explains (in what I view as the most important takeaway from his paper), we must view Hamid Karzai not as the Afghan president, but rather as the CEO of "Karzai Incorporated." From this lens, many of his recent and past actions make sense - repeatedly shielding various cronies from anti-corruption investigations and using his position as president to gain control of a greater share of foreign aid and increase his patronage. In Kandahar in particular, the situation described by Ann Marlowe appears to be spot on:

"Ahmed Wali Karzai is running a mafia out of Kandahar, and his brother Hamid Karzai is protecting him. This mafia is worth over a billion a year to him, if the Times of London is to be believed...In fact, it may no longer be the case that AWK does what he does in order to strengthen the hand of his brother: It may be that Hamid does what he does to strengthen the hand of AWK."

When you examine Hamid Karzai's recent decision to eliminate all private security companies (PSCs) through this "greed" lens it begins to make more sense. I believe this surprise announcement by Karzai is another move in his efforts to gain more leverage over ISAF leaders in his overall campaign to maintain his "bottom line" as leader of Karzai, Inc. When coupled with his recent criticism and challenging of the efforts of the US-backed Major Crimes Task Force and Special Investigative Unit, both of which have implicated several close associates of Karzai in massive corruption and money laundering schemes, his latest move to eliminate PSCs is likely motivated by two complimentary goals:

1) In the short term, to essentially "call the bluff" of ISAF leaders who constantly pressure Karzai to eliminate corruption. By speeding up the timetable for eliminating PSCs to four months, Karzai will force ISAF leaders to concede that PSCs are in fact necessary for success in Afghanistan (at least over the next 12-18 months as ANSF build capacity);

2) In the medium to long-term, to enable Karzai's government to exert more control over the private security efforts across the country - the competition to Karzai, Inc. Under Karzai's plan, his government would oversee all efforts to transition and integrate what are currently "private" companies into the formal Afghan security forces. Thus, Karzai Inc. would essentially determine which private companies continue to exist (albeit, now as nominal Afghan security forces) and which would not. This is the ultimate move to consolidate control of the security industry and eliminate competition.

Claims of confusion and outrage on the part of some of these private security companies, like the massive and powerful Watan Group that employs over 24,000 security guards, are in fact staged blustering to disguise the consolidation going on below the surface. Ahmad and Rashid Popal, owners of Watan, are actually cousins of Hamid and Ahmed Karzai and have a long history of cooperation and mutual interest. While their claims that security guards who lose their jobs will join the Taliban may at first seem to have merit, its much more likely that Watan will end up growing and gaining more power/influence (albeit likely under a different name or even as nominal ANSF). Whatever the public/official outcome, the Karzai enterprise stands only to gain through this consolidation of PSCs. For an excellent summary and analysis of this dynamic, please see Kim Kagan and Carl Forsberg's piece for the Institute for the Study of War, written at the end of May, that essentially predicted this move for consolidation.

Looking forward, US and ISAF strategy and policy must recognize this reality and integrate an understanding of the "greed" paradigm into our efforts. While addressing the grievances of the local populace is a critical component of our COIN campaign, we cannot become solely focused on achieving this end. As Tony Corn advocates, we must complement the ongoing tactical/operational military surge with a policy of coercive diplomacy at the strategic level. At the most basic level, coercive diplomacy would send the message (primarily to Karzai and his cronies) that our commitment is not open-ended and unconditional. This policy represents our best option to affect the growing influence and "greed" of Karzai, Inc. For a more detailed discussion of what this policy might look like at the national level, see the recent articles by Robert Blackwill in Politico (advocating a de facto partition of Afghanistan) and Richard Haas in Newsweek (advocating a "patchworkization" of Afghanistan).

So, what does this look like in Kandahar - the "main effort" in our current campaign? Ultimately, we must resolve the dissonance between Obama's policy of unconditional support for Hamid Karzai (and thus the larger Karzai enterprise) and the ISAF strategy of providing a lasting and comprehensive solution in Kandahar. As Corn succinctly explains, "either the policy is (rightly or wrongly) to consider Karzai as indispensable, in which case his Kandahar brother is untouchable, and a Kandahar offensive is a non-starter; or a Kandahar offensive is seen (rightly or wrongly) as the indispensable centerpiece of a COIN strategy, in which Karzai's brother has to go." This is not an easy choice - but we must make a decision. My vote: Ahmed Wali Karzai must go (or at least be heavily marginalized). By acknowledging and eliminating him as the primary source of "greed" in Kandahar, we have an opportunity to send a message to the people and at the same time eliminate a major source of many of their grievances.

A Business-like Strategy: Al-Qaeda & Al Shabaab

2010-06-08T11:02:00.008-04:00

I cherish those good 'ole days when my colleague Josh was around and posting every other day or so. (Hey Josh, keep trucking over there!). Remember the vibrant discussions we all had on the conglomerate vs. franchise model both here and over at SWJ. Let's revisit!

As the Washington Post reported today, "Foreign fighters gain influence in Somalia's Islamist al-Shabab militia." It is not by any means new to us that AQ's ideology is being imported at an increased pace into Somalia and other regions, such as Yemen. Al Sahwa discussed this months ago when Bill Roggio at LWJ reported that Al Shabaab merged with Ras Kamboni Camp.

The question is why. To embolden ASMM to fight Hizbul Islam? To prepare for the World Cup? (Here is an AEI Critical Threat's Project report assessing the threat of AQ during the World Cup, Charlie Szrom). No, this is simply short term.

Recently, US intelligence reports have estimated Al Shabaab to have approximately 200 fighters affiliated with AQ in southern Somalia. A franchise model holds that AQ wants to expand its business; "it has a great product to sell." A conglomerate model holds that AQ enables ASMM and encourages its success; "it believes in the mission/purpose of the movement and ability to excel."

If AQ senior leadership is beginning to take more of an armchair fighter, sort of a Chairman of the Board role, then it will seek to employ a collaborative campaign while maintaining consistency. This ensures the import of an ideology through a flatter hierarchy. The flatter hierarchy, in this case, imports also foreign fighters to improve operations. Is this an indication that Al Shabaab is weak, that it needs help, that it cannot figure out how to secure regional prowess? AQ wants its affiliate to grow because it grows as a result.

*This arguement is truly based on the assumption that AQ has the direct intention to recruit and deploy fighters to foreign areas.

Of course, we must also consider once again Ronfeldt's tribal paradigm . Is Somalia a pure example of a netwar (low-level conflict)? Regardless, it will escalate if we allow AQ's operational environments to expand.

Go ahead, ask me...Ok, yes, I do think AQ will pursue advancement of its operational environment through a business prism because it seeks to survive; it believes in both its mission (without a doubt that is the driving force) and its "product" (or as I say, dream of the Islamic State). The only way it approaches survival is by clinging to what it already has, which, in this discussion, is Al Shabaab.

The Start of a Counter Narrative Strategy

2010-06-01T09:56:00.001-04:00

*A successful Counter Narrative Strategy begins with a philosophical foundation for building and employing tactical and operational methods of engagement. My perspective is one of many, as I intend to push the envelope here in order to generate dialogue so that we may arrive at an optimal solution.

I encourage you to read John Brennan's full remarks (26 May, 2010) at CSIS, entitled "Securing the Homeland by Renewing American Strength, Resilience and Values."

In the first half of his speech, he pinpointed an aspect of an effective Counter Narrative Strategy (CNS) that I have spoken of in the past: Al-Qaeda, and for that matter, all affiliates, are not Islamic. I mean this literally.

The US and its allies can not benefit (socially or economically) from considering AQ's and AQAM's thought and action as Muslim in nature. Indeed, AQ's stance rests on a dis-illusionary system of motivation and justification that is insane and self-centered. If the AQ definition and practice of Islam is now and/or were to continue to be acceptable, their philosophy would remain on the spectrum as a religious choice. A CNS must (re)affirm that violence and oppression are not adequate and/or viable avenues of fulfillment, freedom, and happiness; that AQ is not a choice.

We commonly hear (correct) arguments that Islam is a religion of peace. AQ is the direct negation of this statement: AQ is a perverted pseudo-movement that seeks to advance a selfish agenda based on an apocalyptic illusion through violent means and propagandized messages. Forming an effective CNS requires the recognition of a two-pronged approach, which Brennan elaborated on in the spirit of President Obama's vision:
1. Fight al-Qaeda and AMs, particularly in targeting safe havens, to disrupt and dismantle operations;
2. Support Muslim communities, both home and abroad (but mainly home) to promote cultural and economic prosperity.

**Andrew Lebovich of the New America Foundation summarizes the main points well in his weekly Foreign Policy Legal War on Terror (LWOT) brief, as well as how it fits into the National Security Strategy (NSS).

The plan (as it remains a plan until strategically engaging in action) requires a wedding of military "hard" power and diplomatic "soft" power. (Here is a sound perspective on the uses of both powers by Angelo Codevilla at FPRI). Above all, such a strategy begs leaders to take an assertive, secure - not sensitive - stance on US values and traditions in order to facilitate the use of inter-disciplinary skills and employ multicultural tactics.

Instead of walking on egg shells, I propose speakingly directly about religion - a tactic that is not typically favorable, perhaps not to offend any one community or party. I believe AQ has already sparked a renaissance of collective thought; we simply have not utilized our joint strengths to synergize our action into a collective authority.

To aid senior-level decision makers, a CNS ought to follow these guidelines:
1. Identify the enemy.
Yes, Islamic extremism exists, but this is simply how we have come to describe it in relation to the phenomenon of religious-centered activity. By default, we use "Islamic" because that is what AQ seems to be. AQ leaders and followers are not Muslim simply because they invoke Allah and Muhammad.

In other words, I think we describe AQ, not define them. Often, the definitions we intermix represent Islam and Muslims, and do not adequately (and rightly) describe the ideology and operations of AQ and AMs. In this sense, a good offense is a good defense: The CNS will actively characterize AQ's worldview as insane and dis-illusionary.

An effective CNS re-formulates the understanding of AQ's goal in light of their worldview, not our understanding of AQ in relation to Islam. This means employing an accurate and dynamic understanding of Islam in order to juxtapose AQ's use of Islamic terms. In fact, their co-optation of terms to promote their cause and identify their enemy is precisely why they continue to be successful: From their inception, AQ has stood for something; all-the-while a "robust" and "diverse" debate has ensued both within Islam and in the West.

***The debate is in no way a negative thing. Indeed, we need intellectual debate. My concern, and frustration, lies with our inability to arrive at a conclusion in order to take action. We cannot debate and then not agree due to the nature of the issue at stake.

An effective CNS gets to the bottom line: It identifies the enemy in black and white terms. We have a choice to join together our authority, and it begins with the "Yes" or "No" answer in response to the question; "Is AQ Muslim?" Can we not agree to define AQ as not Muslim? The violent movement does not represent, foster, and/or promote any ounce of Islam.

