tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4549570844246420522.post3613078933680481453..comments2024-01-28T09:52:33.515-05:00Comments on al Sahwa: The Debate Continues...Pat Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13937507399915070637noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4549570844246420522.post-31635171312830190982009-11-02T16:00:53.199-05:002009-11-02T16:00:53.199-05:00To quote from Chandrasekaran’s article, "Nawa...To quote from Chandrasekaran’s article, "Nawa is blessed with stable social dynamics" and "contains some of Afghanistan's most fertile land." These factors, in addition to 1/5's presence helped turn Nawa into a recovering area with a chance of normalcy in the future. Increased troop levels alone didn't cause this turnabout, which is what Boot's article is suggesting.<br /><br />During the lead up to the Iraq War, I believed we were taking the wrong lessons from Afghanistan (small troop levels, precision strikes, quick reliance on local troops) and applying them to Iraq. Now I fear we are doing the same, but from Iraq (increased troop levels) to Afghanistan. Post hoc ergo propter hoc is both a logical fallacy and no way to run a strategic review.<br /><br />ERAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com