****I have two more guidelines senior decision makers can consider, but will share them in a future thread. It is important to know that this conversation is already under way, as Malcolm Nance of SWJ and Abu Nasr of Challenge COIN have pressed for AQ to be defined as a cult movement. The points posited above can be strengthened by enlisting comparisons of other quasi-religious, pseudo-communities.

Honoring Our Fallen...

2010-05-31T00:37:00.011-04:00

Please take a moment today to remember and honor those who have given their lives for a greater cause...

Fallen Fighting Eagles (OIF)

SSG Dale A. Panchot - 17 Nov 03
CPT Eric T. Paliwoda - 02 Jan 04
CPL Walter B. Howard - 02 Feb 06
SSG Curtis T. Howard - 22 Feb 06
SGT Gordon F. Misner - 22 Feb 06
SPC Thomas J. Wilwerth - 22 Feb 06
SSG Marion Flint - 15 May 06
PFC Grant A. Dampier - 15 May 06
SSG Gary W. Jeffries - 28 Jan 08
SGT James E. Craig - 28 Jan 08
CPL Evan A. Marshall - 28 Jan 08
SPC Brandon A. Meyer - 28 Jan 08
PFC Joshua A. R. Young - 28 Jan 08
SGT Michael K. Clark - 07 Oct 08

You will never be forgotten...

Strike Fear!

Terrorism Trend Analysis

2010-05-25T07:47:00.000-04:00

We at al Sahwa have individually covered the recent spat of terror attacks inside the United States at length, see Nidal Hasan, Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab, and finally Faisal Shahzad. I think there may be an opportunity to accurately nail down the similarities and differences between these, and other cases, to effectively understand the current trend. All of the recent Terror attacks/plots can be traced back to three terror hot spots: Afghanistan/Pakistan (AfPak), Yemen, and Somalia.

Yemen

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad killed one soldier and wounded a second at a Little Rock Arkansas recruiting station on Jun 1, 2009. The NEFA Foundation reports that Muhammad traveled to Yemen in September of 2007 to teach English. He married a local resident of Sana'a, overstayed his visa, and was arrested on November 14, 2007 in possession of a Somali passport. Mohammad's family, the Bledsoe's (Mohammad changed his name in 2006), with the help of Tennessee State Legislators pressured Yemen, who deported Muhammad back to the United States on Jan. 2008.

Muhammad stated the reasons for targeting the recruiting station was a direct result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. His road to radicalization has some interesting connections. Muhammad changed his name and converted to Islam after being exposed to Islam on a college campus. The NEFA foundation reports that Muhammad spent some time, between 2006-7, at a Columbus Ohio mosque, that was also frequented by convicted terrorists, Nuradin Abdi, Iyman Faris, and Christopher Paul. While Muhammad is directly link to Yemen due to his travels, the mosque that Muhammad frequented in Ohio had convicted terrorists with ties to Afghanistan (Faris and Paul) and Somalia (Abdi). ABC reports that Muhammad visited the Damaj Institute in Yemen, a known Islamic School that radicalizes individuals, to include John Walker Lindh.

Nidal Hasan killed 13 US soldiers and wounded over 30 at Fort Hood on November 5, 2009. Nidal Hasan had ties to the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Virginia. It is reported that Hasan attended this mosque at the same time as two the the 9/11 hijackers, while radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki was the main preacher. While Nidal Hasan did not personally travel to Yemen, it is clear that he maintained contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, who is a key member of AQAP. Nidal Hasan's radicalization is directly connected to Yemen.

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas day, 2009. Abdulmutallab made several trips to Yemen between August and December of 2009. Anwar al-Awlaki also had a hand in Abdulmutallab's radicalization. ABC recently posted a video of Umar at a training camp in Yemen.

AfPak

Najibullah Zazi and Zarein Ahmedzay were arrested in connection with an attempted to attack the NYC subway system, in September 2009. Zazi, an Afghani, traveled to North Waziristan on his way to join the Afghanistan Taliban back in 2008. The New York Times reports that Zazi never made it to Afghanistan, instead he met with Saleh al-Somali and Rashid Rauf. At the time both personalities were key members of Al Qaeda to include the leader of AQ External Operations cell, responsible for attacks outside the AfPak region. For some excellent reads on both check out the LWJ's reporting, Saleh al-Somali EKIA Dec 8 and Rashid Rauf.

Faisal Shahad attempted to detonate a VBIED in Times Square on May 1, 2010. It is still to early to accurately know everything about this event; but we do know that Faisal traveled to North Wasiristan back in July, 2009. There are initial reports that Faisal Shahad received training from the TTP.

Somalia

While no known terror plots/attacks, originating from Somalia, have occurred inside the United States; it is my belief, as well as Josh's belief (who is currently out fighting the good fight), that it is only a matter of time before we see a Faisal Shahad scenario with Somali ties. There are several stories describing Somali-American's disappearing and later turning up in al Shabaab camps. Even more disturbing than Americans traveling to al Shabaab training camps, is al Shabaab, working through a man named Anthony Joesph Tracy, smuggling up to 270 illegal Somali immigrants into the United States.

The Current Trend

There are some similarities that are worth highlighting between the five terror plots/attacks described above concerning: targets, method of attack, and the personalities conducting the attacks.

Targets: Plots and attacks that originate from the AfPak region focus on New York City as their primary target. The terror plots/attacks originating from Yemen do not seem to have the same geographical focus as the AfPak attacks. AfPak attacks strictly target civilians while 2 out of 3 Yemen attacks targeted the US Military.

Method of Attack: All attacks originating from the AfPak region continue to revolve around the "Spectacular Attack" using explosives. It is interesting to note that the only two successful attacks originating from Yemen used firearms, while every unsuccessful attack involved explosives.

Terrorist Profile: The are two primary similarities between all of the terrorist attackers, they are Muslims, and they are Americans with proper identification. The days of sneaking 19 hijackers into the United States may be over (until complacency sets in), so the primary terror facilitators (AQ, AQAP, TTP) have resorted to using Americans who can travel legally through the United States. This is clearly the most effective way to circumvent our homeland security apparatus.

Final Thoughts: The AfPak facilitators may decide that the spectacular attack is too difficult to pull off and opt for the Yemen approach, a simple firearm attack. The better our Homeland Security is at thwarting bomb attacks, the more viable the active shooter scenario becomes. Any American who visits Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan or Somalia has to be considered a threat to our homeland security and monitored to the best of our ability. Finally, we can no longer view groups such as AQAP, TTP, al Shabaab, and AQIM, as simply a localized version of AQ proper focused solely on targeting their host nation. The TTP is a great example, they almost exclusively attacked Pakistani targets up until their leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a drone strike last summer. Now they are actively targeting the United States, something that was unimaginable to our security apparatus two months ago. Al Shabaab has not targeted our homeland yet, but they have all the pieces needed to conduct an attack. Al Shabaab has training camps and access to Somali-Americans who can travel throughout the United States legally. They also have the motive to do it, we target their leaders just like we target the TTP's, albeit with less frequency.

It is clear that the current terror trend is to use Muslim-Americans who can be radicalized, trained, and travel throughout the United States. Look for this trend to continue to grow.

Emerging Threats Series: Concealed Cruise Missiles

2010-05-04T09:39:00.002-04:00

This is the second installment of al Sahwa's Emerging Threats Series, which is designed to identify a future threat to our Nation's security and offer plausible solutions to counter the threat.

A Russian defense contracting company, Concern Morinformsystem-AGAT, unveiled a prototype weapon system at the 12th Defense Services Asia Conference (April 19-22, 2010). The prototype weapon system is a cruise missile system concealed in a standard 40 foot shipping container, see their promotional video here.

The Club-K missile system is reported to be able to launch the 3M-54TE, 3M-54TE1, and the 3M-14TE cruise missiles. To get an idea of what their capabilities are, you can read up on the 3m-14 specs here. The missiles come in two varieties, anti-ship and ground attack. From the video, their current model has a one man control station at the front of the container.

After watching the video, it is clear that Concern Moreinformsystem-AGAT is marketing their prototype to anyone who views the United States Military as a clear and present danger. The reported price tag for one Club-K container is $20 million, and CM-AGAT spokesmen state their system will be built to order, in an attempt to alleviate fears that a non-Nation State actor could purchase their system outright. This weapon system is undoubtedly something most nations would be interested in adding to their home defense arsenal. Iran already has a plethora of anti-ship missiles; however, this would be a great addition to Iran's strike options, considering this system would have a high chance of surviving a preemptive strike. Another nation that has a history of purchasing Russian weapon systems is Venezuela. This weapon system could complicate difficult situations as the recent Venezuela/Columbia spat. It is obvious that having a concealed cruise missile weapons system would force the US to be more cautious in future use of boots on the ground, but what about transnational terror threats?

CM-AGAT claims their methods of sale will ensure terror organizations won't be able to purchase their weapon. While it is true that al Qaeda won't buy this weapon system from CM-AGAT out right, I think we have to recognize that nations like Iran have no qualms in providing groups like Hamas and Hezbollah weapons. The primary limiting factor for a terror organization utilizing this system is most likely the satellite navigation system. A non-Nation State organization would probably need access to a Nation State's satellite infrastructure, although this is strictly a personal assumption. I think it is important to "white board" some worst case scenarios.

Iran could complicate any blockade option by using this weapon system as a hedge against our ability to target their known anti ship missile systems. While other anti-ship missiles have a longer range, this system could be loaded onto a ship trying to run through a blockade or be used along their coast line. Thankfully our Navy has a sophisticated anti-missile defense capability, but what about other nations who may take part in a future blockade?

This weapon system could wreak havoc in the Malacca Strait where 30% of the World's trade and over 50% of the World's oil pass through yearly. I think the primary threat would be a ship launched missile from nations other than Malaysia and Indonesia since it would be bad for business. Robert Kaplan, in an article written for the Foreign Policy Magazine, called the Malacca Strait, "the future Fulda Gap. A weapon system such as the Club-K, will only add instability to a flash point such as this.

Piracy has already shown its ability to hijack ships carrying weapons, seen here. Since this weapon is housed in a shipping container, it automatically makes this a prime possibility for sale to a transnational terror organization, through piracy. Again, I do not know the true feasibility of use for such a weapon, due to the navigation system, but do we want to bet a future conflict that transnational terrorism could not operate the Club-K missile system?

Finally, this weapon's portability highlights our Homeland Security's weak underbelly. Homeland Security reports that in 2006, over 32,000 containers arrived at American ports daily. They also state that 86% of all containers are subjected to their pre-screening process. It is not stated, and rightly so, what exactly their screening process entails. It is important to highlight that the most basic screening methods would identify a system such as the Club-K; however, by the Homeland Security's own admission, roughly 4,500 containers that land in America daily are not screened at all. As we have seen in our airport security, the screening process doesn't always work, and that is when 100% of the people are screened to some extent. In a given year, over 1.6 million containers enter the United States unscreened. What if just one Club-K system slips through? The manufacturer could create a remote launch option as well as pre-programed flight paths. Washington D.C is well within range of the Club-K missile system delivered to the Newport News port area. It wouldn't even need to leave the shipping yard.

I don't think we could accurately keep tabs on every Club-K system built in Russia and shipped abroad. The best deterrence for us is to continue to improve our screening process of shipping containers, both in the United States and at their point of departure. The current missile defense proposal is not designed to stop a system such as the Club-K. Improving port security is currently our best option.

From Pakistan to Times Square?

2010-05-03T01:03:00.013-04:00

As usual, Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has some excellent exclusive coverage of the latest claims made by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). In a video recently posted to YouTube (and since removed), Qari Hussein Mehsud - one of the TTP's top explosives experts - took "full responsibility for the recent attack in the USA."

Mehsud explained that "this attack is a revenge for the great and valuable martyred leaders of the mujahideen"- listing Baitullah Mehsud (killed in August 09), Abu Umar al Baghdadi (AUAB), and Abu Ayyub al Masri (AAM).

Additionally, the TTP sent a videotape and audiotape to the Long War Journal that were intended to serve as proof of life for Hakimullah Mehsud, who was initially thought to be killed in an airstrike in January. In the video (produced on 04 April), Mehsud specifically warned of impending attacks in the US, saying "The time is very near when our fedayeen will attack the American states in their major cities...and god willing we will give extremely painful blows to the fanatic America."

Although it's impressive that the TTP's media wing (Umar Studios) was able to so quickly capitalize on the failed attack in Times Square, I believe it's unlikely that the Pakistan-based group was actually responsible. My primary reasoning for this assessment is the method/TTP employed in the attack - which has been reported as a very crude device made of 3x propane tanks, 2x jugs of gasoline, dozens of M-88 firecrackers, and a metal gun case holding 100x lbs. of fertilizer (which police said was incapable of exploding). The only possible explanation for the TTP using such a crude bomb would be that is served as a "test run" to gauge our response/reaction prior to one or more follow-on attacks with more sophisticated devices.

Looking forward, it will be critical for NYPD and federal officials to conduct a detailed exploitation of all evidence (videotapes, detonation device, biometrics, etc.) to determine who was actually responsible. Unfortunately, I believe this attack could mark the beginning of what I predict will be a series of VBIEDs that will strike targets across the US in the coming months/years. The increased use - and success - of the VBIED TTP in both Iraq and Afghanistan by Al Qaeda and affiliated groups (and in several other areas where the group operates) makes it almost inevitable that we'll see this TTP migrate to the US.

Exploiting the Rift in Taliban Leadership

2010-04-26T11:13:00.011-04:00

As I discussed in a previous post, it appears that there may be a potential rift developing among the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban. Last month, the Taliban officially announced their plan to replace Taliban Deputy Leader (and de facto leader of day-to-day operations) Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar with two different individuals - an unusual move that prompted many to question the decision of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. According to multiple reports, all military operations would be overseen by Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir (for more on him, see my previous post here) and all logistics/support operations would be the responsibility of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor.

A recent article in the UK's Times Online provided additional insight into this developing rift, quoting sources within the Taliban and on the ground in Afghanistan who have confirmed the growing tensions within the Taliban's Inner Shura (top council of leaders). According to a tribal elder in Southern Afghanistan with strong links to the insurgency, "When Mullah Baradar was arrested, Mullah Mansoor thought he would be his replacement...when Zakir was introduced as the defense minister, [Mansoor] was disappointed." According to the report, this resentment has caused a bitter power struggle between the two, forcing subordinate commanders to choose sides. Mullah Mansoor, who was appointed as the Kandahar province shadow governor in 2007, felt he was the logical choice to run all military operations in the Southern region. He reportedly asked the Taliban's leadership council for military control of Helmand and Kandahar after Baradar was detained, but his efforts were blocked by Mullah Zakir and his supporters. Zakir, who is also from Helmand province (and spent several years detained at Guantanamo Bay) and has a reputation as a brutal and aggressive fighter, replied that, "I'm the defense minister. I control all of Afghanistan, we should work together."

As US and ISAF forces continue shaping operations in preparation for an offensive in Kandahar, it will be critical for us to take advantage of this growing rift within the Taliban's ranks. US and partner ISAF forces should make this a major information operations (IO) theme and interweave it within both their lethal and non-lethal operations. During key leader engagements (KLEs) and shuras, leaders should draw attention to the feud, gain more information about it, and highlight the fact that Taliban leaders are only out for themselves and care little about the people of Afghanistan. If the results of the poll quoted above are truly representative of the people's sentiment in Kandahar, then we have a long way to go in terms of discrediting the Taliban. The rift theme should also be heavily played upon in IO products to support our lethal targeting and exploitation operations - making a concerted effort to leave stay-behind fliers/leaflets and spread the word that different leaders and commanders are turning on each other and providing information to US forces. This will help to exacerbate the already-existent feud and increase paranoia across the organization. I've seen firsthand how effective this can be in dividing insurgent organization and creating additional targeting opportunities for US and partner forces.

International Fusion Centers: Are They Possible?

2010-04-23T14:46:00.009-04:00

*This post is not as well-researched as I would like it to be. Rather, it is more of a "stream of consciousness" of what I am thinking and how I am envisioning the end goal. It is an activity in both inner-dialogue and discussion with the reader.

Introduction
This is an "idea of the day," so please share your insights as they percolate or simply bring me back to earth on this one. Either way, a forum-style platform to generate innovative ideas - or re-visit old ones - is how organizational structures and stragetic developments like this begin to manifest themselves.

In the midst of fighting a global war on terrorism, which we may de-construct to understand - according to one theory - as increasingly decentralized in nature, our intelligence collection apparatus and conjoining skills are prime. In short, intelligence enables decision-makers to drive operations, both on a domestic scale with criminal investigations and an international scale with combined arms.

Domestic
As we are well aware, we were comforted once again in the wake of Abdulmutallab's underpants attempted-bombing to learn that our intelligence collection methods are solid but were frightened to learn that our intelligence sharing across the board did not produce. As a direct result, and rightfully so, there continues to be an increasing focus on strengthening intelligence-sharing protocols, procedures, and processes because of the threat that "there will be more like [Abdulmutallab]."

For further in-depth reading of creating structures for intelligence sharing, you can read a report by the Heritage Foundation, which called back in 2002 to institute a federal department under the control of the President to "confront the blizzard of information" for the purpose of identifying, tracking, monitoring, and responding to suspected terrorists and actual terrorist activity(ies).

An initiative has followed, now under the leadership of the DOJ, known as the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, to set-up successful fusion centers accessible by the DHS, FBI, and HHS, amongst others, in support of domestic criminal investigations, including terrorism. Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Public Safety, and the Private Sector act as stakeholders who "embody the core of collaboration" by working with effective tools to do more with less "as demands increase and resources decrease."

*The DOJ would greatly benefit from, as they may already be, the DHS' Global Terrorism Database - housed at the University of Maryland - that examines intelligence on domestic and international case events. Just as with, for example, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) while mobile on the ground, how the "user" decides with the intelligence provided determines the success or failure of the mission.

I agree with the idea of this institution, but think that a real-time issue is the actual task of building trusted relationships. That which we certainly agree on, namely, to dynamically examine the terrorist puzzle, can be systematically successful if we master a comprehensive method of collaboration that willingly puts the pieces together. The promise lies in the fact that we have already the best minds and acquired skills. Training (of the user) is essential.

International
Given these preliminary considerations (which I encourage you to either approve of and add to or tackle and dismiss), I think it is valuable to begin with many similar constructs such as "building trusted relationships" while recognizing the obvious constraints of a) compromising intelligence and/or b) endangering lives (which are in this case, nations and/or nations' agencies). One perspective I have held is that intelligence sharing and therefore the intelligence fusion is grounded in "relationship sharing," what is understood generally as social networking - a primary business term - but is meant here as locating "who" knows "what" information. Successful collaboration, as mentioned above, will ensure (at least to a higher degree than before) a successful exploitation of data.

In order to achieve mission-critical objectives, the "relationship" must be protected in order to establish long-term trust, as intelligence that is shared may not lead to the end but only be one step towards putting more pieces together. Applying this understanding to an international framework, can fusion centers maximize intelligence by building and maintaining trustful relationships with nation governments and intelligence agencies? In other words, because the terrorist activity(ies) happens on a global scale does the intelligence community need to create international structures, concretely or in TTP's, to provide a solution to the morphing problem? If nations can share relationships, the idea is that intelligence will be more timely, accurate, and useful in relation to the problem.

If so, it seems an international fusion center (remember, this is in a perfect world) requires first the solid development of partnerships between major players, a go-to list of who can help and how. I think it is wise to center our effort on the stakeholders in the Middle East, in two categories (which I think are obvious):
Group A
Britain
France
Germany
Spain

Group B
Afghanistan
Iraq
Pakistan
Israel
Saudi Arabia
India

In contrast, we must decide who the major antagonists are, who may be grouped together. Iran, of course, comes to mind, which would then include Venezuela. On the table for further discussion is both Russia and China, who in philosophy are competitors that will certainly not be willing to share (any bit of) intelligence but are key economic brokers in the Middle East.

Concluding Thoughts
Lastly, before I leave this post to the wolves for shredding (for positive growth), I think an aspect of our stragetic planning needs to include the formulation of a) incentives for partners to involve themselves and in good, consistent manner and timely fashion as well as b) consequences and punishments for i) partners who do no share according to terms and/or breach trust and ii) competitors who seek to or succeed in disrupting, dismantling, and defeating the fusion process.

Once again, I think the main question is as I stated: "Because terrorist activity(ies) happens on a global scale does the intelligence community need to create international structures, concretely or in TTP's, to provide a solution to the morphing problem? There you have it; no more thinking for the rest of my Friday evening.

Lethal Targeting in Iraq; Success on an Unprecedented Scale

2010-04-22T12:12:00.006-04:00

I think "WE" at al Sahwa would be remiss if we didn't try to put into perspective the recent lethal targeting events in Iraq. I will take a crack at it and hopefully the rest of the gang will fill in the blanks, as we have learned through trial and error, intelligence is always more accurate when it is a group effort. I will link many of the personalities to the LWJ because, as always, Bill Roggio does an impeccable job at providing detailed backgrounds on the myriad of targets.

We in the military largely fail at providing the media with timely facts about our operations under the guise that it will hinder operational success. While this statement is true, it hinders the media's ability to accurately report on our successes (which I will cover in depth later). A side note to this; the military often withholds information from successful operations for days and even weeks, because it often takes a while for our enemies to realize a key personality was killed or captured, thus giving us a golden opportunity to do more damage to a terrorist network.

By now, many of you, know the history of AQs beginnings in Iraq so I will try to cover only the important points. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the face most recognized in association with Al Qaeda in Iraq and is the best place to start when covering the history of lethal targeting in Iraq. Zarqawi, like many Jihadists of his time, got his roots in Afghanistan. What separated Zarqawi from the other Jihadists was his reported refusal to swear fealty to OBL at the time (pre-9/11). Zarqawi infiltrated Northern Iraq in April of 2003 and formed his first terror organization, Taheed wal Jihad (TWJ). Zarqawi's clout continued to grow swelling TWJ ranks from 1500 in 2003 to over 5,000 by mid to late 2004. Zarqawi attracted many talented Jihadists to include Abu Ayyub al-Masri (remember that name), who was reported to be an expert bomb maker. Around October of 2004, Zarqawi pledged fealty to OBL and TWJ merged into al Qaeda in Iraq. Our Government added the modifier Z on the end to signify who AQI was led by, AQIZ. AMZ was undoubtedly the largest thorn in our side from October 2004 until his death in June 2006. Zarqawi was so aggressive that even bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote letters personally telling AMZ to tone his sectarian agenda down because it was beginning to detract from AQ's overarching road map to the Caliphate. Once Zarqawi was eliminated the AQ leadership had to appoint his successor.

Ayman al-Zawahiri (AQ #2) knew that AQI's reputation was damaged under Zarqawi's rein and chose a successor that he could trust to refocus AQI. He chose Zarqawi's expert Egyptian bomb maker, Abu Ayyub al-Masri (AAM).

It was during this transition period that the leadership of AQ and AQI understood that there had to be an Iraqi face to their organization in order to bridge the rift caused between Zarqawi's foreign fighters and their Iraqi counterparts. They decided on the face below, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.

Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (AUAB) was the purported leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the al Qaeda front organization. The lines between groups often blurred but I drew the distinction of calling Iraqi insurgent members, ISI, and foreign fighters as members of AQI. There were a lot of reports in open source media that claimed AUAB was captured, killed, or was a fictitious personality created by AAM. One aspect of AQI/ISI was certain; both AAM and AUAB were not as directly involved with the day to day terror operations to the extent AMZ operated. There were reports circulating that at times, AAM was not even in the country. I think this explains why AAM and AUAB were able to last almost 2 years longer in office than AMZ.

So, if AAM and AUAB were not as aggressive in the day to day leadership of AQI as AMZ, how was AQI still able to maintain such a high Op tempo? Enter Abu Qaswarah and a host of other Wali's. Abu Qaswarah was the Emir of AQI in Northern Iraq until his death on October 5, 2008. He was active in directing terror attacks throughout Northern Iraq similar to how Zarqawi directed AQIZ. I think Abu Qaswarah's death is another example of how Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's rein of terror directly affected the U.S. Military's approach to public affairs relations. Throughout 2005 and up to June of 2006, scarcely a week would go by that Zarqawi's face wasn't plastered all over the news, mocking the American military's ability to capture one lone terrorist amidst over a hundred thousand military personnel operating in the country. From this experience, I think we are 1) afraid to highlight personalities that we are targeting for fear of looking inept to catch them and 2) unwilling to help certain individuals gain recognition through the media that could help bolster our enemy's recruitment (which I do believe is a valid point). The byproduct of this relationship is the American public largely doesn't understand what an immense victory it was to kill Abu Qaswarah, pictured below.

I don't have any hard evidence to back up my claim, but I believe that AAM and AUAB delegaded the day to day operational responsibility to individuals like Abu Qaswarah in an attempt to distance themselves from becoming our targeting focus. It is not a wise career choice to be America's public enemy #1. If AAM and AUAB relegate themselves to providing long term direction and cut themselves out of the day to day terror decision making process, then any intel collected on objectives would not directly point the Coalition Forces to their whereabouts.

This brings us to the lethal targeting events starting in January 2010 to the present day. January 5, 2010 A joint operation resulted in the death of the Wali of Northern Iraq (Abu Qaswarah's old position), Abu Na'im al Afri, and the detention of the Admin Emir, a high level Sharia Emir, and the Detainee Affairs Emir. A roll up of the entire operation resulted in 2 AQI killed and 21 detained.

January 28, 2010 A joint raid led to the death of Abu Khalaf, AQI most senior foreign fighter facilitator. Abu Khalaf was historically based in Syria; however, the successful round of targeting from Jan. 5th probably forced Abu Khalaf to assume a more active leadership role within Iraq. The death of Abu Khalaf was a major blow to AQI, due to his knowledge and expertise in funneling foreign fighters into Iraq.

April 1, 2010 A series of joint raids in March resulted in the deaths of AQI's overall leader in Northern Iraq, Shaykh Khalid, economic security emir (financial), Abu Marwa, and the overall military emir of Mosul, Abu Huda. In addition to the deaths, the security forces also detained several key personalities from the extortion (financial/security) lines. One, the captured oil emir, being a former AQI leader in the al Anbar province.

April 7, 2010 Two more joint operations removed overall military emir in charge of Mosul and one of his subordinates, the East side military emir.

April 19, 2010 Undoubtedly the greatest lethal targeting success since Abu Qaswarah and Zarqawi before him, a joint operation lead to the death of Abu Ayyub al-Masri (AAM) and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (AUAB), along with AAM top assistant and AUAB's son at AAM safe house.

April 20, 2010 Yet another joint operation leads to the death of the AQI Northern Emir, Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al Ubayd, who was in a position to potentially be AQI's interim leader until OBL and Zawahiri can officially name a successor.

It is clear that the AQI senior leadership is in complete disarray since they lost their top two leaders and the third highest position, Emir of Northern Iraq, has turned over at least three times, possibly a fourth if you account for Abu Khalaf. It may seem that we are having an amazing streak of luck in regards to our lethal targeting success; however, that is simply not the case. With lethal targeting, you create your own luck through countless hours of due diligence, and successful targeting often begets additional successful targeting through proper exploitation. The final point I want to highlight is how successful targeting forces AQ leadership to "come up on the net" and chose successors instead of directing from the shadows. I have little doubt in my mind that the three AQI Northern Emirs killed prior to the AAM/AUAB raid directly led to their deaths, because they were the only personalities that could name the deceased's successor. The exploitation from the AAM/AUAB objective probably led to the 4th AQI Northern Emir's death 48 hours later. The most significant aspect of AAM's death is that it will cause Ayman al-Zawahiri to end his communication blackout that started in December of 2009 to appoint AAM's successor. This will most likely take the form of sending a courier to Iraq with instructions from corporate. I hope Ayman's courier understands we are creating our own luck on an unprecedented scale right now.

Global Engagement Directorate: Islamic Extremism

2010-04-20T13:11:00.009-04:00

Are the men in the picture above Islamic extremists? How we define them greatly impacts how we engage them, fight them, and (as we have seen with the politically-driven debates about KSM) legally bring them to justice. Of my concern here is how to engage, as Professor Dan Kuehl of the National Defense University commented on a previous post of mine, in an effective counter narrative strategy to overcome the sway of AQ/affiliate ideology.

On 26 May, 2009, President Obama in an official White House announcement entitled, "Statement by the President on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism," prioritized how the White House should be organized to deal with the critical issues of homeland security and counterterrorism. The last of the five decisions created and instituted the Global Engagement Directorate, a new initiative "to drive comprehensive engagement policies that leverage diplomacy, communications, international development and assistance, and domestic engagement and outreach in pursuit of a host of national security objectives, including those related to homeland security."

Peter Feaver of Foreign Policy's Shadow Government Blog on 27 May, 2009, wrote that the GED would give the Administration an "equity stake" in comprehensive engagement. He also found himself asking what exactly this means internationally: "Will it be a major player on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan...that could benefit from a more seamless integration of communications, aid, diplomacy, and domestic outreach? Is there room for general policy formulation in this area, or is this a quintessentially "operational" matter?" Domestically, does this mean advancing an agenda based on human rights and non-discrimination in aiding community outreach and coalition building?

The Administration's choice to discontinue the use of the term, "Islamic extremism," is understood to strenghten their ability to leverage diplomacy on both the international and domestic levels because it, in theory, communicates the right message to the Muslim community worldwide that America is not at war with Islam (per his Cairo speech). The question remains: What is the benefit?

Perhaps Feaver would agree with my perspective that GED most likely determined that the discontinuation of certain religious-focused language would not enable the Administration to establish equity with Muslim partners both domestically and abroad nor promise to comprehensively engage geo-strategic governments in the Middle East. Yes, "Diplomacy works better the more informed we are about the other [government's] intentions and capabilities;" moreover, warfare is successful when one accurately defines who the enemy, in this case in relation to religious co-optation.

We should re-visit the National Security Decision Directive on U.S. International Information Policy, issued in 1984 (NSC-NSDD-130), relating to both international and domestic information strategies, which states:
"The fundamental purpose of U.S. international information programs is to affect foreign audiences in ways favorable to U.S. national interests. Such programs can only be credible and effective by respecting accuracy and objectivity. At the same time, the habits, interests, expectations and level of understanding of foreign audiences may differ significantly from those of the domestic American audience, and require different approaches and emphasis in the selection and presentation of information. While U.S. international information activities must be sensitive to the concerns of foreign governments, our information programs should be understood to be a strategic instrument of U.S. national policy, not a tactical instrument of U.S. diplomacy. We cannot accept foreign control over program content."

The Administration seems to be pragmatically calculating its rhetoric to achieve their strategic objectives, aiming to appease foreign audiences through the tactical instrument of diplomacy rather than comprehensively engage with governments according to a strong U.S. national security policy. It seems also that the discontinuation of terminology coincides (somewhat) with new rhetoric and action that seeks to advance the Cairo "groundwork" in a global campaign to promote entrepreneurship. Pradeep Ramamurthy, Senior Director for GED who will be hosting Muslim business leaders from more than 40 countries this month for an entrepreneurship summit, proposed the central question, “Do you want to think about the U.S. as the nation that fights terrorism or the nation you want to do business with?’’

In short, both; but it is important to re-iterate that the U.S. does not view Muslim nations through the prism of terrorism specifically.

The point is that changing the rhetoric or not using the terminology, as was done with the report on Nidal Hasan (Protecting the Force: Lessons From Fort Hood), and is expected in a forthcoming report "spelling out the country’s national security strategy plan" does not lessen the problem of Islamic extremism. In fact, discontinuing the terminology does not alter the fact that extremists seek to disrupt and dismantle U.S. economic and legal practices both internationally and domestically.

Islamic extremism exists.* The issue we should be debating is how to use right-minded religious-focused information in our narrative to adequately understand the enemy's co-optation and strategically combat AQ and affiliate's motivation and ideology. The difficult task is agreeing on the meaning of who we are collectively and what we ought to do and how so in reflection of our shared values/traditions. The projection of our values, of course, must comprehensively counter that of AQ/affiliates. In this sense, a good offense is a good defense, but the important aspect of the narrative is that we in fact go on the offense in terms of our religious/cultural, political, and socio-economic beliefs and practices.

*Persons repeatedly raise the rhetorical question of whether or not Islam is a peaceful religion. The answer is, once again, as always, a resounding yes. To continue to ask the question, though, highlights the very fact that analysts and professionals alike have not sufficiently convinced persons in both a quantifiable and qualitative manner.

But Sebastian Gorka has already said almost everything I have been trying to in this post:
"In the culture of Islam, the question of a leader's authenticity is paramount. Bin Laden and those who follow his Salafi worldview must be delegitimized. After the debacle that was strategic communications under the last administration, Washington must formulate a marginalization policy. A lead agency must be empowered by the White House, and it must coordinate a whole-of-government message that focuses primarily on the vast number of Muslim victims of terrorism, of al Qaeda's brand of terrorism. The United States should focus less on concepts such as democracy and more upon the bloody reality that is the result of al Qaeda's ideology. The United States will then soon discover that it is far easier to make al Qaeda and bin Laden look illegitimate and truly evil than it is to make everyone love America."

What I have attempted to add specifically is the value of appropriately detailing religious language as an aspect of an over-arching information strategy to overcome the "evil" of AQ's ideological pursuits. Our national security policy ought to recognize how effective such "marginalization" rhetoric can be in light of the GED's commitment to leveraging diplomacy, communications, international development, domestic engagement and outreach to secure our freedoms and maintain our security. The move would not back away from the enemy or diminish our national policy but engage Islamic extremism by defining its followers for what they rightfully are.

Once more, if I haven't made the point clear: We need more religiously-minded analysts to help in objectively tailoring a counter narrative strategy that directly engages the enemy.

Abu Ayyub al Masri AND Abu Omar al Baghdadi EKIA?

2010-04-19T11:08:00.004-04:00

Short post before I drop a more in-depth Iraq update tomorrow. Abu Ayyub al Masri (AAM) was reportedly killed "in the last couple of days" in Salah ad Din (SaD) Province in a US airstrike.

It would be little surprise to me if AAM was indeed in SaD, even if he was just passing through. Obviously this story is just dropping, but if true could bolster Maliki's attempts to hold onto the premiership.

More to follow in the coming days (hopefully) in regard to this breaking story.

Pseudo-Operations

2010-04-18T17:56:00.004-04:00

Maj Seth Wheeler penned an interesting study on "Pseudo-Operations" as an additional, plausible option for our Nation's CT strategy. You can read his full submission to the Small Wars Journal, here.

The bottom line, Maj Wheeler highlights several historical case studies where nations used Pseudo-Operations to affect Insurgent/Terror groups and offers these examples as a possible future means for America to conduct counter terror operations in non-permissive environments. I have believed for a long time that the United States needs a low visibility option that can degrade terrorist organizations' capabilities in areas where our Foreign Policy is not conducive to direct US involvement. This is one more facet needed in our CT/IW kit bag.

I think the CIA's involvement with Ahmed Shah Massoud during the late 90's is a great example of how a possible Pseudo-Operation could be implemented. To be clear, the US involvement with Massoud was not a Pseudo-Operation; however, the infrastructure used could be utilized as a model for Pseudo-Operations. The CIA would send small teams to bring Massoud money, equipment, and provide training, in the hopes that he would provide intel or even capture OBL. There was great concern on the CIA's part that money and aid used to target Bin Laden would not be consistent with American values, and give, not only, the United States, but also the CIA, the proverbial black eye. One method used to help maintain our morality was the use of written counseling statements, clearly stating what was and was not acceptable behavior. Maj Wheeler states that Pseudo-Operations can be successful with proper oversight. I believe this oversight comes in the form of written counseling that states, support is contingent on the Pseudo Organization's actions.

If there was a place to perfect this kind of operation, it is undoubtedly Somalia. Nothing has worked so far and Somalia is not on the brink of peace, so what do we have to loose? There are loyalty shifts between individuals in al Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, and the Islamic Courts Union. We would need to find a disenfranchised member of Hizbul Islam or the ICU, who wants to play a future role in a functioning Somali government. In effect, the goal would be to pit the three groups against each other (which is already happening to some extent) to degrade al Shabaab's capabilities enough to allow the Transitional Federal Government to succeed. The key to this particular Pseudo-Operation would be a clearly defined end state for the chosen group leader. If he plays by our rules, he will receive money and equipment, while working toward a position in the TFG. The Pseudo-Operation's fighters would also need some legitimate way out of conflict, a program like the "Sons of Iraq" could be the way to go. I think this situation and scenario provides us the least risk in attempting a Pseudo-Operation.

COIN: Art & Culture

2010-04-14T12:17:00.004-04:00

President Obama has proposed a 3.7% cut to the $161.3 million alloted for last year's funding for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). What does this have to do with the military and the state of warfare? Retired Brigadier General, Nolen Bivens, testified to Congress yesterday (Tuesday, 13 April, the day of President Thomas Jefferson's birth), saying to the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies; "Future conflicts should be approached with a better understanding of how a nation values its cultural heritage and its arts."

His statements come with a proposed 7.5% increase in funding, estimated at a total budget cost of $180 million, one supported by a large advocacy group, Americans for the Arts. Bivens' comments call for the "arts," however this is to be particularly defined, to be a vital component of diplomatic efforts both home (i.e. veterans) and abroad (i.e. insurgents). I focus my brief analysis here on the latter: How to win public sentiment in the "new anti-insurgency tactics the U.S. military has since adopted in Iraq and Afghanistan."

On 26 November, 2007, in a speech given at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated; “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufﬁcient to win - economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous militaryand police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.”

What Bivens is bringing to the table is the idea that fostering cultural arts amongst the local populace can serve as a tool in "impacting the lives of people, which in turn affects their attitudes and perceptions." For one, in thise sense, intelligence packets prepared by analysts can highlight art and culture within the context of situational awareness to aid the decision-making process: Win hearts and minds.

Understanding how a nation values its cultural heritage, though, rests on understanding how a local tribe values theirs. We know full well, as this one news report notes, that the Taliban are attempting to secure the same hearts and minds but in different ways (i.e. fear): The pillage of ancient Afghanistan art in the Kabul Museum also destructed the people's connection to, for example, religion and culture; that which fosters national unity. The most difficult task, as in any diplomatic operations, is to generate action on behalf of the people. Then-Director Omara Khan Massoudi recognized this as both a barrier and challenge. Our soliders have enough on their plates trying to secure Afghan jobs for the long-term let alone thinking about providing cultural avenues for enjoyment.

Is it on the U.S. Army's/Marine Corps' tool-belt to get Afghans to visit cultural sites such as this? Is it even within the purview of the military forces on the ground to engage in such diplomatic initiatives? The US Army/US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, in collaboration with Combined Arms Center, state in the report (provided in the link);
"COIN requires deep and detailed context- and culture-speciﬁc understanding of local and regional conditions. Success requires leaders who can effectively understand their environment and the impact of their actions on that environment. Consequently, COIN leaders must learn to be both critical thinkers and innovative problem solvers..."
The essential question is; "How can the U.S. forces act as a broker in the process?" Is it essential to the regional objectives for the Army/Marines to impact the environment through the arts?

The most obvious point of our initial assessment is that there is not a viable structure of military personnel to institute such an effort, and to remain focused on it while the insurgency adapts and morphs. Furthermore, shall we raise once more the question of how much responsibility we ought to place on our soldiers. This, perhaps, might be a profound discussion for another time, as dialogue now-a-days surrounds the emerging trends of "soft engagement."

In short, "soft" efforts led by the military may indeed not promise the best outcome. The promise of success and method by which we measure it may rest more in the hands of non-military partners. For example, between 2003 and 2005, "the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP). APEP offers emergency access to accelerated elementary education for out-of-school youth between ten and eighteen years of age, focusing on females. APEP supported Accelerated Learning (AL) programs for 170,000 over-age youth in more than 3,000 villages in Afghanistan." Funding "arts" campaigns to aid military and diplomatic goals, and U.S. interests abroad, which rest on the stablization of an economic-driven Afghanistan and ousting of Taliban strongholds within the region, is a new and innovative approach (yes); however, the need for organizational collaboration and coordination with partners (like UNESCO) who are specialists in cultural arts should be the cornerstone for this effort.

BG Bivens is hopeful when speaking about incorporating art-awareness, but it appears to me that its application to "new warfare" does not aid soliders' efforts to recognize threats to support decision-makers' response on the ground but aim to promote collective prosperity through individual and cultural expression. If anything, this is a ways down the road, as our troops have enough on their plate trying to promote individual/familial prosperity through the acquistion and procurement of jobs.

The task begins now, of course; I just think we ought to focus primarily on providing basic goods and services to the Afghan people - which is an ingredient for long-term success (per Gates). When we get to a certain point in the road, then the commanders may find it mission-critical to foster growth in this fashion. Again, questions concerning the role of "soft" tactics really needs to continue to be asked.

Shifting Focus to Kandahar

2010-04-09T10:20:00.001-04:00

As the US continues to build combat power as part of the Afghanistan surge, GEN McChrystal has already telegraphed his next major move - into the strategically vital Kandahar province. Recognizing the importance of Kandahar city (and its surrounding towns/villages), US forces are planning to focus several of the additional BCTs arriving in Afghanistan in the province. Additionally, McChrystal and ISAF are re-organizing the Regional Command (RC) structure in the South to split the existing RC-South into RC-SW (Helmand) and RC-SE (Kandahar). RC-SW will be led by a Marine 2-star and RC-SE will be led by British MG Nick Carter (the current RC-South commander). Beginning in 2011, a US commander will take over RC-SE and focus the command on conducting operations in Kandahar.

Just as in the recent operation to clear and secure Marjah in Helmand province, the US has developed a comprehensive plan to improve security, governance, essential services, rule of law, and economic growth in the area considered to be the birthplace of the Taliban. And, just as in Marjah, the most difficult objective will likely be to make improvements in governance amidst a highly complex political and tribal landscape [for more background on Kandahar, check out this excellent open-source primer from The Institute for the Study of War]. As Frank Ruggiero, the top US civilian official in Southern Afghanistan explained in a recent Wall Street Journal article, "Kandahar is a political problem...and the campaign in Kandahar will be led by governance." In addition to improving governance across the province's ten districts, it will also be critical to strengthen the rule of law, maintain the delicate tribal balance, and weaken several key power-brokers who wield more influence than the "official" government leaders.

Governance

ISAF forces definitely have their work cut out for them when it comes to improving governance in Kandahar (both at the provincial and the city level). As I've discussed in previous posts, the "official" Kandahar government is in competition with the Taliban's shadow governance structure, which is recognized by many locals as more effective and responsive than the provincial government led by Kandahar Provincial Governor Tooryalai Wesa. A childhood friend of President Hamid Karzai, Wesa is regarded by many as ineffective at best (and also has a reputation for corruption). As Ruggiero explains, "The specific objective is to make the Afghan government a more viable option for people to turn to...it's to show that the government has more relevance to their lives vis-à-vis the shadow governance of the Taliban."

Currently, the provincial government is essentially holed up in their offices in Kandahar City, unable to exert influence/control into most of the province's 17 districts. As explained in a recent NY Times article, there is much work to be done at the district level. One local explained that in Kandahar proper, “The Taliban can walk around, and government officials cannot.” Outside the city, it is worse. Government services barely exist. Only 5 of 17 districts in the province are accessible for government officials. Administrators and police chiefs are appointed to the districts, but they have so little backup and so few resources, they can do little. With 40 to 60 police officers in each district, they can barely guard the district center. Health services and education are virtually absent outside the towns, and two-thirds of the province’s schools are closed, human rights officials say.

Thus, one of the major objectives of the ISAF campaign in Kandahar will be bolstering the local district governments, making them more powerful and able to respond to the needs of their residents. Many have argued that the district level is where we truly need to focus our efforts, and I tend to agree. With ineffective and often corrupt provincial level leaders (who are usually close personal friends of Karzai), our best bet is to empower the district leaders to allow for true "community-level" governance.

Power Brokers - Karzai and Shirzai

The crux of the challenge lies in the need to limit the power of a small group of power brokers who have a death grip on the provincial budget and wield power based on their control of the provincial council, ties to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and a monopoly on lucrative security and reconstruction contracts. In essence, real power rests with just two families who have prospered under the presence of American forces in the past eight years. One of them is the family of President Hamid Karzai, who is represented here by his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who heads the provincial council. The other belongs to Gul Agha Shirzai, the former governor of Kandahar, and his brothers Bacha Shirzai and Razziq Shirzai, who have gotten lucrative security and construction deals with NATO forces. Residents and elders accuse the families of persecuting rivals and excluding all other tribes from access to power. Their domination has undercut any popular backing for the government or the foreign forces supporting them.

As the New York Times recently explained, “The first thing Afghans fear is the coming of more foreign troops, and the second thing they fear is the empowering of the current leadership and administration,” said Shahabuddin Akhunzada, a tribal elder from Kandahar city. His Eshaqzai tribe has complained of repeated arrests and political exclusion. The West’s acceptance of Mr. Karzai’s re-election despite widespread fraud was the last straw, he said.

Much attention has been centered lately on the murky past of Ahmed Wali Karzai, in particular his potential links to the illegal opium trade and involvement with the Kandahar Strike Force, a paramilitary element allegedly run by the CIA. In a recent NY Times article, Dexter Filkins discusses the controversial decision of ISAF and US leaders to allow Ahmed Karzai to remain in power in Kandahar despite his alleged ties to the drug trade and potentially to Taliban figures in the region. I tend to agree with several ISAF/NATO officials who argued for Ahmed Karzai's removal (much as Bing West has recently argued for Hamid Karzai's removal). The problem, though, is who (or what) do we replace him with?

I think David Ignatius was onto something with his recent Washington Post op-ed when he discussed "re-balancing" the Kandahar power elite. My proposed strategy to do this would draw on the concepts of sub-national/community-level governance advocated by COL Chris Kolenda and call for the empowerment of district level leaders (whether tribal or other) who could better represent the interests of their people and offer some competition for the Wesa-Karzai-Shirzai factions who control most of the provinces resources right now. Although risky, if ISAF elements are able to find, vet, and empower solid leaders at the district level and funnel resources and money directly to them, it could eventually create some competition for the Kandahar provincial leaders and also eliminate some of the feelings of disenfranchisement that many locals feel right now.

We will continue to see this debate play out in the coming months as ISAF/US forces continue shaping operations around Kandahar and begin the clear/hold phase of the operation. Ultimately, though, there will be no enduring success in Kandahar (or Afghanistan at all) until we're able to establish an effective and legitimate alternative to the Taliban's shadow government.

Warrant Based Targeting: The Iraq Model

2010-04-03T10:29:00.004-04:00

A USF-I press release recently informed the public of a successful round of targeting conducted in Northern Iraq. I want to analyze the overall targeting picture from the beginning of 2010 to the latest press release.

At the onset of the new year (January 2009), units deployed in Iraq could no longer capture and detain insurgents without a signed warrant from an Iraqi judge. The transition was a painful but necessary process. Collectively, we put our heads together to develop ways to prolong our pressure on the terror network under this new system. Prior to Jan 2009, if we had actionable intelligence on any insurgent, we simply put together a plan and executed it. The exploitation from the detained individual would usually lead us to our next operation. This targeting model became unsustainable post Jan. 2009.

Since the beginning of 2010, there have been three major rounds of successful targeting: January 5, 2010 A joint operation resulted in the death of the Wali of Northern Iraq, Abu Na'im al Afri, and the detention of the Admin Emir, a high level Sharia Emir, and the Detainee Affairs Emir. A roll up of the entire operation resulted in 2 AQI killed and 21 detained.

January 28, 2010 A joint raid led to the death of Abu Khalaf, AQI most senior foreign fighter facilitator. Abu Khalaf was historically based in Syria; however, the successful round of targeting from Jan. 5th probably forced Abu Khalaf to assume a more active leadership role within Iraq. This operation was not as large as the Jan 5 operation, but the death of Abu Khalaf was a major blow to AQI.

There are some interesting trends that we can gleam from these reports:

1) I think the warrant based targeting model forced us to slow down our targeting cycle. Prior to Jan 2009, we don't see many solitary operations that resulted in the same success as the Jan 5th 2010 and March 2010 operations. The prior targeting model was simple, once you have enough intel you launch your assault force. I think we are now more deliberate and wait to develop a more holistic network picture, with solid warrant packets. The Jan 5th joint raid is most likely the current targeting TTP used in Iraq. I think the March raids were similar in the fact that there was probably solid warrant packets on Abu Huda and Abu Marwa prior to the operation launched to kill/capture the Wali of Northern Iraq. The previous comment is pure speculation on my part, it is possible that the exploitation of Shaykh Khalid provided key information that built a warrant packet complete enough to launch follow on operations. The reason I believe the intel picture was complete prior to Shaykh Khalid's death is; 24 hours between Abu Marwa and Abu Huda is not a lot of time to put a packet together and get it blessed off by an Iraqi judge. Also when targeting, the small fish usually lead you to the big fish, not the other way around. I think the new targeting model could be summarized as, understand the complete terror network and develop one large operation or multiple quick succession follow on operations casting a broad net over the entire network.

2) As our unit was leaving Mosul in 2009, there seemed to be a rising influence on the AQI leadership billets from the al-Afri (Tal Afar) tribal name. I was not surprised to read, on Jan 5th, that the Wali of Northern Iraq was held by someone who's name was Abu Na'im al Afri. As we see from the March 2010 rounds of targeting, the top two AQI positions were held by members of the Jabouri tribe. This is just a guess, but it looks like the al Afri tribe's influence on the AQI leadership is wanning.

3) The detention of the oil extortion emir was probably a major blow to the psyche of the AQI leadership, since the emir was a Legacy AQI member who fought the good fight down in al Anbar province. AQI is extremely good at replacing their killed/captured leadership; however, when key positions such as the Northern Wali have a high turn over rate, or legacy members are captured, it tends to have a deeper effect on the remaining leaders. Sometimes infighting will occur because it may look like there is a mole within their ranks.

The deaths of the Northern Wali within 90 days of each other is a major victory for the lethal targeting side of the house. Leadership positions above the Northern Wali are largely ceremonial. The Northern Wali is the highest leadership position that actually directs terror operations throughout Iraq. I believe Abu Khalaf either assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Northern Wali or was next in line at the time of his death. It is possible that the highest operational leadership position in Iraq has already turned four times this year. Successful pressure on this position will most likely provide the GOI the breathing room they need to continue to grow. Look for another large round of targeting to take place prior to July 1.

A Good Offense is a Good Defense: We Need a Counter Narrative Conference

2010-04-01T09:37:00.008-04:00

Wow, I have not been posting! Actually, I think what is to follow cannot even be considered a full post, but more of a thought.

As I shared on Twitter, we need a conference to discuss a viable Counter Narrative, one that involves professionals of varying but interconnecting education and experience; military, academic, intelligence community, law enforcement, public affairs, media relations, investigative journalists, health practitioners, economists, security administration, international business specialists.

The American-born quantum physicist, David Bohm, who worked closely with Albert Einstein (I encourage you to please put aside his Communist tendencies and focus solely on his professional brilliance), stated in his major work entitled, Thought as a System (London, 2000, 2002); "...thought actively participates in forming our perceptions, our sense of meaning and our daily actions." The conference, I propose, can focus predominantly on formulating a "system of thought" that shapes perceptions of AQCL/affiliates. Further, our particular focus can set-forth a process of implementation characterized by an interconnected construction of actions: We must utilize all of the resources we have to support a single system of thought.

This is the catch, and that which certainly needs to be debated in a forum-style conference: The difficult task is agreeing on the meaning of who we are collectively and what we ought to do and how in reflection of our shared values/traditions. The projection of our values, of course, must comprehensively counter that of AQ/affiliates. In this sense, a good offense is a good defense, but the important aspect of the narrative is that we in fact go on the offense in terms of our religious/cultural, political, and socio-economic beliefs and practices.

For example, one panel discussion ought to highlight the perspectives already brought to the table by Malcolm Nance (An End to Al Qaeda), James Roberts (Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency), and both Sebastian Gorka (Countering the Enemy Narrative) and Katherine Gorka (The Language of Jihad). In many ways, each differs on how we first approach the formation of a counter narrative and then implement the strategy horizontally.

This dialogue will highlight also the importance of an overarching COIN strategy, that which reaches the population directly. So, the perspective of a prominent leader, such as Hwang Jang-Yop, a North Korea defector and current South Korea resident, on the use of an effective ideological warfare (i.e. use language of human rights along with market and diplomatic pressures) can compliment combined arms TTP's to be technically and tactically proficient.

Overall, I am speaking here primarily from a philosophical standpoint in advocating a strategic-systems approach to dismantling and disrupting AQ/affiliates. As Starbuck and I agreed this morning, "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics." See, I told you this was more of a thought than a post. In due fashion, please share your insights, perhaps on an effective counter narrative, news on upcoming events, and/or logistical planning for an upcoming conference!

Fixing Intel: Implementing MG Flynn's SOICs

2010-03-29T11:30:00.001-04:00

Now that several months have passed since MG Flynn published his "Fixing Intel" report, I thought it might be an opportune time to examine how his concepts/ideas are being implemented on the ground in Afghanistan.

One of the key components of MG Flynn's proposed strategy to improve intelligence support to full-spectrum counterinsurgency (COIN) operations was the creation of several Stability Operations Information Centers (SOIC) at the RC level - whose mission would be to write and maintain "meaty, comprehensive descriptions of pivotal districts throughout the country" and organize/share/disseminate all of the information and intelligence gathered in the field across various units, agencies, and partners. Essentially, MG Flynn's intent for the SOICs was to serve as a one-stop shops for a particular district/province, providing assessments that fuse a wide array of lethal and non-lethal intelligence data.

While it's easy to agree with MG Flynn on the need for improved fusion, analysis, and dissemination of lethal and non-lethal intelligence, it's much more difficult to actually operationalize his directive in the complex operational environment (OE) in Afghanistan. A recent report written by the RC-West SOIC Director provides an excellent summary of their efforts to stand up one of these SOICs in Western Afghanistan.
Stability Operations Information Center - 09 Mar 2010

The report, aptly entitled "Comprehensive Understanding for Comprehensive Operations," begins with an excellent explanation of the criticality of information management. Explaining the importance of giving the commander a "timely and comprehensive flow of relevant information," the article explains that this feedback can (and will) come in many forms - including academic assessments, KLEs, surveys, source operations, or tribal engagements. The author bluntly explains the existing lack of processes and organizations to capture, fuse, and assess this information, thus highlighting the need to change the way we do business.

One of the most informative and eye-opening sections of the piece is Part III (Why change is needed), which traces the evolutionary steps that we as a military have taken to improve our intelligence processes and systems in COIN operations. This really hit home for me, perfectly capturing the different "stages" that we went through before grasping the importance of understanding all of the dimensions of the complex and adaptive operational environments in COIN - fusing "hard" and "soft" power disciplines. The author's description of Step 2 is spot on and probably accurately reflects where most conventional forces are still at - emphasizing the importance of the "meat eaters" (S2/S3) over the "leaf eaters" (CA/PSYOP/HTT). In the spirit of being brutally self-critical, my unit probably spent the majority of our last deployment to Mosul (from 2007-09) in Step 2. Although we understood the importance of fusing lethal and non-lethal, we never truly institutionalized the process - at least at the BN level. Which brings up another interesting point: although the SOICs are focused at the RC level (DIV), the imperative to synch the meat eaters and leaf eaters extends all the way down to the company-level. Therefore, units at all echelons must develop processes and systems to do so, relying on the SOICs as the initial point of entry and "clearinghouse" for all data.

Another critical section of the paper that merits further consideration and debate is the explanation of the "Population-Centric COIN Targeting Cycle" - UD3A. As you can see in the graphic below, this cycle is a modified version of the widely-used F3EAD lethal targeting cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate).

In contrast to the F3EAD methodology, which is designed primarily for lethal targeting, the UD3A is more comprehensive and aims to more effectively synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic effects - something that we have traditionally done poorly in the past. The most important (and often the most difficult) step of the process is "Understand." This is also the step which the SOICs are designed to facilitate, fusing and analyzing large volumes of data to provide improved situational understanding for the commander or decision-maker. As you can see in the graphic, the "Understand" step includes a full Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE) cycle with an emphasis on understanding the aspects of PMESII and ASCOPE (various non-lethal factors).

Once the commander has a rich contextual understanding of the operational environment, he/she can make an informed decision (in the "Decide" step) about which targeting methodology to utilize and develop a comprehensive collection plan to fill any intelligence gaps (in the "Detect" step). Once the established trigger has been met, the commander then determines the desired effect and the best option to "Deliver" that effect, whether that be a lethal operation (raid, cordon/search, etc.) or a non-lethal operation (key leader engagement, shura, etc.). This is where we see the true power of the UD3A methodology - flexibility. Armed with a deep appreciation and understanding of the situation, refined through focused intelligence collection and analysis, the commander is empowered to deliver tailored effects in order to impact his/her operational environment. Transitioning seamlessly to the "Assess" step, the commander (and staff) then digest the new information learned and use it to further refine their understanding, feeding the next targeting cycle in a continuous loop.

When used effectively to synchronize and focus all operations (both lethal and non-lethal) in a particular OE, this process is extremely powerful. Although this is the first time I've seen the steps laid out and detailed, I'm sure there are units (at multiple different echelons) out there already using it. As always, I'd be very interested in hearing feedback/ideas from those who have used this methodology. In particular, I'm interested in hearing how tactical units at the BCT and below level have operationalized this process (or another similar process) to fuse their lethal and non-lethal targeting efforts. As we continue to conduct COIN operations, this will remain a critical component of maximizing our effectiveness.

Finally, I would love to hear any feedback (positive or negative) from those in the field who have worked at or with the various SOICs that are being stood up. How have the SOICs tied in with the existing fusion cells across theater? How are the SOICs (which sit at RC/Division level) interfacing with BCTs and BNs? How are we integrating partner and local security forces and overcoming classification issues?

New Taliban Deputy: Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir

2010-03-23T11:45:00.000-04:00

As I predicted last month, it appears that Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir (aka Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul) has been appointed as the Taliban's Deputy Commander. He will replace Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a highly influential leader and close associate of Mullah Omar who was reportedly involved in high-level reconciliation talks with Afghan leaders (some analysts hypothesize this is why he was arrested).

Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai report on their Declassified blog (at Newsweek) that Mullah Omar recently announced the promotion of Abdul Qayim Zakir and Akhtar Mohammed Mansoor as his deputies, according to a reliable source who is a senior Taliban operator. As the Newsweek article mentions, it appears that Zakir is a popular choice among Taliban leadership and members:

"The choice of Zakir, who was released from Guantánamo in late 2007, and who returned to join the Taliban in the field about one year later after being freed by Afghan authorities, is popular with Taliban commanders. Several Taliban commanders have told Newsweek that they wrote letters to Mullah Omar in support of Zakir as the logical replacement for Baradar soon after his deputy's arrest. The commanders favor Zakir because, unlike Baradar—who never set foot in Afghanistan since the Taliban's collapse in late 2001—he frequently visits insurgent units in the field, giving them advice and listening to their complaints. For more than a year, Zakir, who is in his mid-30s, has largely been in charge of insurgent operations in the south of Afghanistan."

It appears initially that the capture of Baradar could in fact result in more harm than good, at least over the next 6-9 months. Although his removal from the critical Deputy position disrupted Taliban command and control and planning, the Taliban was clearly able to appoint a replacement relatively quickly who is highly respected, experienced, and less willing to consider reconciliation than Baradar reportedly was.

On a related note, the announcement of dual deputies is quite interesting and may offer possible opportunities to drive a wedge between the senior Taliban leadership. Clearly, the recent capture of several top Taliban leaders has disrupted the internal leadership structure and might have caused paranoia and infighting that we could exploit. We need to continue to develop a better understanding of the current structure and relationships within the Taliban's Inner Shura in order to identify potential weaknesses and select the best individuals to target, both kinetically and non-kinetically.

For more background on Mullah Abdul Qayim Zakir, check out my previous post here.

Is It the Tribes? Someone Just Tell Me Already.

2010-03-17T12:27:00.001-04:00

Another interesting article pertaining to the relative strength of Afghan tribes is up at SWJ titled, “The Tea Fallacy”. The author, Michael Miklaucic highlights a couple of points that definitely have some validity.

1. Locals know sooner or later we're leaving Afghanistan. That has to weigh heavily on a person sitting on the proverbial fence. Looking back at historic references, it would be interesting to determine what counterinsurgent nation political entities were telling their constituencies. Were they telling their populace the same thing Americans are being told, out in 2 years? Did the folks at home during the many COIN conflicts over the last two centuries even care or truly understand (by and large) what was going on? Would it have been different if communications and media were the same as they are now?

2. First impressions. I'm not 100% on this one, but I think it bears mention. Are we already too far into this to truly change the average Afghan’s opinion?

3. Do the tribes really matter? According to Mr. Miklaucic and LCol JJ Malevich they're overrated. According to MAJ Jim Gant, they're imperative. I'm yet to experience an Afghanistan deployment, and AfPak is not my primary research/reading region, so I’d enjoy comments from those more enlightened than I. Instinct tells me that MAJ Gant is a lot closer to “right” than the other two, but my instincts have failed me once or twice in Vegas before as well.

Comments, as always, are welcome and encouraged.

Terrorists Dream of the Islamic State: Geostrategic Ideology of AQIM

2010-03-13T09:00:00.013-05:00

*Before you read this, I encourage you to brief the first section of this series discussing the emerging "forking strategy" of terrorists in the region; how they move, plan, and organize. Here, I focus particularly on the heightened operational tactics of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to strenghten my analysis on the connecting ideological strands of AQCL affiliates, Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement (ASMM) and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Introduction: AQIM Ideology

I first promised to publish this second part only days after the initial post, but found the research I was conducting to be so facinating while attempting to, at least to some degree, put the pieces together that I continued to read more deeply. Today is an opportune time to finally share some of my thoughts and analysis: Yesterday AQIM, reported by Evan Kohlmann at IntelTweet, released their Spanish hostage, Althea Gamit whose kidnapping was confirmed in an official statement made by Andalusia Institute for Media Production in 2009.

AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, whose operations focus on Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Nigeria, has seemingly showcased their heightened operational methods, at least concerning this recent kidnapping case. Previously, captured tourists have been used for ransom - perhaps to drive their drug trafficking. Further evidence: "GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. The ransom paid for their release is unknown but estimated to be from $5 million to as much as $10 million; the group may have used these funds to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment."

In contrast, Gamit's release is ideologically based, not logistically-centered in criminal/terrorist respects: Gamit was forced to convert to Islam as a fulfillment of their "agreed" terms.

Ideology --> Tactics

But I will be wrong, I think, to not connect the ideologically-driven method to the logistical goal: The terrorist group is positioning it's prowess in the region to support what they believe is the necessary return to the Islamic State, dar al-Islam, the pure reign of the Prophet Mohammad. In this way, the mandate to follow and obey religious governance dictates cultural practices and customs as well as fosters the growth of avenues for economic prosperity and political influence (which, AQIM continues to prove, will be pursued and gained vis-a-vis violence).

Such activity is clearly evident of an offensive jihad campaign, and perhaps one can argue a strategy including offensive daw'a. The actions spotlight a sense of mission itself that is thought to be the anecdote to the conventional Western pursuit of progress, which is thought be rooted in injustice, oppression, self-interest, exploitation, and usurpation: The leaders are driven by the burning desire that returning to the Islamic State is arriving. Islam, to AQIM and other affiliates like ASMM that I covered in Part I, is the answer, and all means of offensive tactics - mostly violence - will be used to pave their arrival to supremacy.

I will discuss in more depth in one of my follow-up posts an historical analysis of the four Caliphs (Caliphate) in order to provide further perspective on how AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP may understand themselves in relation to the Prophet. For now, in short, let me name the offensive procedure by which such terrorist groups, especially AQIM as witnessed by their "release" of Gamit, will continue to structure jihad to ensure a returning to economic, political, and religious purity. During the expansion of the Caliphates, Islam was spread in part through military conquests that rested on three ("just") principles when engaging the non-believer:

Offering to surrender and convert to Islam, as it means to surrender to the will of Allah;
If not, then opposing party(ies) pay tax, jizya, and in return granted dhimma (protection) by Muslim rulers for recognizing Islam's superiority;
Lastly, if not still, then party(ies) defeated by offensive force as result of choice not to comply; thus subjecting all persons to death or rule (if survived) and institution of the holistic governing framework .

AQIM and AQCL affiliates, in general, do not follow this procedure in a lock-step process. In fact, they quickly skip to the end. Gamit's situation is uncommon, but important to understand in the larger AQ movement as I will elaborate below. Before I present methods of expansion, please bear with me on two important points concerning the above procedure:

a) There is need to recognize the argument deconstructing the historical meaning of such principles, highlighting that a non-believer, in traditional terms, means only one who believes in no Deity; whereas, Christian and Jew are "brothers" in the monotheistic faith, known as Ahl al-dhimma. The traditional term used here, brother, is not equal to the meaning of the word, akh, akhoya. Cesari's argument, which I described in short in Part I of this series, is important here in explaining AQIM's (and ASMM, AQAP) ideologically-driven tactics because of the tension between terrorism and modernity - the struggle between "returning" and progressing.

b) I always argue, and try to consistently make it clear, that AQCL and AQ affiliates define meaning based on their own narrow interpretation of Islam; therefore, it is understandable that they target all who fall outside of this narrow framework. Non-believer, in this sense, is not similar in meaning to an historical and theological understanding embraced by true, peaceful Muslims. (This may seem a vague explanation, but it rests on takfir: It is my small attempt to define AQ as outside Islam, and this could help Roberts' argument that AQ is an "outsurgency").

Tactics --> Environment(s)

Accordingly, not only groups like Christians and Jews fall outside of their framework as non-believers, but so too Muslims and others alike. So, the operational environment is not entirely defined by geographic latitudes and longitudes but by an ideological vision. Captain Russell J. Isaacs informs us in his work, The North African Franchise: AQIM’s Threat to U.S. Security - Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 (December 2009) - that the historical development of AQIM is a security threat to US facilities and personnel in Europe, Iraq, and Afghanistan as well as to Europe itself (I provide excerpts here):

Today, AQIM operates a widespread and coordinated structure across Europe. While the majority of their attacks and operations occur inside Algeria, AQIM maintains a widespread network of financial support and direct action cells outside the country. Terrorism analysts estimate that several dozen cells exist across Europe, primarily in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom.
A major task of AQIM cells in Europe is the financial support of the group’s operations worldwide. AQIM’s primary means of finance are car theft, credit card fraud, document forgery and the active seeking of donations. AQIM is extremely successful collecting donations in Europe...
Another focus of AQIM cells in Europe is recruiting Algerian immigrants to fight. French authorities assert that several AQIM cells within France are actively recruiting volunteers for...jihad. Moreover, Spanish media outlets reported in April 2007 that AQIM supporters were collecting funds and recruiting volunteers for terrorist training in the mountains of Algeria. A final focus of AQIM in Europe is the planning and execution of attacks against European targets. AQIM does not hide its intention to carry out attacks against European targets. In February 2005, for example, Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri urged AQIM to be a “bone in the throat of American and French crusaders.

The vision is tied, I think, to OBL's messages (regardless of his actual involvement and/or approval; he mostly issues statements to maintain his own image as the Serpent Head), but more importantly to, for example, Saed Elshari, AQ's number two in the Arabian Peninsula;

"I swear to God, we will open up for them doors of hell on the ground, which will be the key to our victory, where we will cut the tails of the crusaders; destroy the dreams of crusade and ruin the desires of the Jews in the region."

Also, we can consider Gadahn's latest message, which seeks to recruit American-Muslims to act as Hasan did against Western "crusaders;"

"We must erode our cowardly enemy’s will to fight by killing and capturing leading Crusaders and Zionists in government, industry and media who talk the talk but don’t walk the walk and are only interested in prosecuting their profitable wars as long as it’s other people who are in the line of fire and not them...And finally, we mustn’t allow our lawless enemies to provoke us with their evil, sadistic and murderous crimes into crossing the boundaries laid down by Allah and His Prophet or doing anything which may have negative repercussions on the image of the Jihad and reputation of the Mujahideen."

The connection highlights that the regional tactics of AQIM may differ, in degree and manner, to AQAP and ASMM, but the vision is interwoven; it is a singular ideology that is global although environmentally dispersed. We may have cause to apply a rule to AQ regional operations: As I have stated, ideology --> tactics --> environment(s). But this still leaves the odd situation of Gamit: Why did they force him to convert? All AQCL affiliates focus predominantly on violent campaigns which they consider to be defensive, but AQAP and ASMM have not used convergence tactics before (to my knowledge). It is documented as early as 2002 that AQCL under OBL has, having stated in, A Letter to the American People:

(1) The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam.

(a) The religion of the Unification of God; of freedom from associating partners with Him, and rejection of this; of complete love of Him, the Exalted; of complete submission to His Laws; and of the discarding of all the opinions, orders, theories and religions which contradict with the religion He sent down to His Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Islam is the religion of all the prophets, and makes no distinction between them - peace be upon them all.

It is to this religion that we call you; the seal of all the previous religions. It is the religion of Unification of God, sincerity, the best of manners, righteousness, mercy, honour, purity, and piety. It is the religion of showing kindness to others, establishing justice between them, granting them their rights, and defending the oppressed and the persecuted. It is the religion of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil with the hand, tongue and heart. It is the religion of Jihad in the way of Allah so that Allah's Word and religion reign Supreme. And it is the religion of unity and agreement on the obedience to Allah, and total equality between all people, without regarding their colour, sex, or language.

(b) It is the religion whose book - the Quran - will remained preserved and unchanged, after the other Divine books and messages have been changed. The Quran is the miracle until the Day of Judgment. Allah has challenged anyone to bring a book like the Quran or even ten verses like it."

It is obvious this "offering" came after September 11, 2001. So, once again, the lock-step process was not followed but still serves as a framework for justification.

Counter Operations

In short, the US and its allies, I think, do not yet have a comprehensive counter narrative that seeks to erase AQ legitimacy in terms of ideology. Gamit's conversion to Islam, which I would hold is not actually a conversion to Islam but only a recognition of AQIM's narrow definition and interpretation of the meaning of their version in alignment with AQCL's version, provides another opportune time for the US to define and articulate in a clear, concise, and consistent way a counter-narrative that targets AQIM, ASMM, and AQAP leaders. Such an employed tactic, Information Operations, would aid both foreign diplomacy that deeply and rightly involves legitimate Muslim nations and actionable intelligence missions to dismantle AQ logistical tactics in expanding AQ operational environments.

I propose here, as I have promoted before, a targeting strategy focusing on middle-tier personalities: They provide not only training but ingrain identity of both individual persons and collective groups in alignment with ideology throughout an entity. I think HUMINT can be done throughout Europe, but we can follow the money trailing their drug trafficking and financing avenues.

Please share your insights, as we all need to work together to procure our freedoms home and abroad and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ.

Governance in Marjah

2010-03-12T14:00:00.000-05:00

As the Afghan flag was raised over Marjah at the end of February and President Karzai made his second trip to the town on March 7, it was clear that the hardest part of the campaign to make enduring improvements in the key southern town remains. During Karzai's recent visit, it was clear that the main issue on the minds of most locals was likely: How will this operation really change anything and make my life better in the long run?

Already, there are early indications of a return to the way things were before. As I discussed in my previous post, there are three main challenges that lie ahead: 1) Providing enduring security with ANSF (ANA and ANP forces) that are viewed as legitmate and competent by locals; 2) Providing an alternate source of income in the wake of large-scale poppy eradication efforts; 3) and 3) Providing improved local governance and the district and sub-district level.

In my mind, the most important (and most daunting) of these challenges is the governance piece. A recent must-read article by Radio Free Europe provides the best open-source analysis I've read to date of the governance challenges we face in Marjah. The article gives an excellent quote from Azizullah Khan, a prominent local elder in Marjah, who sharply questioned/criticized Karzai during his last visit. Azizullah explained the current dilemma that the people of Marjah face:

"For the past eight years the warlords have been ruling us. Their hands have been stained with the blood of innocents and they have killed hundreds of people. Even now they are being imposed on the people in the name of tribal and regional leaders. People are afraid to convey the real feelings of locals because they sense themselves to be in danger from all sides."

Khan pleaded for the government to ensure security, remove any military presence from schools and private homes, compensate locals for losses resulting from the recent fighting, and help rebuild schools, clinics, and irrigation canals. His most impassioned and telling appeal, however, was for Karzai to avoid repeating a past mistake: Do not hand over control of local affairs to former militia commanders or other "people with influence."

This last statement was clearly a reference to the current battle over influence/control of the Marjah district governor position. As I discussed last week, two individuals (both backed by different elements at the national level) are currently vying for control - Abdul Zahir (the "official" civilian leader that was appointed by the Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal) and Abdul Rahman Jan (the former police chief/local warlord who is recognized by many as the most powerful "strongman" in the area). During the last few weeks, Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) has formed a 50-man "Marjah Executive Committee" in a clear move to re-consolidate the power he previously had (until he lost control to the Taliban over the last 2-3 years). During the time that he held sway, he was known as brutal, corrupt, and mostly ineffective. Yet, in the wake of Operation Moshtarak he's making another bid to capitalize on the power vacuum left behind after the Taliban were pushed out. Abdul Zahir, appointed by Provincial Governor Mangal (recognized by ISAF leaders as quite an effective leader) is also mounting a campaign to gain influence. It will be very difficult given perceptions among the local populace that Abdul Zabir is an outsider.

During the weeks to come, it will be crucial to monitor this tenuous situation. ISAF leadership must work to further legitimize Abdul Zahir, who is definitely the "least worst" option for the crucial post of Marjah district governor. Additionally, as we look forward to planning and preparations for possible large-scale operations in/around Kandahar, we must consider how we'll fight a similar battle there to install a leader who is viewed as more legitimate than the current de facto team of powerbrokers (Ahmed Wali Karzai - the President's brother and head of Kandahar provincial council, Gul Agha Shirzai - former Kandahar provincial governor, and Muhammad Arif Noorzai).